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The mandate for this study goes back to the call by the EU Ministers of Finance at their informal meeting
of 26 September 1998 in Vienna for a comprehensive study on company taxation in the European
Community. At that meeting, among other things, the Ministers discussed the Code of Conduct for
business taxation and some suggested that further measures in the field of company taxation might be
necessary in the future and asked the Commission to examine this question. The ECOFIN Council of 1
December 1998 in Vienna, in approving the first progress report of the Code of Conduct group, formally
agreed to ask the Commission for this study on company taxation in the European Community.
Moreover, it asked the Permanent Representatives Committee to define the concrete terms of the
mandate for the study and requested the Taxation Policy Group to be consulted thereon. The European
Council in Vienna on 11 and 12 December 1998 explicitly confirmed this agreement of the ECOFIN
Council.
After preparatory discussions in the Taxation Policy Group and in the Council Financial Questions
Group of 14 June 1999 and 24 June 1999, the Permanent Representatives Committee agreed on 22 July
1999 the official mandate to the Commission for a study on company taxation in the European
Community.
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In preparing the study, the Commission has been assisted by two specifically created panels of experts.
The task of the first panel was to advise the Commission services on the choice of methodology for the
evaluation of the effective tax rates in Member States as well as the interpretation of the qualitative and
quantitative results of the analysis. The task of the second panel was to advise the Commission services
on the remaining company tax obstacles to the proper functioning of the Single Market and to analyse
these taxation obstacles from the point of view of the European business community and social partners.
The first panel was composed of academics and experts who have previously been involved in
theoretical and empirical work related to the evaluation of effective level of company taxation. They
were chosen on the grounds of their outstanding reputation and proven ability in this area. The members
of panel I were
Prof. Krister Andersson (Swedish Institute for Economic Research)
Prof. Jacques Le Cacheux (Université de Pau and OFCE)
Prof. Michael Devereux (Warwick University)
Prof. Silvia Giannini (Università degli Studi di Bologna)
Dr. Christoph Spengel (Universität Mannheim)
Maître Jean Marc Tirard
Prof. Frans Vanistendael (Universiteit Leuven)
The secretariat of the panel was ensured by Carola Maggiulli (European Commission).4
The second panel was composed of experts from among the business community and social partners at
the Community level. The Commission services contacted a variety of leading business associations,
trade unions and accountancy associations and invited them to designate a member of the panel. The
members of panel II were:
Dr. Carlo-H. Borggreve and Roland Walter for CEEP (European Centre of Enterprises with Public
Participation)
Prof. Bruno Gangemi for CFE (Conféderation Fiscale Européenne)
Dr. Piergiorgio Valente for EFFEI (European Federation of Financial Executives Institutes)
RA Alfons Kühn for Eurochambres (Association of European Chambers of Commerce and Industry);
as from April 2000 Eurochambres was represented by Dr. Harald Hendel
Wilfried Rometsch for Eurocommerce
Philip Gillett for ERT (European Round Table of Industrialists)
Prof. Sven-Olof Lodin for IFA (International Fiscal Association)
Prof. Sylvain Plasschaert for TEPSA (Trans European Policy Study Association)
Dr. Fidelis Bauer for UEAPME (European Association of Craft, Small- and Medium-Sized
Enterprises); as from May 2000 UEAPME was represented by Dr. Peter Zacherl
Jos W. B. Westerburgen for UNICE (Union of Industrial and Employer’s Confederations of Europe)
Christophe Quintard and Marina Ricciardelli for ETUC (European Trade Union Confederation)
Madeleine Lindblad Woodward from the Fédération des Experts Compatbles Européens took part in one
meeting of the panel. The secretariat of the panel was ensured by Dr. Rolf Diemer (European
Commission).
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Both panels operated under the Chair of the Commission (Michel Aujean).
Panel I met five times (in July and October 1999; in February and May 2000).
Panel II met nine times (in July and September 1999; in January, February, March, April, May, June and
July 2000).
Two joint meetings took place (September 2000 and January 2001).
The calculations for the determination of the effective levels of taxation were contracted out to the
Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS – London), the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW –
Mannheim) and the University of Mannheim. Thus, two external studies have been produced which are
available on request.5
$FNQRZOHGJHPHQWV
The Commission is indebted to the members of the two panels and their very helpful oral and written
contributions.
The Commission is very grateful to Dr. Joann Martens Weiner (former economist, Office of Tax Policy,
U.S. Department of the Treasury) and John Neighbour (OECD secretariat) who made very valuable
presentations to panel II.
The Commission also wishes to acknowledge the very helpful submissions by the )pGpUDWLRQ GHV
([SHUWV&RPSWDEOHV(XURSpHQV.
In accordance with the mandate, the Commission services bear the sole responsibility for the study and
its contents. Therefore, the present report does not necessarily represent the views of all or individual
members of the panels of experts.&203$1<7$;$7,21,17+(,17(51$/0$5.(7
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(1)  The conclusions of the ECOFIN Council in December 1998 requested the Commission to carry out
an analytical study on company taxation in the European Union. This study should illuminate
differences in the effective level of corporate taxation and identify the main tax provisions that may
hamper cross-border economic activity in the Single Market. On this basis an assessment should be
undertaken of the effects on the location of economic activity and investments. In July 1999 the
Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER) refined this request into a formal mandate for
the Commission asking for a factual analysis and a policy assessment with a view to EU company
taxation.
(2)  The Commission has been assisted by two specifically created panels of experts one focussing on
the method for calculating the effective tax rates in Member States and the other on the remaining
tax obstacles to the proper functioning of the Single market. The first panel was composed of
academics with appropriate experience and scientific reputation in relevant theoretical works. The
second panel included experts from among the business community and social partners at the
Community level. The individual members of the second panel were designated by the respective
organisations.
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(3)  This study takes the report of the Committee of Independent experts on Company Taxation into
account that was asked by the Commission in 1990 to determine whether differences in business
taxation and the burden of business taxes among Member States lead to major distortions affecting
the functioning of the Single Market and to examine all possible remedial measures (Ruding
Committee). The underlying analysis of this earlier study is mostly still topical. In this context it
has to be noted that little progress has been achieved in the field of company taxation as a result of
its findings and recommendations. However, the context for studying company taxation in the EU
has since then changed in various ways. Moreover, the mandate given to the Commission by the
Council for the present study is broader than that given by the Commission to the expert committee
in 1990 as it explicitly requests the analysis of tax obstacles in the Internal Market.
(4)  The overall economic framework has changed significantly since the early nineties. An
unprecedented wave of international mergers and acquisitions, the emergence of electronic
commerce and the increased mobility of factors with the growing development of "tax havens" all
change the scenery under which European Member States levy taxes on company profits. These
general global developments are still on-going and are particularly strong within the Internal
Market.
(5)  Most significantly, the Internal Market had not been established yet in 1990. The same holds for
Economic and Monetary Union. Both developments impact on how the functioning of company tax
systems within the EU has to be evaluated. As economic integration in the Internal Market
proceeded, the economic, technological and institutional barriers to cross-border trade continued to
wane. At the same time, taxation systems adapted to this process only very gradually. The pattern
of international investments is therefore likely to be increasingly sensitive to cross-border
differences in corporate tax rules in an environment now characterised by full mobility of capital.
Moreover, while considerable progress has been made in the removal of the wide range of barriers
to the establishment of the Internal Market (including the recent agreement on the European2
Company Statute), the tax impediments to cross-border activities within the Internal Market are
becoming increasingly important. These elements describe important specific EU dimensions on
company taxation which did not exist in the same way in 1990.
(6)  EU businesses are presently confronted with a single economic zone in which 15 different company
tax systems apply. This causes losses of economic efficiency, generates specific compliance costs,
and contributes to a lack of transparency. The Internal Market and Economic and Monetary Union
also strongly impact on the way EU companies carry out business in the Community and set the -
intended - incentive to create effective pan-European business structures. This is because EU
companies increasingly no longer define one Member State but rather the whole EU as their "home
market". The resulting structural changes lead to the EU-wide re-organisation and centralisation of
business functions within a group of companies, many of which were traditionally present in many
or even all Member States. Such re-organisation can be achieved via internal realignments, via
mergers and acquisitions or through the creation of foreign branches. These tendencies, in turn,
impact on the taxation of these companies. EU companies argue that their perception of the EU as
their "home market" generally does not correspond to a tax reality, unlike the USA for US
companies. Thus, a variety of legal and economic factors define a specific "EU dimension" for
analysing company taxation.
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(7)  From the point of view of economic efficiency, tax systems should ideally be "neutral" in terms of
economic choices. In such an analytical framework, the choice of an investment, its financing or its
location should in principle not be driven by tax considerations. From this perspective, and in an
international context, similar investments should not face markedly different effective levels of
taxation purely because of their country location. Differences in the effective levels of corporate
taxation may in fact imply welfare costs because economic activity may not take place in the lowest
(pre-tax) cost location by the lowest cost producers. If the impact of differences in tax regimes
favours one location over another, or one producer over another, then goods may be produced at a
higher pre-tax cost. Therefore, the size of these tax differentials and dispersions deserves attention.
(8)  However, a full welfare cost assessment of differences in effective corporation tax rates would
require a broader analysis, taking into account the existence of other taxes and other economic
parameters, as well as national preferences for equity and the provision of public goods. Moreover,
to the extent that there are pre-existing distortions and/or imperfections in the market economy
(market failures), taxes may be used to internalise these externalities (e.g. pollution), thereby
enhancing economic efficiency. It is impossible to precisely quantify the size of tax differentials
needed to correct or mitigate market failures. However, the larger the tax differentials, the larger the
market failure must be unless there is to be a loss of efficiency and welfare. It should be stressed
that this study has not attempted to quantify the size of any efficiency loss or welfare cost that
might be associated with existing differences in effective corporation tax rates in the European
Union.
(9)  In any event, taxation ultimately involves a political choice and may entail a trade-off between pure
economic efficiency and other legitimate national policy goals and preferences. Furthermore, in the
Community context, the subsidiarity principle and Member States’ competences in the field of
taxation have to be taken into account when assessing differences in effective tax rates between
Member States.
(10) The purpose of the analysis of differences in the EU corporations’ effective level of taxation is
twofold. First, it gives summary measures of the overall relative incentive (or disincentive)3
provided by each country’s tax law to undertake various types of investments at home or in another
EU Member State. Second, it identifies the most important tax drivers influencing the effective tax
burdens, that is the weight of each of the most important elements of the tax regimes in the
effective tax burden.
(11) The analysis does not provide evidence of the impact of taxation on actual economic decisions.
Although empirical studies show that there is a correlation between taxation and location decisions,
because of the weaknesses of the existing methodologies and their limitations due to lack of
available data, it has been considered that none of the existing approaches could have been usefully
adopted in the current study without considerably extending the range of the work.
(12) Taxation is, of course, only one of the determinants of investment and financing decisions. The
existence and quality of economic infrastructures, the availability of qualified work, as well as the
short and medium-term outlook in different markets and countries are among the other important
determinants of investment behaviour. The geographical accessibility of markets, transport costs,
environmental standards, wage levels, social security systems and the overall attitude of
government all play an important role tooWhich of these factors are relatively the more important
very much depends on the individual type of investment decision. Nevertheless, as economic
integration in the EU proceeds in the context of the Economic and Monetary Union and the Internal
Market, in an environment where capital is fully mobile, the pattern of international investment is
likely to be increasingly sensitive to cross-border differences in corporate tax rules.
(13) The study presents estimates of effective corporate tax rates on domestic and transnational
investments in the 15 EU countries (as well as the US and Canada in certain cases) taking the tax
systems in operation as of the year 1999. In addition, it presents estimates of effective corporate tax
rates on domestic investments for the EU Member States in 2001. In view of the structure and
magnitude of the German tax reform approved in 2000, the effects of this reform, as of the 1
st
January 2001, are separately analysed. The calculations consider primarily corporation taxes in each
country, but also include the effect of personal income taxation of dividends, interest and capital
gains.
(14) The most commonly used indicators for analysing the impact of taxation on investment behaviour
are based on forward-looking approaches which permit international comparisons and are
especially tailored to provide an indication of the general pattern of incentives to investment that
are attributable to different national tax laws as well as on the most relevant tax drivers that
influence the effective tax burdens. In this study, the main body of the computation of the effective
corporate tax burden builds on the methodology involving calculating the effective tax burden for a
hypothetical future investment project in the manufacturing sector. In technical terms, the analysis
relies on a revised and extended methodology of the so-called King & Fullerton approach, set out
by Devereux and Griffith (1998). This computation is supplemented by data arising from the
application of the "European Tax Analyzer" model which utilises the model-firm approach set out
by the University of Mannheim and ZEW (1999). Considering that each methodology is based on
different hypotheses and restrictions, the comparison of the results of these approaches permits the
testing and, possibly, confirmation of the general trends arising from the computations.
(15) The results of the application of these approaches depend heavily on the assumptions underlying
both the definition of the hypothetical investment in terms of assets and financing or of the future
firm behaviour in terms of total cash receipts and expenses, assets and liabilities over time and of
the economic framework. As far as the economic framework is concerned, the value of the real
interest rate is a crucial element. The existing studies based on these approaches assume different
hypotheses in relation to the economic framework and the definition of the investment. This study,4
for example, like the Ruding report, calculates effective tax rates at a given post-tax rate of return,
whereas other studies1 compute the effective tax rate for a given pre-tax rate of return. Differences
in the assumptions underlying the hypothetical investment and the economic framework can give
rise to somewhat different numerical results.
(16) These approaches do not permit, for methodological reasons, taking into consideration in the
computation all the relevant features linked to the existence and functioning of different tax
systems. For instance, the effects of consolidating profits and losses throughout the EU are not
included because the model assumes all investments are profitable. Neither is it possible to quantify
or include compliance costs. However, the most important features of taxation systems such as the
rates, major elements of the taxable bases and tax systems are included. The results produced
should therefore be understood as summarising and quantifying the essential features of the tax
system.
(17) Effective tax rates can be calculated for a so-called "marginal" investment (where the post-tax rate
of return just equals the alternative market interest rate) or for a "infra-marginal" investment project
(i.e. one that earns an extra-profit). This study has analysed both marginal and infra-marginal
(average) effective company tax indicators. These reflect different hypotheses related to the
underlying methodology, as well as to the domestic or international localisation of the investment,
the profitability of the investment or of the firm considered, and the size and behaviour of the
companies. The computations have been supplemented by "sensitivity analysis" which tests the
impact of different hypotheses on the results.
(18) The broad range of data computed does not intend to present "universally valid values" for the
effective tax burden in different countries, but rather to give indicators, or illustrate interrelations,
in a series of relevant situations. In fact, effective tax rates in a particular Member State depend on
the characteristics of the specific investment project concerned and the methodology applied.
(19) A number of general conclusions regarding both the differences in the effective tax burdens and the
identification of the most relevant WD[ drivers which influence these tax burdens, can nevertheless
be formulated on the basis of the results. Therefore, explanations can be given on how Member
States tax regimes create incentives to allocate resources. A striking feature of the quantitative
analysis is that, across the range of different situations, the relevant conclusions and interpretations
remain relatively constant.
(20) When domestic investments are considered, the analysis for 1999 suggests that there is
considerable variation in the effective tax burden faced by investors resident in the various EU
Member States, depending on the type of investment and its financing. However, the Member
States’ tax codes tend to favour the same forms of investment by assets and sources of finance. The
range of the differences in national effective corporate taxation rates, when personal taxation is not
taken into account is around 37 points in the case of a marginal investment (between -4.1% and
33.2%) and around 30 points in the case of more profitable investments (between 10.5% and 39.1%
when the hypothetical investment methodology is applied and between 8.3% and 39.7% when the
"Tax Analyser" model is applied). The introduction of personal taxation substantially increases the
effective tax burdens and the observed differences. Moreover, the analysis suggests that, in
practically every situation analysed tax systems tend to favour investment in intangibles and
machinery and debt is the most tax-efficient source of finance.
                                                
1 see, for instance: Baker & McKenzie, Survey of the Effective Tax Burden in the EU, Amsterdam; 1999 and 20015
A recent study by Baker and McKenzie conducted under different hypotheses concerning the
economic context and the applied tax codes, shows that in the most similar economic situation to
that considered in this study (pre-tax rate of return of 6% as against a post-tax rate of return of 5%
considered in the Commission study), the range of variation is 32 points in the case of a marginal
investment (from 4.9% to 36.8%). When the pre-tax rate of return is fixed at 10% (base case in the
Baker and McKenzie computation), the range of variation is 23 points (from 6.8 to 30.1). This
study also shows that the most tax efficient method of finance is debt and that the tax systems tend
to favour investments in intangibles and machinery.
(21) Differences between the effective tax burden in the EU Member States may be important for two
reasons. First, differences in effective tax rates faced by companies located in different countries,
but competing in the same market, may affect their international competitiveness: two different
companies, competing in the same market, may face two different tax rates. Second, when
multinational companies face only the tax rate of the country where the activity takes place then
differences in the effective tax rates between countries could also affect the location choice of
individual activities. This can occur either as a result of the provisions of international tax codes,
for example when the repatriation of profits by way of dividend from a subsidiary to a parent
results in no further taxation because the dividend is exempt, or as a result of tax planning. A
multinational company may therefore face different tax rates, depending on where its activities are
located. As indicated, this economic reasoning is based on pure tax considerations and cannot, on
its own, explain the actual behaviour of companies.
(22) Clearly, the EU wide spread cannot be explained by one single feature of the national tax system.
However, the analysis of general regimes tends to show that – leaving aside preferential tax regimes
- the different national nominal tax rates on profits (statutory tax rates, surcharges and local taxes)
can explain many of the differences in effective corporate tax rates between countries. Although tax
regimes are designed as more or less integrated systems (in general high tax rates on profits seem to
correlate with a narrower taxable base and vice versa), tax rate differentials tend to outweigh the
differences in the tax bases. The quantitative analysis also shows that the relative weight of rates in
determining the effective tax burden of companies rises when the profitability of the investment
rises and that, consequently, any compensatory effects of a lower tax base on effective tax rates
tend to disappear when the profitability rises. The study conducted by Baker and McKenzie
concluded that, in general, the composition of the tax base does not have a great impact on the
effective tax burden and that the level of the tax rate is the truly important factor for the difference
in the tax burden.
(23) When transnational investments are considered, the results for 1999 show variations in the way
each country treats investments in or from other countries. Thus, the effective tax burden of a
subsidiary of a parent company in one country depends crucially on where that subsidiary is
located. On the basis of the assumptions considered in this study, the range of variations of the
effective tax burdens of subsidiaries located in different host countries can rise above 30 points
regardless of the method of financing of the subsidiary. This provides an incentive for companies to
choose the most tax-favoured locations for their investment, which may not be the most favourable
location in the absence of taxes. Similarly, subsidiaries operating in a given country face different
effective tax burdens depending on where their parent company is located. Even in this case the
range of variation can reach more than 30 points.6
(24) The analysis of the effective tax burden of transnational investment also gives an indication of the
allocation effects of international taxation by capturing the extent to which the tax treatment of
transnational investments gives incentives to undertake transnational, as opposed to domestic,
investment. The data show that, on average in the EU, outbound and inbound investment are more
heavily taxed than otherwise identical domestic investments and, therefore, the additional
components of the transnational system add somewhat to the effective tax rates on investment.
(25) But, to the extent that companies are free to choose the most tax-favoured form of finance, then the
international tax system works such that foreign multinationals operating in a host country are
likely to face a lower effective tax burden than domestic companies. This seems to be true even
when the treatment of multinationals is compared with the more favourable domestic treatment
allowed for small and medium sized companies.
(26) The spreads observed between the effective rates of taxation in the international analysis are the
results of complex interactions between different tax regimes and cannot be explained by just one
feature of taxation. However, as was the case for the domestic investment, the analysis tends to
show that the most relevant tax component which provides an incentive to locate cross border and
to choose a specific form of financing is the overall nominal tax rate. This is, in general, an
important tax driver when the incentives of taxation to use particular sources of finance and
specific locations are considered. The tax base does however have a greater impact in specific
situations when a country applies, for instance, particularly favourable depreciation regimes.
(27) It is worth noting that across the range of domestic and cross-border indicators presenting the
effective tax burden at the corporate level, there is a remarkable consistency as far as the relative
position of Member States, notably at the upper and the lower ranges of the ranking, is concerned.
In general, Germany, and France tend to show the highest tax burdens while Ireland, Sweden and
Finland tend to be at the lower range of the ranking. Only Italy’s ranking changes materially when































investments are, in fact, subsidised, whereas more profitable investments suffer an effective tax
burden which is in the middle range of the ranking.
(28) When the domestic analysis is updated to take into account the 2001 tax regimes, the overall
picture is broadly unchanged in comparison to 1999. However, as a consequence of a pattern of
generally declining statutory tax rates (albeit with relatively small reductions apart from Germany),
more profitable investments benefited from reductions in effective tax rates in a number of
countries. As a result, the range of differences in domestic effective tax rates in the case of a more
profitable investment decreased from 30 to 26 percentage points.
(29) The German tax reform that entered into force at 1.1.2001 is a significant reform which implies a
substantial cut in the corporation tax rate and in income tax rates, partly financed by the broadening
of the tax base, including the abolition of the split rate system and the imputation system. However,
despite these changes the German tax reform has only minor effects on the relative position of
Germany in the EU country ranking and both the overall national corporate tax rate and the
effective tax burden remains among the highest in the EU.
(30) Simulating the impact of a hypothetical harmonisation of particular features of taxation systems in
isolation on effective tax rates shows that:
Introducing a common statutory tax rate in the EU would have a significant impact by decreasing
the dispersion - both between parent companies and between subsidiaries - of marginal and average
effective tax rates across the EU countries. To the extent that taxation matters such a scenario
would be likely to go some way in reducing locational inefficiencies within the EU.
By comparison, no other scenario would have such an impact. For example, introducing a common
tax base or a system consisting in applying the definition of the home country tax base to the EU-
wide profits of a multinational tends to increase the dispersion in effective tax rates if overall
nominal tax rates are kept constant. 
Moreover, two remarks have to be made concerning these results for a common tax base. First, the
methodologies applied do not permit to take into consideration all the elements of the tax bases.
However, the "Tax Analyser model", whose results are similar to those arising from the simulations
of hypothetical investment, does consider a more significant number of elements of the tax bases.
Second, benefits which would arise under either a common consolidated tax base or a home
country tax base approach such as loss consolidation and simplified transfer pricing cannot be
modelled using the methodologies used in this report.
It is worth emphasising that these results are based on a static analysis and cannot capture the
dynamic effects and reactions induced by the harmonisation of particular features of taxation in
isolation.
(31) The potential distortions in the allocation of resources reported in the analysis of transnational
investments indicate that there can be an incentive for companies to alter their behaviour in order to
minimise their global tax burden. Therefore the study has considered some stylised examples of tax
optimisation strategy of companies by means of an intermediary financial company focusing the
attention on the likely effects of an abolition of these tax reducing financing structures. However,
the removing of these possibilities of optimisation strategy will not contribute, per se, to solving the
problem of tax-induced resources mis-allocations. Since the main tax driver for effective tax rate
differentials is the overall national tax rate, companies located in "high tax" countries will be able8
to compensate for the removal of these financial intermediaries by making greater use of
differences in general tax rates and structuring their investments to take advantage of lower rates.
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(32) The Council mandate also asks for a "highlighting [RIWKH] remaining tax obstacles to cross-border
economic activity in the Internal Market" and calls for the identification of "the main tax provisions
which may hamper cross-border economic activity in the Single Market". For this purpose the
present study focuses on additional tax or compliance burdens which companies incur as a result of
doing business in more than one Member State and which therefore represent a barrier to cross-
border trade, establishment and investment.
(33) The underlying cause of those additional tax and compliance burdens is the existence within the
Internal Market of 15 separate tax systems. First, the fact that each Member State is a separate tax
jurisdiction has a number of consequences. In particular:
·  companies are obliged to allocate profits to each jurisdiction on arm’s length basis by
separate accounting, i.e. on a transaction by transaction basis;
·  Member States are reluctant to allow relief for losses incurred by associated companies
whose profits fall outside the scope of their taxing rights;
·  cross-border reorganisations entailing a loss of taxing rights for a Member State are liable to
give rise to capital gains taxation and other charges;
·  double taxation may occur as a result of conflicting taxing rights.
(34) Moreover, each Member State has its own sets of rules, in particular laws and conventions on
financial accounting, rules for determining taxable profit, arrangements for collection and
administration of tax and its own network of tax treaties. The need to comply with a multiplicity of
different rules entails a considerable compliance cost and represents in itself a significant barrier to
cross-border economic activity. The costs and risks associated with complying with more than one
system may in particular discourage small and medium-sized enterprises from engaging in cross-
border activity.
(35) These fundamental problems hamper cross-border economic activity in the Internal Market and
adversely affect the competitiveness of European companies. In economic terms they result in a
loss of potential EU welfare. The imminent enlargement of the EU makes it all the more urgent to
find appropriate solutions.
(36) To some extent the problems faced by the EU reflect general difficulties in taxing international
activities, and the work of the OECD and its forerunners has provided the basis for an extensive
network of mainly bilateral double taxation treaties between Member States. The OECD has also
published guidance on a range of international tax issues, in particular concerning the application of
transfer pricing methods and on documentation requirements. In addition, the EU itself has taken
several initiatives with a view to removing tax obstacles to cross-border co-operation and activity:
Directive 90/434 ("merger directive"), providing for the deferral of taxation on cross-border
reorganisation; Directive 90/435 ("parent-subsidiary directive"), eliminating double taxation on
cross-border dividend payments between parent and subsidiary companies; and the Arbitration
Convention (90/436), providing for a dispute resolution procedure in the area of transfer pricing.9
Although going some way to resolving the obstacles to cross-border activity they do not provide a
solution which keeps pace with the growing integration in the Internal Market.
(37) A basic concern of companies operating within the Internal Market is the removal of tax obstacles
to income flows between associated companies. The Parent-Subsidiary Directive abolishes
withholding taxes on payments of dividends between associated companies of different Member
States. However, its effectiveness is reduced by the fact that it does not cover all companies subject
to corporation tax and applies solely to direct holdings of 25% or more.
(38) There is the further problem that - independent of the directive- certain systems of company
taxation have an in-built bias in favour of domestic investment. For example, under imputation
systems applied in a number of Member States a tax credit is granted to resident (individual or
corporate) shareholders for the tax paid on company level; that credit is usually not available to
non-resident shareholders and is not normally granted in respect of foreign dividends. There is
evidence to suggest that such systems form a serious obstacle to cross-border mergers within the
EU and can have an influence on related business decisions (e.g. location of corporate seat).
(39) Payments of interest and royalties between associated companies of different Member States are
often still subject to withholding taxes that effectively create situations of double taxation. The
Commission has already presented a proposal for a directive on this subject [COM(1998)67], and it
is expected that this proposal will be adopted in the context of the "tax package".
(40) In addition to obstacles to income flows, corporate restructuring can also be affected by one-off
costs more directly linked to the restructuring operation itself. The tax-cost induced by cross-border
mergers, acquisitions and internal reorganisations in the form of capital gains tax and various
transfer taxes is often prohibitively high and forces companies to choose economically sub-optimal
structures. Such obstacles place existing EU companies at a disadvantage as non-EU companies as
new entrants will generally be better placed to set up the most suitable structure.
(41) The merger directive provides for deferral of capital gains charges in a number of situations.
However, a number of problems remain:
·  First, not all situations are covered. Like the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, it does not include
all companies subject to corporate tax. It does not cover all types of tax charge (e.g. transfer
taxes) that can arise upon a restructuring. Moreover, it does not cover all types of operation
which may be involved in a restructuring, e.g. the centralisation of production or other
activities. Furthermore, the conversion of existing operations (subsidiaries) into branches
may endanger the future absorption of tax losses accumulated pre-conversion.
·  Second, the directive’s usefulness is reduced by the fact that currently there is no EU
company law framework for cross-border mergers. Companies are therefore obliged to have
recourse to share for share exchanges or transfers of assets. The recent agreement on the
European Company Statute will change this situation in one respect and allow, as from 2004,
for companies to merge into a new legal structure.
·  Third, the implementation of the directive differs significantly between Member States. Even
though such differences are to some extent intrinsic to the legal instrument of a "directive",
the study identifies significant disparities which undermine the overall aims sought by the
directive. In particular Member States, in implementing the Directive, have imposed varying
conditions for the tax deferral provided for under the Directive with a view to preventing tax10
avoidance, in some cases significantly limiting the scope of the Directive and leaving
situations of double taxation unrelieved.
(42) The study identifies particular difficulties in relation to cross-border loss-compensation which,
from a business perspective, constitute one of the most important obstacles to cross-border
economic activity. The current rules in Member States generally allow only for the offsetting of
losses of foreign permanent establishments but not for those of subsidiaries belonging to the same
group but located in different EU countries. If available, the loss compensation often takes place
only at the level of the parent company or is deferred in comparison to domestic losses (which
creates significant interest cost). The differences which exist in Member States’ domestic loss
compensation arrangements also impact on business decisions.
(43) The current loss compensation arrangements entail a risk of economic double taxation where losses
cannot be absorbed locally. This situation provides an incentive in favour of domestic investment
and of investment in larger Member States.
(44) In the area of transfer pricing, the tax problems for cross-border economic activity in the Internal
Market have increased over the past years and are still growing. The problems consist essentially in
high compliance costs and potential double taxation for intra-group transactions. A difficulty,
according to business representatives, is that the transfer prices which are calculated for tax
purposes often no longer serve any underlying commercial rationale in the Internal Market. There is
in particular an increasing practice among larger companies to adopt, in EU intra-group trade,
standard "euro" transfer prices for intermediate products, regardless of the production facility from
which the goods are purchased within the group.
(45) There is also a tendency among Member States, fearing manipulation of transfer prices, to impose
increasingly onerous transfer pricing documentation requirements. Moreover, the application of the
various methods for determining the "correct" (i.e. "arm's length") transfer price for a determined
intra-group transaction is becoming increasingly complex and costly. New technologies and
business structures (which imply, LQWHU DOLD, more emphasis on intangibles) cause growing
difficulties to identify the comparable uncontrolled transactions often required for establishing the
arm's length price. In addition, there are substantial divergences in the detailed application of
transfer pricing methods between Member States. The same holds for their implementation of the
relevant OECD guidelines. EU businesses therefore face uncertainty as to whether their transfer
prices will be accepted by the tax administrations upon a subsequent audit. The study indicates that
the combined effect of these difficulties for companies can be a significant increase in compliance
cost for international activities.
(46) Double taxation in transfer pricing occurs when the tax administration of one Member State
unilaterally adjusts the price put by a company on a cross-border intra-group transaction, without
this adjustment being offset by a corresponding adjustment in the other Member State or States
concerned. While inquiries made by the Commission services among Member States suggest that
the number of transfer pricing disputes between Member States is fairly limited, a survey of
multinational companies published by the accounting firm Ernst&Young2 reports a significant
number of instances of double taxation arising from transfer pricing adjustments. This is consistent
with representations made by business representatives, who complain moreover that the cost and
time relating to the current dispute settlement procedures are often too high for enterprises with the
result that it is often less costly to accept the double taxation. In this context the present study finds
                                                
2 Ernst-Young Survey: Transfer pricing 1999 Global Survey: Practices, Perceptions, and Trends for 2000 and beyond11
that the Arbitration Convention 90/436/EEC, which seeks to provide a binding dispute resolution
procedure, is rarely used and that certain of its provisions may act as a deterrent for taxpayers to
make use of it.
(47) In short, the study concludes that, while there is evidence for aggressive transfer pricing by
companies, there are equally genuine concerns for companies which are making a bona fide attempt
to comply with the complex and often conflicting transfer pricing rules of different countries. Such
concerns are becoming the most important international tax issue for companies.
(48) The study also identifies the area of double taxation conventions as a potential source of obstacles
and distortions for cross-border economic activities within the EU. Although the intra-EU network
of double taxation treaties is largely complete, there nevertheless remain some gaps. Most treaties
within the EU follow the OECD Model but there are significant differences in the terms of the
various treaties and their interpretation. There are also instances of divergent application of treaties
by the treaty partners, leading to double taxation or non-taxation. Business representatives also
refer to the increasing complexity of treaty provisions as a source of compliance cost and
uncertainty. What is more, the study shows that tax treaty provisions based on the OECD Model, in
particular non-discrimination articles, are not adequate to ensure compliance with the EU law
principle of equal treatment. Moreover, the lack of co-ordination in the treaty practice of Member
States in relation to third countries, for example regarding limitation of treaty benefits, is liable to
give rise to distortions and partitioning of the Internal Market.
(49) The study also notes that certain areas of taxation which do not form part of company taxation may
nevertheless entail significant obstacles to cross-border economic activity in the EU. This notably
relates to the taxation of fringe benefits and stock options, of supplementary pensions as well as
VAT. It is important to note that together with the company tax obstacles these difficulties have a
cumulative effect for the companies concerned. As regards VAT, this is particularly true for small
and medium-sized enterprises for which the nature of the various tax obstacles to cross-border
economic activity is generally identical but which suffer from disproportionately - and sometimes
prohibitively - high compliance cost for dealing with them.
5HPHGLHVWRWKHWD[REVWDFOHVLQWKH,QWHUQDO0DUNHW
(50) There are essentially two approaches which could be envisaged for tackling the company tax
obstacles in the Internal Market:
·  Targeted solutions which seek to remedy individual obstacles
·  More comprehensive solutions which seek to address the underlying causes of the obstacles.
(51) A comprehensive approach providing EU businesses with a single common consolidated tax base
for their EU activities would address most of the tax obstacles to cross-border economic activity
that have been identified. A piecemeal approach only is unlikely to achieve this in a comparable
manner. It should also be noted that clearly all proposals raise a number of technical issues which
would need to be explored in greater detail.
(52) Regardless of the basic approach of remedies, it is important to note that in the absence of political
solutions taxpayers have been compelled to have recourse to the legal process to overcome
discriminatory rules and other obstacles. In consequence, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has
developed a large body of case law on the compatibility of national tax rules with the Treaty.
National courts are also increasingly being asked to give rulings in this area. While the ECJ has
made a significant contribution to the removal of tax obstacles for companies, it is unlikely that the12
interpretation of the Treaty is sufficient to address all tax obstacles to cross-border activity.
Moreover, ECJ rulings are confined to the particular case put to it and may therefore relate solely to
individual aspects of a more general issue. The implementation of ECJ rulings is left to Member
States, who often fail to draw the more general consequences which flow from them. There
therefore seems to be scope for introducing a Community framework for exchanging views of the
implications of significant ECJ rulings.
(53) One important example for the aforementioned principle is the problem of the bias in favour of
domestic investment in certain systems of company taxation, notably imputation systems, for which
the case law of the Court has particular significance. Recent rulings, such as 6DILU 9HUNRRLMHQand
6DLQW*REDLQ, suggest that tax systems which provide a disincentive to cross-border activity or
investment may be contrary to the Treaty provisions on the fundamental freedoms. Such rulings
raise important issues for the design of Member States’ tax systems for which more guidance on
EU level would be desirable.
7DUJHWHGUHPHGLDOPHDVXUHV
(54) The various problems relating to the divergence of application of (both the existing and future) EU
Taxation Directives across Member States could be tackled via a regular exchange of best-practices
and/or some form of peer review. This could also give the opportunity to develop a more common
understanding of important concepts in EU company taxation, notably tax avoidance. Ensuring a
more uniform application of EU tax law is an important step in order to reduce compliance costs
and increase the efficiency of EU company taxation. At the same time, the need for litigation would
be reduced.
(55) The shortcomings identified in the Merger Directive and the Parent-Subsidiary Directive suggest
the need for amendment of those directives. The Commission has already presented proposals for
amendment of the directives suggesting, in essence, that their scope be extended to cover other
entities subject to company taxation [COM(93)293]. In addition to this and with a view to
clarifying the scope of certain important provisions in the directives, notably those concerning
avoidance and abuse, further amendments to the Directive and/or more detailed guidance on how
those provisions should be implemented could help.
(56) As regards the merger directive, the study also identifies certain other areas where further
amendments would facilitate cross-border restructuring. Within the logic of the existing Directive,
it could first be examined to which extent specific transfer taxes arising on cross-border
restructuring operations (notably on immovable property) could be taken into account. Second, the
Directive could be clarified to make it clear that instances of economic double taxation should be
avoided. One example for this could be to prescribe that capital gains arising on the sale of shares
received in exchange for shares or assets are calculated on the basis of the market value at the time
of the exchange, thus resolving previously accumulated "hidden reserves" without immediate tax
consequences. A more radical change to the Directive would be to extend its scope so as to defer
the triggering of tax charges where assets are moved to another Member State while preserving
Member States’ tax claims. The parent-subsidiary directive could be amended to cover both direct
and indirect shareholdings or, alternatively, provide for a lower minimum holding threshold.
(57) Finally, it may be noted that the recent agreement on the European Company Statute will provide a
company law framework for cross-border mergers the absence of which has hitherto undermined
the utility of the Merger Directive.
(58) As regards cross-border offsetting of losses, the Commission in 1990 presented a proposal for a
directive [(COM(90)595] allowing parent companies to take into account the losses incurred by13
permanent establishments and subsidiaries situated in another Member State. The Council failed to
adopt the proposal and has ceased discussion of it. A review of the proposal conducted as part of
the present study suggests that a number of technical amendments could be made to the proposal.
For example, it could be envisaged calculating losses according to the rules of the State of the
parent company rather than that of the subsidiary as under the proposal.
(59) Alternatively, a similar result from the company’s perspective could be achieved by devising a
scheme similar to the Danish system of ’joint taxation’. In essence under the Danish arrangements a
group of companies with a Danish parent company is taxed as if it were organised as a branch
structure so that Denmark taxes the consolidated results of the group. The advantage of this
approach over the Commission proposal lies in the greater symmetry between the taxation of
profits and the offset of losses.
(60) There are a variety of measures available that would help remedy the various transfer pricing
problems. The practical application of the Arbitration Convention could certainly be improved and
its provisions made subject to interpretation by the Court. Moreover, Member States could be
encouraged to introduce or expand bilateral or multilateral Advance Price Agreement programmes;
such instruments, although costly, are an effective means of dealing with the uncertainty relating to
transfer pricing. Subject to safeguards to prevent aggressive tax planning, a framework for prior
agreement or consultation before tax administrations enforce transfer pricing adjustments could
also be considered.
(61) More generally, the compliance costs and the uncertainty could be reduced by better co-ordination
between Member States of documentation requirements and of the application of the various
methods, for example by developing best practices. Such co-ordination could take place in the
context of an EU working group and should build upon and complement the OECD activities in
this field. It would be possible to develop that process further in order also to address the concerns
of business. The establishment by the Commission of a Joint Forum on transfer pricing comprising
representatives of tax authorities and business might allow the currently conflicting perspectives of
the two sides to be reconciled. While on the one hand tax administrations view transfer pricing as a
common vehicle for tax avoidance or evasion by companies and as a source of harmful tax
competition between Member States, business on the other hand considers that tax authorities are
imposing disproportionate compliance costs. The study finds that both sides have legitimate
concerns to which it is necessary to seek a balanced solution through a dialogue on EU level. A
more uniform approach by EU Member States would also contribute to a stronger position in
relation to third countries.
(62) The filling of the few remaining gaps in the existing network of double taxation treaties within the
EU would be helpful. Moreover, the current tax treaties of Member States could be improved in
order to comply with the principles of the Internal Market, in particular in relation to access to
treaty benefits. Better co-ordination of treaty policy in relation to third countries would also help. In
addition, the study identifies a possible need for binding arbitration where conflicts arise between
treaty partners in the interpretation and application of a treaty, leading to possible double taxation
or non-taxation. The most complete solution to such problems would be the conclusion under
Article 293 of the Treaty of a multilateral tax treaty between Member States, conferring
interpretative jurisdiction on the Court. Another possibility, leaving intact the existing bilateral
system, would be to elaborate an EU version of the OECD model convention and commentary (or
of certain articles) which met the specific requirements of EU membership.
(63) Despite the fact that tax compliance costs are regressive to the size of the company, the study finds
that the nature of the obstacles is essentially the same for all companies. Therefore specific tax14
initiatives for small- and medium-sized enterprises do not seem to be justified. There are however
exceptions to this basic approach which could be usefully addressed mainly at Member State level.
For instance, the administrative tax formalities, bookkeeping requirements etc. for small- and
medium-sized enterprises should be less demanding than for bigger companies, also in cross-border
situations. Moreover, the difficulties with the cross-border offsetting of losses hit small- and
medium-sized enterprises particularly hard and therefore seem to deserve a specific remedy.
&RPSUHKHQVLYHDSSURDFKHVRQ(8FRPSDQ\WD[DWLRQ
(64) The study also examines more general remedial measures aimed at minimising or removing the
obstacles in a more comprehensive manner and analyses a number of comprehensive approaches
that have been presented to the Commission. All aim to address the various tax obstacles by
providing multinational companies with a common consolidated tax base for their EU-wide
activities:
·  Under the mutual recognition approach of "Home State Taxation" the tax base would be
computed in accordance with the tax code of the company’s home state (i.e. where the
headquarter is based), thus building on the existing tax systems and the related experience
and knowledge. This approach is conceived as an optional scheme for companies in Member
States with a sufficiently similar tax base.
·  Another possibility would be to devise completely new harmonised EU rules for the
determination of a single tax base on European level. This again would be an optional
scheme for companies existing as a parallel system alongside present national rules.
Generally known as "Common (Consolidated) Base Taxation", this approach is advocated in
particular by some business representatives.
·  A further model suggested in some literature would be a "European Corporate Income Tax".
This, although originally conceived as a compulsory scheme for large multinationals, could
also be an optional scheme operating alongside national rules. Under this model the tax could
be levied at the European level and a part or all of the revenue could go directly to the EU.
·  Finally, the more ‘traditional’ approach would be to harmonise national rules on company
taxation by devising a single EU company tax base and system as a replacement for existing
national systems.
(65) The most important fundamental advantages of providing EU businesses with a single consolidated
tax base for their EU-wide activities, under whichever form, are as follows:
·  The compliance cost resulting from the need to deal with 15 tax systems within the Internal
Market would be significantly reduced.
·  Transfer pricing problems within the group of companies would disappear, at least within the
EU.
·  Profits and losses would, in principle, be automatically consolidated on an EU basis.
·  Many international restructuring operations would be fiscally simpler and less costly.
(66) The business representatives of the expert panel assisting the Commission emphasised these
fundamental points. Under a comprehensive approach of whatever precise design compliance cost15
would be reduced, many situations of double-taxation would be avoided and many discriminatory
situations and restrictions would be removed.
(67) By definition, an essential element of all the solutions is that there should be group consolidation
on an EU-wide basis. At present not all Member States apply that principle even at the domestic
level and only two at the international level. Under all approaches (with the possible exception of
the European Corporate Income Tax) Member States would retain the right to set company tax
rates.
(68) To a varying extent, all comprehensive approaches could potentially be designed such that not all
Member States would have to participate. In this context, it is important to note that the Treaty of
Nice extended the possibility for enhanced co-operation by a group of Member States where
agreement by all 15 is not possible. This may be particularly appropriate for Home State Taxation,
which presupposes the participation solely of Member States with a fairly close tax base. However,
a group of Member States could equally take advantage of this mechanism in order to introduce any
of the other approaches.
(69) A further key element of all the comprehensive approaches is a mechanism for allocating the
common consolidated tax base to the various Member States. For this purpose the USA and Canada
use a formula apportionment system which allocates the tax base according to a key composed of
factors such as payroll, property and/or sales. Another solution available to the EU would be to
apportion the tax base according to the (adjusted) value-added tax base of the companies involved.
Under all of these Member States would be allocated a specific share of the overall tax base
according to apportionment keys and apply their national tax rate to that share.
(70) All the above models would meet the concerns inasmuch as they remove the need to comply with
up to 15 different tax systems, largely eliminate the transfer pricing problems arising from separate
accounting and effectively provide for cross-border loss compensation. They would also provide a
tax solution for the European Company. An appraisal of the various models should take account of
their respective characteristics.
(71) An important point to note is that Home State Taxation does not require Member States to agree on
a new common EU base because it is based on the principle of mutual recognition by Member
States of each other’s tax codes. The other approaches all entail agreement on an entirely new tax
code.
(72) By contrast with a compulsory harmonised base, Home State Taxation, Common (Consolidated)
Base Taxation and European Corporate Income Tax operate alongside and do not fully replace
existing national systems. In certain circumstances however this can have the disadvantage that
competing enterprises in other Member States are subject to different taxation rules. For example,
under Home State Taxation three competing retail shops in Germany would compute their tax base
under Belgian, French or German rules according to whether the home state of the group to which
they belonged was Belgium, France or Germany. However, the differences may be relatively small
given that an underlying assumption of the Home State Taxation model is that participating States
will have similar tax bases. Under Common (Consolidated) Base Taxation or European Corporate
Income Tax competing businesses may be subject to either local or Common (Consolidated) Base
Taxation / European Corporate Income Tax rules, which may be quite different. It may however be
possible to permit local companies to opt into the scheme, for example, where there are competition
issues.16
(73) In addition the solutions based on a parallel rather than a single compulsory system raise a number
of technical issues requiring further study. Among the main issues are those relating to
restructuring, foreign income and double taxation treaties, and minority interests.
·  First, as regards restructuring, since under Home State Taxation a company’s tax base is
determined in accordance with the rules of its parent’s state, each time the ownership of a
company changes and its shares are sold the method by which it computes its tax base could
change. This equates in current terminology to a potential change of residence and is
potentially very costly. For example a Belgian subsidiary sold by its German Home State
Taxation parent to a French parent could find its tax base changing from German to French,
or if France were not participating in Home State Taxation, back to a Belgian base. In
contrast, as under Common (Consolidated) Base Taxation there would only be one  tax base
such a sale within the Common (Consolidated) Base area would not involve such a change,
and even if a company were sold to a new parent from a non participating state treatment
under the Common (Consolidated) Base system could perhaps be maintained.
·  Second, the treatment of foreign income under Home State Taxation, Common
(Consolidated) Base Taxation or European Corporate Income Tax is complicated by the
current situation of bilateral double taxation agreements, the co-existence of exemption and
credit relief tax systems and the need for a system of allocation. For example, a subsidiary in
a state which operates the credit system, with a 3
rd country branch may be entitled under its
DTA to a credit for foreign tax paid by the branch. This could give rise to a claim under the
DTA for the foreign tax credit even though the foreign income had been exempted under the
Home State Taxation rules.
·  Third, minority shareholders might find themselves receiving dividends under a taxation
system which is incompatible with their existing local personal tax system. For example a
minority shareholder might receive dividends paid under a Common (Consolidated) Base
Taxation or European Corporate Income Tax imputation system whereas previously
dividends had been paid under the local classical system. This can only be avoided if the
payment of dividends by subsidiaries to minority shareholders remains subject to the local
tax code which is the approach envisaged under Home State Taxation. This would imply
additional record keeping.
(74) These issues would not arise if Member States were to agree on the more traditional solution of a
single harmonised company tax system, i.e. a common consolidated base with an agreed allocation
system and method of dividend distribution. Nevertheless, despite their drawbacks, the other
solutions meet the objectives of removing obstacles to cross-border activity without requiring such
fundamental change. More generally, all the solutions would have the potential to contribute to
greater efficiency, effectiveness, simplicity and transparency in EU company tax systems and
remove the hiatuses between national systems which provide fertile ground for avoidance and
abuse.
(75) The assessment of tax obstacles in the Internal Market reveals that many of the factors causing
compliance cost also tend to increase the administrative cost for tax administrations. This is
particularly evident with a view to transfer pricing. Moreover, the co-existence of 15 company tax
systems in one Internal Market opens considerable room for tax evasion and tax avoidance.
Therefore, many remedial measures will also to some extent benefit the efficiency and effectiveness
of tax administrations. Finally, almost all remedial measures, targeted or comprehensive, call for
more mutual assistance and administrative co-operation between Member States which provides17
reliable means for ensuring that tax audits will continue to be made in an appropriate way and that
none of the remedies under consideration results in illegitimate and/or illegal tax evasion.
(76) In short, the report concludes that there are potentially significant benefits to be derived from
providing, via a genuinely comprehensive solution, companies with a common consolidated tax
base for the EU-wide activities. However, its findings are based mainly on the current stage of
development of the research and further work would be necessary to implement any of the
comprehensive approaches. Any solution going in this direction must obviously also take into
account the competition rules laid down in the EC Treaty, in particular those concerning State Aids.
Moreover, as already noted, the results of the quantitative analysis suggests that that the overall
national tax rate is an important factor in determining the effective tax rate, and it is clear that a
single or common base without further adaptations in practice would almost ’mechanically’
accentuate this./,672)7$%/(6
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The tasks given by the mandate to the Commission essentially ask for illuminating differences in the
effective level of corporate taxation and, at the same time, identifying the main tax provisions that may
hamper cross-border economic activity in the Single Market. The analysis should take into account, LQWHU
DOLD, the results of the report of the Ruding Committee (1992). The tax policy issues involved in reducing
tax–induced distortions should be highlighted and possible remedial measures examined. In doing so, the
analysis should take into account the respective spheres of competence of the Member States and the
Community.
The general background to the mandate for this study and the reasons why the Council requested a
comprehensive study on company taxation in the EU can be found in the discussions on tax policy at the
Vienna European Council of 11 and 12 December 1998. At Vienna, the Heads of government, in endorsing




for the study subsequently agreed by the Council explicitly refers to this common denominator between
Member States. The statement condenses the current challenges for EU company tax systems: to achieve
an efficient allocation of resources in an undistorted Internal Market, to ensure an equitable distribution of
tax revenues among Member States and to guarantee the technical feasibility of taxing mobile tax factors.
It thus also creates a link between the study and the general debate on tax competition and the efforts to
curb harmful tax competition in the European Community, as well as the employment effects of taxation.
In March 2000, the European Council in Lisbon placed the mandate in a new perspective: 7KH8QLRQKDV
WRGD\VHWLWVHOIDQHZVWUDWHJLFJRDOIRUWKHQH[WGHFDGHWREHFRPHWKHPRVWFRPSHWLWLYHDQGG\QDPLF
NQRZOHGJHEDVHGHFRQRP\LQWKHZRUOGFDSDEOHRIVXVWDLQDEOHHFRQRPLFJURZWKZLWKPRUHDQGEHWWHUMREV
DQG JUHDWHU VRFLDO FRKHVLRQ4 This overall objective adds strong emphasis on the need to achieve
economically sound taxation systems that contribute to the smooth operation of the Internal Market and, in
addition, to increase the competitiveness of EU companies. In other words, EU company taxation should
contribute to more economic welfare in the Community. This forms an important guideline for the study.
As already correctly noted in the Ruding report, one of the basic objectives of the Treaty of Rome,
founding the European Communities, was to raise the welfare in all Member States and through the
abolition of all obstacles to the efficient allocation of resources in the Internal Market to be erected.
The mandate is thus very topical. Notwithstanding the achievement of the Internal Market and the advent
of Economic and Monetary Union, the European Union still has to confront a number of tax problems. One
focus of this study is the efficient allocation of resources within the European Community - in other words,
the undistorted location of economic activity and investment. This objective has not yet been achieved and,
in giving the mandate for this study, the Council emphasised that company tax problems are one of the
main reasons for this failure. As non-tax impediments to the functioning of the Internal Market have been
mostly removed and the EU markets for goods, labour and capital become integrated, the allocation of
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capital (economic activities and investment) is increasingly sensitive to taxation. Firms and individuals
benefit from the freedom to move their capital to locations where the highest after-tax returns can be
obtained and their investment decisions are thus more responsive to differences in effective tax rates
between countries than without the Internal Market. At the same time, however, tax obstacles may still
hamper the exercise of this freedom. It is therefore logical for the mandate to call for the analysis of these
two - different but related - factors jeopardising allocational efficiency in the Internal Market. At the same
time, it should not be overlooked that important general international developments have also significantly
changed the view on international tax problems since the Ruding report was published.
Against this background, this part of the study briefly considers earlier initiatives to harmonise company
taxation in the EU. It then, in accordance with the mandate, takes a look on the outcome of the work of the
Ruding Committee (1990/92) and continues with an assessment of important developments which together
form the framework for the subsequent analysis. Finally, some criteria for analysing company taxation in
the European Community and the underlying economic considerations are explained. These criteria are
used later in this study to evaluate possible solutions to the problems highlighted by the study.
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Since the early years of the Community various committees and experts have put forward proposals for
harmonising crucial elements of the corporate tax regimes of Members States. On the basis of the Treaty of
Rome, the perspective was right from the start the objective to create within the Community conditions
similar to a true Single Market. The first initiatives in the area of corporate income tax were thus marked
by proposals for radical reform by establishing uniform rules for the core problem of the corporate income
tax, e.g. the double economic taxation of companies and their shareholders. In 1962, the Neumark
Committee developed concrete suggestions for the harmonisation of the company tax systems in the
Community in the form of an imputation system with a split rate for retained and distributed profits5. At
that time, harmonisation was seen as the appropriate "soft" approach as opposed to uniform rules. The
Tempel report of 1970 suggested the introduction of a classical dividend taxation system6. Both reports
thus identified, among other things, the tax treatment of cross-border dividend payments, unless
harmonised, as a major problem within an internal market.
In 1975, having regard to the growing integration within the Community, the Commission put forward a
proposal for a directive providing for the corporate tax rate to fall within a range of 45 % - 55 %, a partial
imputation system and a common withholding tax of 25 % on dividends. The European Parliament did not
give an opinion on the proposal, producing only an interim report in 1980, which said that the tax base
should be harmonised at the same time. The proposal was withdrawn in 1990.
In 1984/85, the Commission proposed to harmonise the rules for the carry-over of losses (three years carry
back and unlimited carry forward). This proposal was discussed in the Council only in 1985 and later
withdrawn. In 1988, the Commission produced draft proposals on the harmonisation of the tax base for
enterprises. It was considered at the time that the objective of optimal allocation of resources, important for
the establishment of the Internal Market, would not be reached unless there was at least some
approximation of the rules to determine the taxable profits of enterprises. It was suggested this measure
                                                
5  Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft – Kommission: Bericht des Steuer- und Finanzausschusses (Neumark Bericht),
Brüssel 1962
6  Tempel, A.J. van den: Impôt sur les sociétés et impôt sur le revenu dans les Communautés européennes, Luxembourg CE
1970.17
would produce greater transparency by the abolition of special incentive measures inside the tax base. The
stability of the rules would also make it easier for enterprises to plan their activities in future. However, the
proposals would still leave the necessary flexibility to Member States. This draft was never officially
presented due to the reluctance of most Member States to support them.
These initiatives were not all successful for various reasons one of the most important of which is no doubt
the unanimity requirement. Recognising the marked lack of success in progressing the above initiatives, in
its communication of 19907 the Commission focussed on a different approach based on three ideas: direct
tax measures should be geared to the completion of the Internal Market; they should be consistent with the
principle of subsidiarity and all initiatives should be defined through a consultative process with the
Member States.
On that basis, and following Commission proposals, three measures - two directives and one convention -
were adopted in July 1990. The Merger Directive8 is designed to defer taxation of capital gains resulting
from certain categories of business re-organisations, in order to create within the Community conditions
similar to those of an internal market. The Parent-Subsidiary Directive9 deals principally with the
elimination of double taxation on distributed profits between a subsidiary and a parent company of another
Member State. Both directives apply since 1 January 1992. They are considered in more detail below. The
principal objective of the Arbitration convention10 is to establish a procedure to resolve transfer pricing
disputes giving rise to double taxation. The convention entered into force on 1 January 1995 but its
application is currently suspended as its prolongation beyond 2000 still awaits ratification in several
Member States.
Two further proposals were made, both in January 1991. The first proposal aimed to abolish withholding
taxes levied on cross-border interest and royalty payments between companies of different Member States.
After almost four years of negotiations in the Council, no rapid progress seemed possible on this proposal
and the Commission decided to withdraw it so as to be able to carry out a comprehensive review of it
(November 1994). The other, the imputation of foreign losses proposal11 is designed to allow an enterprise
to offset against its results the losses incurred by its foreign subsidiaries and permanent establishments. The
proposal was discussed in the Council in 1992, but not since then. It is considered in detail below.
 7KHZRUNRIWKH5XGLQJ&RPPLWWHH
Also following the above-mentioned communication, in 1990 Commissioner Scrivener gave the
Committee of Independent Experts on Company Taxation under the Chair of Mr Onno Ruding a precise
mandate for the analysis of company tax issues. The Committee were asked to evaluate the importance of
taxation for business decisions with respect to the location of investment and the international allocation of
profits between enterprises, in order to determine whether existing differences in corporate taxation and the
burden of business taxes among Member States led to major distortions affecting the functioning of the
Internal Market. The mandate was based upon three main questions:
                                                
7  Commission communication to Parliament and the Council: Guidelines on company taxation [SEC(90)601]
8  Council Directive 90/434/EEC of 23 July 1990
9  Council Directive 90/435/EEC of 23 July 1990
10 Convention on the elimination of double taxation in connection with the adjustment of profits of associated enterprises
[COM(90/436/EEC]. The extension of the convention to Austria, Finland and Sweden [OJ C 26 of 31/1/1996] is still
pending ratification in some Member States as does the prolongation of the convention via a protocol signed on
25/5/1999 at the Ecofin-Council [OJ C 202 of 16/7/1999]
11  Proposal for a Council Directive concerning arrangements for the taking into account by companies the losses of their
permanent establishments and subsidiaries situated in other Member States [COM(94)595] of 24 January 199118
1)  Do differences in taxation cause distortions in the functioning of the Internal Market?
2)  If such distortions arise, can they be eliminated through the interplay of market forces and tax
competition or is Community action required?
3)  In the event that Community action is deemed to be necessary, what specific measures should be
taken?
Unlike the Council mandate given for the present study, the mandate given to the Ruding-Committee did
not explicitly call for analysing the tax obstacles to cross-border economic activity in the Internal Market.
The Ruding-Committee produced its report on 18 March 199212. Its main findings were that tax differences
can affect the location of investment and cause distortion of competition (the average cost of capital in
every Member State was lowest for purely domestic investments); and that some convergence had
happened in the past but the main distortions could not be reduced solely through market forces or through
independent action of Member States. The Committee issued recommendations that fell essentially into
two categories: (i) on the elimination of double taxation and (ii) on corporation tax (rate, base, system).
Among other things, the Ruding recommendations were very favourable about the three measures agreed in
1990 and recommended the further extension of the two directives. The recommendations also welcomed
the proposals for directives made in 1991. A detailed list of the recommendations of the Ruding report and
the follow-up is presented in Annex 1.
The underlying approach of the recommendations appears to be one of a "soft" tax harmonisation designed
to establish a level playing field for free and fair competition between Member States, by setting minimal
standards for European tax legislation. The Community would thus not impose uniform rules, but only the
basic standards which the Member States should observe in designing their tax system. This requires for
example minimal standards with respect to the basic tax rate, and maximal standards with respect to what
could be allowed for systems and rates of depreciation, provisions, and the treatment of stock in trade.
These standards would only determine the limits beyond which Member States could not compete with
their tax systems. Within these boundaries Member States would remain free to determine their own tax
systems. In some cases such as depreciation of goodwill, harmonisation would mean that all Member
States accept the same rule i.e. either a common positive or a common negative answer to the question of
depreciation. This softer approach to harmonisation would still leave Member States with considerable
room for manoeuvre.
These conclusions were, LQWHUDOLD, based on a detailed comparison of the factual corporation tax systems
of Member States. Under this approach, "tax obstacles" appear to be indirectly covered inasmuch they
constitute either cases of double taxation or distortions of competition.
 7KHIROORZXSWRWKH5XGLQJUHSRUW
The Commission indicated in its response to the report of June 199213 that priority should be given to the
elimination of double taxation on cross-border income flows. A more qualified assessment was given of
the second part of recommendations, as some of these seemed to go beyond what was strictly necessary at
                                                
12  Report of the Committee of Independent Experts on company taxation (Ruding Committee), European Commission 1992
13  Commission Communication to the Council and to Parliament subsequent to the conclusions of the Ruding Committee
indicating guidelines on company taxation linked to the further development of the internal market" [Sec(92)1118] of 26
June 199219
Community level. It was suggested that the proposed measures could have the effect of reducing the tax
base, which might in turn involve an increase in tax rates.
The Council conclusions on company taxation of November 199214 introduced a number of criteria that
should be taken into account in deciding whether action was appropriate at Community level. The need to
eliminate double taxation was however recognised. At the same time, the need to ensure effective single
taxation was stressed.
On, among other things, the basis of the Ruding recommendations, in July 1993 the Commission published
two proposals to amend the two Directives of 199015 which were designed to extend the scope of these
directives and notably to include more legal forms of enterprises. Both proposals received a favourable
opinion of the European Social and Economic Committee and the European Parliament and are pending in
the Council. However, so far no unanimous agreement could be reached in the Council of Ministers.
Since the mid-nineties, given the limited success of the earlier initiatives, a more comprehensive approach
to tax policy has been reflected in EU tax policy discussions. In the area of direct taxation, the "traditional"
harmonisation approach was complemented by the notion of tax co-ordination. At the informal ECOFIN
meeting at Verona in April 1996, the Commission, contrasting the need for progress on tax matters in the
EU with the limited number of actual decisions adopted in this area thus far, proposed a new and
comprehensive view of taxation policy. This approach resulted in the 1997 tax package16 to eliminate
harmful tax competition within the EU which to date forms the most important ongoing EU initiative in the
area of direct taxation. As noted above, it is in this context that the Council asked for a comprehensive
study on company taxation in the EU to be undertaken by the Commission.
 /HVVRQVIURP5XGLQJIRUWKHSUHVHQWVWXG\
Generally, the basic problems raised and most of the issues considered by the Ruding-Committee are still
relevant. Any current analysis of EU company tax problems can therefore usefully take into account the
work presented in the Ruding report. After ten years, however, the analysis needs to be updated in many
respects. First and foremost, the Internal Market and, for most Member States, also Economic and
Monetary Union is now a well-established reality whereas it was only a prospect for the Ruding –
Committee. In combination with the relative lack of progress on company tax issues on EU level this
means that the existing problems highlighted by Ruding have now become even more acute. The “tax
package” of 1997 has shifted attention from distortion of market competition through basic structural
elements of the tax system, to distortions caused by specific privileged tax regimes. At the same time the
notions of “legitimate protection” of tax revenue and its equitable distribution Member States were
introduced. Finally in fields closely related to taxation such as financial accounting law and company law
new developments took place like the increasing influence of international accounting standards on tax
accounting and the agreement on the European Company Statute.
Moreover, the economic framework and business strategies have significantly changed since 1992.
Technological developments and more open and deeply-integrated markets impact on the behaviour of
companies and it is necessary to look into possible repercussions this may have on the taxation of these
companies, especially in cross-border situations.
                                                
14  see "Guidelines on Company Taxation linked to the Further Development of the Internal Market – Council Conclusions";
press release (10088/92 – Presse 216) after the ECOFIN Council meeting of 23 November 1992
15  Proposal for a Council Directive on 26 July 1993 [COM(93)293]
16  Conclusions of the Ecofin Council of 1 December 1997, OJ C2 of 6.1.1998, p.1.20
In essence the basic analysis of the Ruding report still remains valid today. Because of deeper integration,
because also of new developments in tax competition with more emphasis on specific tax regimes and the
equitable distribution of tax revenue among Member States, the pressing need for tax co-ordination has
become much clearer. However since the Ruding report very little has been achieved in the field of specific
regulation, and in that respect its impact has been disappointing.
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Although it sounds like a hackneyed phrase it is nevertheless true that the globalisation process has
significantly gained momentum since the Ruding Committee produced its report. It has profoundly
changed the international economic landscape and, subsequently, created new challenges for national
company tax systems. Globalisation means, among other things, more integration of international markets
due to new technological possibilities and the gradual reduction of market access barriers. This
development is, as such, independent of the Internal Market, but not surprisingly its effects are particularly
strong for countries that are already integrated in one market in which the liberalisation process is relatively
advanced (e.g. telecommunications, energy, public procurement, financial services). The same holds for the
companies that are based and operating in that integrated market. The result is increasing competition, both
between market operators and between Member States. Tax competition is an increasingly important aspect
of the latter.
Generally, the basic elements of the tax systems of most countries were established when economies were
relatively closed, capital movements limited and information technologies less developed than today.
Inasmuch as the tax systems of some countries do not yet reflect recent economic and technological
developments there is scope for companies to exploit loopholes and for other countries to try to attract
business from those countries. Hence, the opening of EU economies within the Internal Market and of that
Internal Market towards the rest of the world makes a case for collective action, in particular on the co-
ordination of EU company tax systems.
More specifically, the globalisation process has involved a significant increase in international mergers and
acquisitions. Box 1 below explains the general trend, but this is particularly marked within the EU. Market
integration in the EU favours the re-organisation of investment and production. This results in increasing
flows of investment, goods and services both between related and non-related companies. In 1999, EU
multinational enterprises accounted for $510 billion in foreign direct investment (FDI), i.e. almost two-
thirds of global FDI outflows. The number of mergers and acquisitions involving EU firms increased to
12.796 in 1999, compared to 10.024 in 1998 and 8.382 in 1997, an increase of more than 50% in two
years17. Western European mergers and acquisitions totalled $354 billion in sales and $519 billion in
purchases in 1999 18, representing more than two thirds of the value of all world-wide mergers and
acquisitions.
This development impacts on the way in which companies and tax administrations confront the taxation of
cross-border mergers and acquisitions. When the Ruding report was written, these trends were already
marked but were far from being as strong as they are today.
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The following figures illustrate that companies increasingly operate, in various facets, on a multinational scale. Tax
administrations however broadly continue operating on a national scale.
·  The number of multinational enterprises has increased from some 7,000 parent firms in 15 developed (EU and non-EU)
countries at the end of the 1960s to some 40,000 at the end of the 1990s. There are now approximately 63,000 parent firms
and 690,000 foreign affiliates operating world-wide.
·  Accordingly, international production, trade and investment have increased significantly. Sales of foreign affiliates world-
wide accounted for an estimated $13.6 trillion in 1999, compared to about $2.5 trillion in 1980, a figure twice as high as that
of global exports. Multinational enterprises now account for about one-tenth of global GDP, compared to one-twentieth in
1982.
·  This corresponds to a broad increase in foreign direct investment (FDI). The ratio of world FDI inflows ($865 billion in
1999) to gross domestic capital formation is now 14 %, compared to 2 % twenty years ago. In the same period, the ratio of
world FDI stock to world GDP increased from 5 % to 16 %.
·  At the same time, both the number and the value of mergers and acquisitions have increased significantly. The value of all
mergers and acquisitions (cross-border and domestic) as a share of world GDP has risen from 0.3 % in 1980 to 8 % in 1999
while the value of completed cross-border mergers and acquisitions rose from less than $100 billion in 1987 to $720 billion
in 1999. The total number of all mergers and acquisitions world-wide has grown at 42% annually between 1980 and 1999.
Looking towards the future, the structural technological changes driving the globalisation process are
creating new challenges for taxation and may introduce "tax termites"20 into national tax systems. The
increasing use of electronic commerce could become a fundamental problem for the correct taxation at a
national level of company profits21. Electronic transactions leave far fewer identifiable traces than "real"
transactions and many traditionally "physical" products are becoming virtual (e.g. software, music, films or
educational services). This makes it increasingly difficult to identify the economic operators, the territory
from which a transaction is made, etc.
The use of off-shore centres expanded during the 1990s. Indeed, the Ruding report expressed serious
worries about the prospect of “increased tax competition in a Single Market without internal frontiers”. In
recent years, both the EU and the OECD have been engaged heavily in efforts to curb harmful tax
competition.
Some commentators suggest that the taxation of corporate profits – already today a relatively minor source
of state revenue – could eventually vanish as it will no longer be enforceable. Others argue that there is
ultimately no economic case for taxing company profits as only individuals eventually bear taxes.
However, others see economic justifications in taxing companies that consume public goods and stresses
the practical link in levying both a corporate tax and a personal income tax. This study does not attempt to
rehearse those arguments further; it is written on the clear assumption that company taxes will continue to
be levied in the EU for the foreseeable future.
                                                
19  These figures are presented in UNCTAD (2000), Overview, p.9-13
20  Tanzi, Vito (2000), Globalization and the future of social protection, IMF Working Paper, WP/00/12, January 2000.
21  Estimates of the European Information Technology Organisation indicate that the EU will have about 80 million internet
users by 2002, the US 110 million. The total global electronic commerce is expected to reach a value of $ 330 billion by
2001-2002 and $ 1 trillion by 2003-2005. For the time being, however, 95% of e-commerce transactions are pure
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In this context it is however worth noting that, generally, corporate income tax has been fairly stable source
of revenues for European governments in the past 10 years, after a period of growth in the 1970s and
1980s. Thus, at this point in time, there seems to be little empirical evidence of a "race to the bottom".
Corporate income tax as a percentage of GDP varies considerably between the Member States. The
following box gives some information in this respect.
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1970 1980 1990 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001* 2002*
Belgium 2,4 2,2 2,4 3,1 3,5 3,6 3,5 3,5 3,5 3,4
Denmark 1,1 1,5 2,6 3,4 3,7 3,6 3,6 3,5 3,5 3,5
Germany 1,7 1,8 1,8 1,7 1,9 1,9 2,0 2,1 1,9 1,9
Greece - 0,5 1,7 2,2 2,4 2,9 3,2 3,3 3,3 3,2
Spain - 1,2 3,1 2,1 2,1 2,1 2,1 2,1 2,1 2,1
France 2,2 2,1 2,4 1,9 2,2 2,7 2,9 2,9 2,8 2,8
Ireland 1,3 1,5 2,2 3,6 3,7 3,7 3,7 3,5 3,4 3,3
Italy 3,0 2,4 3,7 4,2 4,3 3,9 4,1 4,1 3,9 3,9
Luxem-
bourg
5,9 7,6 6,6 6,9 8,3 8,3 8,2 8,2 8,0 7,6
Netherl. 2,5 3,0 3,4 4,1 4,6 4,5 4,5 4,4 4,2 4,2
Austria - 1,4 1,3 1,8 1,8 1,8 1,7 1,7 1,8 1,8
Portugal - 0,9 2,5 2,7 2,8 2,8 2,9 3,0 3,1 3,1
Finland - 1,2 2,0 3,0 3,7 3,7 3,7 3,8 3,6 3,5
Sweden - 1,2 2,0 3,1 2,8 2,9 2,9 2,8 2,7 2,6
U K 3,7 2,9 4,1 3,8 4,3 4,7 4,7 4,8 4,7 4,7
Europe          
* The figures for 2001 and 2002 are forecasts.
6RXUFHRIWKHILJXUHV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The introduction of the Internal Market in 1993 significantly changed the scenery for the company tax
systems of Member States. The Ruding report expressed serious worries about the prospect of increased
tax competition in a Single Market without internal frontiers. As indicated above, the current work on the
tax package and notably the Code of Conduct for business taxation is addressing the issue of KDUPIXO tax
competition. But in an increasingly integrated Single Market in which harmful forms of tax competition are
being removed, the competition effects of the general features of EU company tax systems become
significantly more important. The Internal Market thus accentuates general tax competition between
Member States and it needs to be assessed which welfare effects this increased competition has. The
analysis of part II of this study can be appraised in this context.23
Moreover, the Internal Market has affected the perspective of EU companies: they now increasingly change
their focus from the national state towards the Union as a coherent economic zone. This is evidence of the
success of the Internal Market. However, it makes all the more urgent to address the remaining tax
obstacles that prevent EU companies from exploiting its full benefits and that still bias companies towards
national rather than multinational economic activity. EU businesses have to deal with 15 company tax
systems and tax administrations in one market. This creates efficiency losses and unnecessary compliance
costs. These run against the potentially high positive welfare effects relating to the opening of national
markets via Internal Market integration and puts EU businesses at a relative competitive disadvantage
(compared to third country operators). These issues are considered in part III.
More specifically, when EU multinational companies define the EU as their home market they generally
wish to re-align their business structures accordingly by creating pan-European business units instead of
country-based organisations. Small and certainly medium-sized companies can also face this problem.
Although operating at a smaller scale and in fewer Member States, the basic idea of a market for goods and
services extending beyond the domestic market (be it via e-commerce or distance selling) translates into
practical business decisions and subsequent tax considerations for small and medium-sized enterprises. The
Internal Market thus concretely determines the way EU companies carry out their business within the
Community.
The creation of pan-European business structures can essentially be achieved by three means (which are
not mutually exclusive): (i) cross-border intra-group restructuring and expansion within the EU by way of
acquisitions or joint ventures, (ii) fully-fledged mergers and (iii) establishment of foreign branches. Within
the EU, this trend is clearly driven by the Internal Market. However, in a broader perspective it is
reinforced because businesses tend to concentrate their activities more and more on core activities (on EU
level or beyond), thus disposing of non-related business units and in turn purchasing related ones from
other companies. The result of this process of business re-alignment is that the number of cross-border
mergers and acquisitions and of intra-group transactions cross-border can be expected to rise even further.
In the context of this transformation of traditional country-based organisations into more transnational
organisations it is often necessary to move earning capacity cross-border, either by moving (parts of) the
business itself (including intangibles like goodwill) or the shares of the company containing this business.
Within a group of companies, both production facilities for final products or components and service
functions are thus increasingly concentrated and relocated. This is because business functions are no longer
organised according to national territories but along production lines and the value chain. Put simply:
whereas a large company traditionally used to have production, marketing and R&D facilities in every EU
Member State, it now typically concentrates the production in one country, marketing in another and R&D
in a third.
As a consequence of the reduced number of production facilities, the cross-border intra-group trade
between the few remaining manufacturing units and the associated marketing/sales organisations in other
Member States will grow significantly, both in volume and value. Where in the past export to affiliated
companies in other Member States was the exception rather than the rule, it is now not unusual that
manufacturing units export most of their products to affiliates. OECD estimates of the early 1990s already
indicate that over 60% of all international trade is trade between related companies. Thus, the tax problems
relating to transfer pricing take on a new dimension. While this issue is now dominating large parts of the
current discussions on international taxation it was hardly mentioned in the Ruding report.
As regards the re-alignment of other functions such as marketing, R&D and group financing, these
generally will be centralised either at the head office or in designated countries throughout Europe.
Consequently the costs of these functions have to be allocated through some sort of cost sharing24
mechanism. Such cost sharing arrangements, sometimes involving a large number of units, are becoming
more and more complicated.
In short, the process of creating pan-European business structures is today at the root of many specific
cross-border tax problems that did not have the same importance when the Ruding report was produced.
These problems are considered in detail in part III.
 7KHDFKLHYHPHQWRI(FRQRPLFDQG0RQHWDU\8QLRQ
The above trends are reinforced by the introduction of Economic and Monetary Union. For the euro-zone
countries the question of tax competition is even more important now that monetary and exchange rate
policy are no longer nationally available policy tools.22
Moreover, the transparency achieved by the single currency intrinsically generates a tendency of price
convergence (certainly for tangible goods) within the euro-zone. Consequently, it becomes logical for
multinational enterprises to set intra-group transfer prices EU-wide as a single harmonised price in euro per
product or product group, regardless from which production facility the goods are purchased.
This concept, which is often referred to as "euro pricing", can already be widely witnessed in business
practice. Transfer pricing is a traditional management tool and there is good reason to believe that euro
pricing is now also used similarly, its advantage being intra-group disputes about price levels and optimum
efficiency in the structure should disappear. In fact this concept treats the various factories in Europe as
production lines that happen to be based in different Member States but all belonging to the same single
European manufacturing unit. It is evident that such new tendencies impact on many features of
international company taxation, notably in the area of transfer pricing.
Economic and Monetary Union thus increases the integration achieved by the Internal Market even further
and. It also raises a further question as to which tax problems hamper the completion of an integrated EU
capital market. This somewhat separate problem is not specifically mentioned in the mandate for this study.
Moreover, unlike most other goods and services markets, the EU capital market currently still suffers from
relatively fundamental non-tax barriers. The Commission has recently put forward a number of measures to
remove the barriers to the Internal Market for financial services, and good progress is being made here in
collaboration with Member States23. For the purpose of this study, however, general tax problems within
the Internal Market are the most relevant.
 (8FRPSDQ\ODZGHYHORSPHQWV
The basic agreement on the principles of the European Company Statute (Societas Europaea – SE) at the
European Council of Nice provides a genuinely new element for analysing company taxation in the
European Union24. After the adoption of the appropriate legislative acts EU companies and specific other
legal persons governed by the law of Member States will be able, as from 2004, to merge, create a holding
company or form a joint subsidiary under the legal form of a European Company. Moreover, any public
limited-liability company with a registered office and headquarter within the Community will be able to
                                                
22  See, for instance: Vanistendael, F., 5HGLVWULEXWLRQRIWD[ODZPDNLQJSRZHULQ(08", EC Tax Review 1998/2
23  See, for instance, the basic Commission communication "Financial Services: Implementing the framework for financial
markets: action plan" [COM(1999)232] of 11 May 1999 and the subsequent progress reports.
24  Conclusions of the Presidency, European Council, Nice 7-9 December 2000, pt.22. See also the underlying  legislative
acts as proposed by the Commission: Amended proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) on the statute for a European
Company [COM(91)174]; Amended proposal for a Directive [COM(91)174] complementing the Statute for a European
Company with regard to the involvement of employees.25
transform itself into a European Company without going into liquidation, provided it has a subsidiary or a
branch in a Member State other than that of its registered office. This supplements the existing possibilities
for co-operation between firms established in a number of Member States under the European Economic
Interest Grouping (EEIG)25. Proposals for a European Company Statute have been on the Internal Market
agenda since 1970. The agreement thus constitutes an important break-through.
The basic idea of the European Company Statute is to provide companies in the EU with an additional
company law option as how to organise their activities at EU level. The existing national systems remain
unchanged. As from 2004 EU corporations will thus be able to carry out their business free from the
obstacles arising from the disparity and the limited application of national company laws. The registration
of the new European Company, its formation and personality are governed by the domestic laws of
Member States. The same holds for the subsidiary rules. It is however possible to transfer the registered
office to another Member State without winding up the old or having to create a new legal person. The
regulation deals with a significant number of legal issues encountered by the European Company. Those
issues that are not covered are in principle subject to domestic laws.
As regards taxation, an earlier draft of the European Company Statute regulation26 included provisions on
loss-compensation within the European Company (parent - subsidiary and parent - permanent
establishment). However, these provisions were dropped in 1991 in order to facilitate agreement on the
statute.
Ultimately, the tax regime applicable to the European Company is that of the Member State in which the
parent-company is headquartered and, according to the general tax rules of the Member States, where the
related subsidiary or permanent establishment is based. This is coherent inasmuch the whole idea of the
European Company Statute is to remove certain company law obstacles but at the same time to keep
companies anchored in the legal system of a specific Member State (and not in, say, an EU register or
similar). Nevertheless, it is imperative to examine the existing body of EU law on direct taxation in order
to identify necessary adaptations and, to consider the necessity of an appropriate EU tax regime. These
issues are, among other things, addressed in parts III and IV.
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It follows from the foregoing that company taxation constitutes one of the most important remaining issue
for the completion of the Internal Market and the full integration of the economies of Member States. At
the same time all major initiatives to tackle the underlying problems have met with little success so far,
while new external developments increase the competitive pressure on the EU as an economic zone and on
EU businesses.
Against this background, this section briefly presents some criteria for the assessment of company tax
systems. It then offers some basic considerations of how these criteria can be used in the context of this
study for assessing the welfare effects of different effective levels of taxation and persisting tax problems
in the Internal Market. They also serve as assessment criteria for the possible solutions to those problemss
described in parts III and IV of the study.
                                                
25  Council Regulation (EEC) No 2137/85 of 25 July 1985 on the European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG), OJ l L 199,
31/07/1985 p.1 - 9.
26 COM(89)16826
 *HQHUDOSULQFLSOHVIRUWKHGHVLJQRIFRPSDQ\WD[V\VWHPV
It is common ground between economists and tax experts that an "ideal" company tax system has to be
equitable, efficient, simple, transparent, effective and provide certainty. These inter-related general criteria
can usefully serve as basis for the analysis of company taxation in the EU to be carried out in this study.
(TXLW\
The requirement of equity has two dimensions. "Vertical equity" refers to the re-distributive feature of a tax
system, i.e. to its capacity to operate a distribution of the tax burden among taxpayers according to their
contributive capacity ("ability-to-pay-principle"). "Horizontal equity" holds that taxpayers who are in the
same economic circumstances should receive an equivalent tax treatment. The concrete perception of these
concepts is strongly related to societal values such as solidarity and fairness. Vertical and horizontal equity
therefore strongly condition the political acceptability of a tax system. In the context of international
company taxation, equity mostly relates to the fair allocation of the tax base between states in which
international companies operate.
Inter-country equity traditionally involves three main principles: source-country entitlement, non-
discrimination and reciprocity. Under the "principle of source-country entitlement" the source country has
the prior right to tax profits earned within its jurisdiction. This principle can be justified for efficiency
reasons and it can help to achieve some redistribution of resources across countries, since the proportion of
foreign-owned businesses is generally higher in relatively poor countries than in richer ones. It is also
sometimes justified as a TXLGSURTXR for the provision of public infrastructure and services in the source
country. The "principle of non discrimination" implies that countries agree, usually on a bilateral basis, not
to discriminate against foreign firms and shareholders in their tax laws. This principle is strongly linked to
horizontal equity, since the same tax treatment is applied to similar companies independently of nationality
considerations. The "principle of reciprocity" can, for instance, be illustrated by the requirement of equality
of the rates applied to any withholding tax levied on interest, dividends and royalties by states involved in a
tax treaty. Reciprocity applies to any tax arrangement which leads to similar effective tax burdens on
foreign-owned investmentsThis is particularly relevant when states have strongly differing tax rules and
practices.
(IILFLHQF\
Generally, taxes should be neutral and influence in as limited a measure as possible economic decisions,
for example the choice of location of an investment. Otherwise, economic activities may not take place in
the lowest cost location by the lowest cost producers. Investing in a low tax jurisdiction may yield higher
after-tax returns on capital than a similar investment in a high tax jurisdiction despite a lower productivity
of the inputs used. The result of locational inefficiency is thus a lower level of productivity of capital, and
reduced international competitiveness and growth for the EU as a whole. Therefore, an efficient tax system
is in principle neutral to economic decision-making.
Tax systems can however be used to correct or mitigate a market failure. To the extent that there are other
distortions or imperfections in the market economy, taxes may offset these externalities, thereby enhancing
economic efficiency. A typical example would be negative environmental consequences, not fully taken
into account by an individual agent, which an imposed tax would mitigate by decreasing the activities
harmful for the environment. There are also other instances when national governments will try to reduce
existing (non-tax) incentives through the use of the tax system. A good company tax system should avoid
distortions with regard to location, etc., unless these are deliberately decided (e.g. in economic “free zones”
which are designed to boost economic development).27
The two main concepts for considering the international economic benefits of efficiency and neutrality are
"capital export neutrality" and "capital import neutrality". Both concepts are considered in detail in the
analysis of the effective tax rates in part II .
Under "capital export neutrality" a tax system does not affect the decision by any specific company as to in
which country to invest. Resident investors in a given country have no incentive to invest at home rather
than abroad, or vice versa. The domestic/foreign composition of the investment income does not influence
the world-wide tax thereon. Other things being equal, capital mobility would then tend to equalise the
required pre-tax rates of return on investment across Member States, thereby eliminating differences in the
cost of capital, and thus distortions in the demand for capital in the EU. Capital export neutrality could be
achieved if income were taxed only in the investors’ country of residence and if there were no
discrimination between domestic and foreign-source income in the capital-exporting country. This could be
achieved if all countries applied the "world-wide" or "residence" principle, that is, levied taxes on the
income accruing to their residents regardless of the source of that income.
A tax system achieves "capital import neutrality" when all investors, both domestic and from foreign
countries, investing in any one national economy face the same after-tax rate of return on similar
investments. This implies that the cost of capital and the tax rate for any inbound investment must not
depend on the home country, that is the country of residence of the investor. In fact, the application of the
residence principle can lead to cases where a domestic company investing in a given country is placed at a
competitive disadvantage compared to a similar foreign company investing in the same country - because
the tax rates applied in their home countries are different. Therefore, in order to avoid distortions of
competition and to achieve capital import neutrality, income should be taxed according to the "source" or
"territorial" principle. According to this principle, a government should tax all income originating within
its jurisdiction at the same rate, regardless of the origin of the beneficiary of the income.
Inefficiencies do not only arise due to different tax treatments of cross-border investments. There may also
be distortions in the decisions for the types of investment, as tax treatments applied to the assets used by
companies or to the sources of financing of investment may vary considerably within and across countries.
(IIHFWLYHQHVV
The effectiveness of a tax system refers to its capacity to achieve its basic objectives - to generate the
desired level of revenues and to set the desired economic incentives. The effectiveness of a given tax
system strongly depends on its interactions with other tax systems. For instance, measures like reduced
statutory rates, accelerated depreciation allowances or investment tax credits may improve the international
competitiveness of a country both by reducing the overall tax burden of domestic firms and by attracting
foreign investments. However, in the case of a foreign multinational firm taxed on a residence basis in its
home country, tax cuts in the country of source would have no effect on their total tax burden and,
therefore, on investment. It would merely shift tax revenues from the source country to the home country of
this firm as, under the credit method usually linked to the residence principle, firms receive a full credit for
taxes paid abroad. The reduction of the tax liability in the host country is thus simply compensated by an
increase of the tax liability in the home country (via a smaller tax credit).
It is self-evident that tax incentives (e.g. for investment) will, when efficient, directly reduce tax revenues
Although, depending on the type of measure, the revenue reducing effects may vary significantly. The
indirect trade-off is more complex. Foregone tax revenues, i.e. "tax expenditures", may be partially or fully
offset as a consequence of an increase in investment and in the international mobility of tax bases, which in
turn directly and indirectly generate increased tax revenues.28
6LPSOLFLW\FHUWDLQW\DQGWUDQVSDUHQF\
The requirement of a "simple" tax system is relatively straightforward. It implies the minimisation of the
costs linked to the operation of the tax system. These costs are "compliance costs" for the taxpayers and
"administrative costs" incurred by the administration to enforce the law. Administrative and compliance
costs are intrinsic to any tax system: governments have to raise revenues and taxpayers have to comply
with tax rules. However, one might wonder which amount of cost is proportionate for meeting these
objectives. Generally, these costs are higher for international transactions involving more than one tax
administration than for purely domestic operations. For instance, even the mere co-existence of two simple
but conflicting principles – source or residence taxation –in principle creates cases of double taxation or
unintentional double exemption that can only be overcome by appropriate – usually complex and costly -
international agreements. The criterion of simplicity is thus linked to efficiency and effectiveness. Simple
tax systems do not only mean relatively low costs; they usually do not provide intentional preferential tax
regimes or unintentional tax arbitrage or tax avoidance opportunities. They may, however, also imply a loss
of equity.
The requirement of simplicity also requires that the rules according to which taxes are levied are certain
and clear to the taxpayer. Certainty relates to the stability of a tax system and of tax practices in a country.
The uncertainty resulting from frequent changes in tax legislation and its interpretation has, as such, a
negative or delaying impact on investment decisions. Simplicity and certainty are generally linked to the
criterion of transparency of the laws, regulations and administrative procedures of a tax system.
Transparency usually supports equity. For instance, it can help to avoid the replacement of direct State aid
by tax incentives offered by administrations on a discretionary basis. Moreover, the transparency of a tax
system is generally important for ensuring accountability of the policy-makers.
 7KHHFRQRPLFZHOIDUHHIIHFWVRIFRPSDQ\WD[DWLRQV\VWHPV
Broadly, one can say that if a company tax system meets some or all of the above criteria it contributes to
more economic welfare. However, for the purpose of the study, it is necessary to clarify how these general
criteria work within the EU in the context of the Internal Market and which trade-offs may exist. So far, it
has been shown that the study is necessary to deal with two basic company tax issues of relevance in the
context of European integration: (i) company tax obstacles to the Internal Market and (ii) differences in
effective tax company tax rates or tax competition in general.
If one looks at the current situation of company taxation in the EU from the perspective of the above
criteria it is possible to identify the risk of distortions to business decisions, in particular location decisions.
At the same time, one can point to distortions in the provision and financing of public goods and/or in the
distribution of tax burdens for a given supply of public goods and transfers. Both may reduce the overall
welfare in the EU and both may work in different directions. By measuring the magnitude of the welfare
loss, one can estimate the probable efficiency gains that would be generated by eliminating such
distortions. This sort of measurement is very difficult, but valuable and meaningful conclusions are still
possible.
'LVWRUWLRQVWREXVLQHVVGHFLVLRQV
It is fairly evident that differences in effective tax rates across countries (or within countries) for different
types of investment, financing mode etc. will influence the incentive structure of investors. As mentioned
above, according to economic theory, optimal decisions in a market economy should be based on prices
that are not distorted. Taxation will affect the rate of return and therefore the prices an investor faces for
different investment opportunities. To what extent taxation has a negative impact on investment decisions,
depends on to what extent taxes offset or reinforce other distortions in the economy. There are two
different aspects that need to be considered for approaching this question and for evaluating the effects of29
different levels of taxation. First, the impact of taxation on economic efficiency depends on the economic
environment in which the tax is imposed. As pointed out above, taxes are sometimes used to correct or
mitigate a market failure and/or offset specific externalities. This increases economic efficiency. On the
other hand taxes may be used to compensate for physical or locational disadvantages. This use of taxes
often decreases over all economic efficiency, although it may increase local or regional social welfare. The
second aspect is what could be called the “transmission mechanism”, i.e. to what extent incentives lead to
changes in actual behaviour. To the extent that economic agents are not affected by the imposed taxes,
there will be no negative effect stemming from the level of taxation.
It is essentially an empirical question to what extent investment decisions are affected by taxes, as
predicted by economic theory. Consequently, the associated welfare implications are also to a large extent
an empirical question. Despite these difficulties in assessing the precise effect on investment decisions and
welfare levels for ordinary citizens, it is still possible to draw valuable conclusions. If there are really
significant differences in the effective level of taxation, then one can certainly argue that there would have
to be a very complex structure of externalities to justify such variation in tax structure and tax rates. For
example, on pure economic grounds it is hard to imagine that debt financing should be favoured above
equity financing, since the negative macro effects to the economy from excess debt levels are substantial,
particularly in times of financial turbulence.
It is also hard to imagine that it would be desirable that similar investments face markedly different
effective levels of taxation purely because of their country location. Even if one cannot on economic
grounds rule out the need for different levels of taxation in various countries, given their natural resources
and skill levels etc, one must question the size of the differences and their dispersion. To the extent that
there are no convincing economic justifications for these variations in levels of taxation across countries,
types of investments and modes of financing, it can be concluded that, overall, the tax systems distort
investment allocations. Decreasing these distortions would hence enhance economic efficiency and growth
in the Union. It would contribute to a better allocation of resources in the Internal Market that is based on
real economic factors rather than tax considerations.
Furthermore, as mentioned above, the tax differences also entail large administrative costs and they foster
tax planning behaviour with further costs to the business community and society at large. With reduced tax
distortions, these efforts would be put to economically better use.
To some extent, one could compare the situation with unifying the tax structure to the creation of the single
currency. Certainly, the benefits from lower transaction costs are substantial (but often assessed to a
fraction of a percent of GDP) but the benefits of a single currency go beyond that. It enhances growth
prospects, thereby promoting a more efficient economy. Removing obstacles and creating a level playing
field in the area of taxation, would have its largest impact on enhanced competition and value added to
European consumers.
'LIIHUHQFHVLQHIIHFWLYHWD[UDWHVDQGWD[FRPSHWLWLRQ
One of the elements that has changed most drastically since the early 1990s is what is commonly called
"tax competition". As indicated above, the effects of globalisation and the creation of the Internal Market
and Economic and Monetary Union may have given rise to, on the one hand, more tax competition
between countries, both within the Internal Market and world-wide, for different tax bases, and, on the
other, to specific initiatives designed to combat KDUPIXO tax competition. Reference is notably made to the
work carried out in the context of the EU Code of Conduct for business taxation and the OECD Forum on
harmful tax practices. Moreover, the European Commission has stepped up its efforts in the control of
fiscal State Aids under the EC Treaty.30
For the purpose of this study it is not necessary to review the history and results of these initiatives in
detail. However, it is most important to note that as a result of these efforts many SUHIHUHQWLDO tax regimes
for companies are being changed, abolished or phased out. It follows from this development that the
JHQHUDO features of the company tax systems of Member States will become more important for economic
decisions than today. Therefore, differences between Member States in (general) effective company tax
rates also become more important in comparison to a situation where the recourse to preferential regimes is
possible. This development provides a common thread for the present study. EU enlargement will
compound the underlying trends.
The welfare implications of tax competition in general are manifold, as tax competition affects the tax
structure, the tax burden and, ultimately, the financing and the provision of public goods. Tax competition
may affect to different extents the various existing tax bases, thereby inducing differentiation or
approximations of effective tax rates, and the corresponding increase or diminution of a number of tax
distortions. At the same time, it may induce a change in the overall tax burden, in the form, for instance, of
a downward pressure (a “cap”) on the overall tax level. Its effect on welfare will then depend on a number
of factors, such as the State expenditures and revenues structures, the overall public finance position of the
State, etc.
To sum up, taxation ultimately involves a political choice and a trade-off between some costs in terms of
efficiency and other goals, such as redistribution or reduction of market failures and funding of public
goods and services, being pursued through taxation. The same applies in the European context.
 7+(6758&785(2)7+,6678'<
Part II of this study is devoted to the detailed analysis of the company tax systems in the European
Community. This includes a comparative analysis of the qualitative features of the company tax systems in
Member States and the detailed determination and calculation of the effective rates of company taxation in
Member States under various scenarios.
Part III then examines company tax obstacles in the Internal Market how market operators are hampered in
the exploitation of the "four freedoms" and how their decisions on the location of economic activity and
investment is influenced by concrete tax rules.
Finally, part IV looks into possible remedial measures for the obstacles identified in part III. This includes
an analysis of both targeted measures for resolving specific tax problems as well as more comprehensive




A. ANALYSIS OF THE COMPANY TAX LAW
 ,1752'8&7,21
 :K\D4XDOLWDWLYH$QDO\VLV"
Effective Tax Rates are principally the product of the nominal tax rate and the rules governing the
computation of the tax base. In some countries financial accounting standards may influence to a certain
extent the rules governing the tax base and specific tax incentives over and above the general
computational rules, may also have an impact. Where there are large differences between the nominal and
the effective tax rate a comparison of the structural elements which make up the tax base between countries
can assist in the identification of the causes.
The Quantitative Analysis in Part II B includes the results of two economic models based on a ‘forward-
looking’ concept. One is based on a hypothetical simple manufacturing investment with a well-defined but
limited number of computational rules and covers all the Member States. The other is based on a
hypothetical model firm in the manufacturing sector and uses more computational rules, but does not cover
all the Member States. (Part II B explains the models and the results in detail.) Through sensitivities and
simulations the models identify and quantify the effect of certain structural elements of the tax base,
including the nominal tax rate, on the effective tax rate.
The Qualitative Analysis complements this to enable a comparison between more of the structural
elements. To the extent that the relationship between nominal rates and effective rates is relatively constant
(as is illustrated by the quantitative analysis) it should be possible to identify similarities and differences
between Member States’ approach to company taxation by comparing a number of the major structural
features of each Member State’s tax legislation.
Ten structural elements of a typical tax system were identified27 as being the most material in determining
a corporate entity’s tax liability and hence the effective tax rate. These were:
Statutory rate, tax accounting rules, depreciation, provisions, losses, capital gains, mergers and
acquisitions, group relief/consolidation (including inter-group dividends), inventories and expense
deductions.
Some of these categories were further subdivided and the tables prepared for each Member State include
descriptions of thirty eight sub-categories.
                                                
27  Messrs Tirard and Vanistendael, members of Panel I prepared a detailed paper ‘Measuring effective rates of corporate
income tax in the EU - a qualitative report’ on which this section draws heavily. That paper in turn made extensive use of
IBFD data concerning individual Member States’ tax legislation.32
The ten structural elements were selected as the most important ‘common’ elements. Specific measures
such as those identified by the Primarolo Group28 as providing for a significantly lower effective level of
taxation than those levels which generally apply in a particular Member State and regarded as potentially
harmful were excluded as they are the subject of separate initiatives.
 :KDWFDQVXFKDTXDOLWDWLYHDQDO\VLVUHYHDO"
In the tables the basic structural elements of a tax system are identified and for each Member State the
approach adopted by that Member State is briefly explained. It is therefore possible to classify the different
approaches for each structural element and identify groups of Member States who follow a similar
approach, i.e. apply the same or similar treatment to particular elements. Groups or individual Member
States who apply a different treatment, outside this ‘average’ can also be identified.
As mentioned above the Quantitative Analysis models necessarily summarise the structural elements of
each Member State tax system and this Qualitative Analysis includes a number of important elements
which could not be included in the models, such as certain rules governing capital gains, the treatment of
losses including carry back and carry forward rules, and domestic consolidation.
In addition to facilitating a comparison of the different treatments by Member States of the basic structural
elements the analysis also permits comparisons within the Member States to understand how certain
features interact. For example some Member States do not tax certain capital gains nor give relief for
capital losses whereas others tax and permit loss relief.
The analysis does not attempt to identify which approach to a specific element is the ‘best’. Each Member
State has established its rules with the aim of constructing a coherent tax system to meet its particular
needs. Without quantifying the effects of the specific measures it is not possible to say, for example that
one particular method of calculating depreciation is better than another. The Quantitative Analysis, in
particular in some of the simulations, is where the effect of particular tax measures can be quantified.
However, the Qualitative Analysis does reveal the range and complexity of methods in use for example in
depreciation, where the overall aim of each Member State is likely to be broadly similar and might raise the
question of why such a diversity is necessary.
The tables do not seek to explain every aspect of each Member State’s tax system. As explained above only
the basic elements have been included, and within each sub-category only a summary description of the
principle rules has been presented. In many instances there are exceptions and slight amendments to the
main rules applicable in certain circumstances but unless these were considered material they have been
excluded.
In the context of this report the Qualitative Analysis is also useful in the consideration of the
comprehensive approaches. In Part IV some of these approaches to EU company taxation are discussed,
one based on the mutual recognition of Member States of each other’s tax codes and others based on a
common or harmonised tax base. Where a group of the same Member States consistently follows similar
approaches to a number of the structural elements those Member States would appear to be more able to
participate in any comprehensive approach based on mutual recognition than those who in general follow
different approaches. Where particular structural elements are characterised by a wide range of different
approaches, or fundamentally different approaches, it might suggest that mutual recognition in this
particular area would be particularly difficult, for example in the treatment of foreign income.
                                                
28  Code of Conduct Group (Business Taxation) Report to ECOFIN Council 29 November 199933
A common or harmonised base implies, at the very least, that the basic structural elements of the Member
States’ existing tax systems be aligned, or in the event of the existing national systems remaining alongside
the new system in parallel, that a new tax code be drafted. The tabulation of the basic structural elements of
Member States’ current systems illustrates the number of features which would need to be harmonised and
the identification of groupings of Member States who already have structural similarities.
 )LQGLQJV
 7D[5DWHV
The tax rate is the most visible element determining the effective tax rate in any corporate income tax
system. Rates vary considerably from one Member State to another and in addition to the main statutory or
‘headline’ rate details concerning reduced rates, surcharges, minimum rates and special rates are also given
where applicable. Two Member States, Germany and Italy, at the 1999 reference date had a ‘dual rate’
system distinguishing between retained and distributed profits. A number of Member States assist small
and medium enterprises by having a specific reduced rate for companies whose profits are below a certain
threshold or via a system of progressive rates but there is no standard definition. Certain industries are also
sometimes subject to rates other than the main statutory rate. Certain types of income, such as capital gains
are also subject to different rates.
With the exception of Ireland these variations from the statutory rate, although important to the companies
subject to them, are not considered to be material to an overall comparison of EU rates, as the majority of
enterprises competing across the EU will be subject to main statutory rate, adjusted in some cases for
‘temporary’ surcharges. Ireland is a special case because although the main rate is 40% there is a special
rate of 10% applicable to certain companies including those in the manufacturing sector and for the
purposes of this study it is more appropriate to consider the rate of 10% as the ‘main’ rate.29
The range of statutory rates is substantial. Ireland’s rate of 10% is the lowest followed by a group of
Member States with rates around 30% (Sweden 28%, Finland 29%, Luxembourg 30%, UK 30%, Denmark
32%). At the upper end there is a group with rates around 40% (Belgium 39%, Italy 37% + 4.25%, Greece
40%). Germany’s rate was in this grouping but as from 2001 the new statutory rate is 25% plus ‘Trade
Tax’ typically at 12 to13%. The extent to which these differences in statutory rates are reflected in effective
rates is covered in the Quantitative Analysis in Part II B.
 $FFRXQWLQJ5XOHV
Differences between financial accounting rules and tax accounting rules can have a significant effect on
effective tax rates. With a few specific exceptions the rules applied within each Member State are applied
to all companies and sectors. Part IV explains in some detail the two ‘traditions’ of ‘dependence’ and
‘independence’. The tables show how three Member States (Ireland, the Netherlands and UK) take a
similar approach in permitting differences between the financial accounting and the tax treatment of certain
items. In the remaining Member States there is a much closer relationship between the two. However,
because the financial accounting rules in operation across the EU are not completely harmonised to a
certain extent such comparisons are rather difficult as both the financial accounts and the tax accounts of
any given enterprise could be prepared according to different rules in different Member States. The
Quantitative Analysis necessarily effectively assumes a common definition of accounting profits for the
purpose of calculating a effective rates although the Tax Analyser work does include certain sensitivities
concerning different accounting conventions and this is also referred to the section on the Economic
                                                
29  The information is based on applicable legislation as at 30 June 1999. The developing rate structure in Ireland underlines
the appropriateness of basing any comparisons on the lower rate.34
Effects and the results of the Quantitative Analysis in Part IV C in relation to the Comprehensive
Approaches. A more detailed comparison would require not only the tax treatment of particular
transactions in all the Member States to be compared, but also the normal accounting treatment of the same
transactions to be compared.
 'HSUHFLDWLRQ
The significance of the rules on tax depreciation as regards the effective tax rate varies depending on the
capital asset intensity of particular sectors of activity. When the rate of depreciation permitted for tax
purposes exceeds the true economic rate of depreciation there is effectively an tax incentive for investment.
In many Member States this appears to be the case.
The initial depreciable base for capital assets is uniform across the EU in that it essentially equates to the
cost. The only exception is Greece where an element of revaluation is permitted in certain cases. The most
common methods in use are the reducing balance and straight line or a combination of the two. There are
also sundry other methods in certain circumstances. However, it is in the rates where the greatest variations
are seen with some Member States also providing a number of rates depending on the type of asset
involved.
Given the range of methods, rates and asset categories it is difficult to compare the depreciation rules
without carrying out a series of computations. When choice is also involved any comparison becomes even
more complex. In contrast some Member States30 have a relatively simple system, which when combined
with group relief and an unlimited loss carry forward can give the same amount of flexibility as the more
complex approach where the amount and timing of depreciation ‘claims’ is an important factor.
It is more straightforward to compare which assets are not eligible for depreciation. Member States take
quite different approaches to the depreciation of intangibles. Concerning patents and trademarks a number
of different rates and methods are applied but the biggest contrast concerns the treatment of goodwill.
Twelve Member States permit some form of depreciation but four Member States (France, Ireland,
Portugal and UK ) do not permit any depreciation. In principle land is treated as a non depreciating asset
across the EU. Some Member States do however permit in certain circumstances a deductible provision for
a permanent loss in value of some non-depreciable assets. The rules for the accounting for tax depreciation
in general follow the overall rules governing financial and tax accounting in the sense that in most Member
States depreciation is only deductible to the extent that it is provided for in the financial accounts, whereas
in Ireland, the Netherlands and UK this is not a requirement.
 3URYLVLRQV
Provisions may be divided into two main categories. First, the type whose purpose is to ensure that the
financial statements of the company accurately reflect the true position in accordance with the accounting
principle of prudence, taking into account the necessity to ensure that assets are not overvalued and that
expenses are allocated to the correct accounting period. Second, the type whereby profits may be
transferred to what could be considered a tax free reserve which could be considered a kind of tax
incentive. The categories compared in the tables are mainly of the first type with the exception of pension
reserves.
There are three main possibilities for the rules governing bad debt provisions: general provisions, specific
provisions and provisions limited in value and all three are used in the EU; sometimes in combination. In
                                                
30 Compare for example the complexity of Spain’s rules, with a 10 year loss carry-forward limit to the relative simplicity of
the UK’s rules, with an unlimited loss carry forward.35
some sectors there are special rules reflecting the relative importance of debts to the business activity, such
as in banking and other finance activities.
As regards provisions for future expenses in the most part these are deductible although in several Member
States provisions for repairs are not, possibly to avoid this category being used as a type of tax free reserve.
The major differences appear in the category of Pension reserves which could be considered to be in the
second category of provisions as outlined above, a type of tax free reserve. However, this particular
category of reserve is heavily dependent on the method by which pensions in general are provided for in
individual Member States.
One approach would be the example of the UK where provisions for pensions could generally be described
as non deductible, but where the general system is that a company does not have a liability to pay pensions,
but agrees to make contributions to a separate pension fund which will eventually pay the pensions. In this
case the UK company would have no reason to make a provision for pensions, it would be required to
make a payment to the pension fund to the extent required by the fund, and the payment would be
deductible. An example of the contrasting approach would be the situation in Germany where the liability
remains with the employing company and the pension fund assets are not separated from the company’s.
Companies have the option to fund pensions by provisions (discounted at 6%) to what could be considered
a tax free reserve. However, given the summarised nature of the tables it is difficult to comment in any
detail on the detailed implications in each Member State.
The main effect of these different approaches to pension provisions is that in some Member States31
companies have the opportunity to obtain a tax deduction on the basis of a provision and can therefore
retain the cash within the company, in others deductions are received only when the cash has been paid out.
Whereas the actual tax situation of two similarly prudent companies who provide for the future pensions of
their employees might be similar, one company might be able to retain the cash in the business, the other
not.
 /RVVHV
The possibility of carrying losses forwards for relief against future profits is particularly important for new
business start ups if they are unable to utilise the losses before they time expire. Seven Member States still
retain time limits and these vary between 10 years (2 Member States) and 5 years (4 Member States). The
possibility of carrying losses backwards against previous profits also varies across the EU with nine
Member States not permitting carry back at all and the remainder permitting it for between 1 year (3
Member States) and 3 years (2 Member States).
The approach of Member States to losses illustrates how structural elements in a tax system can change
over time. Until a few years ago losses were subject to time expiry in a number of Member States.
However, there is now far more scope to carry losses forward for longer periods and the trend is moving
towards more generous rules. Similarly loss carry back is now more widely available than in the past and
both these factors can have a significant impact on the effective tax rates of companies in the EU. This
development is particularly marked because the time expiry of losses is permanent. Other elements, such as
depreciation, generally tend to concern timing differences: for asset categories eligible for depreciation it is
only the speed at which relief for its loss of value is obtained where there are differences between Member
States.
                                                
31  Member States are split approximately 50:50 in their approach.36
Loss carry forward provisions also illustrate the parallelism between structural elements and specific tax
incentives. The latter are not considered here but it is interesting to note that an unlimited loss carry
forward (structural) could be considered equivalent to an extended tax holiday to new businesses
(incentive), although in fact the structural element could prove more beneficial in cases where losses are
incurred during a tax holiday but time expire before they can be offset against subsequent profits.
 &DSLWDO*DLQV
The treatment of capital gains can be divided into two main areas: tangible assets and intangible assets such
as shares. In general the rules relating to tangible assets have moved closer together. All Member States
observe the realisation principle; although in certain circumstances some Member States permit unrealised
permanent losses in value to be recognised. With the exception of Ireland, France and Greece the
applicable rate32 of tax is the same as for trading income. Only Denmark, France and Italy have no
provision for rollover relief and only Ireland (related to the separate rate of tax) and the UK (possibly for
historic reasons) treat capital losses differently from trading losses. Only Denmark, Spain (for immovable
property), Ireland and the UK make allowances for inflation when computing capital gains. Overall the
treatment of capital gains and losses is broadly similar between Member States and the rate is largely
determined by the normal statutory rate.
With respect to intangibles, specifically shares, there is greater contrast in treatment. A growing number of
Member States exempt gains (and losses) on the sale of shares, or apply a reduced rate of tax to gains (and
losses) whereas some tax (and relieve) at the normal rate.
 0HUJHUVDQG$FTXLVLWLRQV
With respect to mergers and acquisitions the situation is relatively similar across the EU. All Member
States permit, under certain conditions, some sort of deferral of gains on mergers. The deferral can be
achieved by two means: a full deferral until subsequent realisation (similar in effect to rollover relief), or a
deferral by means of an instalment plan for tax payments due on any gains arising as a result of the merger.
The deferral also provides for the transfer of the existing tax base of the ‘old’ company although there are
generally strict rules concerning the transfer of losses.
This area of taxation is very technical and other than identifying the broad similarities it is not possible to
provide a detailed comparison between Member States on the basis of the summarised information
presented in the tables. However, it is worth mentioning that some Member States have extended the
deferral rules provided for in the Merger Directive33 to domestic mergers.
 *URXS5HOLHIµ&RQVROLGDWLRQ¶
Member States fall into one of three categories as regards group relief. Denmark, and in a more restricted
way France provide group relief on a world wide basis. Belgium, Greece and Italy in contrast have no
provision for group companies to offset gains and losses. The remaining Member States provide for group
relief within their jurisdictions although the precise rules concerning eligibility and the actual method of
achieving the relief vary widely.
These differences, like the ones concerning loss carry back and forward, create fundamental permanent
differences between the taxation of enterprises in different Member States. Depending on the geographical
                                                
32  Italy also has a reduced rate but only for certain gains on assets held > 3years and no roll over relief as such.
33  EC Directive 90/434 OJ 1990 L225/137
spread, and corporate structure of an international enterprise its overall effective tax rate can be
significantly effected by the range of rules across the EU.
 ,QWHU±&RPSDQ\'LYLGHQGV
The main distinction between Member States concerns whether they operate a credit system or an
exemption system. In general the exemption system is considered more advantageous to the tax payer. The
‘generosity’ of a tax system can also be measured by considering to what extent the relief granted in a
Member State is more generous than the minimum required by the ‘Parent Subsidiary’ Directive34. The
majority of Member States (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, The
Netherlands, and the UK) are more generous than required by the Directive and make no distinction
between dividends from Member States, and from outside the EU. Spain provides more generous relief
than required under the Directive, but makes a distinction between EU and non EU dividends. Austria
provides the minimum relief in accordance with the Directive but extends this to non EU dividends and
finally Greece, Italy, Portugal and Sweden apply only the Directive.
This illustrates that the Directive is essentially operating as a minimum standard, which a majority of
Member States are prepared to go beyond. To the extent that the Directive sought to provide for the same
treatment across the EU it has not achieved this aim.
,QYHQWRULHV
In periods of low inflation the rules relating to stock valuation are unlikely to have a decisive impact on
effective tax rates. However, even when inflation is low individual sectors may be subject to large
variations in stock valuations when particular commodity prices vary, such as crude oil which over very
short periods has fluctuated from over US $30 per barrel, down to US $10 and back to US $ 30. The
distinction between Member States who permit the LIFO method of valuation, and those who do not can
therefore be an important factor. The majority of Member States do accept this basis for stock valuation but
Finland, France, Sweden and the UK do not.
In certain industries the extent to which certain administrative and overhead expenses are included in stock
valuations may have a impact on the final stock valuation and hence the taxable profit and effective tax rate
for a given period but the summarised tables to do not permit a detailed comparison between policies in
different Member States. Such considerations would only be applicable in certain industries.
                                                
34 EC Directive 90/435 OJ 1990 L225/638
([SHQVHV
The basic rules concerning expenses are broadly similar. Although differences tend to be permanent rather
than simply timing, and therefore potentially more significant, where there are differences they tend to be
very specific and in most cases concern relatively low value items such as entertaining and travelling.
However, without going into a great deal of detail it is not possible to make a general distinction between
Member States.
The treatment of interest, specifically thin capitalisation is an exception. Several Member States do not
have formal rules on thin capitalisation and this could lead to substantially different effects on the effective
tax rates in Member States when comparing those who do have protective rules and those who do not.
 &RQFOXVLRQV
On the basis of the tables it is not possible to draw general conclusions concerning the quantitative impact
of the variations in the structural elements. However, it is clear that there are substantial qualitative
differences in certain areas. Within each category one can identify ‘clusters’ of Member States who
approach specific elements in a similar manner. However, it is difficult to identify a group of Member
States who consistently, across all the structural elements, form a coherent grouping on the basis of their
current tax systems or a group or individual Member State who are consistently outside the ‘norms’. In a
number of cases the changes which would be required to bring Member States closer together would not
appear to be major and in a number of the categories one could question the ‘need’ for the detailed
differences.
It has been suggested that the tax treatment of structural elements of the tax base is compensatory and in
terms of the overall effective tax rate a high nominal tax rate is indicative of a ‘narrow’ tax base, and a low
nominal tax rate is indicative of a ‘broad’ tax base. Analysing the individual structural elements reveals
that there are differences and these may themselves be compensatory, for example within a Member State
restrictive rules on the depreciation of goodwill might be ‘compensated’ for by generous tax depreciation
of tangible assets. ‘Compensation’ could therefore exist at two levels – at the rate/base level, and within the
different elements of the calculation of the base. The qualitative analysis helps in identifying the potential
compensatory factors, and in identifying the different clusters of Member States. For example with respect
to the statutory rate ‘clusters’ around 30% and around 40% can be identified and at the ‘extremes’ the
tables show that the highest rate is currently four times the lowest rate. For a single market this is a wide
range. However, without measuring the relative financial effect of each of the structural elements any
statement concerning the degree to which one measure compensated for another would be subjective. It is
for this reason that the Quantitative Analysis is necessary in order to place objective values on the
structural elements and test the hypothesis that the treatment of the existing structural elements is
compensatory and to quantify the respective impact of these on the effective tax rate. 0HPEHU6WDWH7DEOHV
6WUXFWXUDO￿HOHPHQWV %HOJLXP 1HWKHUODQGV )LQODQG $XVWULD
￿￿￿7D[￿5DWHV
- Standard 39 % 35 % 29 % 34 %
- Reduced 28 % profits 1-25.000 EURO
36 % profits: 25.000 – 90.000 EURO
41 % profits: 90.000 – 325.000 EURO
these reduced rates are subject to
conditions
n.a. n.a. n.a.
- Surcharge temporary surcharge of 3% calculated
on income tax actually due as
computed before deductions.
n.a. n.a. n.a.
- Minimum Tax n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.750 EURO per annum on
Aktiengesellschaften
1.875 EURO per annum on
Gesellschaften mit Beschränkter
Haftung
5.625 EURO per annum on companies
with annual turn over in excess of
37.5000 EURO
- Special Rates 21,5 %: Belgian office for business and
agriculture
19,5 %: approved investment funds in
real estate or unlisted shares
5 %: approved professional credit
associations and some approved
building societies
n.a. n.a.
￿￿￿7D[￿$FFRXQWLQJ￿5XOHV taxable income is computed on the
basis of business accounting rules
unless tax law provides otherwise
deductions for tax purposes are allowed
only when recorded in the accounts
taxable income is computed on the
basis of “sound business practice”
unless tax law specifically provides
otherwise
the basic principle of “sound business
practice” is prudence
taxable income is computed on the
basis of the relevant rules of tax law
which, in general, closely follow those
of the business accounts
deductions for tax purposes are allowed
only when recorded in the accounts.
taxable income is computed on a net
worth comparison of the company’s
assets at the beginning and the end of
the tax year
(Betriebsvermögensvergleich)
commercial valuations are binding for
tax purposes unless the law provides
otherwise
￿￿￿’HSUHFLDWLRQ
- Basis historic acquisition or production cost historic acquisition or production cost
(not below residual value)
historic acquisition or production cost historic acquisition or production cost40
6WUXFWXUDO￿HOHPHQWV %HOJLXP 1HWKHUODQGV )LQODQG $XVWULD
- Methods - straight line
- declining balance (excluding
intangible assets, cars and assets used
by lessee)
- combination of declining balance and
straight line
- straight line
- declining balance depreciation
(excluding buildings)
- combination of declining balance and
straight line depreciation
- depreciation on the basis of asset’s
usage (for assets with great variety in
annual use)
accelerated depreciation is permitted
for certain assets (e.g. environmentally
friendly investments)
- declining balance depreciation
- straight line for intangibles and long
term expenditures
- depletion method for natural resources
assets of which the acquisition value is
small or of which the economic life
does not exceed three years may be
expensed
a taxpayer may choose any depreciation
percentage between 0% and a
maximum depreciation rate
- straight line depreciation
- Rates declining balance is double the rate of
straight line with a maximum of 40 %
depreciation rates are fixed by
administrative practice: office buildings
(3 %), industrial buildings (5%),
equipment (10-25 %), computer
equipment (33%), rolling stock (20%)
calculated depending on useful life of
the assets 
depreciation on the basis of the asset’s
output, in general:
office buildings: 1,5 % - 3 %
industrial buildings: 2 % - 4 %
machinery and equipment 10 % - 20 %
personal computers: 25 % - 33 % 
trucks: 30 %
over the probable economic life of the
asset, except statutory rates for various
kind of assets
the maximum depreciation rates are:
for residential and administrative
buildings: 4%
for commercial and industrial
buildings: 7%
for light construction and buildings
used for research activity: 20%
for machinery and equipment: 25 %
vehicles: over 5 successive years
although standard rates have been
developed, individual depreciation rates
are allowed
buildings of business companies: up to
4 %
buildings (bank or insurance): 2,5 %
other buildings: 2%
machinery and equipment￿￿average
useful life (German depreciation tables
as possible reference)
cars: 12,5 ￿
movable fixed assets, purchased in the
second half of the financial year, are
depreciable at 50 % of the annual
depreciation rate
- Accounting tax deduction must be recorded in
business accounts, no deferral of
depreciation allowed
tax deduction must be recorded in
business accounts, no deferral of
depreciation allowed (OPEN to be
verified!)
tax deduction must be recorded in
business accounts. If the depreciation
for accounting purposes is lower than
that which is allowed for tax purposes,
the additional (tax) depreciation (i.e.
the difference) is to be recorded under a
special heading. Depreciation taken for
accounting purposes can also be
deferred for tax purposes
tax deduction must be recorded in
business accounts
depreciation is mandatory and cannot
be postponed41
6WUXFWXUDO￿HOHPHQWV %HOJLXP 1HWKHUODQGV )LQODQG $XVWULD
- Intangibles intangibles, including goodwill, are
depreciated on a straight line basis
intangibles (including goodwill if
purchased from a third party) are
depreciable, in principle with all
depreciation methods, depreciation of
goodwill is not compulsory
straight line depreciation with
maximum period of 10 years
goodwill idem, except that when the
probable period of use does not exceed
3 years, the acquisition value may be
expensed
depreciation is allowed for intangible
assets
goodwill: depreciation over 15 years in
equal amounts, although in the
commercial accounts the depreciation
for acquired goodwill may be shorter
- Non depreciable assets Land Land the decrease in value of fixed assets not
subject to wear and tear, such as land
and certain securities can only be
written off for tax purposes if the
decrease in value is substantial and the
taxpayer produces evidence of this or
when such assets are disposed off
As an exception the value of land or
financial assets may be written down to
the fair market value if the fair market
value has gone permanently below the
acquisition cost.
￿￿￿3URYLVLRQV
- Risks and future expenses provisions are deductible if loss is
sharply defined or expense is likely to
occur in accordance with current events
provisions for probable losses and
provisions for probable risks and
charges
Equalization reserve: in anticipation of
certain future expenditure, the reserve
enables recurrent costs to be spread
evenly over a period of time
risk reserve deductible by the company
equal to annual gross premium charged
by insurance company for same risk
Not deductible except for guarantees,
for aircraft and shipping or in
construction industry for buildings,.
claims do not have to be legal and
certain in amount, a wide scope is
generally given to tax payers’ estimates,
if based on objective facts and
especially on business experience
- Bad debts Specific provisions are allowable
General provisions are not allowed.
Both specific and general provisions
are allowable provided that they accord
with ‘sound business practice.’
Specific provisions are allowable if
they are in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles.
General provisions are not allowable
but there are exceptions in the case of
financial traders.
Specific provisions are allowable
(National Administration to comment
otherwise)
provisions for doubtful claims are
allowed, although a valuation at the
lower going-concern by a direct write-
off is more common
- Pensions only deductible if (1) there is a firm
pension obligation by the employer, (2)
total of resulting legal and extra-legal
pension < 80% of last salary, (3) only
for the amount necessary to build up
the pension over a number of years (4)
deductions or reserves are recorded in
the commercial accounts
Contributions to an outside pension
fund are generally deductible (subject
to conditions)
Contributions to a pension reserve are
only deductible if the pension payments
are managed or maintained by the
company itself and if there is an
irrevocable obligation to pay a pension
Contributions to a reserve for future
pension payments are deductible if (1)
an early retirement scheme is provided
for, (2) for employees older than 47
years without an early retirement
scheme in their employee contract and
(3) for whom future payments actually
can be expected
provisions for probable future
payments of employee pensions, are not
tax deductible until the costs effectively
occur
Contributions to a reserve for future
pension payments are deductible (1) in
case of an obligation under an
agreement to pay old age pension, (2)
for the ratable share of future pension
obligations as actuarially computed, (3)
reduced by 20 % plus a reduction for a
discount at an interest rate of 6% per
annum42
6WUXFWXUDO￿HOHPHQWV %HOJLXP 1HWKHUODQGV )LQODQG $XVWULD
- Repairs Non deductible a tax free replacement reserve, as long
as it is intended that the asset (tangible
or intangible) is to be repaired or to be
replaced, within a maximum of 4 years
a tax free replacement reserve, provided
that the asset is replaced, within 2 years
only allowed if the assets are lost or
damaged or in case of disposal of




- Carry Forward no limitation in time no limitation in time up to 10 tax years no limitation in time
- Carry Back Not available Up to 3 years Not available Not available
- Transfer of losses Not available No special restrictions except in case of
mergers (see 7)
see below under 8a ‘Group relief’ Not possible
￿￿￿&DSLWDO￿*DLQV
Sale of Fixed Assets:
- Timing Rules
capital gains are taxable at the time of
realization,
recorded but unrealized gains are
exempt (except for recorded gains on
inventory and work in progress)
Capital gains are taxable at the time of
realization, as ordinary business
income
capital gains are taxable at the time of
realisation, as ordinary business income
exception: replacement reserve for
business premises; see below under
‘exemptions’
capital gains are taxable at the time of
realization, as ordinary business
income
- Accounting Rules No special rule
- Inflation no inflation correction since 1950
exemption for inflationary gains
originating before 1950
no inflation correction no inflation correction no inflation correction
- Rates no special rate no special rate no special rate no special rate
- Exemptions roll over relief on condition of
reinvestment within 3 years (exemption
of gains on assets sold and decrease of
depreciation base of reinvestment, with
the amount that has been exempted
from tax)
recorded gains are only exempt when
recorded on a separate blocked reserve
account (unavailable for distribution)
roll over relief in the form of a
replacement reserve for gains on
tangible or intangible assets to be
repaired or replaced within 4 years.
Depreciation on new assets is reduced
by amount of tax except replacement
reserve
roll over relief in the form of a tax free
replacement reserve for business
premises and shares (which entitle the
taxpayer to use the business premises)
and in case of damage or loss for other
assets, upon condition of reinvestment
within two years
roll over relief on condition of
reinvestment in similar assets within 1
year
condition: the asset sold has been a
fixed asset of the company for at least 7
years, the asset for which roll over
relief is claimed, is used in a resident
company or permanent establishment
the sale of a shareholding in a non-
resident company and the sale of
participations in companies by private
foundations are exempt
Sale of shares no taxation of gains realized upon the
sale of shares,
Exemption for gains on transfer of
substantial holding
no special regulations Tax exemption for transfer of shares
held in non-resident companies, subject
to conditions of participation
exemption43
6WUXFWXUDO￿HOHPHQWV %HOJLXP 1HWKHUODQGV )LQODQG $XVWULD
Capital Losses
- fixed assets deductible as ordinary loss, gains
taxable as ordinary gains
Deductible as ordinary loss deductible as ordinary loss deductible as ordinary loss
deduction can be claimed (only when
computed according to proper
bookkeeping and when recognized in a
tax assessment for preceding calendar
years)
- shares no deduction of losses Losses on the realization of a
substantial holding of shares are not
deductible, except for losses resulting
from liquidation.
deductible as ordinary loss if the shares
have been held as fixed assets or as
inventory
deductible against capital gains of the
same type if the shares have been held
as investments/financial assets
losses incurred from the disposal of
shares in a stock company or a limited
liability company, may only be set off
against other income in seven equal
portions starting in the year of
disposition
￿￿￿0HUJHUV￿￿￿$FTXLVLWLRQV
- Deferral of taxation Available in accordance with Mergers
Directive
Available in accordance with Mergers
Directive - including domestic
transactions
Available in accordance with Mergers
Directive - including domestic
transactions
Possible
- Transfer of losses corporate reorganizations: amount of
loss carry forward is reduced by
multiplying the amount of the loss with
the ratio between tax base of net assets
of transferor company and total net tax
base of transferor and transferee
company
Total loss of loss carry forward in case
of change in shareholders control
No deduction of losses against profits
resulting from transactions not at arm’s
length
The following losses do not qualify for
loss compensation: losses incurred by a
company which discontinues its
business if not at least 70 % of its
shares continue to be held by the same
shareholders
losses sustained by a company having
the status of an investment institution
do not qualify for compensation with
profits made by that company after is
has obtained a different status
the losses of the transferor company are
carried forward, provided that the
combined holdings of the transferee
company and its shareholders have,
since the beginning of the loss year,
exceeded 50% of the shares in the
absorbed company
the loss carry forward is completely
forfeited when more than 50 % of the
shares are sold
tax treatment of divisions is the same as
that for mergers
however, tax authorities may, upon
application by the taxpayer, grant a
dispensation as regards this general rule
Yes
- Transfer of tax bases Available in accordance with Mergers
Directive
In order for the merger to be tax free
the acquiring company should take
over the assets of the acquired company
at the same book value
Reorganisation transactions provided
for in the Merger Directive entail
transfer of of the tax base in the sense
that for tax (depreciation) purposes the
assets are transferred at their remaining
balance value
Not possible44
6WUXFWXUDO￿HOHPHQWV %HOJLXP 1HWKHUODQGV )LQODQG $XVWULD
￿D*URXS￿5HOLHI no consolidation Consolidation no consolidation, but group
contributions
Consolidation
- Conditions n.a. Resident NV’s (public company) or
BV’s (limited company), cooperative
societies and mutual guarantee
companies
the ownership of at least 99% of the
shares subject to the same tax regime
additional “standard conditions” in
order to safeguard the imposition and
the collection of the corporate income
tax
additional requirements for foreign
entities: capital divided in freely
transferable shares, subject to income
tax in the country of residence, ...
minimum share participation of 90 %
and effective business requirements
with exception of financial, insurance
and pension institutions
(1) a relationship of subordination
between parent and subsidiary called
(2UJDQVFKDIW), and (2) a profit and loss
pooling agreement
((UJHEQLVDEI￿KUXQJVYHUWUDJ) of at least
5 years
- Type of Relief n.a. Taxation in the hands of the parent
company, as one fiscal unit: full
transfer of losses, all transactions
between members of the group are
disregarded: fixed assets can be
transferred at book value within the
group
members of the group may make
payments to other members that are tax
deductible by the payor company and
taxable to the payee company
Pooling of all income and taxation in
the hands of controlling parent
￿￿,QWHUFRPSDQ\￿GLYLGHQGV domestic companies
95% exemption of gross amount of
dividend if holding equals or> 5% or
1.250.000 EURO
Interest fully deductible, except for
dividend stripping
non-resident companies:
Idem, except no relief for dividends
from holdings in tax havens or
companies in countries with
substantially lower tax rate
Domestic companies
Fully deductible 100 % exemption if
holding equals or> 5% of share capital
or capital in joint account and if shares
are not held as current stock
Non-resident companies:
Idem, but 2 further requirements:
(1) the non-resident entity must be
subject to a national tax on profits,
whatever the rate is,
(2) held as a non-portfolio investment
or equal conditions as set forth in the
EC Parent-Subsidiary Directive (>25%)
If the participation exemption applies,
expenses related to shareholdings in
resident and non-resident companies
are not deductible
domestic companies
dividends received are taxable but with




dividends received are exempt, when
there is a treaty and resident company
owns 10 % in voting power or 25 % in
capital stock
Domestic companies
full tax exemption for dividends
received by domestic companies +
permanent establishments of EU
companies in Austria, no conditions
non-resident companies
full tax exemption for dividends
received, condition: shareholding of 25
%
no taxation of capital gains on shares
held in non-resident companies45
6WUXFWXUDO￿HOHPHQWV %HOJLXP 1HWKHUODQGV )LQODQG $XVWULD
￿￿,QYHQWRULHV
- Valuation Rules cost or fair market value, whichever is
lower
lower valuation for materials subject to
sudden and considerable price




(2)at cost or at market value, whichever
is lower, or
(3)base stock method
at the lowest of direct acquisition cost,
replacement cost or net sales value at
the last day of the accounting year
adding a proportional amount of
essential overhead expenses to the
acquisition cost of inventory assets is
allowed, if the same is done for
accounting purposes
Acquisition cost or going-concern
value whichever is lower
- Allocation Methods Any of FIFO, LIFO, the unit method
(each item priced individually) and the
average weighted price method.
The base stock method is not allowed
LIFO, FIFO, and the “initial stock
system “ (with or without replacement
reserve)
FIFO FIFO, LIFO, the selected method must
be used consistently
weighted average cost method for
fungible goods
￿￿￿’HGXFWLRQ￿RI￿H[SHQVHV
- General Rules deductible business expenses and
charges are those incurred or borne by
the taxpayer to obtain or retain business
income, i.e. those that are of a
professional nature
accrual or cash basis expense is only
deductible, when it is certain and
payable
deductible expenses include all
expenses directly or closely connected
with the conduct of a business and
others if they conform to “sound
business practice”
Deductions are allowed for all costs and
expenses incurred for the purposes of
earning, securing, or maintaining
taxable business income
all expenses are deductible if they are
directly connected with taxable income
(incurred in acquiring, securing, or
maintaining taxable income)
- Non-deductible expenses There is a non-exhaustive list,
including among others.:
part of the expenses for cars,
restaurant and entertainment expenses,
excessive interest,
 exempt fringe benefits,
fines and penalties and
income tax itself
An exhaustive list of expenses are no
longer deductible (e.g. fines)
or only up to 75 % of certain expenses
having a mixed character such as.
certain gifts, foodstuff, clothes, meals
expenses incurred in earning or
maintaining tax-exempt income,
losses arising in connection with a
merger,
penalties,
connection charges paid to suppliers of
water, electricity, telephone etc.
facilities (when these are refundable or
transferable),
excessive compensation paid to
shareholders,
50 % of entertainment expenses
certain deductions can only be claimed
when reasonable: cars, sporting boats,
luxury yachts, hunting facilities,
antiques, ...
tax rules specifically prohibit the
deduction of
50% of representation expenses,
50 % of any form of remuneration paid
to members of the supervisory or
administrative board of the company
- Thin capitalization debt/equity ratio of 1/1, but only for
loans granted by individual
shareholders;
a 7/1 debt-equity ratio applies to debt if
the creditor is exempt or taxed at a
reduce rate in respect of the interest
paid on the debt
no thin capitalization rules, but certain
limitations on the deductibility of inter-
company interest expenses (e.g. for
expenses related to artificial conversion
of equity into debt).
no explicit debt-equity ratio thin
capitalization rules,
however, deductibility of interest paid
on loan taken with a non-resident may
be denied when the loan has a
permanent character i.e. is deemed as
an equity capital investment.
no specific thin capitalization rules,
although the Administrative Court has
established guidelines based upon
whether the loan arrangement was
“appropriate”46
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￿￿￿7D[￿5DWHV
- Standard 33 1/3% 40%
(for resident corporations which are not
quoted in the Athens stock exchange
and for non resident corporations)
Open quoted companies???
28% Italian companies are subject to two
different corporate taxes:
37 % (IRPEG)
4,25 % (IRAP) (basis: net value of the
“production” in the tax year)
- Reduced 19 % applied to capital gains on sale of
long term qualifying shares and certain
royalties and industrial patents
20% and 30% applied to capital gains
: 25% where profit is lower than IEP
100.000
19 % IRPEG (to the portion of income
derived from the increase in the equity
capital – effective rate cannot be lower
than 27%)
7 % IRPEG (new listed companies –
first three years)
- Surcharge 10 % of standard tax charge
(Standard plus surcharge = 36 2/3%)
n.a. Yes, where distributable investment
income and 50% of professional
income exceeds the distributions of a
closed company excess is surcharged at
20%, or 15% .
n.a.
- Minimum Tax 5.000 FRF to 200,000 FRF depending
on turnover
n.a. n.a. Minimum rate applies only to "non-
operating" companies and is charged by
reference to a minimum deemed
income
- Special Rates n.a. n.a. Incentive rate: 10% for manufacturing
and financial services
n.a.
￿￿￿7D[￿$FFRXQWLQJ￿5XOHV taxable income is computed on the
basis of business accounts, unless tax
law provides otherwise)
taxable income is computed on the
basis of business accounts, unless tax
law provides otherwise
Although based upon accounting
income, income liable to corporation
tax is subject to significant
adjustments(e.g. depreciation is added
back to taxable profit and replaced by
"capital allowances")
taxable income is computed on the
basis of business accounts, unless tax
law provides otherwise47
6WUXFWXUDO￿HOHPHQWV )UDQFH *UHHFH ,UHODQG ,WDO\
￿￿￿’HSUHFLDWLRQ
- Basis historic acquisition or production cost Acquisition or production cost of the
asset or its value after revaluation.
From 1992, companies are required to
revalue fixed assets every four years.
The capital gain arising from
revaluation is subject to a special tax.
Depreciation is replaced by capital
allowances
historic acquisition or production cost
- Methods - straight-line method
- declining-balance method (optionally
available for certain assets)
Accelerated depreciation may be
available for certain environmental
protection assets.
- straight-line depreciation
- Declining balance depreciation may
be used for plant and machinery
acquired after 1
st January 1993.
- free depreciation for fixed assets with
a purchase price of not more than Drs
200,000 in the year the asset is
purchased or first used.
In the tax-incentive areas, more
favourable treatment is granted in many
cases which may result in a very
substantial increase in the permitted
rates of depreciation.
- straight-line for plant and machinery
and certain buildings over a seven-year
period.
- straight-line for industrial buildings
4%
- reducing balance for motor vehicles
 In addition, allowance for capital
expenditure on new plant and
machinery and buildings used for the
purposes of a trade carried on either in
the Customs House docks area or
Shannon can be accelerated and
depreciated at the rate of 100% in the
year in which it is incurred.
- straight-line method
- $FFHOHUDWHG￿GHSUHFLDWLRQ is available
up to twice the normal amount of
depreciation in the year of acquisition
and the next two years. If the assets are
acquired second-hand, such accelerated
depreciation is allowed only in the
taxable period they are put into use.
If the cost of the tangible property is
less than ITL 1 million, it can be
deducted entirely in the period of
acquisition.
- Rates Straight-line depreciation rates are
determined in accordance with normal
length of use of the asset, set by
reference to standard practice for the
industrial or business sector concerned.
Declining-balance depreciation rate is
equal to normal straight-line rate
multiplied by a coefficient that varies
from 1.5 to 2.5 depending upon the
probable length of use of asset.
The applicable rates are set out by law.
Rates of declining-balance method are
those which apply to the straight line
method multiplied by the factor of 3.
For plant and machinery and certain
buildings for the first six years the
annual rate is 15% and in the seventh
year is 10%
For motor vehicles – 20%
For industrial buildings – 4%
Rates of depreciation are fixed by
ministerial decree and vary according
to the nature of the asset and the
activity carried out. 
More intensive use may justify more
rapid depreciation.
If the depreciation taken in a taxable
period is less than the maximum
allowed (UHGXFHG￿GHSUHFLDWLRQ), the
difference is deductible in subsequent
years, unless depreciation taken is less
than half of the maximum and there is
no proof of a lesser use of the asset as
compared to the normal use in the
sector.
- Accounting tax deduction must be recorded in
business accounts, no deferral of
depreciation allowed
Companies are required to account for
depreciation at least equal to the
relevant straight-line depreciation. That
fraction of depreciation that does not
reach this limit is lost
tax deduction must be recorded in
business accounts, no deferral of
depreciation allowed
n.a. tax deduction must be recorded in
business accounts48
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- Intangibles Only intangible assets with a limited
life may be depreciated (e.g. patents,
industrial processes). Research
expenses may be deducted from profits
from the financial year in which they
were incurred, or may be capitalised
and depreciated on a straight-line basis
over a maximum period of five years.
Intangible assets, including goodwill,
may be depreciated.
Research and development costs may
normally be written off in the years in
which they are incurred.
Purchased patents are written off over
their residual life (limited to 17 years).
Expenditure on know how and
scientific research is deducted in
computing trading income when
incurred
Expenditure on the right to use
software qualifies for capital
allowances over 7 years.
Goodwill acquired from third parties
may be depreciated over a period of not
less than 10 years. Cost incurred to
acquire patents and know how is
deductible over 3 years. Research and
development costs may be either
deducted from the income for the fiscal
year during which they are incurred or
depreciated in equal shares over five
years. Trademarks may be depreciated
up to one tenth for each taxable period.
- Non depreciable assets Land, goodwill, trademarks Land Land, Goodwill Land
￿￿￿3URYLVLRQV
- Risks and future expenses Deductible Non deductible Deductible Tax law specifically states which
reserves and provisions are recognized
for tax purposes. No other reserves and
provisions are recognized for tax
purposes, even though they may be
recognized for company law purposes.
In addition to those already mentioned
in this section, the law allows a
provision to cover the risks from
foreign exchange, and the one on
account of expenses incurred for
lotteries and other prizes (such as
coupon savings schemes in
supermarkets).
- Bad debts Specific provisions are allowable General provisions are allowable within
the following limits:
Deductible up to a max of 0.5% of
turnover, without exceeding 35 % of
trade receivables
Specific provisions are allowable Provided the debts are not hedged by
insurance, General provisions are
allowable within the following limits:
Deductible up to 0.5% of trade
receivables until the provision reaches
5% of the total.
To the extent that it is not covered
within the general reserve, losses
arising through debtor insolvency are
also allowed.49
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- Pensions Non-deductible Deductible Non deductible, however, contributions
to approved pension schemes are
deductible
Deductible
Amounts allocated to a reserve for
personnel severance and welfare are
deductible in the amount accrued
during the fiscal year in conformity
with statutory and contractual
provisions governing the employment
of individual workers. The setting aside
is allowed on an accrual basis.
- Repairs Deductible Non deductible Deductible if in accordance with
standard accounting principles. In general, the deduction of actual costs
for repair and maintaining expenses is
allowed up to 5% of the value of fixed
tangible assets according to the record
of depreciable assets at the beginning
of taxable year. Any excess can be
deducted in equal parts in the following
five taxable periods.
Companies operating ships or aircraft
may set up a reserve for cyclical repairs
and maintenance, the maximum annual
deduction being 5% of the cost as
shown in the register of depreciable
assets at the beginning of the year. Any
excess in the reserve must be included
in taxable income in the current year.
Any excess in actual expenses must be
claimed as for normal repairs and
maintenance
Companies involved in the construction
and operation of public works may
make a tax-deductible allocation to a
reserve. The maximum annual amount
set aside is 5% of the cost of the goods
they will have to transfer to the public
body without compensation
￿￿￿/RVVHV
- Carry Forward Up to 5 years (but indefinitely for
losses attributable to depreciation ).
The loss carry over is only disallowed
in case of a substantial modification of
activity (liquidation, merger, change of
trade)
Up to 5 years No limitation in time
Losses may be carried forward only
against future income of the same trade
Up to 5 years
No limitation for losses derived in the
first 3 years from the beginning of the
business activity.6WUXFWXUDO￿HOHPHQWV )UDQFH *UHHFH ,UHODQG ,WDO\
- Carry Back 3 years - to release a credit against tax;
If not used refundable in cash after 5
years
Not available One year Not available
- Transfer of losses Only available within a group, or under
certain mergers
No special restriction except in case of
mergers




Sale of Fixed Assets:
- Timing Rules
Taxed at the time of realisation Taxed at the time of realisation Taxed at time of realisation Taxed at time of realisation
- Inflation No inflation correction No inflation correction Cost of asset is adjusted by applying a
multiplier based on the Consumer Price
Index.
No inflation correction
- Rates Standard rate; a reduced rate of 19%
(plus surcharges) applies to capital
gains on long term (5 years) qualifying
shares and certain royalties and
industrial patents
Standard rates; reduced rates apply to
capital gains on the sale of shares
(20%) and the sale of industrial
property rights such as patents (30%)
(table not completed for all elements
20% Standard rates; special rate of 27%
applies to capital gains derived from
the sale of a business owned for at least
3 years and of certain qualifying
participations.
- Exemptions and reliefs Not available Roll-over relief
Capital gains derived from the sale of
fixed assets are tax exempt if reinvested
in other fixed assets within 2 years of
sale
Roll-over relief
Capital gains derived from the sale of
fixed assets are tax exempt if reinvested
in other fixed assets within 3 years of
sale, or 1 year before
Taxation can be spread over 5 years.
This spreading option is limited to
gains on assets held for at least 3 years.
This option is also available for
financial assets which have been
classified as such in the last 3 annual
balance sheet; the LIFO method applies
for determining the holding period.
Sale of shares Taxable Taxable Taxable Taxable
Capital Losses
- fixed assets Deductible as ordinary loss. Deductible as ordinary loss Cannot be set off against trade profits.
Can only be set against gains in the
same year or carried forward and set off
against future capital gains.
Treated in the same way as ordinary
loss.
- shares Capital losses on sales subject to 19%
can only be set off against similar
"long-term" gains (e.g. capital gains on
sale of a substantial holding of shares).
losses can only be set off against gains
from the sale of listed shares.
As for fixed assets As for fixed assets
￿￿￿0HUJHUV￿￿￿$FTXLVLWLRQV
- Deferral of taxation Deferral of taxation of capital gains
granted for mergers and exchanges of
shares – subject to prior approval. And
Contribution of part of a business in
exchange for shares/asset contributions
also qualify without approval.
Deferral of taxation may also benefit
cross-border (EU and non EU) similar
transactions upon prior approval.
Mergers and similar transactions (e.g.
division and contribution of a sector
activity) may be made tax free only if
they qualify under special incentive
laws (aimed at crating large
companies).
Domestic re-constructions and
amalgamations are tax neutral. Cross
border transactions in accordance with
Directive 90/434 are tax neutral.
Generally exchanges of shares are tax
neutral.
Tax neutral for domestic. The same
treatment applies to intra-EU similar
transactions.6WUXFWXUDO￿HOHPHQWV )UDQFH *UHHFH ,UHODQG ,WDO\
- Transfer of losses No special restrictions in case of
acquisition (assuming there is no
modification of activity)
In case of merger, the losses of the
absorbed company can only be
transferred to the absorbing company
with special agreement – available only
to industrial companies, industrial
support companies and SMEs in
financial difficulty.
No special restriction in case of
acquisition
In case of merger, losses of merging
companies are not carried forward
On a transfer of a trade between 75%
associated companies losses can be
transferred to the transferee
Otherwise, the losses carried forward at
the date of transfer cannot be set
against the future profits of the new
company.
In case of acquisition, losses cannot be
carried forward if the majority of the
voting rights of the company is
transferred and the activity of the
company is changed. In case of merger
the transfer of losses of each company
is subject to certain limitations
The values of the assets and liabilities
of the merged companies are
maintained by the company resulting
from the merger.
The company resulting from the merger
takes over all the tax attributes and
obligations of the merged companies
- Transfer of tax bases When tax neutral regime applies capital
gains realised on depreciable assets
transferred upon merger have to be
taken into income over 5 years (plant &
machinery) or 15 years (buildings) and
taxed at standard corporate tax rate. In
counterpart the new basis for
depreciation is the fair market value of
the assets transferred. Deferment of
taxation for capital gains realised on
non-depreciable assets and for
provisions transferred.
Under the standard regime a merger of
two Greek companies gives rise to
taxation of capital gains resulting from
the re-evaluation of assets. However,
then a merger qualifies for the tax
incentive regime, the value of assets
and liabilities of the absorbed company
should be taken over by the absorbing
company
Where transactions are tax neutral the
acquirer takes them for capital gains
tax purposes at their historic cost to the
seller.
See above
￿D*URXS￿5HOLHI no consolidation No consolidation.
- Conditions The income and losses of French
companies within the same group may
be aggregated and taxed in the hands of
the parent company. The minimum
percentage of participation is 95%.
No tax consolidation regime. No system of tax consolidation as such
but members of a group of companies
are permitted to transfer losses and
excess capital allowances to one
another. A group is made up of parent
and 75% subsidiaries.
No special group regime for corporate
tax purposes
- Type of Relief
￿￿,QWHUFRPSDQ\￿GLYLGHQGV Domestic companies: dividends
received are 95% exempt if minimum
holding of 10%
Non-resident – same treatment
Domestic companies: full exemption.
Non-resident companies:
- Unilateral relief: dividends received
are taxable with credit only for
withholding tax
- Parent subsidiary directive and tax
treaty: dividends received are taxable
but with full credit
Domestic companies: exemption.
Non-resident companies: full credit for
foreign taxes if 25% ownership.
Domestic companies: dividends
received are taxable (IRPEG) but with
full credit for corporate income tax
(dividends are not subject to IRAP)
Non-resident companies:
- 60% of dividends received from a non
EU affiliated company are tax exempt
- Dividends received from a EU
affiliated company with a 25%
ownership are 95% exempt.52
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￿￿,QYHQWRULHV
- Valuation Rules Lower of cost and market value. Lower of cost and market value Lower of cost or market value Lower of cost and market value
- Allocation Methods FIFO and average cost method. LIFO, FIFO and average cost method. LIFO, FIFO and average cost method. LIFO,FIFO and average weighted cost
method
￿￿￿’HGXFWLRQ￿RI￿H[SHQVHV
- General Rules Deductible if they are justifiably
incurred in the interest of the company
and result in decrease of net assets
Deductible if related to business
activity
Deductible, if revenue expenses
incurred for the purposes of the trade.
Deductible if incurred in the production
of income
- Non-deductible expenses In respect of hunting, fishing, holiday
homes and yachts. There is also a
limitation for depreciation allowances
for passenger vehicles the cost of which
exceeds FF 65.000.
Corporate tax and penalties for failure
to file tax returns or for late payment of
taxes
Penalties for late payment of taxes,
Capital expenditure. Some restrictions
on deductibility of business
entertainment and motor expenses.
Interest paid is deductible only in the
proportion that gross taxable income
bear to total income.
- Thin capitalization Debt/Equity ratio of 1,5:1 but only for
loans granted by controlling
shareholders (i.e. shareholders who
manage the borrowing company or own
more than 50% of its share capital)
No special rules. No special rules. No special rules.53
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￿￿￿7D[￿5DWHV
- Standard 28 % 32 % 40 % for retained earnings
30 % for distributed profits
(split rate tax system)
35 %
- Reduced n.a. n.a. n.a. 30 % on first bracket of 90.151 EURO
of SME profits
- Surcharge n.a. n.a. 5,5 % solidarity surcharge n.a.
- Minimum Tax n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
- Special Rates 30 % investment trusts 26% for pension funds
5% on dividends on shares and capital
gains in pensions funds
n.a. 40 % hydrocarbon companies
25 % mutual insurance companies
25 % rural and cooperative banks
20 % and 25 % cooperatives
10% or 25% non-profit organizations
0 % pension plans and funds
1 % collective investment entities
investing in securities and in real estate
￿￿￿7D[￿$FFRXQWLQJ￿5XOHV taxable income is computed on the
basis of business accounts, unless tax
law provides otherwise
deductions for tax purposes are allowed
only when recorded in the accounts
all expenditure and most income is
taxed on accruals basis but certain
limited classes of income are taxed only
on the realization basis
Taxable income is computed on the
basis of business accounts, unless tax
law provides otherwise
taxable income is computed on the
basis of business accounts, unless tax
law provides otherwise (principle of
authoritativeness)
taxable income is computed on the
basis of business accounts, unless tax
law provides otherwise
deductions for tax purposes are allowed
only when recorded in the accounts
all expenditure and most income is
taxed on accruals basis but certain
limited classes of income are taxed only
on the realization basis
exceptionally only when authorised by
the tax administration, different
allocation and timing criteria may be
used by the taxpayer.
￿￿￿’HSUHFLDWLRQ
- Basis historic acquisition or production cost historic acquisition or production cost historic acquisition or production cost historic acquisition or production cost
(less residual value), regularised asset
value under 96 Royal-Decree Law is
amortised under this new net value.54
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- Methods - straight-line on acquisition cost
(excluding for buildings)
- declining balance
- depletion method for national
resources
- straight-line (buildings)
- declining balance (ships, plant,
machinery and equipment)
100 % depreciation in first year
allowed for assets of low value or
useful lifetime of less than three years
and for EDP software
- straight line
- declining balance (not for buildings
constituting a business asset or for
intangibles)
- production methods - output method
or depletion method (for specific
categories of fixed assets, e.g. mines)
the only change in method allowed is
from the declining balance to the
straight line method
the economic owner has the right to
claim the depreciation
accelerated or additional depreciation
for the new /lQGHU (20%-50%) and
investment by SME (20%)
movable fixed assets, purchased in the
second half of the financial year, are
depreciable at 50 % of the annual
depreciation rate
straight line – declining balance (not
for buildings, furniture and tools) -
sum-of-the-digits (not for buildings,
furniture and tools)
no change in method is allowed
free depreciation for mining, R&D and
certain agriculture associations under
Act 19/1995
- Rates Buildings: 2 – 5 % depending upon the
estimated lifetime of the asset
(the National Tax Board has published
guidelines )
machinery equipment, plants,
intangibles: 20 % (straight line) - 30%
(declining balance)
Buildings: maximum of 5-8 %
Ships, plant, machinery and equipment:
maximum of 30 %
Immovable property
industrial and commercial buildings
(excluding those used for living
accommodation): straight line
2,5 % for buildings before 1925, 2 %
for buildings between 1925 – 31/03/85,
4 % for buildings after 31/03/1985
living accommodation: declining
balance (5 % for the first 8 years, 2,5 %
for the following 6 years and 1,25 %
for the remaining 36 years)
plant, machinery and equipment (the
declining balance rate is limited to
three times the allowable straight-line
rate, with a maximum of 30 %)
straight line rates: machinery (10 %),
office equipment (20 %), office
furniture (10 %), computers (20 %),
cars, trucks, etc (20 % -25 %)
Depreciation may be taken at any rate
up to the maximum rate
Maximum rates and maximum period
of amortisation (industrial buildings
and warehouses: 3 % - 68 years, office
buildings: 2 % - 100, equipment and
machinery : 8%,10%,12% - 18,20,25,
tools: 30% - 8, computer hardware:
25% - 8, office installations: 8% - 25,
trucks, cars, vans: 16% - 14)
for declining balance depreciation
straight line rates are to be multiplied
by 1.5 (depreciation in less than 5
years), 2.0 (between 5-8 years), 2.5 (8
years or more)
rates are to be multiplied by 2.0 for
second hand assets55
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- Accounting tax deduction must be recorded in
business accounts (not required for
buildings)
 There is no link between tax
depreciations and business
depreciations
tax deduction must be recorded in
business accounts,
depreciation is mandatory and cannot
be postponed
any depreciation must be accounted for
(either as a deduction from the value of
the asset, either as a provision on the
balance sheet) but in cases of free
depreciation
Lesser market value of assets is tax
deductible under certain conditions.
Special restrictions are set for editorial
funds and securities
- Intangibles intangibles are depreciable like
machinery and equipment
Intangibles (including goodwill) are
depreciable on a straight line basis and
at a rate of maximum 14,28 % (seven
years)
Know-how and patents (including
licenses), however, can be deducted
100 % in the first year provided the
intangibles are linked to the business of
the enterprise
Intangibles are depreciated on a straight
line basis over their useful life (except
goodwill with a fixed depreciation
period of 15 years)
Intangibles are depreciable
Trademarks and patents: annual
maximum limit of 1/10 of total amount
Goodwill: annual maximum limit of
1/10 of the total amount if acquired
from a unrelated party, if not
depreciation depending on the actual
decrease in value
- Non depreciable assets land Offices, premises used for business in
the financial sector (bank, insurance,
brokerage etc.), accommodation
(except hotels), health care and land
As an exception the value of land or
financial assets may be written down to
the fair market value if the fair market




- Risks and future expenses provision for future liabilities, that may
be encountered under guarantee given
to customers
20 % of taxable income may be
allocated to a profit periodization
reserve that remains tax free for another
five years
Generally not available. Provisions for
guarantee obligations are deductible
under narrow and strict conditions and
provided they are not immaterial
Insurance companies can make tax free
provisions to cover future payments to
insured persons.
Provisions for foreseeable expenses are
deductible when the expense has its
cause in the financial year
Provisions that are mandatory for
commercial accounting purposes are
also mandatory and deductible for tax
purposes (principle of reversed
0DVVJHEOLFKNHLW or authoritativeness)
Provisions for environmental risks are
deductible when action is mandatory
Provisions for breach of copyrights and
patents, where a claim has been lodged
or is very probable
claims do not have to be legal and
certain in amount, a wide scope is
generally given to tax payers’ estimates,
if based on objective facts.56
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- Bad debts Specific provisions are allowable Specific provisions are allowable.
There is a limited allowance for general
provisions.
A special rule applies to banks. They
may deduct a provision for debts
outstanding, rather than on actual
losses
Specific provisions are allowable (must
be made in the form of a partial write
off following revaluation).
Specific provisions are allowable.
General provisions are allowable only
for SME’s
a debt is doubtful if any of the
following applies
(1) it is more than 12 months overdue,
(2) The debtor is insolvent for any
reason (3) the debtor is charged with
fraud
(4)payment depends on the result court
proceedings.
No deduction for debts with associated
parties, public administrations or
covered by guarantees.
- Pensions the creation of a tax-free reserve is
allowed (up to certain maximum
amounts), although subject to certain
legal requirements (such as insurance
against insolvency)
According to the pension legislation
employers cannot set up pension
schemes for its employees (other than
general managers) unless the pension
commitments are covered by an
authorized insurance company or
pension fund; thus the funds must be
outside the control of the employer.
Internal pension funds are therefore not
allowed
Provisions for pension payments are
deductible for tax purposes provided
they are supported by actuarial
computations based on a formal and
binding pension plan; discounted at an
interest rate of 6%, no restrictions in
the actual use of the provision
only contributions to pension schemes
which meet requirements under pension
legislation are deductible, i.e. only for
capitalisation schemes which are not
controlled by the employer
contributions to internal pension funds
are not deductible
there is a specified maximum
contribution per year per person which
varies with age of employee
- Repairs replacement reserves (1) may be
created to cover damage by fire or other
accidents to machinery and equipment,
buildings and installations in the soil,
as well as for the expropriation, or
forced sale of machinery and
equipment, (2) have to be used within 3
years, (3) for costs of repair and
maintenance of the type of assets for
which the reserves are created for
Generally not available Provisions (mandatory for tax
purposes) for substantial maintenance
or repair work caused in the financial
year which reduce profits are tax free if
the maintenance is carried out in the
first three months of the following
financial year
Provisions for substantial repairs are
deductible in case of fishing activities
and air and shipping transport. In any
other case it is so provided the plan for
the repairs is approved by the tax
authorities
￿￿￿/RVVHV
- Carry Forward no limitation in time Up to 5 years no limitation in time up to 10 tax years
- Carry Back by means of a profit periodization
reserve (cf. “Risks and future
expenses”)
Not available losses incurred in 1999 and 2000 may
be carried back up to DEM 2 million
for 1 year prior to the year in which the
losses were incurred
Not available
- Transfer of losses Restricted Available only within ￿2UJDQVFKDIW￿ Not available Not available57
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Sale of Fixed Assets:
- Timing Rules
capital gains are taxable at the time of
realization, as ordinary business
income
note on immovable property: all
depreciation taken as well as costs of
improvements etc. deducted within 5
years preceding the disposal of the
property are reversed and recorded as
income for tax purposes
Capital gains are taxable at the time of
realization, as ordinary business
income
capital gains are taxable as ordinary
business income at the time of
realization
capital gains are taxable as ordinary
business income at the time of
realization
- Accounting Rules No special rule No link to accounting rules No special rule taxable in the tax period in which they
are realized and recorded
- Inflation no inflation correction no inflation correction no inflation correction  In 1996 an extraordinary discounting
value was passed (indexation rate for
1984: 1.851, for 1996: 1.023). Any
time, immovable property acquisition
value should be index on inflation rate
- Rates no special rate No special rate no special rate no special rate
- Exemptions machinery and equipment:
roll over relief: an amount equal to the
capital gain is deducted from the
aggregated depreciable base, so no tax
arises in the year of disposal and the
actual tax liability is postponed, in
whole or in part, to subsequent years,
through reduced depreciation
allowances in those years
For gains on real property roll over
relief applies in case of reinvestment
capital gains from the sale of a
qualifying investment in a foreign
company are tax exempt
replacement of assets: the taxation of
capital gains (arising from the sale of
land, buildings or the production of
agricultural and forestry enterprises)
may be deferred by creating a tax free
replacement reserve, subject to a 6 year
holding period prior to the sale
roll over relief in case of involuntary
disposition of the assets: tax free
reserve deductible from assets
reinvested within maximum two years
Element of tax deferral for fixed assets
on condition of reinvestment within 3
years
Sale of shares taxable in principle as ordinary profits
special rules for computing the capital
gain for quoted shares: the acquisition
cost may alternatively be calculated as
20 % of the sales price (the deemed
purchase price)
Gains from the sale of shares etc. are
exempt when held for 3 years or more.
Does not apply to gains on shares in
foreign financial companies that has
been subject to substantially lower tax
burden than compared to Denmark
(unless it has been subject to Danish
CFC-taxation)
No special rule. tax deferral on a sale of shares on a
minimum holding of 5 % by way of roll
over relief on condition of reinvestment
Capital Losses
- fixed assets may generally be offset against any
income in the current year
Capital losses on immovable property
may only be set off against capital
gains on immovable property
Deductible as ordinary losses deductible as ordinary losses, taking
into account previous tax deductible
provisions58
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- shares losses on shares and other securities not
deemed to be necessary for the
company’s business, may be set off
only against capital gains of the same
type (+ carry indefinite forward)
Losses on the sale of shares etc. held
for more than three years are not
deductible
capital losses on shares sold before 3
years of ownership may only be set off
against capital gains on shares also held
for less than 3 years(but not against
other capital gains)
they may be carried forward for 5 years
a capital loss on a financial contract
based on shares is only deductible to
the extent it does not exceed the income
on the same contract during the
preceding 5 tax years and under
condition that no other losses on
financial contracts based on shares
have been set off against this income.
Carry forward is available up to 5
years.
Deductible as ordinary losses As for fixed assets above
￿￿￿0HUJHUV￿￿￿$FTXLVLWLRQV
￿￿Deferral of taxation Rules allow for deferral of capital gains
taxation including recapturing of
depreciations in case of merger,
divisions, transfer of assets and
exchanges of shares (tax free merger
etc.)
Exemption in case of mergers and other
forms of corporate reorganization
Provided for mergers, divisions,
exchange of shares and transfer of
assets. That includes cross-border
operations under the Directive 90/434.
exemption on transfer of shares in case
of mergers and reorganization
￿￿Transfer of losses Mergers: the absorbing company
obtains the same right to carry forward
and to carry back as the absorbed
company before the merger; losses
incurred by either of the companies
prior to the year of the merger may not
be deducted during the first five years
after the merger Acquisitions: if a
company acquires control over a loss-
making company, the loss-making
company permanently loses its right to
deduct losses in excess of 200 % of the
acquisition price, and it may not set off
losses against group contributions
received from the other company
during the first 5 years after the change
of ownership;
In case of a tax free merger etc. losses
from prior income years of both the
absorbing and the absorbed company
cannot be carried forward. In case of a
taxable merger only the loss in the
absorbed company cannot be carried
forward. Special rules apply for
companies under joint taxation.
With respect to acquisitions; if more
than 50 % of the company’s capital and
the end of the tax year is owned by
shareholders other than those at the
beginning of a tax year, the carry
forward of losses is sometimes
restricted (to restrict trading in loss
companies)
a loss carry-over is disallowed if more
than 50 % of a company’s shares are
sold and the company continues or
restarts its business mainly with new
assets unless the introduction of new
assets serves to rehabilitate the loss-
making business and the company
continues the business for 5 years in the
same scope
no loss carry-over when a company is
converted into a partnership and vice
versa
limitation of loss carry forward
in case of a change in ownership, the
difference between the acquisition cost
of the shares and the nominal value of
the shares, cannot be carried forward if
(1) ownership of the majority of the
share capital has changed after the
losses did occur
(2) the purchasers owned, at the end of
the loss year, less than 25 % of the
share capital, and
(3) the company did not carry out a
business activity prior to the change in
ownership
- Transfer of tax bases59
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￿D￿*URXS￿5HOLHI no consolidation concept, group relief
is achieved by group contributions or a
commission system of a company
acting on behalf of one or more similar
companies
Consolidation Group taxation (2UJDQVFKDIW) Consolidation
- Conditions group contributions:
All companies must be Swedish entities




commissioner company does not carry
on any other business activity
(exclusive commissionary)
100 % direct or indirect interest in the
other company
Joint taxation with a non-resident
company is allowed
(1) the controlled company must
generally be a resident company
(2) the controlling company can be an
individual, a partnership, or a company.
(3) a financial, economic and
organizational integration
(4) a profit-and-loss pooling agreement
 consolidation is voluntary,
The controlling company must be a
resident entity in Spain which owns,
directly or indirectly, more than 90 %
of the dependent corporation or
corporations for a minimum period of 1
year prior to making the request for
consolidation and should maintain such
holding during an additional year.
Consolidation lasts for periods of 3
financial years, and may be extended
indefinitely
- Type of Relief group contributions: paying group
contributions in order to equalize
profits in the group
commission system: taxation of the
companies on activities carried out by
the commissionary company
Pooling of all profits and losses and
taxation in the hands of the controlling
company
Taxation in the hands of the parent
company, as one fiscal unit: pooling of
all profits and losses.
Losses of a controlled company
incurred prior to the group taxation
cannot be transferred as long as group
taxation applies
taxation in the hands of the parent
company, as one fiscal unit:
consolidated profits and losses within
the group are eliminated, only the
consolidated net income is subject to
corporate tax
losses of companies currently within
the group, prior to the period of
consolidation can only be offset against
profits earned by the same company
in addition, when the consolidation
period expires, remaining losses from
the consolidated period cannot be
carried forward and applied against
affiliated corporations60
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￿E￿,QWHUFRPSDQ\￿GLYLGHQGV domestic companies
exemption of dividends on business-
related shares (25 % of the voting
rights or necessary for the business)
non-resident companies:
exemption under EU directive, with a
minimum effective tax requirement of
15 %
Domestic companies:
dividends derived by companies
holding less than 25 % of the capital of
the paying company, are subject to a
reduced effective tax rate of 21,12 %
(34 % of the dividend is tax free and
the remaining 66 % is taxed at the
normal rate of 32 %)
Dividends received by companies
holding more than 25 % of the shares,
are fully exempt (shares must be hold
for minimum 1 year)
Non-resident companies:
Idem, except for dividends from
holdings in a foreign financial company
subject to a substantially lower tax
burden than compared to Denmark
(unless it has been subject to Danish
CFC-taxation)
Domestic companies
full and refundable imputation credit,
intercompany dividends from foreign
companies may be received tax free
under certain Double Taxation Treaties
Domestic companies
full tax credit for shareholdings in
excess of 5 %, half tax credit < 5%
Non-resident companies
Full tax credits for shareholdings >5%
                        Or
Exemption method in certain cases
￿￿￿,QYHQWRULHV
- Valuation Rules not below the lower of cost, or market
value or alternatively at 97 % of
inventory’s total acquisition cost
The tax payer can choose between the
market value at the end of the financial
year, the purchase price, or cost of
manufacture. Different methods may be
used for each group of inventory (and
principles can be changed yearly).
the lower of acquisition or
manufacturing cost, or fair market
value when the decrease in value is
presumed to be permanent
acquisition or production cost or lower
market value.
Provisions are tax deductible
- Allocation Methods FIFO is mandatory
For tax purposes only FIFO or weighted
average method
LIFO except for perishables
weighted average value for group
valuation of similar goods
any of the recognized commercial
valuation methods may be used.61
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￿￿￿’HGXFWLRQ￿RI￿H[SHQVHV
- General Rules all expenses incurred in obtaining or
safeguarding income subject to taxation
are deductible
In general expenses incurred in
acquiring, securing and maintaining of
business income, are deductible
in general deductions are allowed for
all expenses caused by the operation of
the business
all costs and expenses that are allowed
for accounting purposes
- Non-deductible expenses entertainment expenses in excess of
certain limits, gifts (except under the
general definition of business expenses)
75 % of entertainment expenses tax rules define expenses that are
(1) not deductible (inter alia..
expenses relating directly to tax-free
income or capital gains, penalties,
expenses for guest houses,...) or
(2) only partly deductible (inter alia.
50 % of fees paid to a member of the
supervisory board, 80 % of expenses
for business meals, gifts in proportion









- Thin capitalization No special rules. Interest expenses paid to controlling
non-resident companies relating to debt
in excess of a 4/1 debt/equity ratio are
not deductible provided that the
controlled loan could not have been
obtained from a third party
debt/equity ratio of 3:1 for debt with
fixed interest, 0,5:1 for debt on which
variable interest is paid
a holding company privilege increases
the debt/equity ratio for fixed interest-
bearing loans to 9:1
a debt/equity ratio of 3:1 applies in
general. Where there is a treaty, the
ratios are determined in line with
market conditions.62
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￿￿￿7D[￿5DWHV
- Standard 30 % 34 % 30 %
- Reduced 20% for companies whose￿taxable
income does not exceed￿LUF 600,000
20%
(in case of entities that do not exercise
business activity as their main purpose)
20% for profit not exceeding £300,000,
with marginal small company relief for
profits above £300,000 and below
£1,500,000.
- Surcharge 4%,  up to 10% n.a.
- Minimum Tax n.a. equal to the difference between 1% of
the previous year's turnover (cannot be
less than PTE 100,000 or more than
PTE 300,000) and the previous year's
ordinary corporate tax prepayments)
n.a.
- Special Rates n.a. 0 % Pension funds
25% Management and investment in
immovable property companies
n.a.
￿￿￿7D[￿$FFRXQWLQJ￿5XOHV taxable income is computed on the
basis of business accounts, unless tax
law provides otherwise
taxable income is computed on the
basis of business accounts, unless tax
law provides otherwise
all expenditure and most income is
taxed on accruals basis
Although based upon accounting
income, income liable to corporation
tax is subject to adjustments in
accordance with tax law (e.g.
depreciation is added back to taxable
profit and replaced by "capital
allowances")
￿￿￿’HSUHFLDWLRQ
- Basis historic acquisition or production cost Acquisition or production cost or a
“regularised net value when revaluation
has been legally authorised.
Depreciation is replaced by capital
allowances
- Methods Two methods are generally allowed:
Straight-line depreciation is obligatory
for buildings and intangible assets and
declining-balance depreciation may be
used for tangible fixed assets other than
buildings
Depreciation is normally calculated on
the straight-line method but for most
new fixed assets (not for buildings,
passenger vehicles and office
furniture), by the declining balance
method.
Different methods could be used when
justified and recognised by General
Direction of Taxes.
Free depreciation is possible for assets
whose value is not bigger than 40.000$.
Straight line or declining balance
depending on the nature of the assets63
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- Rates The applicable rates are determined by
standard practice. The declining-
balance rates generally may not exceed
three times the straight-line rates
subject to a limit of 30% of the value of
the depreciated asset (four times and
40% for scientific and technical
research equipment)
Rates fixed by law and vary according
to sector and nature of asset.
For declining balance depreciation,
straight-line rates are to be multiplied
by 1,5 (if useful life is less than 5
years), 2 (between 5-6 years) and 1,5
(more than 6 years).
Rates are weighted for assets subject to
more intensive use than normal.
- Industrial buildings (not in enterprise
zone) are eligible for a 4% annual
allowance on the straight line method
- Plant, machinery (which includes
equipment and motor vehicles): 25%
annual writing down allowance.
Restricted to £3,000 for motor vehicles.
SMEs are eligible for 40% First Year
Allowance
Capital expenditure on scientific
research and development – 100%
Agricultural Buildings – 4% straight
line
- Accounting tax deduction must be recorded in
business accounts,
tax deduction must be recorded in
business accounts,
n.a.
- Intangibles Intangible assets may be valued at their
"useful value" to the extent that this is
lower than the cost of acquisition..
Acquired goodwill is depreciable over
10 years.
 May be depreciated at the applicable
rate based on the number of years of
expected use, subject to a minimum of
3 years.
R&D expenses may be written off as
incurred or depreciated over maximum
of 5 years on straight-line basis
Patents and know how: 25% writing
down allowance.
- Non depreciable assets Land Land (in case of buildings, 25% of the
value is deemed to be land)
Goodwill, trademarks & patents not
depreciable unless they suffer an
effective reduction in value recognised
by the General Direction of Taxes.
Land, goodwill
￿￿￿3URYLVLRQV Specific provisions deductible in
principle but subject to any specific tax
rules
In general only deductible if legislation
specifies
Provisions correctly included in
accordance with accounting principles
are acceptable for tax, subject to any
specific tax rules to the contrary (e.g.
provisions for entertaining are
disallowed as entertaining is non
deductible)
- Risks and future expenses Deductible Specific provisions deductible – e.g.
foreseeable expenses as result of
pending law suits, environmental risks
in extractive industries.
Deductible where obligations arising
from past events exist independently of
an entity’s future actions64
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- Bad debts Specific provisions are allowable Specific provisions are allowable in
certain circumstances. A debt is
doubtful if debtor is insolvent, payment
depends on court proceedings, or it is
more than 6 months overdue in which
case the following deductions are
permitted -
25% for > 6 < 12 months
50% for > 12 < 18 months
75% for > 18 < 24 months
100% for receivable held for over 24
months
It is not possible to deduct debts with
associated parties or public
administrations or backed up by
guaranties.
Special rules apply to banks and
insurance companies
Specific provisions are allowable.
General provisions are not allowable.
- Pensions Deductible Non deductible. Payments to certain
schemes are deductible.
Non deductible. Payments to funded
schemes are dealt with under separate
rules.
- Repairs Non deductible Non deductible Generally Non deductible
￿￿￿/RVVHV
- Carry Forward No limitation in time Up to 6 years No limitation in time
Losses may be carried forward only
against future income of the same trade
- Carry Back not available  not available 1 year, extended to 3 years if trade
ceases.
- Transfer of losses No special restrictions except in case of
mergers
Subject to the consolidation rules no
special restrictions except in case of
mergers, and where there is a
significant change in nature or conduct
of business
Allowed if trade transferred between
companies in common ownership.
￿￿￿&DSLWDO￿*DLQV
Sale of Fixed Assets:
- Timing Rules
Capital gains are taxable as ordinary
business income at the time of
realisation.
Capital gains are taxable as ordinary
business income at the time of
realisation.
Capital gains are taxable as ordinary
business income at the time of
realisation.
- Inflation No inflation correction The acquisition price of tangible fixed
assets held for 2 years is adjusted to
take account of inflation.
The acquisition price of assets is
adjusted to take account of inflation.
- Rates No special rate. No special rate. No special rates.6WUXFWXUDO￿HOHPHQWV /X[HPERXUJ 3RUWXJDO 8QLWHG￿.LQJGRP
- Exemptions Capital gains derived from the sale of a
building or a non depreciable asset are
tax exempt if reinvested in similar
assets within 2 years of the sale
Roll over relief for fixed assets on
condition of reinvestment within
3 years. Minister of Finance can
authorised to extend the period to a
fourth year.
Roll over relief for fixed assets on
condition of reinvestment within
4 years (1 year before and 3 years after
the sale)
Sale of shares Capital gains on the sale of shares are
exempt if the participation represents at
least 25% of the capital and has been
held for a period of at least 12 months
preceding the beginning of the financial
year in which the sale occurred
Taxable Taxable
Capital Losses
- fixed assets Deductible as ordinary loss Deductible as ordinary losses Can only be carried forward and set off
against capital gains
- shares Deductible if gain would have been
taxable
Deductible as ordinary loss if held as
investment, financial assets or as
inventory.
Can only be carried forward and set off
against capital gains
￿￿￿0HUJHUV￿￿￿$FTXLVLWLRQV
- Deferral of taxation Domestic: tax neutral. Domestic mergers, division and similar
transactions are tax neutral, subject to
certain conditions.
The same regime also applies to cross
border operations of the same type in
the framework of the Directive
90/434/CEE.
UK company law does not provide for
mergers and divisions of the type
covered by the Merger Directive.
Consequently most "mergers" are
accomplished through an exchange of
shares. Subject to certain conditions
capital gains arising on the exchange of
shares are deferred until such time as
the new shares are disposed of.
Divisions may be carried out by
liquidating the company or by
distribution of shares. In both cases the
shareholders are exempt from capital
gains tax subject to various strict
conditions.
The UK has not implemented the
Merger Directive as regards mergers
and divisions.
- Transfer of losses In case of merger, the absorbing
company cannot take over the losses of
the absorbed company
In case of merger, the transfer of losses
from the absorbed company to the
absorbing company is only possible if a
prior ruling is granted (it should be
demonstrated that the merger will
improve the restructured business).
Losses incurred before the change of
ownership of a company cannot be
carried forward if there is also a major
change in the nature or conduct of the
trade.
- Transfer of tax bases In order for the merger to be tax free
the absorbing company should take
over the assets of the absorbed
company at the same book value
In order of the merger to be tax free the
absorbing company should take over
the assets of the absorbed company at
the same book value
There are no specific provisions dealing
with mergers6WUXFWXUDO￿HOHPHQWV /X[HPERXUJ 3RUWXJDO 8QLWHG￿.LQJGRP
￿D*URXS￿5HOLHI
- Conditions Luxembourg applies the German
concept which allows a Luxembourg
company to treat the Luxembourg
resident subsidiaries in which it owns
at least 99% as if they were
establishments for corporate tax
purposes. Consequently, the profits
made by one company may be set off
against the losses made by another
company belonging to the same group.
Consolidation.
Type of relief: taxation in the hands of
the parent company as one fiscal unit.
The income and losses of companies
within the same group are aggregated
subject to the following limit: The
consolidated taxable profits may not be
lower than 65% of the aggregate
taxable profits of the consolidated
companies should there be no
consolidation.
No consolidation as such.
Conditions: A group is made up of
either 51% or 75% subsidiaries
depending on the type of group
treatment being claimed.
- Type of Relief See above Conditions: in addition to the granting
of permission by the Ministry of
Finance for five years – extensible -,
the following requirements must be
met: all the companies of the group
must have their principal offices or
effective management in Portugal. The
controlling company's shareholding in
each subsidiary must be at least 90%
(directly or indirectly. All companies
are subject to Corporate Tax general
rules.
Losses of companies currently within
the group, prior to the period of
consolidation can only be offset against
profits earned by the same company.
When the consolidation period expires,
remaining losses from the consolidated
period cannot be carried forward and
applied against affiliated corporations.
The "group relief" allows tax losses to
be transferred between members of a
group (upwards, downwards or
sideways).
Where assets are transferred between
companies in a group, no capital gain
or loss arises to the transferor.
￿￿,QWHUFRPSDQ\￿GLYLGHQGV Domestic companies: full exemption
for dividends received (minimum
participation of 10%)
Non-resident companies: idem if the
non-resident subsidiary is subject to
minimum corporate tax (15%)
Domestic companies: dividends
received are 95% exempt if minimum
holding of 25% for 2 years. < 25% tax
credit of 60% of underlying IRC
available.
Non-resident companies:
-Non EU: dividends received are
taxable with full tax credit only if
provided by tax treaty. Deduction of
withholding at source is provided with
the limit of the corresponding domestic
taxation.
-EU: dividends received are 95%
exempt if 25% ownership, for 2 years.
Domestic companies: full exemption.
Non-resident companies: dividends
received are taxable but with full credit
for withholding tax and underlying
corporate tax67
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￿￿,QYHQWRULHV
- Valuation Rules At lower cost or "going concern” value. At cost or fair market value. Provisions
referred to market value are tax
deductible.
Lower of cost or market value.





- General Rules Deductible if does not serve to increase
the net assets and incurred in the
interest of the firm
Deductible if related to the carrying out
of the objectives of the company
Most expenses are deductible if
incurred for the purposes of trade
- Non-deductible expenses So-called "hidden profit distributions"
which include unduly high salaries and
transactions not at arm's length with
shareholders or related parties.
Fines
state taxes, illegal expenses, 20% of
representation and passenger vehicle
expenses; fines, the acquisition cost of
leisure craft and aircraft and any non
justified or substantiated expenses.
There is also a limitation for
depreciation allowance for passengers
vehicles the cost of which exceeds PTE
6 millions.
Entertainment and gifts are not
deductible. There is also a limitation
for depreciation allowance for
passenger vehicles the cost of which
exceeds
£ 12,000.
- Thin capitalization Although no specific legislation against
thin capitalisation in practice
debt/equity ratios are applied by the tax
authorities.
As a general rule, debt/equity ratio of
2:1 with respect to loans granted by a
non-resident related party. (Limitation
does not apply if the loan conditions
are at arm's length). Coefficient is
referred to the shareholder
participation.
Although there is no fixed debt/equity
ratio, interest paid do a non-resident
can be recharacterised as a dividend if
it is not at arm's length having regard to
the rate of interest and other terms
including the debt/equity ratio (a ratio
of 1:1 is normally acceptable)
Interest paid by a thinly capitalised
subsidiary to a non-resident 75% parent
can be recharacterised as a dividend if
not at arm's length. There is no fixed
ratio but a ratio of 1:1 is normally
acceptable.B. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTIVE LEVELS OF COMPANY TAXATION
IN MEMBER STATES
 ,1752'8&7,21
This part of the study presents effective corporate tax rates on domestic and transnational investments in
the 15 EU Member States taking the tax systems in operation in 1999. Moreover, in view of the structure
and magnitude of the German tax reform approved in 2000, the analysis developed in this section also
takes account of the effects of this reform as of the 1
st January 2001.
Effective tax rates are tax rates which take into account not only the statutory corporate tax rates but also
other aspects of the tax systems which determine the amount of tax effectively paid. In other words, they
take into account the tax base and the manner (if any) in which corporate and personal tax systems are
integrated.
Systems of taxing profits are, however, far too complex to be encompassed fully in the methodologies
developed so far in order to calculate effective tax rates. A number of the special features of individual
tax systems thus have to be ignored, for instance special sectoral incentives. However, the main features
of the national tax systems are captured in the calculations presented in this report. The methodologies
used in this study build, on the one hand, on a revised and extended methodology from the so-called
King & Fullerton approach, set out by Devereux and Griffith (1998) and, on the other, on the "European
Tax Analyser model", set out by the University of Mannheim and ZEW (1999).
The purpose of the quantitative analysis developed in this part of the study is twofold. First, it gives
summary measures of the overall relative incentive (or disincentive) provided by each country’s tax law
to undertake various types of investment at home or in the other EU countries. This provides an
indication not only of the general pattern of incentives to investment that are attributable to Member
States’ tax law, but also of the extent to which taxation in each country discriminates in favour or against
inward and outward investment. Second, it identifies the most important tax drivers influencing the
effective tax rate, that is the weight of each of the most important elements of a tax regime. From the
pure point of view of economic efficiency, decisions related to the location and the organisation of an
investment in terms of choices of assets and sources of finances should not be driven by tax
considerations. In order to highlight the policy issues involved in reducing potential tax-induced
economic distortions to the allocation of resources, this part of the study investigates the contribution of
particular features of taxation to the lack of neutrality in taxation systems.
Taxation is, of course, only one of the determinants of investment and financing decisions. Among the
other determinants of investment behaviour are: the market size, the short and medium-term economic
outlook in different markets and countries; the cost of capital in relation to the cost of other productive
inputs; the profitability of investments; the availability of finance and government investment grants, the
existence and quality of economic infrastructure, the availability of qualified labour. The geographical
accessibility of markets, transport costs, environmental standards, wage levels, social security systems
and the overall attitude of government all play an important role too. The relative importance of these
determinants varies between countries and over the business cycle. Nevertheless, as economic
integration in the EU proceeds in the context of Economic and Monetary Union and the internal market,
in an environment where capital is fully mobile the pattern of international investment is likely to be
increasingly sensitive to cross-border differences in corporate tax rules.
Other taxes, such as those on payroll and social security contributions or energy taxes may also affect
costs, and thus the location of investment, particularly in the short to medium term. At national level, EU
governments have a number of common concerns regarding the corporation tax which is the focus of the
mandate given to the Commission by the Member States. The main focus of this report is corporation tax
including its interaction with some elements of personal tax.69
In this part of the report, the cost of capital, marginal effective tax rates and average effective tax rates
are computed for different types of domestic and transnational investments in the manufacturing sector
in each Member State. The contribution of various features of Member States’ tax laws to the lack of
neutrality of the tax regimes is assessed by means of a series of simulations. Some cases of the effective
tax burden of SMEs as well as some cases of tax planning are analysed separately.
This quantitative analysis relies heavily on the report "The effective levels of company taxation in the
Member States of the EU", produced for the Commission by the Institute for Fiscal studies, the
University of Mannheim and the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) of Mannheim. The
calculations presented in the boxes "Tax Analyser" are based on the report "Computing the Effective
Average Tax Burden for Germany, France, the Netherlands, the UK, Ireland and the USA using the
"European Tax Analyser" Model" produced for the Commission by the University of Mannheim.
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The existing approaches to measure the effective tax burden are based on two types of analysis implying
either backward-looking concepts or, alternatively, forward-looking concepts. Both approaches have
their respective advantages and disadvantages and can lead to different quantitative results. Even if the
results of the application of different methodologies are not directly comparable, the existence of tax
induced distortions seems to be confirmed by a variety of studies regardless of the particular approach
adopted. Nevertheless, the size of the observed differences as well as the relative situations of countries
do vary depending on the methodology applied.
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One approach to measure the effective tax burden in policy-making is based on aggregated data from
existing firms. As this looks at the capital stock, profits or other relevant data accumulated in the past it
is called a backward-looking approach. By referring to the observation of ex-post data, it measures
"actual" rather than "hypothetical" tax rates. Within this framework, one can distinguish between
approaches based on firm-specific data or on aggregated economic data.
Approaches based on firm-specific data generally express the effective tax burden as a percentage of the
tax liability relative to the profits from companies’ annual accounts. Data can either be taken from
individual financial statements or consolidated returns35. Although these measures have the advantage of
showing the actual tax burden borne by companies, they could be misleading if they are used to assess
and compare the effective domestic tax burden in international comparisons. This is because approaches
based on ex post company-specific data do not take into account the interaction between personal and
corporate taxation which is relevant when the marginal investor is domestic. In addition, they fail to
measure the incentive for additional investment or to correctly consider the foreign source income from
individual or consolidated company accounts. Moreover, the data sometimes tends to show significant
yearly fluctuations depending on business cycle effects. For these reasons backward-looking profit based
indicators are imprecise indicators of the investment incentives of taxation. But, they do permit an
assessment of effective actual tax burdens by firm size, sector or industry, which may be useful in
addressing equity concerns.
                                                
35  Recent studies of Buijjnk HWDO (1999) and Nicodème (2001) applied a backward-looking approach based on the
financial data of EU  companies in order to estimate effective tax rates in the manufacturing sector.70
Measures for the tax burden using aggregate economic data from national accounts are computed as a
percentage of domestic corporate taxes (in general only corporate income tax) relative to various income
measures, such as aggregated domestic corporate profits or the corporate operating surplus. Although
these formula are mathematically correct, it is hazardous to make an international comparison of
corporate tax rates on the base of aggregated economic data. On the one hand, the methods and
definition of the National Accounting Systems differ between countries and, on the other, these data are
not sufficiently developed to distinguish different sources of taxation. Moreover, as is the case for tax
rates based on firm-specific data, tax rates based on macroeconomic data sometimes tend to show
significant fluctuations from one year to another due to business cycle effects.
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Consequently, the most commonly used indicators for analysing the impact of taxation on investment
behaviour are based on forward-lookingconcepts and involve calculating and comparing the effective
tax burden for hypothetical future investment projects over the assumed life of the project or,
alternatively, the effective tax burden for hypothetical future model firm behaviours, using the statutory
features of the tax regimes.
These approaches permit international comparisons and are especially tailored to "isolate" the effects of
taxation thus providing an indication on the general pattern of incentives to investment that are
attributable to different national tax laws. It is worth noting that the results of the application of these
approaches rely on the assumptions underlying the definition of the hypothetical investment in terms of
assets and financing and of the future firm behaviour in terms of total cash receipts and expenses, assets
and liabilities over time. Moreover, these approaches do not take into account in the computation all the
features of a tax system.
The results produced by the application of these approaches summarise and quantify the essential
features of the tax system in a relatively straightforward manner. They provide an estimate of the
discrimination of Member States’ tax law between various forms of investment and different sources of
financing as well as of the discrimination in favour or against inward and outward investment. They also
identify the most important tax drivers influencing the effective tax burden. Therefore, these approaches
can illustrate the distortive effect on the allocation of resources of a tax system for typical investments or
typical firm behaviour, which may be useful in assessing the investment incentives of taxation and
addressing efficiency concerns.
Nevertheless, the actual effect of the tax system will, of course, vary according to the particular
investment project which a company undertakes. Moreover, the measurement of effective corporate tax
differentials does not provide evidence of the effects of taxation on actual business location.
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The approach taken in this study is based on the general forward-looking framework introduced above
and is in part similar to that taken by previous studies of the international comparison of effective tax
rates on capital income, and in particular by the OECD (1991), the Ruding Committee (1992), and Baker
& McKenzie (1999)36.
The computation of the effective corporate tax rate builds on two different methodologies which involve
calculating the effective tax burden either for a hypothetical future investment project or, alternatively,
                                                
36  Several studies have used forward-looking methodologies to analyse the impact of taxation on the incentives to invest.
Among them, see : Bovenberg HWDO (1989), the Report of the Canadian Department of Finance (1997), Bordignon HWDO
(1997), Le Cacheux HWDO (1999), Bond and Chennels (2000).71
for a hypothetical model firm behaviour. In technical terms, the analysis relies on a revised and extended
methodology from the so-called King & Fullerton approach, set out by Devereux and Griffith (1998) and
on the "European Tax Analyser" model, set out by the University of Mannheim and ZEW (1999). The
main computations are based on the hypothetical future investment approach and they are supplemented
by the "European Tax Analyser" model, which utilises the model firm approach.
Considering that each methodology is based on different hypothesis and restrictions, it has been
considered useful to compare the results of these two different approaches in order to test them and,
possibly, to confirm the general trend arising from the computations.
It is worth noting, however, that the analysis of a hypothetical investment is more complete, in the sense
that it covers a broader range of cases for all the European Union Member States. For technical reasons
linked to the availability of data and the nature of the model, the "European Tax Analyser" only covers a
limited numbers of countries and cases.
The main body of the quantitative study thus relies on the application of the analysis of a hypothetical
investment and is complemented, where relevant and possible, by results arising from the computation of
the behaviour of a hypothetical model firm.
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The King and Fullerton approach (reviewed by Devereux and Griffith) is based on the assumptions that
all markets, especially production factors markets, are competitive and the production function has the
usual properties, notably constant return to scale. In this situation, the decision to invest and locate
somewhere is influenced only by capital taxation, not by taxes or contributions on other factors such as
wages, energy etc. and the incidence of these other elements of the tax system is borne by other agents
(see Annex A for a more detailed description of the methodology).
This approach computes directly the tax "wedge" between the rate of return on investment of a series of
hypothetical investments and a given alternative rate of return on savings. In the absence of taxes, when
the decision taker invests money to finance a project he earns a rate of return equal to that earned on the
project itself. When a tax is introduced, the two rates of return can differ. The size of the tax wedge
depends, among others, upon the system of corporate taxation, the interaction of taxation and inflation,
the tax treatment of depreciation and inventories, the treatment of different legal forms of income, and a
number of other elements linked to the definition of the tax base. It is clear, therefore, that the effective
tax rate on an investment project depends upon the industry, where it is located, the particular asset
purchased, the way the investment is financed, and the identity of the investor who supplies the finance.
a) Cost of capital and Effective Marginal Tax Rate
The basic approach for the computation is to consider an incremental "marginal" investment located in a
specific country undertaken by a company resident either in the same country (domestic case), or in
another country (transnational case). A marginal investment is one whose expected rate of return is just
sufficient to convince the investors that the project is worthwhile. This minimum rate of return is widely
referred to as the "break-even" rate of return. Given a post-tax rate of return required by the company’s
shareholder (for instance on interest earned in some alternative use of the capital), it is possible to use
the tax code to compute the pre-tax rate of return of the hypothetical investment, that would be required
in order to obtain the minimum post-tax rate of return. This is known as the cost of capital.
A company that is contemplating a new investment project has, on the one hand, to compute the overall
cost of the asset, taking into account not just the initial outlay, but also any reduction of that outlay due
to tax relief received as a result of the investment. On the other hand, the company must also calculate
the after-tax returns that it expects the investment to generate in the future. The company would72
undertake the investment provided the present value of the after-tax profits from the investment is
greater than the initial cost of the asset minus the present value of any tax relief. Hence, the principal
impact of taxation on investment is through the cost of capital. The difference between the cost of capital
and the required post-tax rate of return (expressed as a percentage of the cost of capital) is known as the
effective marginal tax rate (EMTR) that is, the rate applied to a marginal investment.
For example, if the minimum rate of return required by the company’s shareholder is 5% and the
company must earn 6.67% before tax (the cost of capital) in order to pay this 5% rate of return to the
investor, then the effective marginal tax rate is 25% (6.67%-5%/6.67%). The difference between 6.67%
and 5% represents the impact of taxation on the cost of capital.
This approach is based on the presumption that companies will undertake all investment projects which
earn at least the required rate of return. For a given required post-tax rate of return, the more severe the
tax system, the higher is the cost of capital, i.e. the required pre-tax rate of return, and hence the less
likely that any specific investment project will be undertaken. In comparing such investments in
alternative locations, the underlying economic model would predict that, ceteris paribus, locations with a
higher cost of capital or EMTR would have less investment.
b) Effective Average Tax Rate
The current study goes beyond this approach, however, to also consider the effective "average" tax rates
(EATR) on various forms of incremental investment which are more profitable then the marginal
investment explained above. The rationale for doing so is that often a company that has taken the
decision to undertake a specific profitable investment has to choose between two or more mutually
exclusive locations. Examples include the location decision of multinationals in choosing a site for one
new factory, and the choice of investment projects in the presence of binding financial constraints. In this
case, the impact of taxation on the choice is likely to be measured by the proportion of total income
taken in tax in each location. The measure used in this study is computed as the net present value of tax
revenue expressed as a proportion of the net present value of the income stream (excluding the initial
cost of the investment). The literature commonly defines the effective average tax rate as the effective
tax burden held by an infra-marginal (average) investment as opposed to the effective marginal tax rate,
which is the effective tax burden held by a marginal investment.
In this study, two computations are therefore made for each of the alternative hypothetical investment
projects with two different rates of profitability, which illustrate respectively:
I)  The EMTR, where the real before tax return is the minimum rate which is required to undertake
the investment ("marginal investment"),
II)  The EATR, where the incremental investment project is not marginal, but generates a
considerably higher rate of return ("average investment")
%R[
3URSHUWLHVRIWKHPHDVXUHRIHIIHFWLYHDYHUDJHWD[UDWHXVHGLQWKHFRPSXWDWLRQ
The properties of this measure have been explored by Devereux and Griffith (1999).
One attractive feature of the measure is that, in the absence of personal taxes, the EATR for marginal investments is identical
to the EMTR. At the other extreme, for extremely profitable investments, the EATR tends to the statutory tax rate. An
example of this is given in Figure 1, which presents a range of values of the EATR for different levels of profitability for




The line begins at the marginal investment, where the EATR is the same as the EMTR. When the level of profitability of the
investments rises, so does the EATR. The reason is that allowances against the cost of the investment become relatively less
important when the cost of investment becomes smaller relative to the returns. At very high levels of profit, the stream of
income from the project far exceeds the costs. In this case, virtually the only element of the tax regime to matter is the overall
statutory tax rate. When profitability reaches very high levels, the EATR gets very close to the statutory Belgium tax rate of
39%.
The equivalent figure for each of the other 14 EU Member States is presented in Annex D.
c) Hypotheses and assumptions
Estimates of the effective tax rates on domestic and transnational investments in the 15 EU Member
States are presented as at June 30, 1999. In the transnational case, the analysis is extended to the case of
investors located in the USA and in Canada. Calculations consider primarily corporation tax in each
country, but also include the effects of personal income taxation of dividends, interest and capital gains.
Several assumptions need to be made in order to define the hypothetical investment project analysed, and
the economic conditions under which it is assumed to take place. Besides these, the exercise is limited to
parameters of the various tax regimes which can be captured in the context of the analysis of a
hypothetical investment project. Thus, as in every study of this kind, the hypothetical investments
analysed are rather simple manufacturing sector investments, and a number of detailed features of actual
tax systems cannot be incorporated in the model as for instance different kind of provisions in the
different Member States. The fact that the analysis is limited to the manufacturing sector is due to the
impossibility to quantify, in the framework of the model the number of different specific provisions
applying to the service sector across the EU Member States (e.g. the special provisions applying to the
financial service sector). Moreover, this approach does not, for methodological reasons, take into
consideration all the relevant features linked to the existence and functioning of different tax systems. It

















and losses throughout the EU because, by definition, it only takes into account investments which make
profits. The quantification of compliance costs is also impossible.
The computation is also based on the hypothesis that all taxes due are paid and therefore that the results
are not affected by different levels of tax enforcement. In fact, there is no reason to believe, nor is there
any empirical evidence, that possible shortcomings in the enforcement of tax laws have a significant
impact on the location of business activities within the EU.
The assumptions and parameters underlying the computation are given in Annex B. Sensitivity analysis
investigates the impact of the assumptions and of some elements of tax systems on the results.
It is worth noting that, for the sake of comparison, the definitions of investment and of the economic
variables underlying the computations are the same for all countries considered. The purpose of the
analysis is to understand how taxation influences the profitability of the same hypothetical investment in
different countries and not to give a picture of the actual economic situation for each country.
Due to these assumptions and restrictions, the numerical estimates arising from the application of the
model should be interpreted with caution and should be understood as summarising and quantifying the
essential features of tax systems.
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The conceptual framework of a model firm approach is significantly different. No explicit assumption is
made about the competitive situation of production factor markets and therefore the incidence of factors
others than capital taxation, but implicitly the reasoning is based on the assumption that some elements
of the non-corporate tax system (for instance some payroll taxes) are in fact borne by companies. So this
methodology differs from the Devereux and Griffith model as far as the incidence of some elements of
tax systems on companies is concerned. It can be argued that it is somewhat arbitrary to consider that
only some elements of the non-corporate tax system are borne by firms. Nevertheless, the purpose of the
present study is not to test the empirical relevance of the "Tax Analyser" model hypotheses. As already
mentioned, the data arising from the application of the Tax Analyser model are presented only with the
purpose to test and, possibly, confirm the general picture arising from the application of the
"hypothetical investment" approach. (The methodological framework and the hypotheses and
assumptions of the Tax Analyser model are given in Annexes G and H).
The calculations are based on an industry-specific mix of assets and liabilities taking as a base case a
typical medium-sized manufacturing company. Based on this (in general, existing) capital stock, the
future pre-tax profits are derived on the basis of estimates for the future cash receipts and cash expenses
associated with this initial capital stock. In order to determine the post-tax profits the tax liabilities are
derived by taking into account the tax bases according to the national rules and then applying the
national tax rates.
This approach does not need to characterise optimal investment behaviour but it relies heavily on the
particular characteristics of the model firm, in particular the initial capital stock and the expected
development of the capital stock over the simulation period.
a) Average effective tax rates
The tax effects of infra-marginal investments, i.e. of investments that are more profitable than the
marginal investment, are central to this model and the taxation of an existing capital stock is analysed.75
Consequently, this model only computes effective average tax rates which measure the effective tax
burden of projects that earn more than the capital costs.
The effective average tax rate is expressed by the difference between the pre-tax and the post-tax return
of the capital invested in the corporation divided by the pre-tax return.
b) Hypothesis and assumptions
Estimates of the effective average tax rates for Germany, France, the Netherlands, the UK, Ireland and
the USA are presented as at 1999. The calculations consider primarily corporation tax in each country,
but also include the interaction of corporate and personal income taxes, the individual income tax rates
including surcharges and capital taxes at the shareholder level. The effective average tax rate is derived
by simulating the development of a medium-sized manufacturing company over a ten year period.
Several assumptions need to be made in order to simulate such a development, notably the company’s
initial total assets and liabilities and the expected development of the capital stock over the simulation
period. The model firm’s structure refers to a typical German medium-sized manufacturing company.
With regard to investment, the assumptions ensure that the initial capital stock at least remains constant.
In contrast with the analysis of the taxation of a hypothetical investment, this model takes into account a
large majority of the relevant tax provisions. (The assumptions and parameters are given in Annex H).
Box 4 compares the tax provisions taken into account in the two models.
As already mentioned, the results of this model rely on the particular characteristics of the company.
Sensitivity analysis investigates the impact of alternative rules for profit computation and different
business data. Moreover, as is the case for the analysis of a hypothetical investment, the application of
this methodology does not take into consideration some features linked to the existing and functioning of
different tax systems, such as, for instance, loss consolidation or compliance costs.
For the sake of comparability and in order to isolate the effects of taxation, it is assumed that the model
firm in each country shows identical data before any taxation. The purpose of the analysis is to
understand how taxation influences the profitability of the same capital stock in the different countries




- Depreciation (methods and tax period for all considered
assets);
- Inventory valuation (production costs, lifo, fifo, and
weighted average);
- Elimination and mitigation of double taxation of foreign
source of income (exemption, foreign tax credit, deduction of
foreign taxes);
- Investment incentives (extraordinary depreciation, special
tax credits, special tax incentives). These are considered only
in the sensitivity analysis (section 5).
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- Depreciation (methods and tax period for all considered
assets, extraordinary depreciation);
- Inventory valuation (production costs, lifo, fifo and weighted
average, inflation reserves);
- Development costs (immediate expenses or capitalisation);
- Taxation capital gains (roll-over relief, inflation adjustment,
special tax rates);
- Employee pension schemes (deductibility of pension costs,
contributions to pension funds, book reserves);
- Provisions for bad debts;
- Elimination and mitigation of double taxation of foreign




The reference date for the computation of effective tax rates on domestic and international investments
for all countries is 1999. In the meantime, a number of Member States have introduced some changes to
their corporation tax codes.
In view of the fact that there is always a tax reform in progress in at least one Member State, it is
inevitable that the data arising from the computation can only present a picture of a situation at some
point in the past. Any comparison has to be made on a consistent basis and constantly updating the
national tax codes is impracticable. Moreover, it is impossible to take into account in the application of
the models the effect of tax reforms that are announced but not yet completely defined. However, the
overall results of the analysis should not be fundamentally affected by reforms aimed at revising
particular individual features of national tax systems.77
That said, as the German corporate tax reform approved in 2000 addresses in both a quantitatively and
qualitatively significant manner all the main relevant characteristics of the German corporate tax system,
the analysis developed in this section also takes account of the effects of this reform.
Therefore, an additional separate set of effective tax rate data for Germany as at the 1
st January 2001
have been computed, as well as additional comparative tables which take into account the 2001 situation
for Germany and the 1999 situation for the other countries (see annexes E and J). Where relevant for the
analysis of the effects of effective tax rate differentials, the inclusion of the new German situation in the
EU context is commented on in this section. All the tax reforms introduced in other Member States are
less significant as far as corporate taxes are concerned, both quantitatively and qualitatively.
The simulations of the harmonisation of particular features of taxation are based on the 2001 situation
for Germany and on the 1999 situation for the other countries. As such policy simulations refer to a
hypothetical future situation, the use of a consistent basis is less relevant here and indeed to ignore the
German reform would be highly misleading.
The effective tax burden of SMEs and the tax planning cases are analysed on the basis of 1999 data for
all countries considered.
It is worth mentioning that France introduced a tax reform in 2000 aiming at abolishing the surcharges
on corporation tax by the year 2003. Due to the particular structure of these surcharges, which are
determined partly by the amount of wages and salaries, and the period over which the changes will be
implemented, this reform has not been modelled. Section 10 of this part of the Study presents an updated
computation of the effective tax rates on domestic investments for all Member States, taking into
account the tax regimes of 2001. This permits an analysis of the impact of national reforms of the
corporate tax regimes on the effective tax burdens.
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This section considers the influence of domestic tax regimes on the organisation of companies’
investments and the way in which national tax codes can affect the international competitiveness of
resident companies and, under certain assumptions, the location choice of multinationals.
In the analysis, the case where all personal taxes are set to zero is first considered. In this case, any
variation in effective tax rates is purely due to differences in corporate taxation. Then personal taxes on
dividends, capital gains on the increase in the value of the shares and taxes on interest are added, on the
assumption that companies act in the interest of their shareholders, to maximise the shareholders’ wealth.
The economic rationale for including (or not) personal taxation and the difficulties arising in seeking to
take into account personal taxes in the analysis are the subject of some controversy. There are good
reasons both for including or excluding personal taxation (see Box 5). The current analysis presents
separate computations of effective company tax rates which respectively take into account only corporate
taxation and corporate taxation plus some elements of personal taxation.78
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The influence of personal taxation on company investment behaviour depends on the functioning of international capital
markets and, in particular on the extent to which international portfolio capital is mobile. If companies can only raise money
domestically, then changes in the personal tax treatment of investment income will alter company behaviour. Instead, if
companies are able to finance their investments on the international capital markets, the influence of personal taxation on
investment income varies according to the degree of integration of capital markets.
If this market is so integrated that the world interest rate is unaffected by the domestic amount of saving, personal taxes do not
and should not affect the investment behaviour of companies. In fact, a personal tax on all forms of interest income will result
in a lower post-tax return to savers; consequently they will save less. But assuming that domestic saving is small relative to the
world supply of saving, the world interest rate will be unaffected, and so the investment decisions of the domestic corporate
sector will be unaffected. In contrast, taxes on corporate income generated in a particular country will affect corporate
behaviour, regardless of how the project is financed. In such a case, due to capital mobility, personal taxes in small open
economies like the individual EU Member States do not affect investment decisions of companies. From this point of view the
taxation of shareholders or more generally, the taxation of suppliers of finance, would not be relevant for a comparison of
business tax burdens.
This conclusion, however, depends on the assumption that internationally mobile portfolio capital always exists. But this
assumption could be questioned on the grounds that all companies raise at least some money domestically and small and
medium sized companies may even have no access to international capital markets. The literature is not unanimous on
whether the assumption of perfect international capital market mobility is pertinent for all type of economic agents.
Moreover, structural differences between national tax systems are mainly caused by the differing corporation tax systems and
the different ways in which the corporation tax and income tax interact. For this reason, the level of taxation not only for
retained, but also for distributed profits differs among countries.
A practical difficulty also arises in seeking to take into account personal taxes. That is, the company may have many
shareholders, facing different rates of tax from each other. Which set of personal taxes should a company take account of in
these circumstances? Economic theory suggests that a company should act in the interest of the "marginal" shareholder that is,
the shareholder who is just indifferent between owning and not owning the company’s share. Unfortunately, in practice, it
could be impossible to identify "the" marginal shareholder.
In order to consider all these arguments, the present study shows a separate analysis of the impact of personal tax in the
domestic case. The central case analysed takes into account only corporate taxes on the hypothesis that the company does not
know the identity of the marginal shareholder. Then, in order to provide a comprehensive analysis of the impact of Member
States’ national tax systems on investment and financing decisions, personal taxes are added. However, as far as the effective
average tax rate is concerned, since its main focus in this analysis is on the choice of location, an implicit underlying
assumption for this case is that economies are open to flows of mobile capital. In this situation it is very difficult for firms to
allow for the tax positions of their shareholders. Nevertheless in the framework of the "Tax Analyser" model, personal




Domestic tax regimes can influence the organisation of companies’ domestic investments by creating
incentives both as to how to finance the investment and the overall mix of assets. In fact, different forms
of investment or different sources of financing may face very different tax treatments. Such variations
constitute a potential source of distortion in the allocation of resources and may therefore impact overall
efficiency. If the impact of differences in tax treatment favours one particular form of investment or
financing, then the economic activity may not be organised in the most efficient economic way.
Although these differences may be secondary to the main focus of this section, which is the impact of
taxation on the incentives to locate investments, it is useful to have an indication of the effects of tax
regimes on the organisation of investments in the EU as a starting point.
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The first case analysed is the simplest case in which there are no personal taxes. Separate investments in
five different assets are considered: intangibles (e.g. purchase of a patent), industrial buildings,
machinery, financial assets and inventories. In presenting averages over different forms of investment,
these assets are weighted equally. Three sources of finance for investment in each asset are separately
considered: retained earnings, new equity and debt. The weights used are taken from OECD (1991):
retained earnings 55%, new equity 10% and debt 35%. Thus, calculations are made for 15 different types
of investments.
Tables 1 and 2 present the cost of capital, the effective marginal tax rate and the effective average tax
rate for each type of investment averaged across the 15 Member States. This is an unweighted average.
That is, it does not take into account differences in the size of each country (or any other factor). As
such, it gives an indication of the average effect of tax regimes in the EU and it is not an attempt to
measure the "average" taxes in Europe, where the size of countries and hence the numbers of
investments facing each specific tax regime would need to be taken into account.
Tables 1 and 2 capture the extent to which corporate taxation in the EU affects the incentives to
undertake particular kinds of investments by responding to the following questions, respectively for
Table 1 and Table 2.
"Given a real interest rate of 5% in each country and assuming that the investments will not raise extra-
profits, what is the required pre-tax rate of return (the cost of capital) for different types of investment
financed by different methods, and what is the percentage difference between the pre-and post-tax rates
of return (the effective marginal tax rate)?"or, alternatively, "Given a real interest rate of 5% and an
assumed pre-tax rate of return of the investment of 20% in each country, which is the proportion of total
income taken in tax in each type of investment financed by different methods (the average effective tax
rate)?"
As pointed out above, in the first case it is assumed that the investors undertake all investment projects
which earn, at least, the required rate of return before tax. For a given required post-tax rate of return, the
more severe the tax system, the higher is the cost of capital, and hence the less likely that any project will
be undertaken. In the second case it is assumed that companies may choose between mutually exclusive
investments and that they will choose the project whose proportion of total income taken by tax is lower.80














6.6 8.0 6.7 8.6 7.9 7.6 Retained
Earnings
20.0 35.2 23.3 39.9 35.5 32.6
6.4 7.8 6.6 8.4 7.8 7.4 New Equity
18.5 34.2 22.0 39.3 34.6 31.6
3.3 4.4 3.5 4.9 4.3 4.1 Debt
-67.3 -22.2 -50.9 -3.8 -16.8 -24.6
5.4 6.7 5.6 7.3 6.7 6.3 Mean
3.6 23.3 8.3 29.8 24.1 20.2
Note. Each number in the Table is an unweighted average over the equivalent number for each member state. This is true for
both the cost of capital and the EMTR. For a specific investment in a specific country, the EMTR is the percentage difference
between the equivalent cost of capital and the post-tax required rate of return of 5%. For example, a cost of capital of 7.5%
generates an EMTR of (7.5-5)/7.5=33.3%. However, taking an average of the costs of capital, and a separate average of the
EMTRs implies that the DYHUDJHEMTRs presented in the table are not precisely the percentage difference between the
DYHUDJH cost of capital and 5%.
Generally, according to Table 1, there is considerable variation in the tax treatment of different forms of
investment within the EU and, therefore, the EU tax regimes effectively seem to create incentives as to
how to organise investment in the EU. Annex C (country tables) shows that there is a remarkably
similarity between countries in the pattern of tax incentives for domestic investments even if the range of
values across countries gives an indication of differences between EU Member States in their treatment
of specific forms of investment (see sections 4.2 and 4.3).
As far as the source of finance is concerned, first, as shown by many other studies, corporate tax regimes
tend to give a strong advantage to investment financed by debt. For debt-financed projects the EU cost of
capital is always lower than 5%, and, consequently, the EMTR is negative in all cases. This means that at
the margin corporation tax regimes subsidise the financing of investments by debt. This advantage arises
because nominal interest payments on debt are deductible from corporation tax, and there is usually no
comparable corporation tax relief for investment financed by new equity. Thus, from the point of view of
the company, financing through new equity and retained earnings is disadvantageous, as no deduction
from the taxable base for the corresponding payment is allowed.81
Second, in the absence of personal taxation, there is almost no difference in the cost of financing the
investment by giving up one unit of dividend income as opposed to contributing one extra unit of new
equity37.
When considering the assets, considerable variation in the average treatment can be observed too.
Financial assets are the most heavily taxed. In fact, financial assets are assumed not to depreciate and
hence not to benefit from any allowance. Any income generated from the asset is generally taxed at the
full statutory tax rate. Moreover, this rate is applied to the nominal return defined as the real interest rate
plus inflation rate (set at 2% for each country in this analysis), rather than to the real return, and for this
reason the effective marginal tax rate exceeds the statutory tax rate. Hence, the higher the inflation rate,
the higher the EMTR. In the case of financial assets financed by debt, the fact that nominal interest
payments are deductible from tax generally compensates for the fact that the nominal interest receipt is
taxable38. In such a situation, the value of both tax and economic parameters plays no role.
In general, the cost of the other assets can be offset against taxable profit over a period of time.
Typically, the rate at which the cost can be offset is related to the economic depreciation rate of the
assets. For a given true economic depreciation rate, the more quickly the cost can be set against tax, the
more valuable the allowance and hence the lower the effective marginal tax rate. The EMTR thus
reflects the difference between the true economic rate of depreciation and the rate of allowance permitted
in the tax code.
Differences between the remaining four assets therefore reflect not only the generosity of the tax systems
with respect to the allowance rates for the four assets, but also the assumptions made about the true rate
of economic depreciation. However, even allowing for this dependence, significant differences seem to
persist within the EU. In general, industrial buildings and inventories have the highest cost of capital and
effective marginal tax rate, while intangibles and machinery are rather lower.
                                                
37  The slight differences of data in table 1 for retained earnings and new equity are only due to the German regime which
in 1999 had a split rate system which taxes distributions at a lower rate than retained earnings. In this case if the
company reduces its dividend payment by one unit, the tax saving which would otherwise have been gained from
paying the dividend is lost. In effect, the net income of the shareholder falls by more than one unit and this increases
the cost of financing the investment by retained earnings.
38  Exceptions to this arise because of special provisions in the tax regimes in Germany and Italy, which have a slighter
higher cost of capital, and in Greece which taxes investment income at only 15% and hence has a significantly lower
cost of capital.82
B) The case of a profitable (infra-marginal) investment
Table 2 presents estimates of the effective average tax rates for each of the same 15 investments analysed











Ret Earnings 30.6 35.1 31.0 35.6 34.9 33.5
New Equity 30.2 34.7 30.7 35.2 34.5 33.1
Debt 20.0 23.8 20.7 23.6 23.5 22.3
Mean 26.8 31.1 27.4 31.4 30.9 29.5
In this case, it is important to remember that, as explained in Box 3, the EATR varies according to the
expected level of profitability of the investments. In particular, in the absence of personal taxes, the
EATR is identical to the EMTR for marginal investments, and it rises when the profitability rises
because allowances against the cost of the investment become relatively less important when the cost of
the investment becomes smaller relative to the returns.
Since the assumed real rate of return of 20% is not high enough to mean that allowances and deductions
are too small to have much impact, the pattern of the EATR in Table 2 bears some resemblance to that of
the EMTR in Table 1.
Some differences may however be underlined. Concerning the source of finance, it is now worth noting
that the relative advantage of debt is lower than in the case of marginal investment, reflecting the lower
value of the interest deductibility relative to the return generated. Therefore, this advantage tends to
diminish when the profitability of the investment rises.
The relative ranking of the treatment of the 5 assets is also the same as in Table 1, but the introduction of
extra-profits results in a narrowing of the differences between them. Once again, however, these
averages hide a considerable dispersion between countries. This is explored in sections 4.2 and 4.3.
 7KHLQWURGXFWLRQRISHUVRQDOWD[DWLRQ
In principle, if companies act in the interest of their shareholders and the international capital market is
not perfectly mobile, they should take account of their tax liabilities. If a different choice of source of
finance, for example, results in a higher post-tax income for the shareholders, then this is advantageous.
As discussed in Box 5, this situation is more likely to be relevant when the shareholders are domestic
residents, and hence face the domestic tax system. Of course, even in this case there may be considerable
variation in the tax position of different shareholders, which may make it impossible for a company to83
maximise the post-tax earnings of all shareholders. Table 3 presents the cost of capital and the effective
marginal tax rates, averaged across the 15 EU Member States, for the 15 hypothetical investments in the
case where companies aim to maximise the wealth of top-rated qualified shareholders, taking into
account their personal tax liabilities on the hypothesis that these are known by the company39. A
qualified shareholder is a shareholder who holds a substantial part of the shares of the company. Three
personal taxes are introduced in this section: on interest received, on dividend income and on capital
gains.
This table, therefore, captures the extent to which corporate taxation and these three forms of personal
taxation affect the incentives to undertake the particular forms of investment considered in this study,
assuming that the investments will not raise extra-profits.
For the theoretical reasons explained in Box 5 the analysis of the impact of personal taxation is restricted













4.1 5.2 4.3 5.6 4.9 4.8 Retained
Earnings 51.0 61.4 53.3 63.4 60.3 59.3
4.7 5.9 4.9 6.3 5.6 5.5 New Equity
56.7 64.5 58.8 68.1 65.5 64.0
3.5 4.6 3.8 4.9 4.3 4.2 Debt
30.9 44.6 34.9 52.4 47.5 44.7
3.9 5.1 4.2 5.4 4.8 4.7 Mean
48.0 58.2 50.5 61.8 58.4 56.9
Note In the case of Spain, the cost of capital for several types of investment is close to zero. This implies that the EMTR can
reach extremely large values. This table therefore presents an average of the costs of capital across all 15 EU Member States.
However, the results for the EMTR are an average only over the 14 EU Member States excluding Spain.
                                                
39  Companies should aim to maximise the wealth of other kind of shareholders. If they would act in the interest of the
zero-rated shareholders, then in most countries there will be no effect on the cost of capital and the EMTR compared
with the case of only considering taxes on corporations. This is obviously because considering such shareholders does
not introduce any new form of taxation. However, in certain countries this is not the case. Instead, Finland, France,
Germany and Spain all permit a zero-rated shareholder to claim a rebate equal to the tax credit associated with the
payment of a dividend. This has a significant impact on the cost of capital and hence the EMTR in the case of new
equity finance, where the return subsequently distributed as a dividend. In this case the effective tax burden is
considerably lower. If the shareholder taken into consideration would be a top-rate, non-qualified shareholder, then the
only countries presenting significantly different situations compared to the case of a qualified shareholder will be Italy
and the Netherlands. This is due to the different tax rates on dividend applied to non-qualified shareholders. In Italy the
tax rate is higher for qualified participation and in the Netherlands it is lower. The other countries apply the same rates
to both kinds of shareholders.84
Table 3, shows, that when personal taxation is taken into account, the differences observed in Table 1
still exist, even if a different treatment of the sources of finance can be observed. But the most striking
feature of this table is that the taxation of the investment backflows in the hand of the shareholders
considerably reduces the EU average cost of capital and increases by more than twice the effective
marginal tax rates.
The most important reason for the decrease of the cost of capital is the impact of the personal tax on
interest. In fact, the post-tax rate of return required by the shareholder depends on the post-tax rate of
return of an alternative financial investment. Assuming the alternative to be lending, then any tax on
interest -the return on lending- reduces the post-tax return to lending. Consequently a lower post-tax rate
of return is required from equity investment. In fact, on average, investment financed by retained
earnings and debt have a cost of capital less than the real interest rate of 5%. Of the five assets, only
industrial buildings and financial assets have an average cost of capital above 5%.
Personal taxes do not generally affect the cost of capital for investments financed by retained earnings.
This is because they affect the net cost of the investment in the exactly same way as the net return to the
investment. Suppose, for example, that the tax rate on a dividend payment is 30%. And suppose that a
company finances the purchase of an asset costing 100 euros by reducing dividends. The net cost to the
shareholder is therefore 70 euros. Suppose also that the investment generates a gross rate of return of
10%, being worth 110 euros after one period (ignoring taxes). When this amount is distributed as a
dividend, it generates post-tax income of 77 for the shareholder. But this represents a post-tax rate of
return to the shareholder of 10% -the same as the pre-tax rate of return. The impact of the dividend tax is
negated by the fact that it affects both the net cost of the investment and the net return. There are much
smaller effects on the cost of capital for investment financed by debt.
The underlying reason why the average EMTRs in Table 3 are considerably higher than those in table 1
is that the alternative opportunity open to each individual is to lend an equivalent sum. Therefore the
EMTR compares the cost of capital with the post-tax rate of return on lending rather than to the real
interest rate. Since this post-tax rate of return is lower as a result of taxes on interest received, the
effective marginal tax rates are higher.
 'LIIHUHQFHVDFURVVWKH(8
This section begins to address the question of the differences between Member States in their treatment
of the specific forms of investment considered in this analysis.
It is useful to remember that in this section only domestic investment is considered, and therefore the
analysis of the differences in Member States’ tax treatment relates to the case of a domestic company
resident in the same Member State.
Within such a framework, differences between Member States may affect the international
competitiveness of resident companies and, under certain assumptions, the location choice of
multinationals.
In fact, first, when companies operate mainly in their domestic country, but export their output to other
countries, where they compete with each other, a lower tax burden in one country may generate a
competitive advantage for companies resident in that country.
Second, in certain specific cases, differences in the effective tax burden between countries could also
affect the location choice of individual companies. This would be the case for multinational companies
that ignore personal taxes (perhaps because they do not know the identity of their marginal investor) and
that are able to leave effective tax rates close to those of the host country, due to the provisions of
international tax codes or to the tax planning activity of the company.85
This section considers these questions by looking at the EU range of values for the 15 types of
hypothetical investment considered earlier.
With regard to the location of investment, it should be noted again that the data arising from the
application of the theories underlying this analysis give summary measures of the incentives (or
disincentives) to undertake different types of investments and do not provide evidence of the impact of
taxation on actual economic decisions. Box 6 presents a short survey of the empirical studies which have




The mandate given to the Commission by Member States requests an assessment of the effects of
differences in the EU Member States’ effective tax burdens on the location of economic activity and
investments. The methodologies applied in the current study assess the relative incentives (or
disincentives) provided by each country’s tax law to undertake various types of investment at home or in
the other EU countries. To what extent taxation has an impact on actual investment decisions depends,
however on the extent to which tax incentives lead to changes in actual behaviour.
If taxation were the only element influencing location decisions, that is, ceteris paribus, differences in the
effective tax burdens between countries would be the only factor determining location decisions,
investment should be located in countries where taxation is lower. But taxation is only one of the
elements affecting location decisions. Several differences arising from the macro and micro economic
framework of each country contribute to determine the actual behaviour of companies.
The fact that differences in the effective tax burdens between countries persist, shows that the arbitrages
are not perfect and that taxation is not the only element affecting location decisions.
Therefore, when assessing the impact of taxation on location decisions it is necessary to isolate the
effects of taxation among the other factors in order to study the correlation between taxation and location
decisions.
While there has been a fair amount of empirical studies of this issue in the US, the empirical literature in
Europe is rather scant. Three major issues have been explored:
(A) The convergence of tax rates
(B) The incidence of international tax differentials on the flows of foreign direct investment
(C)The relationship between taxation and location in the context of tax competition amongst local
governments,
.
(A) According to many authors, one implication of the hypothesis of tax competition amongst
governments to attract business should logically be the convergence of the observed tax rates. Empirical
evidence of such convergence is, however, not very strong.
Moreover, the relative convergence of statutory tax rates on companies’ profit and on individual
investors’ income and capital gains that has been observed in the European Union does not, in itself, give86
much indication of the extent to which tax competition and effective differences amongst Member States
in the treatment of such income remain.
In fact, the effect of differences in taxation on economic decisions depends on their marginal impact on
the rates of return to investment, which, in turn, depends not only on apparent tax rates, but also on rules
determining the tax base. So, the convergence of effective marginal tax rates should be evident over a
period of time.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to study this possible convergence due to the lack of appropriate data
based on forward-looking methods covering a long enough period of time.
(B) One obvious direction for testing the consequences of differentials in national business taxation on
location decisions is foreign direct investment, where, by definition, capital is internationally mobile.
The empirical relevance of tax considerations in investment decisions has been mostly studied by
looking at the investment location decisions in multinational corporations. A number of empirical
studies show that tax considerations are relevant in investment decisions. Nevertheless, the size of the
correlations varies according to the specific methodology applied.
Devereux and Griffith (1998), using individual firm activity data of US multinationals investing in
Europe (restricted to the UK, France and Germany) show that the choice of the location, conditional on
the decision to produce abroad rather then to export, is driven by taxation and other cost-related factors.
Friedman, Gerlowsky and Silberman (1992) consider the establishment of new manufacturing plants of
European and Japanese firms at the state level in the USA. They find that per capita state and local taxes
are strong determinants for location.
Hines (1996), on the basis of models of the investment process, reported positive correlation between
investment levels and after-tax returns to foreign direct investment.
A recently published study - Fontagné, Benassy-Quéré and Larèche-Révil (2000)- has attempted to
implement a direct econometric test of the hypothesis by confronting net bilateral foreign direct
investment flows with indicators of business tax differentials; their results support the hypothesis.
Most of these studies investigating the empirical relations between tax differentials and investment
location suffer from particular difficulties. A difficulty encountered by all empirical investigations
looking at international investment flows is the potential interference of many other elements of national
tax and social protection systems in the decision of a multinational corporation to locate investment in
one country rather than another. This points to the need for further research on the interaction between
several tax instruments with different bases.
The studies using foreign direct investment data all have to face the weaknesses of existing data, with, in
particular, the difficulty of distinguishing between financial transactions and "real" foreign direct
investment. Certain studies use inappropriate indicators of tax pressure based on apparent average tax
rates on corporate profits, which can widely differ from the relevant indicators as expressed by effective
tax rates.
Therefore, the fact that the existing literature has been rather deceptive in furnishing coherent results on
the size of the impact of taxation on capital flows or location decisions seems mainly due to sample
biases or data shortcomings. A way to properly deal with the difficult issue of the interaction between
taxes on various factors would be to use a general-equilibrium framework allowing for imperfect
competition on some markets. An alternative way of proceeding would be to confront net bilateral
foreign direct investment flows with series indicators of average effective tax burden.87
(C) A number of studies based on European data have focused on the hypothesis of tax competition
amongst local governments within national economies. This restricted field has the advantage of more
closely resembling the US context in which the original empirical work was initiated. In addition it also
restricts the number of differences potentially interfering with business tax differentials in the firms’
location decisions: for instance, within the national economy, social contributions are uniform. However,
even in this environment of restricted differentiation amongst jurisdictions, they are potentially many
factors influencing the location of firms, and taxation is only one of these.
Conventional wisdom currently rests on the apparently sound hypothesis that firms’ location decisions,
be it when a firm relocates or when it decides to open a new plant or office, are made according to many
factors, that are treated in a hierarchical way. A firm first chooses the region -the so-called "macro
location" decision- based on such factors as market for product, labour market conditions and labour
costs, etc. Only then, in the so-called "micro- location" decision - i.e. when choosing the precise locality
in which to settle- will local tax differentials influence the firm’s choice (Jayet, 1993; Jayet and Wins,
1993; Conseil national des impôts (F), 1997, Madiès, 1997a and b; Houdebine and Schneider, 1997;
Paty, 2000).
To conclude, the empirical studies show, to different degrees, that there is a negative correlation between
the size of taxation and location decisions. Nevertheless, most of the empirical studies suffer
methodological weaknesses or are tailored to study just the effect of local business taxation. It is
therefore difficult to have "the" quantitative measure of this impact even if the existence of such a
relation is generally undisputed.
Because of the weaknesses of the existing methodologies and the severe limitation due to lack of
available data, it is considered that none of the existing approach could be usefully adopted in the current
analysis, without considerably extending the range of the work. Taxation has certainly an influence on
the location of economic activity but it is very difficult to correctly isolate this influence.88
 5HOHYDQWHFRQRPLFPHDVXUHVUDQJHRIWKHFRVWRIFDSLWDODQG($75YDOXHVDFURVV
WKH(8
As in the previous analysis on the influence of domestic tax regimes on the organisation of companies’
investments, the first case analysed in this section is the simplest case in which there are no personal
taxes. The calculations are made for the same 15 different types of investment.
Tables 4 and 5 capture the range of values across EU Member States and therefore present the highest
and lowest values observed when analysing separately individual EU Member States, respectively in the
case of marginal investments and in the case of investments whose assumed rate of return is 20%. These
ranges give some indication of the differences between EU Member States in their treatment of specific
forms of investment. The individual situation of each EU Member State is presented in section 4.340.











8.4 10.1 9.8 12.6 10.5 Retained
Earnings 3.4 5.1 4.3 5.8 5.5
8.4 10.1 9.8 10.4 9.0 New Equity
3.4 5.1 4.3 5.8 5.5
4.8 6.3 5.7 5.7 5.0 Debt
1.6 2.2 2.2 3.0 3.6
This table provides evidence of considerable variation across Member States in the cost of capital for
each investment. A range of 5 percentage points or more is common. For example, the cost of capital on
investment in machines financed by retained earnings and new equity ranges from 4.3% to 9.8%. This
would suggest that companies located in the lowest value country have a significant advantage over
firms located in the highest value country in selling their output in the European, and possibly world,
markets. Moreover, this would imply that, under the conditions mentioned above, multinational
companies resident in the EU have a significant incentive to locate investments in the lowest value
country.
                                                
40  The lowest and highest values presented in Tables 4,5 and 6 cannot be compared with the lowest and highest values of
country data presented in section 3.3. In this section the hypothesis is that each asset is entirely financed by each source
of finance. Appendix C (country tables) gives detailed results for each EU Member State. In section 3.3, where the
situation for each country is presented, data related to each asset are averaged across the sources of finance.89











40.6 46.3 44.3 54.3 48.2 Retained
Earnings
10.1 17.0 9.4 11.0 11.0
40.2 45.4 44.3 47.9 42.0 New Equity
10.1 17.0 9.4 11.0 11.0
26.9 31.5 32.2 34.8 28.8 Debt
6.6 13.5 6.0 2.5 7.5
This table shows that there is even greater variation in the effective average tax rates across Member
States than there is in the cost of capital. To take one example, the EATR on investment in machines
financed by retained earnings and new equity ranges from 9.4 to 44.3%.
In contrast to the case of a marginal investment, differences in the EATR are less likely to generate a
competitive advantage (or disadvantage). In fact, the EATR is based on the assumption that the
investment will generate a rate of return in excess of the minimum required. If a company in this
situation (resident in one country) finds itself undercut by its competitors, then there is nothing to
prevent it from responding by reducing its prices, and lowering its pre-tax rate of return.
As far as location is concerned, the difference with the marginal case is that an infra-marginal project
which is not located in more than one place is now analysed. The large variation in the EATR between
possible sites for location of investment may therefore indicate considerable distortions to location
choices.
 7KHLQWURGXFWLRQRISHUVRQDOWD[DWLRQ
When personal taxation is introduced into the analysis of tax differentials in the domestic case, it is
worth noting that differentials in Member States’ effective tax burden are still relevant in affecting the
relative competitiveness of domestic operators, as was the case for the analysis of the cost of capital, but
they are no longer relevant for the choice of location. In fact, in this case the objective of companies is to
maximise the wealth of their domestic shareholders. This could be incompatible with the hypothesis that
the company aims at  leaving effective tax rates close to those of the host country by means of tax
planning
Table 6 shows the range of values of the cost of capital across the 15 EU Member States, using as an
example a qualified shareholder taxed at the highest personal tax rate. Once again, the impact of personal











6.5 7.1 6.4 9.6 7.1 Retained
Earnings
0.0 0.1 -0.3 0.2 -0.8
8.9 8.9 8.8 10.0 8.8 New Equity
0.2 0.4 0.0 0.5 -0.5
4.8 6.4 6.2 5.7 5.0 Debt
2.0 2.5 2.6 3.0 3.6
The differences shown in this table are even more striking than in the case of Table 4. These results
imply that the differences in the tax systems may give some companies a considerable competitive
advantage over others.
Summing up the results of Tables 4,5 and 6 it is possible to assert that, in the EU, the competitiveness of
domestic companies and, under the conditions described above, the location choice of multinationals can
be affected in a significant way by differences in the effective domestic tax burden.
The next section examines the dispersion of the effective tax burden across the EU more closely by
presenting the situation of each Member State.
 7KHSRVLWLRQRIWKH(80HPEHU6WDWHV
One of the main purposes of this section is to analyse the differences in the effective tax burden borne by
EU companies located in different Member States and thus appreciate the possible effects of such
differentials on competitiveness and investment decisions. Under the hypothesis and assumptions
already mentioned, Tables 7 and 8 present country data where only corporate taxation is taken into
account : this includes the statutory tax rates, the surcharges and the local taxes. (The list of such taxes
for each Member State is given in Annex B). Section 4.3.2 will present data including the forms of
personal taxation already considered above.
 5HOHYDQWHFRQRPLFPHDVXUHVFRVWRIFDSLWDO(075DQG($75E\0HPEHU6WDWHV
A) The case of a marginal investment
Table 7 shows the cost of capital and the EMTR for the level of corporation and examines more closely
the dispersion across the EU and the relation between the effective tax burden and the national tax rate












































































































































































Austria 34.00 6.3 20.9 5.9 6.1 5.9 7.3 6.3 7.5 7.5 4.0 33.3 33.3 -25.0
Belgium 40.17 6.4 22.4 5.2 7.0 5.3 8.0 6.7 8.0 8.0 3.5 37.5 37.5 -42.9
Denmark 32.00 6.4 21.9 4.2 8.1 5.4 7.1 7.1 7.5 7.5 4.4 33.3 33.3 -13.6
Finland 28.00 6.2 19.9 6.1 6.1 5.6 6.8 6.8 7.2 7.2 4.5 30.5 30.5 -11.1
France 40.00 7.5 33.2 5.2 8.5 8.4 8.0 7.4 9.0 9.0 4.6 44.4 44.4 -8.7
Germany 52.35 7.3 31.0 5.4 7.2 5.8 10.0 7.9 9.7 7.6 3.2 48.4 35.5 -56.2
Greece 40.00 6.1 18.2 6.8 5.1 6.1 5.1 7.4 7.6 7.6 3.4 34.2 34.2 -47.1
Ireland 10.00 5.7 11.7 5.3 6.8 5.2 5.5 5.5 5.9 5.9 5.2 15.2 15.2 3.8
Italy 41.25 4.8 -4.1 2.9 4.6 3.8 7.7 5.0 5.5 5.5 3.6 10.0 10.0 -38.9
Luxembourg 37.45 6.3 20.7 5.2 6.8 5.3 7.7 6.5 7.7 7.7 3.7 35.1 35.1 -35.1
Netherlands 35.00 6.5 22.6 5.1 6.9 5.9 7.4 6.9 7.7 7.7 4.1 35.1 35.1 -21.9
Portugal 37.40 6.5 22.5 6.7 6.2 5.2 7.7 6.5 7.9 7.9 3.9 36.7 36.7 -28.2
Spain 35.00 6.5 22.8 6.5 6.7 5.4 7.4 6.4 7.7 7.7 4.1 35.1 35.1 -21.9
Sweden 28.00 5.8 14.3 5.0 6.0 5.0 6.6 6.6 6.7 6.7 4.3 25.4 25.4 -39.5
UK 30.00 6.6 24.7 5.5 8.2 5.6 6.9 6.9 7.7 7.7 4.8 35.1 35.1 -25.0
Note. Each asset column represents an average across all three types of finance, with weights of 55% retained earnings, 10% new equity and 35% debt. Each finance column represents an
unweighted average across all 5 assets. The overall average is an average across all 15 types of investment, with the same weights.
(1) including surcharges and local taxesTable 7 shows that there is considerable dispersion across the EU. Focussing first on the overall average,
it is notable that 7 Member States have an average cost of capital between 6.3% and 6.5%. Three others
(Greece and Finland and the UK) are very close to this range, leaving five significantly outside: France
and Germany have an average of 7.5% and 7.3% respectively, and Sweden, Ireland and Italy have an
average of 5.8%, 5.7% and 4.8% respectively.
This EU wide spread cannot be explained by one feature of the national tax systems alone, but it can be
observed that Germany had in 1999 the highest statutory tax rate on profit, and France by far the highest
non-profit taxes (local taxes on corporations). On the other hand, statutory tax rates in Sweden, in Ireland
and for certain categories of income (see below) in Italy, are by comparison the lowest. Even Finland,
which has one of the lowest statutory tax rates, shows a relatively low cost of capital.
All the EU Member States, except Ireland, have an EMTR lower than the overall corporate tax rate.
The fact that Ireland has an EMTR higher than the corporate tax rate is fundamentally due to the
relatively high (relative to the corporate tax rate of 10% applying to the manufacturing sector) real estate
tax rate (1.58%) applicable to industrial buildings (see Table 3 of Appendix B). The influence of the real
estate tax in the EMTR for Ireland is shown in Table 7, where the cost of capital for industrial buildings
is 6.8 and therefore the related EMTR is 26.8%. This influences the overall mean.
In order to appreciate the dispersion across Member States and the relation between overall nominal
profit rates and EMTR it is useful to look at the situation of the specific types of investment both by type
of assets and by source of finance.
Table 7 clearly confirms that, from the point of view of the corporation, the most tax-efficient way of
financing is debt. The major reason is that deduction of nominal interest payments from the corporation
tax base significantly reduces the effective tax burden on investments financed by debt. The effect of
interest deduction is high in countries where the corporation tax rates are higher. Furthermore, in certain
countries, debt-financed investments are subsidised if, relative to other countries, assets receive
"accelerated" depreciation as is the case for example in Belgium, Greece, Italy and Sweden.
Financing through new equity and retained earnings is disadvantageous, as no deduction from the
taxable base for the corresponding payments (dividends) is allowed. The national effective tax burden
for both forms of financing almost equal the tax rate on profit. Given the close relation of the effective
tax burden on new equity and retained earnings to the tax rates on profits in most of the EU Member
States, it can be inferred that "normal" accounting rules for profit computation, in so far as they are
considered in the model, in general do not have a great impact on the effective tax burden and on the
ranking of the countries, as they only result in "timing differences". Rather, it is likely that the different
tax rates on profit explain most of the differences in EMTR between countries.
The Italian case is worth noting. Table 7 shows an advantage of the Italian tax regime. This advantage
can be largely traced to the Italian "dual income" tax system, which splits the tax base for profits into
two components, taxed at different rates. Very broadly, the "ordinary return", calculated as the interest
rate multiplied by equity invested into the company, is taxed at 19%, while the residual profit is taxed at
37%. In this way, the system "encourages" self-financing through retention of profits and the issue of
new share capital. This results in a more homogeneous treatment between debt and equity financing.
Since in this section only marginal investments are considered, which, by definition do not earn any
residual profit, then the return on such investment is essentially taxed at the lower rate.
The French case is also worth noting. Table 7 shows that France has marginal effective tax rates for
retained earnings and new equity far above the overall nominal tax rate on profit. This is due to the fact
that France imposes high non-profit taxes.93
With regard to assets, in general, intangibles and machinery are taxed quite generously. The only
exception is Greece, where buildings are depreciated for tax purposes over a period of ten years and
where financial assets benefit from a very favourable tax rate. Reasons for the general disadvantageous
treatment of buildings include the comparatively long lifetimes for tax purposes and the obligation to use
straight line depreciation (except in Finland and Sweden).
As far as non depreciable assets are concerned, inventories are, in general, more heavily taxed. It is very
difficult to draw general conclusions concerning the relative treatment of depreciable and non
depreciable assets. In fact, as already pointed out when analysing Table 1, estimates of the effective tax
burden could be sensitive to the assumptions made for true economic depreciation. Section 5 of this
section examines the sensitivity of the results commented on in this section to the assumptions made.94
B) The case of a profitable (infra-marginal) investment
Table 8 presents a summary of the effective average tax rates for each Member States for investments







































































































































Austria 34.00 29.8 28.6 29.2 28.4 33.2 29.9 33.9 33.9 22.3
Belgium 40.17 34.5 30.7 36.1 31.0 39.2 35.3 39.1 39.1 25.8
Denmark 32.00 28.8 21.3 34.7 25.3 31.2 31.2 32.3 32.3 22.1
Finland 28.00 25.5 24.8 24.8 23.1 27.3 27.3 28.8 28.8 19.3
France 40.00 37.5 30.6 40.6 40.1 39.0 37.1 42.1 42.1 28.8
Germany 52.35 39.1 33.9 39.0 34.9 46.8 40.8 46.1 40.1 27.7
Greece 40.00 29.6 35.5 30.4 33.4 11.6 37.1 34.4 34.4 20.8
Ireland 10.00 10.5 8.9 15.8 8.2 9.8 9.8 11.7 11.7 8.2
Italy 41.25 29.8 24.9 29.8 27.4 36.1 31.1 31.8 31.8 26.1
Luxembourg 37.45 32.2 28.6 33.7 29.2 36.6 32.9 36.6 36.6 24.0
Netherlands 35.00 31.0 26.7 32.4 29.2 34.2 32.5 35.1 35.1 23.3
Portugal 37.40 32.6 33.2 31.8 28.6 36.5 32.8 37.0 37.0 24.5
Spain 35.00 31.0 31.1 31.8 27.4 34.2 30.7 35.2 35.2 23.3
Sweden 28.00 22.9 19.6 23.4 19.7 25.7 25.7 26.0 26.0 17.1
UK 30.00 28.2 24.2 33.7 24.7 29.3 29.3 31.8 31.8 21.6
Note. Each asset column represents an average across all three types of finance, with weights of 55% retained earnings, 10%
new equity and 35% debt. Each finance column represents an unweighted average across all 5 assets. The overall average is
an average across all 15 types of investment, with the same weights.
(1) Including surcharges and local taxes95
For all countries bar one (see below), the EATRs are higher than the effective marginal tax rates but still
lower than the overall nominal profit tax rate. The effective tax burden rises when the profitability rises
because allowances against the cost of the investments become relatively less important when the cost of
the investment becomes smaller relative to the returns.
It is worth noting that the only country which has an EATR lower than the EMTR is Ireland. For this
country the average tax burden of the investment decreases when profitability rises and marginal
investments are relatively more highly taxed than profitable investments. In fact, as was shown when
analysing Table 7, for Ireland the marginal tax rate is higher than the national profit tax rate because of
the relatively high real estate tax rate applicable to industrial buildings. When profit rises, the weight of
this tax becomes relatively less important because the tax is levied not on profit but on the value of the
industrial buildings. As a result, when profit rises, the effective tax burden for industrial building
diminishes.
Table 8 shows that, when profitability is set at 20% the EATR for industrial buildings is 15.8%. This is
lower than the EMTR for industrial buildings (26.8%) but still higher than the corporate profit tax rate.
This influences the overall mean.
There appears to be rather more dispersion in the overall average EATR for each Member State than
there is in the equivalent EMTR. The Irish average rate is only 10.5%. Other rates range from 22.9% in
Sweden to 39.1% in Germany.
The other main conclusions of the previous section are equally applicable in the case of a profitable
investment. The link between effective tax burden and national profit tax rate is now even stronger and it
is noteworthy that the ranking of Member States is almost the same when considering the EATR and
national profit rates. The only exceptions are Italy and Greece. For Italy, again, the existence of "dual
income" tax system tends to reduce its EATR in comparison to the national profit rate when the
profitability is set at 20%. At the same time, this system plays now a less important role than in the case
of a marginal investment. Italy has the lowest average cost of capital, but only the seventh lowest EATR.
For Greece, the higher difference between its national corporate rate and average effective tax burden
seems to depend on the generous capital allowances granted for depreciable assets and on the very
favourable treatment of financial assets, which benefit from reduced rates.96
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This box gives measures of the effective tax burden of companies as computed by the application of the
model "Tax Analyser", which was described in section 3. (The hypothesis and restrictions of this model
are given in Annex H).
For the sake of international comparability and in order to isolate the effects of taxation, the comparisons
of the effective average tax rates are made under the assumption that the weights of assets and liabilities
of the model firms are identical in all countries. The Tax Analyser model refers, as a base case, to a
typical medium-sized German manufacturing company with data taken from published German
statistics. (Annex H explains the structure of the balance sheet of the model firm).
The effective average tax rates for the scenario in which only taxes at the level of the corporation are
taken into account, over a calculation period of ten years, are shown in the following table.
7$%/($ (IIHFWLYH$YHUDJH7D[5DWHDFURVV(80HPEHU6WDWHVDQGWKH86$
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FD I R L N L U K E U - 5
Average
USA
EATR - (corporation) 39.7 32.8 8.3 24.0 21.0 25.2 29.7
relative in % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Corporation tax and
surcharges
54.3 77.0 77.2 98.5 88.6 79.1 80.1
Trade tax / franchise tax on
income
- 22.3 - - - 4.5 12.7
Trade tax on capital / taxe
professionnelle
32.4 - - - - 6.5 -
Employer´s contribution 10.7 - - - - 2.1 -
P r o p e r t y  t a x ------ 7 . 2
Real property tax 2.6 0.7 22.8 1.5 11.4 7.8 -97
As was the case for the analysis of a hypothetical investment, this table shows that there is considerable
variation in the EATR, with a range of 31.4 percentage points between the highest and lowest rate. In the
case of a hypothetical investment the range was 28.6 percentage point. Therefore, the application of the
Tax Analyser model confirms the magnitude of the variation inside the EU.
If we compare the results of Table 8 with the results of Table A, the most striking result is that, with the
exception of France and Germany, the ranking of the countries from the highest to the lowest EATR is
the same for each model and this ranking closely follows the country ranking according to statutory tax
rates. The difference in the relative position of France, which is the highest EATR country here and the
second in the ranking in Table 8 can be explained by the fact that, in contrast to the hypothetical
investment case, a higher portion of non-profit taxes is included in the Tax Analyser model. That is, the
three "employer taxes" and the personal expenses forming part of the base of the "taxe professionnelle"
are included in the Tax Analyser model.
The differences between EU countries’ EATR are self-evidently due to different national tax systems, tax
bases and tax rates. But, it is important to stress that the Tax Analyser model takes into account almost
all the elements that affect the tax base. Only special incentives are excluded.
The results of Table A reveal that there is considerable variation in the structure of the national tax
systems. In all countries, profit taxes have the highest impact on the EATR. By contrast, the impact of
non-profit taxes on the EATR is low on average. The only exception is France where the weight of non-
profit taxes is 45.7%.
When the corporation tax bases are compared for a typical medium sized company, Figure A below
reveals a large variation between the countries. This considerable range is mainly caused by the low tax
base in France, as notably a consequence of the relatively high social contributions, and, to a lesser
extent in Germany. These differences are, however, smaller than would be expected from the findings in
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The analysis of the tax bases shows that all tax regimes are designed as more or less integrated systems.
This means that there is a particular relationship between the tax rate and the tax base. High rate
countries tend to compensate it through a reduced tax base and vice versa. Nevertheless, the cases of
France and Germany, which have the highest EATR, and the highest overall corporation rates, clearly
illustrate that higher tax rates more than compensate for reduced tax bases. On the other hand, despite
having the highest corporation tax base, Ireland benefits greatly from its comparatively very low rate,
which results in by far the lowest effective corporation tax burden. In general, tax rate differentials more
than compensate for differences in the tax base.
Therefore, the effects of the different tax bases, even if these differences partly compensate tax rate
differential, have therefore only a comparatively minor impact on EATR.
 7KHLQWURGXFWLRQRISHUVRQDOWD[DWLRQ
The introduction of personal taxation in the case of a marginal investment increases the effective tax
burden significantly. This is caused by the taxation of the investment backflows in the hand of the
shareholders. But personal taxes do more than simply increase the wedge driven between the initial
return on the investment and the return finally received by the financier. They alter the whole structure of
incentives to use one form of finance rather than another.
Table 9 shows the range of values of the cost of capital and the EMTR in each Member State for a

























































































































Austria 5.8 43.5 5.4 5.6 5.4 6.7 5.7 6.5 7.6 4.1
Belgium 5.7 30.2 4.6 6.3 4.7 7.1 5.8 6.5 8.1 3.7
Denmark 4.1 78.4 2.4 5.9 3.3 4.5 4.5 3.8 4.6 4.6
Finland 5.4 60.2 5.2 5.3 4.8 5.9 5.9 6.1 4.6 4.6
France 5.3 72.5 3.5 6.4 6.6 5.4 4.7 5.1 7.8 4.9
Germany 5.4 79.5 4.0 5.3 4.3 7.7 5.6 6.8 4.1 3.5
Greece 5.0 27.8 5.6 4.1 5.0 4.1 6.0 5.9 5.6 3.5
Ireland 4.1 56.4 3.8 5.3 3.7 3.9 3.9 3.1 6.0 5.2
Italy 5.1 18.8 3.1 4.9 4.0 8.0 5.4 6.0 5.6 3.5
Luxembourg 4.1 70.3 3.4 4.5 3.5 5.1 4.0 4.1 4.7 4.0
Netherlands 2.8 95.7 2.3 3.1 2.6 3.4 2.9 2.0 2.2 4.4
Portugal 5.4 33.8 5.6 5.3 4.4 6.6 5.4 5.8 8.7 3.9
Spain 1.5 156.3 1.6 1.8 1.3 1.9 0.9 -0.2 0.1 4.5
Sweden 5.3 73.2 4.5 5.4 4.5 6.0 6.0 5.6 6.7 4.3
UK 5.1 56.9 4.1 6.7 4.3 5.3 5.3 5.2 5.8 4.8
Note. Each asset column represents an average across all three types of finance, with weights of 55% retained earnings, 10%
new equity and 35% debt. Each finance column represents an unweighted average across all 5 assets. The overall average is
an average across all 15 types of investment, with the same weights.
As explained in section 4.1.2 the introduction of personal taxation implies a decrease in the cost of
capital and a considerable rise in the effective marginal tax rates.
As in Table 7, over half the countries have an average cost of capital within a very narrow range: in this
case between 5.0% and 5.4%. The only two significant outliers are the Netherlands with an average cost
of capital of 2.8% and Spain with only 1.5%. Neither of these countries had a low cost of capital when100
personal taxes were not taken into account. In both cases the low cost of capital can be traced to the
difference in the tax treatment between dividends and interest received by the shareholders. In the
Netherlands, for example, qualified shareholders can pay tax on interest at a rate of 60% on nominal
interest receipts, but pay tax on dividend income at a rate of only 25%. The high tax rate on interest
income means that the shareholder demands a much lower rate of return on their investment in equity,
which is reflected in the cost of capital.
However, the ranking of countries by the EMTR is very different. This is because the EMTR is defined
as the percentage difference between the pre-tax rate of return earned on the investment and the post tax
rate of return earned by the shareholder- that is, the difference expressed as a proportion of the cost of
capital. Given a very low cost of capital in Spain, it is quite likely that the EMTR will appear very high.
This is compounded in the case of Spain by the fact that the high tax rate on interest income implies that
the shareholder is willing to accept a very low post tax rate of return on equity investment; in this case
actually less than zero. This results in an EMTR over 100%. The fact that countries with the same cost of
capital nevertheless have a different EMTR is because the post-tax rate of return differs between
countries.
As far as the whole structure of incentives to use one form of finance over another is concerned, it is no
longer true that debt is always the form of finance which minimises the effective tax rate. For a majority
of Member States debt is still the most favoured form of finance and new equity the less efficient form,
with retained earnings in between. The reasons for the different relative treatment of finance are the
different corporation tax systems, the taxation of capital gains from the disposal of shares from the
shareholders and, in certain relatively generous cases, final withholding taxes on interest income. These
three tax-drivers have an interactive impact on the relative position of the forms of finance.
For example, the reason for the lower tax burden on retained earnings when personal taxation is
considered, is simply that capital gains are either not taxed at the personal level, (whereas debt or
dividends are) or else that capital gains are not taxed on accrual but only on realisation, whereas with




Compared to the tax burden at the level of the corporation (see Box 1 Tax Analyser), the overall tax
burden including personal taxes is higher, with no changes in the country ranking.
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EATR - (corporation and
shareholder) 48.8 37.4 17.2 32.0 25.6 32.2 32.0
The range of the EATR is also higher. This suggests that there is even more variation in personal taxes
than in corporate taxes.
Besides corporate taxes, these differences at the overall level come from the interaction of corporate and
personal income taxes, the individual income tax rates including surcharges and capital taxes at the
shareholder level.102
 7KHLPSDFWRIWKH*HUPDQWD[UHIRUP
The analysis so far has been based on the tax regimes which were in place in 1999. For the purpose of
comparison across countries it is important to choose a particular time at which to make a comparison.
Clearly, tax reforms in the EU can and do occur almost continuously, and so it is impossible for any set
of results to reflect the long-term position. However, the German tax reform, which came into effect on
January 1, 2001, is such a substantial and important reform affecting at the same time the system, the
taxable base and the rate, that it is useful to investigate how the main conclusions of the analysis are
affected by it. Therefore, this section investigates the impact of the German tax reform on the main
results of the previous analysis.
%R[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With effect from January 1, 2001, the German tax reform has changed the corporation tax system, reduced corporation and
personal income tax rates and broadened the tax base.
-  &RUSRUDWLRQWD[V\VWHP: The full imputation system that has been in force since 1977 has been abolished and instead a
shareholder relief system has been introduced. Under the new system (which is similar to the system in Luxembourg), only
one half of the dividends received by a private shareholder are subject to personal income tax. At the same time, all
deductions connected with dividend income from the income tax base are halved. However, other elements of private
capital income such as interest receipts are still taxed at the full rate. The abolition of the (full) imputation system follows
an international trend. After the German tax reform only five EU Member States remain that apply an imputation system:
Finland, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The vast majority of the Member States now utilise shareholder relief systems.
-  &RUSRUDWLRQWD[UDWHV: The changes in the corporation tax rate cover both the structure and the level of the tax rate. The
split-rate that distinguished between retained (40%) and distributed profits (30%) has been abolished and a single uniform
tax rate of 25% has been introduced. Although the 25% corporation tax rate is the second lowest of the countries
considered in this report (and within the EU), the solidarity levy of 5.5% and the trade tax with an average rate of 17.56%
remain. This has reduced the national tax rate on retained earnings from 52.35% to 39.3%. Although this is a significant
reduction, the statutory tax rate is still high by EU standards. Only France, at 40%, has a higher tax rate.
-  ,QFRPHWD[UDWHV: The top marginal personal income tax rate is being lowered from 53% (55.92% including the solidarity
levy of 5.5%) in three successive steps leading to a rate of 42% (44.31% including the solidarity levy) in 2005. The top
marginal tax rate begins at a taxable income of Euro 52.152. For the year 2001 the top marginal rate has been set at
48.5%, and it will be 47% in 2003. For the purposes of the following calculations only the situation applying from the year
2005 is considered.
-  &RUSRUDWLRQWD[EDVH: There has been a broadening of the tax base by cutting back the depreciation rules both for tangible
fixed assets and for buildings. The maximum declining balance rate for tangible fixed assets has been reduced from 30%
to 20%. For buildings, the straight-line depreciation has been reduced from 4% to 3%.103
 5HOHYDQWHFRQRPLFPHDVXUHVFRVWRIFDSLWDODQG($75EHIRUHDQGDIWHUWKHUHIRUP
The effects of the reform both on the cost of capital and the EATR for domestic investments in the case
in which there are no personal taxes are summarised in Tables 10 and 11.
A) The case of a marginal investment
Table 10 presents the cost of capital for domestic investment in Germany both before the reform (based
on the 1999 tax regime) and after the reform has been implemented. For each of the 15 types of
investment, the upper number represents the case before the reform, and the number below represents the














7.8 9.8 8.0 12.6 10.5 9.7 Retained
Earnings
6.6 8.4 7.4 9.5 8.2 8.0
5.8 7.6 6.1 10.4 8.2 7.6 New Equity
6.6 8.4 7.4 9.5 8.2 8.0
1.6 3.0 2.2 5.7 3.6 3.2 Debt
3.2 4.7 3.9 5.7 4.5 4.4
5.4 7.2 5.8 10.0 7.9 7.3
Mean
5.4 7.1 6.1 8.2 6.9 6.8
The lower rate on retained earnings reduces the cost of capital for investment financed by retained
earnings. Further, since the split rate system is abolished, and in the absence of personal taxes, the cost
of capital for retained earnings equals that of new equity. The cost of capital for new equity rises, partly
because of the broadening of the tax base, and partly because the effective subsidy to paying dividends is
removed. The cost of capital for debt finance also rises -and rather more substantially. This is due to the
fall in the tax rate, which means the value of interest deductibility will fall.104
With respect to the taxation of different types of assets, investment in all types of assets benefits from the
tax rate reduction. However, only investment in buildings and in machinery suffers from the reduction in
depreciation allowances. Overall, given the assumptions made here, the average cost of capital across
assets is generally reduced; however, it rises for investment in machinery.
It is worth comparing the relative position of Germany after the tax reform with its position before the
tax reform. The overall average cost of capital for Germany before the reform was 7.3% . This is the
second highest in the EU after France. After the reform the overall average cost of capital for Germany
falls to 6.8%. Given the economic assumptions used in the computation, then, the average cost of capital
for domestic investment in Germany does fall, but not by enough to change its ranking in the EU. The
reason could be the overall national tax rate, which at 39.3% is still the second highest in the EU.
B) The case of a highly profitable (infra marginal) investment
Table 11 presents the impact of the tax reform on the EATR for domestic investment in the absence of
personal taxes. As noted elsewhere, the EATR depends more closely on the statutory tax rate than does
the cost of capital. As a result, the EATR on retained earnings falls substantially - on average across the
5 assets from 46.1% to 38.7%. The EATR on investment financed by new equity also falls - unlike the
cost of capital for such investment- reflecting the lower statutory corporation taxation tax rate for
distributions. Finally, on average the EATR for investment financed by debt is almost unaffected,














40.6 46.3 41.2 54.3 48.2 46.1 Retained
Earnings
34.4 39.9 36.6 43.2 39.3 38.7
34.9 40.1 35.8 47.9 41.9 40.1 New Equity
34.4 39.9 36.6 43.2 39.3 38.7
23.1 27.2 24.8 34.8 28.8 27.7 Debt
23.9 28.6 26.1 31.7 27.9 27.6
33.9 39.0 34.9 46.8 40.8 39.1
Mean
30.8 35.9 32.9 39.2 35.3 34.8
The overall average impact of the German tax reform on EATR is to reduce it from 39.1% to 34.8%.
Comparing Germany to other Member States (shown in Table 8), pre-reform, Germany had the highest
EATR, ahead of France, (37.5%) and Belgium (34.5%). The effect of the reform is to shift Germany’s
ranking in terms of the EATR from the highest to the second. As with the cost of capital, the reform
appears to have some impact on the effective tax rates faced by domestic German companies, but it has
little effect on Germany’s overall position relative to other EU Member States.106
 7KHLQWURGXFWLRQRISHUVRQDOWD[DWLRQ
Table 12 presents the cost of capital when the firm is owned by a qualified shareholder taxed at the
highest personal tax rate. The addition of personal taxes has several effects. First, the reduction in the tax
rate on interest income raises the post-tax return available on lending by the shareholder, which in turn
raises the post-tax required return on equity. This tends to raise the cost of capital. Second, the abolition
of the imputation system tends to raise the cost of capital for investment financed by new equity.
However, this is offset by the reduction in the personal tax rate on dividend income. Third, the reduction
in the effective capital gains tax rate tends to reduce the cost of capital, especially for equity financed














5.4 6.8 5.6 9.3 7.1 6.8 Retained
Earnings
3.6 4.7 4.1 5.6 4.4 4.5
2.8 3.9 3.2 6.4 4.2 4.1 New Equity
4.2 5.3 4.7 6.2 5.0 5.1
2.3 3.3 2.6 5.7 3.6 3.5 Debt
3.7 4.8 4.2 5.7 4.5 4.6
4.0 5.3 4.3 7.7 5.6 5.4
Mean
3.7 4.8 4.2 5.7 4.5 4.6
The changes in the cost of capital are similar to those in Table 10 - on average the cost of capital rises for
investment financed by new equity and debt, and falls for investment for investment financed by retained
earnings. However, the rise in the cost of capital for investment financed by new equity is more
substantial than in Table 10 reflecting the replacement of the imputation system.107
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This Box highlights the impact of the German tax reform on the EATR both at the level of the
corporation and overall (corporation and shareholder) based on the behaviour of a typical medium-sized
German corporation in the manufacturing sector over the calculation period of ten years.
A) Corporation level
The following table compares the tax burdens for the base case corporation in the manufacturing sector









- effective in % 32.8 30.1
Relative in % 100 100









The tax reform reduces the EATR of the typical German corporation from the manufacturing sector over
the calculation period of 10 years by 2.7 points. Regarding the weight of the different taxes in the EATR,
the results from Table C show that a decrease in the corporation tax is mechanically associated with  an
increase of the shares of the trade tax and of the real property tax in the total EATR. Since both local
taxes are deductible as business expenses from the base of the corporation tax, and the corporation tax
rate is reduced, the (corporation) tax savings due to the deduction of these taxes will also be lower.
Moreover, the change in the depreciation rules immediately affects the trade tax since it is based on the
same taxable profits as the corporation tax.
An analysis of the impact of the different elements of the reform (see Table D) reveals that the decrease
in the effective tax burden that can be attributed to the reduction of the corporation tax rate is
outweighed (by more than 50%) by the changes in the depreciation rules and the corporation tax system.
The reduction in the effective tax burden which is solely attributable to the lower corporation tax rate is
23.4%. The new depreciation rules for buildings and tangible fixed assets increase the effective tax
burden by 5.5% (buildings 1.3% and tangible fixed assets 4.2%). The EATR increase due to the change
in the corporation tax system is 11%. This requires some explanation. It is assumed here that the amount
of dividends distributed to the shareholders after the reform is the same as before the reform. Since the108
dividends are no longer accompanied by a tax credit, the corporation must increase its cash distribution















Altogether, the EATR reduction is too low to improve the relative position of Germany in the country
ranking. Before the reform, German corporations’ EATR (32.8%) was the second highest after France
(39.7%). After the reform, Germany is still second highest (30.1%) now closely followed by the USA
(29.7%). There is still a considerable gap to the Netherlands (24%) in fourth position.
B) Overall (corporation and shareholder) level
If we consider the overall level including personal taxes of the shareholders, the German tax reform
reduces the effective tax burden significantly. In addition to the reduction of the marginal (and average)
income tax rate, which affects both the dividend and interest income, this result can be attributed to the
introduction of the new corporation tax system. According to the German method of shareholder relief
only one half of the dividends is subject to personal income tax. The results in Table E, which combine
corporate and personal taxes, show that the overall EATR falls from 37.4% in 1999 to 30.1% in 2005.
As a result Germany improves two positions in the country ranking to third lowest place behind Ireland
(17.2%) and the UK (25.6%).
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- effective in % 32.8 30.1
EATR (corporation and shareholder)
- effective in %(1) 37.4 30.1
(1) The fact that the effective tax rates at the corporation and shareholder level are identical is only valid for the
individual case. It cannot be concluded that the effect of the German tax reform is to equate these rates. It will depend on
the income of the shareholder whether the rates are higher, lower or by chance the same.109
As a result, overall it seems reasonable to conclude that a typical medium-sized corporation with a low
number of shareholders benefits from the German tax reform.
The results presented in this box are in line with the results presented in section 4.4. Despite the
considerable reduction of the EATR, the German tax reform has only minor effects on the relative
position of Germany in the country ranking.
 1HXWUDOLW\DQGGLVWRUWLRQHIIHFWVFRQFOXGLQJUHPDUNVIURPWKHGRPHVWLFDQDO\VLV
The analysis of the domestic case shows that European tax codes have an influence on the incentives to
investment and the choice of the way of financing the investment. The analysis suggests that, in
practically every situation analysed, on the one hand, tax systems tend to favour investment in
intangibles and machinery and, on the other, debt is, by far, the most convenient source of financing.
Moreover, the data tend to show that financing by retained earnings implies a lower cost than financing
by new equity when personal taxation is taken into account. Thus, tax regimes as such are clearly not
neutral to the extent that they tend to distort investment and financing decisions compared to a situation
without taxation. From a purely economic point of view this has an impact on the efficiency of the
allocation of resources within Member States and within the EU as a whole.
The previous analysis also suggests that there is considerable variation in the effective tax burden faced
by investors resident in the different EU Member States. However, the Member States’ tax codes tend to
favour the same forms of investment by assets and sources of finance. Differences between the effective
tax burden in the EU Member States can affect the competitiveness of companies competing in the same
external markets and may affect, under certain conditions, the location choice of multinationals.
The wide spread within the EU cannot be explained by one feature of the national tax systems alone.
However, the analysis presented above tends to show that the different overall nominal tax rates on
profits (statutory tax rates, surcharges and local rates) can explain most of the differences of EMTR
between countries. Therefore, although tax regimes are designed as more or less integrated systems (in
general high tax rates on profit correlate with lower taxable bases and vice versa) tax rate differentials
more than compensate for differences in the tax base. These conclusions are to be considered when
discussing the compensatory effects of a broad tax base compared to a relatively low tax rate on the
effective tax burden. The relative weight of rates in determining the effective tax burden of companies
rises when the profitability of the investment rises. The policy simulations presented in section 7 will
allow a better appreciation of the influence of particular features of taxation on the effective tax burden
differentials between Member States.
When considering the effect of the German reform the analysis suggests that, although this reform
appears to have some impact on the effective tax rates faced by domestic German companies, the reform
has little effect on Germany’s position relative to other EU Member States. This is because the overall
national corporate tax rate in Germany remains high by the standards of the EU.
How far governments should be concerned about non-neutralities and differentials depends on the
different legitimate goals of tax policy. For instance, a desire to "fine tune" depreciation allowances in
order to approximate true economic depreciation would have to be traded off against the desire for
administrative simplicity. Also, when personal taxation is taken into account, solutions which would
ensure that one form of financing is not favoured over another, could be incompatible with the
traditional goal of progressive taxation of comprehensive income. With a progressive personal income110
tax, it is more difficult to achieve a neutral corporate tax system. More generally, a non-neutral tax
regime may be justified from the point of view of economic efficiency in order to encourage or
discourage certain activities insofar the activities in question render positive or negative side-effects.
On the other hand, concerns related to the non-neutrality of tax systems derive from the fact that taxation
is one instrument for the creation of an appropriate business environment, and that its various other goals
can often be furthered more effectively by other policy means. In this case the taxation system must not
act as an obstacle to market efficiency. Moreover, a system characterised by large differences may often
offer unintended opportunities for tax avoidance.111
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Various assumptions have been made to generate the results given so far. This section examines the
effects of altering these assumptions, thereby illustrating the sensitivity of the results to the assumptions
made. In fact, the previous analysis is based on a set of very specific hypothetical investments under
specific economic conditions. Therefore, the data presented in the previous sections should not be
regarded as the universally valid values for the effective tax burden in different countries. It is therefore
legitimate to ask to what extent the general results shown above depend on the assumptions and, in
particular if changes in the parameters defining the investments or in the economic variables alter the
general conclusions of the previous sections. In fact, even if there are no universally valid values, it is
important to check whether it is possible to make generally valid statements regarding differences in the
effective tax burden. In order to answer this question, this section conducts a sensitivity analysis which
recalculates the cost of capital and each effective tax rate several times, each time varying the main
parameters of the model. This is done for the average values across the EU and for the different countries
separately. For the purposes of this exercise, only corporate taxes are considered.
 6HQVLWLYLW\RIWKHDYHUDJH(8FRVWRIFDSLWDODQG($75WRWKHFKDQJHVLQWKHHFRQRPLF
PRGHORUOHYHORIWD[HV
Tables 13 and 14 present an average across all Member States of the cost of capital and EATR for the
different forms of investment, corresponding to the tables in the previous sections. The first row in each
of these tables summarises the position in the base case, that is the averages shown respectively in
Tables 1 and 2. The other rows consider separately the effects on the overall average of changing one
parameter or set of parameters at a time. These changes involve the economic variables (real interest
rate, rate of inflation and level of profitability of the investment), the weights assigned to the assets and
the impact of local taxes and special investment incentives. There is no row numbered 4 in Table 13
















































































































1 Base case 6.3 5.4 6.7 5.6 7.3 6.7 7.6 7.4 4.1
2 Real interest rate: 10% 12.5 11.0 13.1 11.2 13.9 13.4 14.6 14.4 8.6
3 Rate of inflation: 10% 6.7 5.4 6.1 5.7 9.6 6.5 9.2 8.9 2.1
5 OECD/Ruding weighs 6.1 - 6.7 5.6 - 6.7 7.3 7.2 3.9
6 BACH average weights 6.0 4.7 6.0 4.9 6.5 5.9 8.0 7.8 4.4
7 Service sector weights 6.1 4.6 5.8 4.8 6.4 5.8 8.3 8.1 4.6
8 Equal weights 6.4 5.4 6.7 5.6 7.3 6.7 7.6 7.4 4.1
9 High level of local taxes 6.5 5.4 7.3 5.7 7.4 6.7 7.8 7.6 4.2
10 Low level of local taxes 6.2 5.4 6.2 5.5 7.2 6.6 7.4 7.2 4.0
11 Tax incentives for
new investments
5.1 4.1 5.7 2.2 7.1 6.5 6.3 6.1 3.0
Note. Each asset column represents an average across all three types of finance, with weights of 55% retained earnings, 10%
new equity and 35% debt. Each finance column represents an unweighted average across all 5 assets. The overall average is
an average across all 15 types of investment, with the same weights. Note also that the OECD report and the Ruding report
















































































































1 Base case 29.5 26.8 31.1 27.4 31.4 30.9 33.5 33.1 22.3
2 Real interest rate: 10% 24.9 20.3 27.0 20.7 28.6 28.0 31.7 31.0 12.5
3 Rate of inflation: 10% 30.7 27.0 29.4 27.6 38.9 30.6 38.7 37.9 16.1
4 Level of Profitability: 40% 31.6 30.4 32.6 30.7 31.7 32.5 33.5 33.3 28.0
5 OECD/Ruding weights 29.2 - 31.1 27.4 - 30.9 33.0 32.7 22.2
6 BACH average weights 28.0 24.7 28.9 25.3 29.0 28.6 34.4 34.0 23.0
7 Service sector weights 28.9 25.3 29.2 25.8 29.5 29.2 36.1 35.7 24.0
8 Equal weights 29.6 26.9 31.2 27.5 31.5 31.0 33.5 33.1 22.3
9 High level of local taxes 30.5 27.3 33.6 28.2 31.9 31.4 34.4 34.0 23.3
10 Low level of local taxes 28.6 26.3 28.9 26.5 30.8 30.3 32.5 32.1 21.4
11 Tax incentives for new
investments
25.7 22.8 28.0 17.0 30.5 30.3 29.4 29.0 19.0
As far as the economic parameters are concerned the tables show that, when the real interest rate is
doubled from 5% to 10%, ceteris paribus, the cost of capital roughly doubles in all cases and the EATR
tends to fall. This reflects the fact that, in the case of the cost of capital, taxes tend to have a multiplier
effect: very roughly, the cost of capital is the real post-tax required rate of return multiplied by a factor
reflecting the tax system. The EATR falls because the pre-tax rate of return is still fixed at 20% and so
investments are rather less profitable. Given the relationship between the EATR and profitability
demonstrated in Figure 1, one would expect the EATR to be lower. Although the values of the cost of
capital are higher and those of the EATR slightly lower, the relative pattern across types of investments
is not affected.
By contrast, introducing a higher rate of inflation, from 2% to 10% exacerbates the differences between
debt and equity finance. This is due to the fact that nominal interest rates are assumed to rise in line with
inflation; since these are deductible in the case of debt financing, both the average cost of capital and the
average EATR fall for debt finance.114
The rise of the profitability of the investment from 20% to 40% increases the value of the EATR. This is
in line with the analysis in Box 1. The higher the profitability of the investment, the closer is the EATR
to the statutory profit tax rates. In general, this tends to reduce differences both between types of
investments and types of financing and between countries. Figure 2 illustrates that for a level of
profitability of 40% the individual countries EATR have already moved much closer to the national
nominal profit tax rates. Italy and Greece show wider differences for the reasons explained in section 4.3
(commentary on Table 8). Annex D shows the distribution of the EATR in each EU Member State. It






























Statutory RateChanging the weights of assets (rows 5 to 8) has almost no effect on the average cost of capital or the
average EATR. This suggests that the weights of the assets are not likely to be very sensitive for the
purpose of the overall analysis.
Row 5 considers only the 3 assets and the respective weights considered by the OECD/Ruding studies:
industrial buildings: 28%, machinery: 50% and inventories: 22%. The weight of the sources of finance is
held constant at the levels of the base case scenario. These weights are taken from the OECD (1991) and
Ruding (1992): retained earnings: 55%, new equity: 10% and debt: 35%.
Rows 6 and 7 use  weights generated from accounting data (the BACH database). This approach uses
accounting data for a large number of companies from different Member States. The numbers in the




















































































































The high weight in the BACH database attached to debt for both the manufacturing and services sector
implies that the average cost of capital and EATR is lower for the 5 assets. The overall averages are
lower mainly as a result of the high weight for debt.
Considering that the purpose of the quantitative analysis in this study is to "isolate" the impact of
taxation on the same identical investment in each EU country, indicators based on the weight of each
individual Member State have not been computed.
Rows 9 and 10 in each of the Tables relate to local taxes. In the analysis in the base case, "typical" values
of local taxes were used: these are detailed in Appendix B. However, by their very nature, local taxes
vary within a country. Hence two more extreme cases are considered - where local taxes are 50% higher
than those in the base case and where they are half those in the base case41- to discover whether these
taxes play an important role in determining the cost of capital and the EATR. In fact, local taxes seem to
play a relatively small role in determining these measures. The results are very close to the base case,
with the exception of investments in industrial buildings. This reflects the fact that most real estate taxes
are local taxes, which apply to buildings but not to other assets.
The final row considers the impact of special investment incentives There are a large number of such
incentives within the EU, which takes a variety of forms. The exercise here is intended only as a part of a
sensitivity exercise, to get an impression of the likely effect of such incentives, rather than to document
them fully. Specifically, the last row of each Table gives the average cost of capital and average EATR
where each country operates a single investment incentive. The incentives considered represent country-
typical incentives extracted from a questionnaire. They reflect significant or common incentives.
                                                
41  Note that this is simply intended to investigate the relative importance of local taxes. In practice, under existing law,
local governments may not have the right to vary local taxes by these amounts. This is the case in France and Italy for
example.117
Depending on the country, the incentives considered might be extraordinary depreciation, special tax
credits or special tax incentives. The precise incentive for each country is given in TABLE 12 of
Appendix B.
Not surprisingly, such incentives do reduce the average cost of capital and the average tax burden
without altering the relative position of the source of finance.
All in all, the previous analysis demonstrates that in most cases the parameters used in the model tend to
have a little effect on the overall EU values of the cost of capital and the EATR. More importantly,
changing the parameters does not alter the nature and the broad size of differences observed in section 4
as far as the overall EU values are concerned.
 ,PSDFWRIWKHVHQVLWLYLW\DQDO\VLVRQWKHUHODWLYHSRVLWLRQRI0HPEHU6WDWHV
The exact values of the effective tax burden of each Member State can, however, vary according to the
definition of the investment and, as mentioned above, there is no universally valid value in one country.
The purpose of this section is therefore to test if the ranking of Member States according to their average
cost of capital and the average EATR arising from Tables 7 and 8, would be affected by changes in the
assumptions used in the base case. The analysis is made for the 1999 situation.
Tables 15 and 16 show the ranking of Member States from 1 to 15, with the country with the highest cost
of capital or EATR having the rank 1, and the lowest having the rank 15. Each of the cases presented in
Tables 13 and 14 are presented; these are numbered 1 to 11 with 1 corresponding to the ranking relative
to the base scenario. The column numbered 4 is blank in Table 15 (cost of capital), since that refers to
the change in profitability which is relevant only for the EATR. The first column presents the average
ranking over columns 1 to 11 and therefore gives the position of each Member State when all the


















123456789 1 0 1 1
A u s t r i a 9 98 9. / .81 0 1 091 07 6
B e l g i u m 575 1 0 . / .7635584
D e n m a r k 48 1 1 4. / .44484 1 01
F i n l a n d 1 11 11 2 6 . / .1 01 11 21 11 1 9 3
F r a n c e 2121. / .1121111 3
G e r m a n y 1212. / .3212225
Greece 12 12 10 12 ./. 6 15 15 12 12 11 14
Ireland 14 14 14 14 ./. 13 13 11 14 13 14 10
Italy 15 15 15 15 ./. 15 14 14 15 15 15 15
Luxembourg 10 10 9 11 ./. 9 7 7 10 6 12 12
N e t h e r l a n d s6565. / .5567949
P o r t u g a l 7638. / . 1 2 986852
S p a i n 8447. / . 1 1 894731 1
Sweden 13 13 13 13 ./. 14 12 13 13 14 13 8
U K 3373. / .2353367
Looking across the columns in Table 15, many of the rankings are largely unaffected by the sensitivity
analysis. For example, apart from the last column (investigating special investment incentives), France
has always the highest cost of capital, and is never lower than second. Italy usually has the lowest, and is
never higher than 14
th. However, while these more extreme cases tend to be fairly stable, there is rather
more movement in the rankings for countries in the middle of the distribution. This is not surprising: as
noted in the discussion above, a number of countries have average costs of capital very similar to each
other. The ranking of these countries is likely to change more easily than the rankings of the countries
outside the band. Despite this, the most notable feature of the Table is the consistency of the ranking of
each country across the different elements of the sensitivity analysis. Comparing, for example the
ranking based on the base case (column 1) with the average rank in the first column, most of the
countries have the same rank in the two columns. This suggests that the base case does give a reasonable



















123456789 1 0 1 1
A u s t r i a 88 1 0 8 1 0 1 0 998977
B e l g i u m 333334333332
D e n m a r k 1 01 11 11 1 8 9 1 01 01 11 01 1 6
F i n l a n d 1 31 31 31 21 21 31 21 31 31 31 31 1
F r a n c e 222221222218
G e r m a n y 111112111121
Greece 11 10 9 9 11 3 14 15 10 11 8 13
Ireland 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 12 15 15 15 15
Italy 9 9 4 13 13 11 6 6 9 8 10 14
L u x e m b o u r g 556565445494
N e t h e r l a n d s678756777765
P o r t u g a l 445447554543
S p a i n 767678886659
Sweden 14 14 14 14 14 14 13 14 14 14 14 12
UK 12 12 12 10 9 12 11 11 12 12 12 10
Table 16 repeats the exercise for the EATR. Once again, there is considerable stability in the rankings of
countries across the different elements of the sensitivity analysis. Thus, for example, Germany has the
highest ranking in the base case (column 1). Only in two cases does the ranking fall, and then only to 2
nd.
Ireland has the lowest ranking on all but one case -for the service sector- where it rises to 12
th. This rise
in the Irish case is because the 10% corporation tax rate applies only to manufacturing and some other
special sectors of industry, and the rate applied in general for the service sector is 28%. In the absence of
personal taxes, the ranking of countries according to the EATR is broadly similar to that of the cost of
capital. As was the case for the cost of capital, this table suggests that the base case does give a
reasonable indication of the relative position of each Member State.120
%R[7D[$QDO\VHU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In order to test the robustness of the results presented in the previous boxes "Tax Analyser" the effects of
alternative assumptions of the input data on the EATR are tested by means of sensitivity analysis
covering data both at the level of the corporation and the level of the shareholder.
1) Level of the corporation
The impact of changing assumptions is investigated by varying on the one hand the tangible fixed assets
to total balance sheet ratio of the model firm and on the other, the weighting of the sources of finance.
a) Investment policy
This variation takes into account a change in the model firm’s capital intensity. The quantity of tangible
assets as a percentage of total assets is raised or reduced first by 10% and then by 20% in comparison
with the base case. The ratio in the base case is 22.9%.
The results in figure B show that, with the exception of Germany and the Netherlands, the EATR
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In Germany and the Netherlands the EATR decreases due to a shift from less generous rules for non-
depreciable assets (i.e. financial assets) to a more generous capital allowances practice for depreciable
assets. In the case of Ireland, the UK and the USA, it is above all the higher level of real property tax in
the overall tax burden that overcompensates for the effects of the capital allowances and is therefore
decisive in causing the increase. The EATR increase in France is noticeable. This can attributed to the
structure of the French "taxe professionnelle". In fact, the basis of this tax includes tangible fixed assets
but exempts intangibles and financial assets.
Although there is no change in the country ranking, it is worth noting that France and Germany have
very similar EATR in the case of low capital intensity.
b) Structure of finance
In order to investigate the impact of changing assumptions regarding corporate financing on the EATR,
the weighting of the sources of financing is gradually changed by increasing the equity to total capital





Figure C shows that the EATR increases with the equity to total capital ratio in all countries. Therefore,
as already underlined for the analysis of a hypothetical investment, national tax systems are not neutral
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This discrimination against equity financing at the level of the corporation is more evident in Germany
and in the USA. Besides the high level of the corporation tax rate, this result is caused by the levying of
other taxes that do not treat the payments for debt and equity capital equally. By contrast, the increase in
the EATR is lower by far in Ireland and the UK. Since both countries apply the lowest corporation tax
rate and levy no other taxes that discriminate against a particular source of finance, the reduction or
saving of taxes due to the deductibility of interest is also the lowest.
Since the discrimination against equity financing in contrast to debt financing is common in all the tax
systems that are under review, the EATRs neither cross nor converge. Therefore, differing assumptions
about the debt to equity ratio do not change the country ranking of the base case. The level of variation
within the sources of finance depends to a great extent on the level of the statutory corporation tax rate.
Low tax rates tend to reduce such variations.
2) Overall level (corporation and domestic shareholder)
Just as at the corporation level, the tax burden at the overall level, that is including personal taxation, is
influenced by the assumptions about the economic data. Among the variables which have a large impact
on the overall EATR, the distribution policy of the company and the sources of company financing
provided by the shareholders are the most relevant.
a) Dividend policy
In order to work out the impact of changing distribution policy assumptions on the overall EATR, the
corporation’s distribution rate is gradually increased from zero (full retention of profits) to 100% (full
distribution of profits).
Figure D below shows that if the profits are fully retained in the corporation the overall EATR is above
all influenced by taxes at the level of the corporation. Due to the differences in the tax burden of the
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The overall EATR increases with the rate of distribution in all countries. However Germany improves its
relative position while the position of France, Ireland and the USA deteriorate. Ireland and the USA even
lose one place in the ranking. This result can be attributed to a great extent to the different corporation
tax systems and the degree of progression of income tax rates.
It is interesting to note that the EATRs converge with an increased rate of distribution. The combination
of different levels of corporate and personal taxes and the interactions of these taxes with the different
corporate tax systems thus reduces the dispersion of the EATR at the level of the shareholders to a great
extent.
b) Equity to total capital ratio
In order to investigate the impact of changing assumptions about the financing of the corporation on the
EATR at the shareholder level, it is assumed that the corporation is entirely financed by its shareholders
with debt or equity capital (i.e. the corporation does not raise any funds from third parties). In the case of
debt financing, the shareholders receive interest income from the loan granted to the corporation at a
fixed rate. Whereas, in the case of equity financing, the profits are fully distributed to the shareholders.
The weighting of the sources of finance are gradually changed by increasing the equity to total capital




Altogether, the results show that taxation is not entirely neutral towards the financing of a corporation in
any of the countries covered by the computation. Moreover, no common pattern exists as to a
preferential taxation of debt or equity financing. Since there are countries that either favour debt
financing (Germany and, in particular, the UK and the USA) or equity financing (France and the
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of the countries at the overall level depends on the assumptions regarding the equity to total capital ratio.
In general, such dispersions are lowest in countries that either apply a full imputation system (e.g.
Germany in 1999) or-irrespective of the corporation tax system-apply a low corporation tax rate (e.g.
Ireland). In addition another prerequisite for neutrality towards company financing is an equal treatment
of the dividends and interest payments with respect to income tax (and of shares and loans with respect
to private property tax).
 7+(7$;$7,212)75$161$7,21$/,19(670(176
Section 4 examined the impact of taxation on the incentives to invest domestically. This section uses the
same approach to consider the impact of taxation on the incentives to undertake transnational
investments, i.e. to invest across country borders.
It describes how the framework used to analyse the domestic corporate tax systems of the EU Member
States can be extended to cover investments located in one country by companies residents in another.
The purpose of this section is to analyse whether there is an incentive for EU companies to choose
specific forms of investment and the tax-favoured locations for their investments (which may not be the
most favourable locations in the absence of taxes). To the extent that companies respond to such
incentives, the tax system may create a global misallocation of resources as activities may be financed or
undertaken in high cost locations because they are tax-favoured.
In order to understand the effects of the different Member States’ tax systems on investment coming from
two of the main EU economic partners in the transnational case, the analysis also considers inward
investment into each Member State from the USA and from Canada, which respectively have a credit
system and an exemption system.
As was the case for the analysis of domestic investments, this section gives summary measures of the
potential distortions by tax systems of transnational investments and does not provide a measurement of
the impact of these potential distortions on international investment patterns. (Box 6 in section 4
presented a short survey of the empirical studies which have attempted to measure this impact). The fact
that companies may use more complex financial arrangements and group structures in order to minimise
tax burdens indicates that the potential distortions reported in this section can be sufficiently large to
alter company behaviour from that which would otherwise prevail. It should also be recalled that there
are costs associated with these complex financial arrangements. Moreover, to the extent that these
arrangements can imply tax evasion, this may create new distortions.
 7KHWD[WUHDWPHQWRIWUDQVQDWLRQDOLQYHVWPHQWV
Investing across borders results in a substantially more complex tax position than investment in one
country. Purely domestic investment is determined by one tax system. Transnational investment involves
not only dealing with two (or more) tax systems, but also dealing with the interactions of these systems.
Throughout section 6, attention is focused on a parent company that invests in a foreign country by
means of a wholly-owned subsidiary. As well as taking account of the domestic tax system, charges on
the payments of interest between the subsidiary and the parent and any further taxes levied by the
country of residence of the parent company are also incorporated. (The details of the tax regimes
modelled are given in Annex B). The other assumptions are the same as those made in the domestic case.
With these assumptions, the effects of the tax systems on transnational investments can be isolated from
the effects of prevailing economic conditions.125
The position of the subsidiary is essentially the same as the independent firm analysed in the domestic
case. It may invest in one of the five assets, and it is financed in one of the three ways: retained earnings,
new equity and debt. The parent company also raises finance in one of these three ways.
As in the analysis of domestic investments, primarily corporate taxes are considered. Given that it is
assumed here that cross border flows of capital are possible, it seems reasonable also to suppose that
parent companies can be financed on the international market. But in this case, for the reasons explained
in Box 5, it is less plausible that personal taxation affects investment decisions and that the identity of
the shareholder is known. Most of the analysis in this section is therefore based on the comparison of
taxes paid by the corporation only.
Nevertheless, section 6.5 discusses the role of personal taxes, especially in the context of whether tax
credits associated with a dividend payment by the parent to the domestic shareholder are available if the
underlying source of income is from abroad.
It is worth noting that the introduction of transnational investments considerably increases the number of
cases to be dealt with42. Therefore, this section summarises these cases (by calculating simple averages)
and highlights only the main issues arising from the transnational investment additional to those already
discussed in the context of the domestic investment.
 7UDQVQDWLRQDOHIIHFWLYHWD[UDWHVGHWDLOHGSRVLWLRQVFRVWRIFDSLWDODQG($75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The tables in this section summarise the effective tax burden of each possible transnational investment,
averaged across the five different assets and the three sources of finance of the parent company. A
separate table is used for each of the three different ways in which the subsidiary can be financed.
These tables address the question of differences in the effective tax burdens across possible locations of
the investment for a given State of residence of the parent company or, alternatively across possible
States of residence of the parent, for an investment in a given location. Moreover, they identify
differences in taxation which arise solely because of the way the investment is financed.
A) The case of a marginal investment
Three fundamental matrices of transnational rates are given in Tables 17, 18 and 19. These give the
required pre-tax rates of return, - the cost of capital - necessary when there is a 5%  post-tax rate of
return from investing cross-border. The parent country (home country) is given down the side of each
matrix and the subsidiary country (host country) is given along the top of the matrix. Table 17 gives the
cost of capital when the subsidiary is financed by retained earnings, table 18 when the finance is through
new equity from the parent, and table 19 when the parent lends funds to the subsidiary. In all three cases
the reported figures represent the averages of the five types of assets and the weighted averages of the
three sources of finance of the parent, using the weights of the domestic case.
The results can be interpreted in the following ways. When an Austrian parent company decides to
expand the operations of its Belgium subsidiary by retaining funds in the subsidiary then, on average, it
must earn a pre-tax rate of return in Belgium of 8.0% in order to be able to give its investors a post-tax
                                                
42  In the previous section attention was focussed on 15 possible investments  in a domestic context, although considered
in several different scenarios. Transnational investments from each of the 15 Member States to the other 14, plus
inward investment to each Member State  from 2 further countries creates 240 (15x14 + 2x15) different cross border
flows. For each of these there are 9 possible sources of finance and 5 possible assets.126
rate of return of 5% (see Table 17); whereas if the Belgium subsidiary were financed by funds lent by the
parent, the subsidiary would need to earn 6.0% (see Table 19).
Table 17 presents the cost of capital for investment financed by retained earnings in the subsidiary. As
was the case for a domestic investment discussed in section 4.1, the cost of capital in this case is not
influenced by the taxation of dividends paid by the subsidiary to the parent. In fact, since the parent
forgoes dividends to finance the investments and receives higher dividends as the return from the
investment, the tax rate on such dividend flows nets out of the analysis.
Given the assumption of no personal taxes, there is in general also no differences between investments
financed by the parent from retained earnings and new equity. Within the different sources of finance
used by the parent, then, only debt financing introduces any element of the parent (home) country tax
regime.
This implies that within each column in Table 17 - i.e. considering a single subsidiary (host) country -
differences in the cost of capital across different home countries arise only in the different treatment of
debt in the parent company. Some countries, Austria, Denmark, Netherlands, Spain and Canada do not
permit interest paid on loans used for outbound investments to be deductible; these countries have a
higher cost of capital. Other countries do permit this. In their case the tax rate determines how valuable
this deduction is, and hence how low the average cost of capital is. It is worth noting that the higher the
tax rate, the more valuable the deduction.
By contrast, the differences within each row reflect primarily the host country tax system. These
differences are likely to affect the location choice of the parent companies. The relative ranking of host
countries in Table 17 is very close to that shown in the case of domestic investments. Thus, on average,
Italy is the most attractive host location and France and Germany are the least attractive host locations.
Summing up the results of table 17, it can be observed that when the subsidiary is financed by retained
earnings, the differences in the cost of capital of subsidiaries located in the same country largely depend
on the treatment of debt financing of the parent and on the tax rates applied in the home countries. On
the other hand, the incentives to locate faced by the parent company largely depend on the domestic tax
systems of the possible host countries.
These results are therefore largely in line with the results obtained in the case of domestic investments,



























































































































Austria ./. 8.0 7.5 7.2 9.0 9.7 7.6 5.9 5.5 7.7 7.7 7.9 7.7 6.7 7.7 7.6
Belgium 6.1 ./. 6.1 5.8 7.5 8.1 6.1 4.8 3.9 6.2 6.2 6.3 6.3 5.4 6.3 6.1
Denmark 6.4 6.8 ./. 6.1 7.8 8.4 6.4 5.1 4.2 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.6 5.7 6.6 6.4
Finland 6.5 6.9 6.5 ./. 8.0 8.6 6.6 5.2 4.4 6.7 6.7 6.8 6.7 5.8 6.7 6.6
France 6.0 6.4 6.1 5.8 ./. 8.1 6.1 4.8 3.9 6.2 6.3 6.3 6.3 5.4 6.3 6.0
Germany 5.6 6.0 5.7 5.4 7.0 ./. 5.5 4.5 3.4 5.7 5.8 5.9 5.8 5.0 5.9 5.5
Greece 6.0 6.5 6.0 5.6 7.5 8.1 ./. 4.3 3.9 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.2 5.1 6.1 6.0
Ireland 7.2 7.6 7.1 6.8 8.7 9.3 7.2 ./. 5.1 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.4 6.4 7.3 7.3
Italy 6.2 6.5 6.2 5.9 7.6 8.2 6.2 4.9 ./. 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.4 5.5 6.4 6.4
Luxembourg 6.2 6.6 6.2 5.9 7.6 8.2 6.2 4.9 4.0 ./. 6.4 6.5 6.4 5.5 6.4 6.2
Netherlands 7.5 8.0 7.5 7.2 9.0 9.7 7.6 5.9 5.5 7.7 ./. 7.9 7.7 6.7 7.7 7.5
Portugal 6.2 6.5 6.2 5.9 7.6 8.2 6.2 4.9 4.0 6.3 6.3 ./. 6.4 5.5 6.4 6.2
Spain 6.3 6.6 6.3 6.0 7.7 8.3 6.3 5.0 4.1 6.4 6.5 6.5 ./. 5.6 6.5 6.3
Sweden 6.6 7.0 6.6 6.3 8.0 8.7 6.6 5.2 4.4 6.7 6.8 6.9 6.8 ./. 6.8 6.7
UK 6.5 6.8 6.5 6.2 7.9 8.5 6.5 4.9 4.3 6.6 6.6 6.7 6.7 5.7 ./. 6.4
Canada 7.5 8.0 7.5 7.2 9.0 9.7 7.6 5.9 5.5 7.7 7.7 7.9 7.7 6.7 7.7 7.6
USA 6.2 6.6 6.2 5.9 7.6 8.2 6.2 4.6 4.0 6.3 6.4 6.3 6.3 5.4 6.4 6.3





























































































































Austria ./. 8.0 7.5 7.2 9.0 7.6 7.6 5.9 5.5 7.7 7.7 7.9 7.7 6.7 7.7 7.4
Belgium 6.3 ./. 6.3 6.0 7.7 6.2 6.3 5.0 4.1 6.4 6.5 6.5 6.5 5.6 6.5 6.1
Denmark 6.4 6.8 ./. 6.1 7.8 6.3 6.4 5.1 4.2 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.6 5.7 6.6 6.3
Finland 6.5 6.9 6.5 ./. 8.0 6.5 6.6 5.2 4.4 6.7 6.7 6.8 6.7 5.8 6.7 6.4
France 6.2 6.6 6.2 5.9 ./. 6.1 6.2 4.9 4.0 6.3 6.4 6.4 6.4 5.5 6.4 6.0
Germany 5.9 6.2 5.9 5.6 7.2 ./. 6.6 4.7 3.6 6.0 6.0 6.1 6.0 5.2 6.1 5.8
Greece 7.0 6.5 7.2 7.5 7.5 6.0 ./. 8.2 4.0 6.6 7.0 6.8 7.0 7.2 7.7 6.9
Ireland 7.2 7.6 7.1 6.8 8.7 7.2 7.2 ./. 5.1 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.4 6.4 7.3 7.2
Italy 6.4 6.8 6.4 6.1 7.8 6.3 6.4 5.1 ./. 6.5 6.6 6.6 6.6 5.7 6.6 6.4
Luxembourg 7.5 8.0 7.5 7.2 9.0 7.6 7.6 5.9 5.5 ./. 7.7 7.9 7.7 6.7 7.7 7.4
Netherlands 7.5 8.0 7.5 7.2 9.0 7.6 7.6 5.9 5.5 7.7 ./. 7.9 7.7 6.7 7.7 7.4
Portugal 6.4 6.7 6.4 6.1 7.8 6.3 6.4 5.0 4.2 6.5 6.5 ./. 6.6 5.6 6.5 6.2
Spain 6.3 6.6 6.3 6.0 7.7 6.2 6.3 5.0 4.1 6.4 6.5 6.5 ./. 5.6 6.5 6.1
Sweden 6.6 7.0 6.6 6.3 8.0 6.5 6.6 5.2 4.4 6.7 6.8 6.9 6.8 ./. 6.8 6.5
UK 6.5 6.8 6.5 6.4 7.9 6.4 6.8 7.1 4.3 6.6 6.6 6.7 6.7 6.1 ./. 6.5
Canada 9.4 10.0 7.5 8.2 9.6 9.7 7.6 5.9 7.4 8.3 8.3 12.4 9.6 7.2 7.7 8.6
USA 6.8 7.2 6.7 6.9 8.2 6.7 6.7 7.6 4.6 6.9 6.9 8.2 7.5 6.6 7.1 7.0





























































































































Austria ./. 6.0 6.5 6.6 7.1 5.8 5.7 6.9 6.1 6.1 6.4 6.2 6.4 6.3 6.9 6.3
Belgium 6.8 ./. 6.9 7.0 7.6 6.3 6.2 7.2 6.6 6.6 6.9 6.7 6.9 6.7 7.3 6.8
Denmark 6.2 5.9 ./. 6.5 6.9 5.7 5.6 6.8 5.9 5.9 6.3 6.1 6.3 6.2 6.8 6.2
Finland 5.9 5.6 6.2 ./. 6.6 5.3 5.3 6.6 5.6 5.7 6.0 5.8 6.0 5.9 6.5 5.9
France 6.7 6.5 6.9 7.0 ./. 6.3 6.2 7.2 6.5 6.5 6.8 6.7 6.8 6.7 7.3 6.7
Germany 7.6 7.4 7.7 7.8 8.5 ./. 8.2 7.9 7.5 7.4 7.7 7.6 7.7 7.5 8.1 7.7
Greece 7.0 6.4 7.2 7.5 7.5 6.3 ./. 7.4 6.5 6.6 7.0 6.8 7.0 7.2 7.7 7.1
Ireland 4.7 4.8 5.1 5.1 5.3 4.0 5.1 ./. 4.3 4.4 4.8 5.1 4.8 4.9 5.4 4.8
Italy 6.6 6.3 6.7 6.8 7.3 6.1 6.0 7.0 ./. 6.3 6.6 6.5 6.7 6.5 7.1 6.6
Luxembourg 6.5 6.3 6.7 6.8 7.3 6.1 5.9 7.0 6.3 ./. 6.6 6.5 6.6 6.5 7.1 6.5
Netherlands 6.4 6.1 6.6 6.7 7.1 5.9 5.8 6.9 6.1 6.1 ./. 6.3 6.5 6.3 7.0 6.4
Portugal 6.6 6.3 6.8 6.9 7.4 6.1 6.0 7.1 6.4 6.4 6.7 ./. 6.7 6.5 7.1 6.6
Spain 6.4 6.1 6.6 6.7 7.1 5.9 5.8 6.9 6.1 6.1 6.5 6.3 ./. 6.3 7.0 6.4
Sweden 5.8 5.5 6.1 6.1 6.5 5.2 5.2 6.5 5.5 5.5 5.9 5.7 5.9 ./. 6.4 5.8
UK 6.0 5.7 6.3 6.4 6.8 5.5 5.5 7.1 5.8 5.8 6.1 5.9 6.1 6.1 ./. 6.1
Canada 7.6 7.3 7.2 7.6 8.0 7.2 6.4 7.4 7.4 7.0 7.3 8.3 7.7 7.1 7.6 7.4
USA 6.5 6.2 6.7 6.9 7.3 6.0 5.9 7.1 6.3 6.3 6.6 6.7 6.7 6.6 7.1 6.6
Mean 6.4 6.1 6.6 6.7 7.1 5.7 5.8 7.1 6.1 6.1 6.4 6.3 6.4 6.4 7.0 6.4Table 18 considers the case in which the subsidiary is financed by new equity from the parent. Since the
return from this investment is assumed to be paid to the parent as a dividend, this adds another ingredient
to the cost of capital calculation: the taxation of such dividend flows43. The differences between Tables
17 and 18 therefore reflect the taxation of the dividend receipts in the hand of the parent (and the
German split rate system when Germany is the host country).
A number of (home) countries exempt such income in the hands of the parent: Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden and Canada. For parent companies in these
countries, in the absence of personal taxes the cost of capital when funding the foreign subsidiary
through new equity is the same as when the subsidiary retain earnings.
Other countries operate a limited credit system: essentially credit is given for the foreign tax paid (in the
host country); the home country levies further tax only if the home country tax exceeds that of the host
country. In many cases, then, financing the foreign subsidiary by new equity and paying tax on the
dividend receipts generates a higher cost of capital of the transnational investments. As a result the
average cost of capital for inward investments (the average of each column) is higher in Table 18 than in
Table 17.
Table 19 presents the case in which the parent lends to the subsidiary and subsequently receives an
interest payment (and the return of capital). All the host countries permit the interest paid to be
deductible from corporation tax, although some charge a withholding tax as interest is paid; all home
countries tax the interest income, with a credit for any foreign tax levied.
Relative to the case of financing by retained earnings, there are two main differences. First, the income
of a marginal investment is primarily taxed in the home country rather than the host country; this can
increase or reduce the cost of capital depending on which country has the higher rate. Second, however,
it is generally the case that the parent is able to claim interest deductibility on its own borrowing if that
borrowing is used to finance lending to the subsidiary; this gives an advantage over providing equity
finance to the subsidiary for those countries where interest deductibility is not permitted if the loan is
used to support equity investment in the subsidiary. In general these factors tend to reduce the dispersion
of costs of capital across different possible locations of investments.
The figures shown in Tables 17, 18 and 19 illustrate a large variation in the way that each country treats
other countries. Thus the return required by a subsidiary of a parent country in one country depends
crucially on where that subsidiary is located. This suggests that there are considerable incentives for
companies to choose tax-favoured locations for their investments which may not otherwise be the most
favourable location. Similarly, subsidiaries operating in a given country face different required rates of
return depending on where their parent company is located. Moreover, these figures show that, in line
with the analysis of domestic investments, there are differences in taxation which arise solely because of
the way which the investment is financed.
B) The case of a highly profitable (infra-marginal) investment
The three following tables present EATR for transnational investments as defined above, whose
profitability is now fixed at 20%. Table 20 shows the EATR when the investment is financed by retained
earnings, Table 21 in the case of financing by new equity and Table 22 when the subsidiary is financed
by borrowing from the parent.
                                                
43  The taxation of dividends may in principle also reflect the withholding taxes charged by the host country; however,



























































































































Austria ./. 39.1 32.3 28.8 42.1 46.1 34.4 11.7 31.8 36.6 35.1 37.0 35.2 26.0 31.8 33.4
Belgium 29.9 ./. 28.7 25.0 38.1 42.1 30.4 8.1 28.0 32.6 31.2 33.0 31.2 22.2 27.9 29.2
Denmark 30.1 35.4 ./. 25.0 38.4 42.4 30.6 7.8 28.1 32.8 31.3 33.2 31.4 22.2 28.0 29.8
Finland 30.6 35.9 29.2 ./. 38.9 42.9 31.0 8.3 28.6 33.3 31.8 33.7 31.9 22.7 28.5 30.5
France 29.5 34.8 28.3 24.5 ./. 41.8 30.0 7.5 27.6 32.3 30.8 32.7 30.8 21.7 27.5 28.6
Germany 20.1 26.4 18.8 14.3 29.8 ./. 25.4 -5.7 17.9 23.4 21.6 23.8 21.7 11.0 17.7 19.0
Greece 32.9 34.5 32.9 31.8 37.5 41.5 ./. 27.9 27.5 33.4 33.5 33.9 33.5 30.3 33.2 33.2
Ireland 32.7 38.0 31.2 27.6 41.0 45.0 33.2 ./. 30.7 35.4 34.0 35.8 34.0 24.8 30.6 33.8
Italy 30.3 35.5 29.0 25.3 38.4 42.4 30.7 8.4 ./. 32.9 31.5 33.3 31.5 22.5 28.2 30.0
Luxembourg 29.4 34.8 28.2 24.4 37.8 41.8 29.9 7.1 27.5 ./. 30.7 32.6 30.7 21.6 27.3 28.8
Netherlands 33.9 39.1 32.3 28.8 42.1 46.1 34.4 11.7 31.8 36.6 ./. 37.0 35.2 26.0 31.8 33.3
Portugal 30.2 35.5 29.0 25.2 38.4 42.3 30.7 8.3 28.3 32.9 31.4 ./. 31.5 22.5 28.2 29.6
Spain 29.7 35.1 28.4 24.6 38.1 42.1 30.2 7.4 27.8 32.5 31.0 32.9 ./. 21.8 27.6 29.2
Sweden 30.8 36.1 29.4 25.7 39.1 43.1 31.2 8.5 28.8 33.5 32.0 33.9 32.1 ./. 28.7 30.9
UK 30.3 35.6 29.0 26.5 38.6 42.7 32.9 22.1 28.3 33.1 31.6 33.5 31.6 24.8 ./. 31.5
Canada 40.1 44.5 32.3 33.4 43.8 50.4 34.4 11.7 38.3 38.5 37.1 48.4 41.2 28.4 31.8 37.0
USA 31.8 36.9 30.3 29.1 39.7 43.5 33.0 25.0 29.9 34.4 33.0 38.6 35.0 27.6 30.7 33.2




























































































































Austria ./. 39.1 32.3 28.8 42.1 40.1 34.4 11.7 31.8 36.6 35.1 37.0 35.2 26.0 31.8 33.0
Belgium 30.6 ./. 29.3 25.6 38.8 36.9 31.1 8.8 28.7 33.3 31.9 33.7 31.9 22.9 28.6 29.4
Denmark 30.1 35.4 ./. 25.0 38.4 36.4 30.6 7.8 28.1 32.8 31.3 33.2 31.4 22.2 28.0 29.3
Finland 30.6 35.9 29.2 ./. 38.9 36.9 31.0 8.3 28.6 33.3 31.8 33.7 31.9 22.7 28.5 30.1
France 29.9 35.2 28.6 24.9 ./. 36.2 30.4 7.8 27.9 32.6 31.1 33.0 31.2 22.1 27.8 28.5
Germany 21.0 27.2 19.6 15.1 30.7 ./. 29.2 -4.8 18.7 24.2 22.4 24.7 22.5 11.9 18.6 20.1
Greece 36.0 34.5 36.6 37.4 37.5 35.5 ./. 39.5 27.8 34.8 36.1 35.3 36.1 36.6 38.0 35.8
Ireland 32.7 38.0 31.2 27.6 41.0 39.0 33.2 ./. 30.7 35.4 34.0 35.8 34.0 24.8 30.6 33.4
Italy 30.9 36.1 29.6 25.9 39.0 37.1 31.4 9.0 ./. 33.6 32.1 34.0 32.2 23.1 28.8 30.2
Luxembourg 33.9 39.1 32.3 28.8 42.1 40.1 34.4 11.7 31.8 ./. 35.1 37.0 35.2 26.0 31.8 32.8
Netherlands 33.9 39.1 32.3 28.8 42.1 40.1 34.4 11.7 31.8 36.6 ./. 37.0 35.2 26.0 31.8 32.9
Portugal 30.8 36.1 29.6 25.9 39.0 37.1 31.3 9.0 28.9 33.5 32.1 ./. 32.1 23.1 28.8 29.8
Spain 29.7 35.1 28.4 24.6 38.1 36.1 30.2 7.4 27.8 32.5 31.0 32.9 ./. 21.8 27.6 28.8
Sweden 30.8 36.1 29.4 25.7 39.1 37.1 31.2 8.5 28.8 33.5 32.0 33.9 32.1 ./. 28.7 30.5
UK 30.3 35.6 29.0 27.5 38.6 36.7 34.1 29.8 28.3 33.1 31.6 33.5 31.6 26.5 ./. 31.9
Canada 45.2 49.5 32.3 36.8 45.4 50.3 34.4 11.7 43.3 40.2 38.8 58.4 46.2 30.1 31.8 39.6
USA 33.5 38.5 31.7 32.4 41.4 39.5 34.6 34.7 31.6 36.1 34.7 43.6 38.4 31.5 33.1 35.7




























































































































Austria ./. 33.1 29.2 26.8 36.2 35.0 28.3 15.9 33.5 31.4 30.8 31.9 30.8 24.5 29.1 29.7
Belgium 32.3 ./. 31.5 29.3 38.4 37.3 30.7 18.6 35.8 33.8 33.2 34.2 33.2 27.0 31.5 31.9
Denmark 29.4 32.7 ./. 26.4 35.7 34.6 27.9 15.4 33.1 31.0 30.3 31.4 30.4 24.1 28.7 29.4
Finland 28.5 31.8 27.9 ./. 34.9 33.7 27.0 14.5 32.2 30.1 29.4 30.6 29.5 23.2 27.8 28.7
France 31.7 34.9 31.0 28.7 ./. 36.8 30.2 17.9 35.3 33.2 32.6 33.7 32.7 26.4 31.0 31.1
Germany 27.8 31.5 26.7 24.3 35.0 ./. 31.9 11.7 31.9 29.6 28.9 30.1 28.9 21.6 26.9 27.6
Greece 36.0 34.4 36.6 37.4 37.5 36.3 ./. 39.5 35.2 34.8 36.1 35.3 36.1 36.6 38.0 36.4
Ireland 24.5 29.6 24.2 21.5 31.0 29.9 26.4 ./. 28.3 26.2 25.5 28.3 25.5 19.3 23.8 26.0
Italy 31.5 34.7 30.8 28.5 37.7 36.5 30.0 17.8 ./. 33.0 32.4 33.4 32.4 26.3 30.8 31.1
Luxembourg 30.6 33.9 29.9 27.6 36.9 35.7 29.1 16.7 34.2 ./. 31.5 32.6 31.6 25.3 29.9 30.4
Netherlands 30.1 33.3 29.4 27.0 36.4 35.2 28.5 16.1 33.7 31.6 ./. 32.1 31.0 24.7 29.3 29.9
Portugal 31.6 34.8 30.9 28.6 37.8 36.6 30.1 17.9 35.1 33.1 32.5 ./. 32.5 26.4 30.9 31.3
Spain 30.1 33.3 29.4 27.0 36.4 35.2 28.5 16.1 33.7 31.6 31.0 32.1 ./. 24.7 29.3 29.9
Sweden 28.2 31.5 27.6 25.1 34.5 33.4 26.6 14.2 31.8 29.8 29.1 30.2 29.1 ./. 27.4 28.5
UK 29.0 32.3 28.3 27.5 35.3 34.1 30.0 29.8 32.6 30.6 29.9 31.0 29.9 26.5 ./. 30.5
Canada 40.1 42.8 31.4 34.7 40.8 44.4 30.6 18.3 43.1 36.3 35.7 49.3 40.9 29.7 31.4 36.6
USA 32.7 35.8 31.7 32.4 38.7 37.6 31.9 34.7 36.2 34.2 33.6 39.7 36.2 31.5 33.1 34.7
Mean 30.1 33.0 29.5 27.5 36.0 35.0 28.9 18.7 33.3 31.4 30.9 31.9 31.0 25.5 29.6 30.2134
Much of the discussion above regarding the cost of capital remains relevant for the case of the EATR.
However, some additional factors are also now present.
In measuring the EATR it is assumed the investment is more profitable that is, extra-profit is generated
by the subsidiary. This is paid to the parent in the form of dividend. Any tax liability associated with
such a payment reduces its value to the parent and hence increases the EATR. In this case, the taxation
of the dividend payments from the subsidiary to the parent does affect the EATR even when the
subsidiary is financed by retained earnings. Further, since this tax rate varies according to the home
country, the EATR on an investment in a specific host country may vary according to the home country
of the parent, even when the subsidiary is financed by retained earnings. Of course, this is also true when
the subsidiary is financed by new equity and debt.
Consequently, there is even more variation within each column in Table 20 than there is in the
comparable Table 17 showing the cost of capital. When personal taxes are excluded, the main effect of
the home country tax is through the tax rate; where the home country has a limited credit system, there is
a positive tax on the dividend payment to the parent only if the home country tax exceeds the host
country tax.
The variation within the rows of Table 20 also reflects home and host country taxation. Yet, the same
host countries turn out to have high EATR as had high cost of capital: Germany has an average EATR of
43.0%, and France has an average EATR of 38.4%. At the other extreme, Sweden has an average of
22.9% and Italy an average of 28.0%. These would appear to be significant differences in the EATR
facing companies in other countries choosing where to locate.
A similar pattern arises in Table 21, where the subsidiary is financed by new equity.
When the subsidiary is financed by debt, these differences are still considerable even if they are smaller.
EATR ranges from 25.5% for Sweden as a host country to 36.0% for France as host country.
If the position of USA and Canadian investors is taken into account, the data tend to show that
investments from these two countries - and from Canada in particular - into the EU are relatively more
highly taxed than intra-EU investments. The worst situation for Canadian inbound investments is largely
due to the weight of withholding taxes on dividends. Moreover, since the USA applies a foreign tax
credit system, and Canada an exemption system, investments from the latter country retain the benefit of
lower than Canadian rates in the host country. In general investments from countries which operate an
exemption system benefit from a lower tax rate in the host country. Data (EMTR and EATR) related to
foreign investment in Ireland from the USA and Canada clearly illustrates this.
In order to draw more general conclusions and notably to identify the impact of international tax regimes
on the incentive to undertake transnational, as opposed to domestic, investments, it is useful to
summarise the data and compare it with the data for domestic investments. This is done in the next
section.135
 $OORFDWLRQHIIHFWVRILQWHUQDWLRQDOWD[DWLRQ
As shown in the previous section, issues of international taxation are very complex to deal with since
they involve the interaction between national tax systems. One commonly used criteria to assess the
allocation effects of international taxation is to capture the extent to which the tax treatment of
transnational investments gives an incentive to undertake transnational, as opposed to domestic,
investments. This is done by evaluating the tax treatment of cross-border investment flows against the
criteria of capital import and capital export neutrality.
 &DSLWDOH[SRUWDQGFDSLWDOLPSRUWQHXWUDOLW\
Capital export neutrality (CEN) occurs when the tax system is neutral towards the export of capital since
the investors face the same effective tax burden on income from similar investments, whether they invest
in the domestic economy or abroad. In such situations the tax systems provide no incentives to invest at
home rather than abroad, and vice versa. A regime of capital export neutrality therefore tends to ensure
an efficient allocation of resources across countries.
CEN is achieved when investors are taxed on accrued worldwide income and receive full credit against
domestic tax liabilities for all taxes paid abroad. A pure credit system with no limitation on the foreign
tax credit and no deferral of domestic taxes on profits retained abroad would ensure capital export
neutrality. Under such a regime, the free mobility of capital would tend to equate the effective tax burden
across borders, because each investor would then also obtain the same after-tax rate of return on
domestic and foreign investments. A cross-country equalisation of the rates of return before tax implies
that no output gain can be made by reallocating capital from one country to another. It is worth noting
that a pure credit system does not exist in any EU tax regime.
The importance of attaining capital export neutrality is well assessed in terms of economic welfare. It
seems clear that if taxation distorts the location of productive activity, then goods may be produced at
higher cost, which is likely ultimately to be borne by the consumer in terms of higher price. Thus the
absence of capital export neutrality creates an economic loss to the extent that differences in the cost of
capital and effective tax rates result in changes in behaviour. Moreover, capital export neutrality
maximises the volume of output obtainable from any given global stock of capital.
Capital import neutrality (CIN) prevails when domestic and foreign suppliers of capital to any given
national market obtain the same after-tax rate of return on similar investments in that market. A regime
of capital import neutrality ensures that imported and domestic capital in each jurisdiction will compete
on equal terms. Therefore, a regime of capital import neutrality would tend to guarantee an efficient
international allocation of savings flows.
Provided that source countries do not practice tax discrimination between domestic and foreign investors
operating in their jurisdiction, capital import neutrality will be attained if residence countries exempt all
income from foreign source from domestic tax.
The importance of capital import neutrality has to be underlined in the context of the EU Internal
Market. In fact, this concept is important when analysing the competition conditions faced by economic
agents. CIN (as reflected in the exemption method) can ensure a level playing field for non resident
companies and local companies operating in the same market. Moreover, an exemption system is simpler
to administrate and implies less compliance costs than a pure credit system.
When capital income tax rates differ across countries, achievement of CEN implies different net returns
to saving in different countries and will therefore tend to distort the international allocation of savings.
By contrast, achievement of CIN would guarantee roughly identical after-tax rates of return to savings136
for savers in different countries, but would distort the pattern of international investment by causing the
cost of capital to deviate from one country to another. Consequently the effect on welfare of attaining
one neutrality or the other, depends on the relative sensitivity of investment demand to the cost of capital
and of savings to the after-tax rate of return.
It is worth noting that capital export and import neutrality could be achieved simultaneously only in the
hypothesis that the effective tax burden on profit is identical across all countries, that is in presence of a
far-reaching tax harmonisation. This is clearly not the case today.
These concepts are both useful benchmarks by which to judge the efficiency effects of international tax
arrangements and a useful starting point to analyse international tax arrangements. The use of these
criteria may encourage policy makers to take a more global view of the benefits and costs of existing
international tax arrangements and proposed changes thereto.
 5HOHYDQWHFRQRPLFPHDVXUHVDYHUDJHFRVWRIFDSLWDODQG($75E\FRXQWU\
A) The case of a marginal investment
Tables 23 summarises the cost of capital shown in Tables 17 to 19 and compares these costs with those
for domestic investments, in order to identify the impact of international tax regime on the incentive to














































Austria 6.3 6.5 7.1 0.2 0.6
Belgium 6.4 6.7 6.3 0.3 0.6
Denmark 6.4 6.6 6.3 0.3 0.6
Finland 6.2 6.4 6.3 0.3 0.6
France 7.5 7.7 6.2 0.3 0.5
Germany 7.3 7.0 6.3 0.3 0.6
Greece 6.1 6.4 6.6 0.3 0.6
Ireland 5.7 5.9 6.4 0.4 0.6
Italy 4.8 5.0 6.5 0.3 0.4
Luxembourg 6.3 6.5 6.7 0.3 0.6
Netherlands 6.5 6.6 7.1 0.2 0.6
Portugal 6.5 6.7 6.3 0.3 0.6
Spain 6.5 6.7 6.3 0.3 0.6
Sweden 5.8 6.0 6.3 0.3 0.6
United Kingdom 6.6 6.8 6.4 0.3 0.5
EU Mean 6.3 6.5 6.5 0.3 0.6
EU Standard Deviation 0.6 0.6 0.3
Canada ./. ./. 7.8 ./. 0.8
USA ./. ./. 6.6 ./. 0.6
Note. These are averages across either host (for outbound) or home (for inbound) countries of an overall average cost of
capital for each pair of home and host countries. This overall cost of capital is found by taking an unweighted average of each
element of Tables 17, 18 and 19.
The first column presents the average cost of capital for domestic investments in each Member State,
averaged over the 15 types of investments, using the base case weights. The second column presents the
average cost of capital for inbound investments and the third column the average cost of capital for138
outbound investments. The fourth and fifth columns present the dispersions respectively for inbound and
outbound investment44.
A comparison of the figures in the first three columns gives some indication of the effects of the tax
systems on investment flows. Many factors will, of course, determine investment flows. Insofar as tax is
of any importance, then if the required cost of capital when investing domestically is lower than when
investing abroad, companies will prefer domestic operations (assuming, of course, that there are equal
investment possibilities in each country). Whether this results in a net inflow of capital, depends on
whether investment in that country is more attractive to foreign owned companies than investment in
their own domestic economies or into other countries.
By computing the average required rate of return when investing in or from each country a lot of the
information contained in Tables 17 to 19 is lost, in particular the variation between countries and source
of finance. (Annex C presents detailed country tables showing the outbound and inbound cost of capital
and EATR for the 15 investments analysed in this study). To compensate, the standard deviations (fourth
and fifth columns) give some indication of the degree to which the international tax regime results in
subsidiaries which operate in the same country face different effective tax rates according to the
residence of the their parent company and the source of finance, and the extent to which the location of a
subsidiary for a parent company and the source of finance may affect the effective tax rate. A low figure
in the last column, for example, suggests that there is only a small dispersion across countries in the
effective tax rate faced by a company when considering in which country to undertake an investment.
If the third column (outbound) were identical to the first column (domestic) and the fifth column
(standard deviation of outbound) were full of zeros, this would imply that any company resident in a EU
Member State would face (on average) the same cost of capital whether it invested at home or in any
other Member State. If that applied generally in the EU, then location decisions of companies would not
be affected by taxation. This situation represents capital export neutrality.
If the second column (inbound) were identical to the first column (domestic) and the fourth column
(standard deviation of inbound) were full of zeros, this would imply that any company resident in a EU
Member State or Canada or the USA would face (on average) the same cost of capital if it invested in a
specific EU host country. This implies that companies choosing to locate in a specific location all face
the same cost of capital, and hence, none has the benefit of a tax-induced competitive advantage over
others. This situation represents capital import neutrality.
Table 23 clearly shows that neither capital export neutrality nor capital import neutrality are respected in
the EU. On average outbound and inbound investments are somewhat more heavily taxed than domestic
investments and, therefore, the additional components of the transnational system add somewhat to the
marginal effective tax rate on investment.
However, these averages hide significant variations between Member States.The tables presented in
section 6.2 showed ranges of variation of more than 30 percentage points. Moreover, the fact that the
standard deviations are not zero indicates variations across potential host/home countries.
                                                
44  The average cost of capital for inbound investments is formed by first taking an unweighted overall average cost of
capital for each pair of countries (home/host) in Tables 17, 18 and 19. That is, each type of finance of the subsidiary is
given an equal weight. An unweighted average is then taken across the 14 (EU Member States only, i.e. excluding
Canada and the USA) potential home countries for each host country. The standard deviation of this distribution of 14
elements is presented in the fourth column. The third and fifth column are equivalent, but treating each country listed
as a home country rather than a host country.139
As far as the case of outbound investments is concerned, the companies located in countries that have the
highest domestic cost of capital and apply an exemption system are less heavily taxed when investing
abroad and, in particular can benefit from a lower effective tax burden if they invest in a foreign
subsidiary either through new equity or profit retention (see Tables 17 to 19). Thus, from the point of
view of high tax countries, investments in low tax countries are more advantageous than domestic
investment, and debt financing is the least attractive way to finance the subsidiary.
On the other hand, if the investor is located in countries which have the lowest costs of capital, on
average, domestic investment is more attractive than transnational investment. It is worth noting that,
when different sources of finance are considered, it is not always true that high tax countries are always
unattractive and that it depends on the source of finance of the subsidiary. If the subsidiary is financed by
debt, as a consequence of interest deductions the foreign profits are taxed at the lower domestic and not
the foreign corporate profit rate (see Tables 20 to 22). This could imply a lower effective tax burden.
When inbound investments are taken into account, all countries, except Germany, have average cost of
capital for inbound investments higher than that of domestic investment. Therefore, domestic companies
have on average a competitive advantage over subsidiaries located in their country.140
B) The case of a highly profitable (infra-marginal) investment
As with the cost of capital, it is useful to summarise the information in Tables 20 to 22 in order to assess
how far away the EU tax regimes are from either capital export neutrality or capital import neutrality.












































Austria 29.8 30.3 32.1 2.5 6.6
Belgium 34.5 34.8 30.2 2.0 6.3
Denmark 28.8 29.5 29.5 2.7 6.6
Finland 25.5 26.5 29.7 3.4 6.5
France 37.5 37.8 29.4 1.9 6.2
Germany 39.1 38.5 22.2 0.9 7.4
Greece 29.6 30.6 35.1 1.1 1.7
Ireland 10.5 13.5 31.1 8.1 4.0
Italy 29.8 30.0 30.4 2.2 6.5
Luxembourg 32.2 32.5 30.7 2.1 6.5
Netherlands 31.0 31.4 32.1 2.3 6.6
Portugal 32.6 33.0 30.2 2.1 6.4
Spain 31.0 31.6 29.3 2.4 6.6
Sweden 22.9 24.1 29.9 3.9 6.3
United Kingdom 28.2 29.1 31.3 3.0 3.5
EU Mean 29.5 30.2 30.2 2.7 5.8
EU Standard Deviation 6.5 5.7 2.6
Canada ./. ./. 37.7 ./. 9.0
USA ./. ./. 34.5 ./. 3.4
Note. These are averages across either host (for outbound) or home (for inbound) countries of an overall average cost of
capital. This overall cost of capital is found by taking an unweighted average of each element of Tables 20,21 and 22.
This Table confirms the result of the previous section and in particular indicates that, on average,
outbound investment is more heavily taxed than domestic investment. For Germany and France (and to a
lesser extent Belgium), the EATR for outbound investment is substantially lower than for domestic
investments. The standard deviation indicates that there are variations in potential host countries for each
home country. As with the cost of capital, this indicates that the EU tax regime is some way from capital
export neutrality.141
The same is true for inbound investment, although in this case for every host country, except Germany,
EATR on inbound investment is higher than that for domestic investments. Clearly, on average, on this
measure the net impact of the taxation on international flows is to increase tax liabilities. There are again
variations within each host country for the average EATR faced by companies resident in different home
countries.
It is worth noting that the countries which show the highest differences between average domestic EATR
and average outbound EATR are the countries which have the highest EATR and the highest profit tax
rates on domestic investment (Germany, France, Belgium) and the countries which have the lowest
EATR and the lowest profit tax rates on domestic investment (Ireland, Sweden and Finland). This seems
to confirm that, even when the interactions of different tax regimes are taken into account, differences in




The previous section showed that, on average, the interaction of the EU Member States taxation systems
implies differences in the tax treatment of domestic investment compared with outbound or inbound
investment and, therefore, that capital export or capital import neutrality is never attained. But, as
already explained, a lot of specific information for each Member State is lost when computing overall
averages.
In particular, considering the different treatment across Member States of different sources of finance, it
is realistic to suppose that parent companies would try to minimise their tax burden by choosing the most
convenient source of finance of the subsidiary. If one particular source of finance is tax disadvantaged,
then it would not be used.
This section considers how the international tax regime affects the effective tax burden faced by a
company willing to invest abroad when it chooses the most tax-efficient means of financing the
subsidiary45.
A) The case of a marginal investment
Table 25 shows the averages of the cost of capital across host countries and across home countries, based
on the most efficient way to finance the subsidiary and it is comparable to Table 23.
                                                
45  The analysis does not take into account the “tax efficient” means of financing the parent company. This is partly to
provide measures which are comparable to the analysis of domestic investments. But it is further based on the notion
that there exist constraints on the use of different forms of finance by a parent firm. However, in financing a wholly-
owned subsidiary, the position is quite different. The financing of a parent company is subject to the constraints
imposed by third party financiers- both equity and debt providers. It is reasonable to suppose that the parent firm has
considerably more discretion concerning the financing of a subsidiary because it can provide either equity or debt
itself.Where debt financing is provided by third parties it is reasonable to assume that they also take into account the
standing of the parent company. Accordingly a parent company is more able to take advantage of tax advantages
associated with specific forms of finance. It has to be considered, however, that the use of specific forms of finance
may be restricted by Member States' legislation, such as thin-capitalisation rules for debt financing and CFC legislation














































Austria 6.3 6.0 6.2 0.6 0.4
Belgium 6.4 5.9 5.9 0.4 0.8
Denmark 6.4 6.1 5.9 0.4 0.6
Finland 6.2 5.9 5.7 0.4 0.6
France 7.5 7.0 5.9 0.5 0.7
Germany 7.3 5.7 5.5 0.6 0.8
Greece 6.1 5.7 5.8 0.3 0.9
Ireland 5.7 5.0 4.8 0.4 0.4
Italy 4.8 4.3 6.2 0.6 0.5
Luxembourg 6.3 5.9 6.0 0.5 0.8
Netherlands 6.5 6.1 6.3 0.4 0.4
Portugal 6.5 6.1 6.0 0.4 0.8
Spain 6.5 6.1 6.0 0.4 0.7
Sweden 5.8 5.5 5.7 0.4 0.5
United Kingdom 6.6 6.3 5.8 0.4 0.6
EU Mean 6.3 5.8 5.8 0.4 0.6
EU Standard Deviation 0.6 0.6 0.3
Canada ./. ./. 7.1 ./. 0.7
USA ./. ./. 6.1 ./. 0.8
Note. These figures are based on the most tax-efficient means of financing the subsidiary - that is retained earnings, new
equity or debt. This is found by taking the minimum cost of capital for each element in Tables 17, 18 and 19. Averages are
then constructed across either host (for outbound) or home (for inbound) countries.
This approach generates a rather different picture, even if CEN and CIN are still not respected, compared
to the situation illustrated in Table 23.
In general, domestic investments are more heavily taxed than outbound and inbound investments. This
suggests that, to the extent that companies are free to choose the most tax-favoured form of investment,
then - other things being equal- the international tax system works such that foreign multinationals
operating in a host country are likely to face a lower cost of capital than domestic companies.143
This suggests also that, as already commented on in section 6.2, from the point of view of a foreign
investor, so-called high tax countries are not always unattractive as a business location and that
companies resident in low tax countries may take advantage to invest abroad instead of at home.
It is worth noting that it has been assumed here that the company is able to use the most "tax efficient"
way of financing only in the case of transnational investment. This hypothesis is realistic considering
that a multinational company has, in general, greater flexibility when financing its subsidiary than a
domestic company (see footnote 44).
The relevant component that results in distortions with respect to cross border location and financing
decisions is, above all, the profit tax rate. In fact, if there were only minor differences between the tax
rates, there would be less incentives to use either debt (e.g. for investors located in low tax countries) or
equity (investors located in high tax countries) for the financing of foreign investment. However, the tax
base can have a greater impact on the cost of capital in particular situations (e.g. favourable depreciation
regimes) as is the case, for example, in Belgium, Greece, Italy and Sweden.
It should be noted that Table 25 shows "extreme" situations and that national tax regimes may impose
restrictions on the use of particular sources of finance.
Moreover, Table 25 shows higher dispersions than Table 23. This means that the averages shown in
Tables 25 hide even greater variations across countries.
B) The case of a highly profitable (infra-marginal) investment
Table 26 shows the averages of the EATR across host countries and across home countries based on the













































Austria 29.8 28.7 29.3 3.0 5.7
Belgium 34.5 32.6 28.8 2.2 7.0
Denmark 28.8 27.8 28.2 3.0 6.6
Finland 25.5 24.8 27.9 3.6 6.1
France 37.5 35.6 28.2 2.4 6.8
Germany 39.1 34.9 19.0 1.7 8.3
Greece 29.6 28.4 32.7 1.5 2.6
Ireland 10.5 9.9 26.0 7.4 3.2
Italy 29.8 27.9 29.4 3.1 7.0
Luxembourg 32.2 30.7 28.2 2.7 7.1
Netherlands 31.0 29.8 29.5 2.8 5.7
Portugal 32.6 31.2 29.1 2.5 7.0
Spain 31.0 29.8 28.3 2.8 6.9
Sweden 22.9 22.3 27.8 4.0 5.9
United Kingdom 28.2 27.4 29.4 3.3 3.3
EU Mean 29.5 28.1 28.1 3.1 6.0
EU Standard Deviation 6.5 5.9 2.8
Canada ./. ./. 35.6 ./. 8.4
USA ./. ./. 32.6 ./. 3.9
Note. These figures are based on the most tax-efficient means of financing the subsidiary - that is retained earnings, new
equity or debt. This is found by taking the minimum cost of capital for each element in Tables 20, 21 and 22. Averages are
then constructed across either host (for outbound) or home (for inbound) countries.
This Table indicates that, if the source of finance is chosen so as to minimise the EATR, then, on
average in the EU the domestic EATR is very close to the outbound and inbound EATR. However, the
fact that the standard deviations are not zero, and are even relatively high, indicates that international
regimes are far from neutral and that CEN and CIN are not respected.
While a number of countries have EATRs broadly similar for domestic, outbound and inbound
investments, for some other countries they are markedly different for domestic and outbound
investments. This is the case in high profit rate countries and low profit rate countries (as was also the
case in Table 24).145
 5HVWULFWLRQVRQLPSXWDWLRQV\VWHPVIRUWUDQVQDWLRQDOLQYHVWPHQWV
The previous analysis was based on the assumption that the parent company has sufficient undistributed
domestic profit that any additional dividend which it wishes to pay as a result of the additional
investment in the subsidiary can, for tax purposes, be deemed to be a payment from domestic income. In
this section the situation is considered in which dividend payments are paid from the foreign source of
income (the subsidiary) to the shareholders. In this way another element is introduced: the domestic
treatment of foreign source income.
In Finland and France, dividend payments deemed to be paid from foreign source income are subject to
an equalisation tax. In 1999 in Germany, such dividend payments did not qualify for the imputation tax
credit. In all three cases, then, there can be in effect an additional tax on outbound investments. In fact,
compared to the situation shown in Table 23, in Finland and France, the average cost of capital for
outbound investment increases substantially - from 6.3% to 7.8% for Finland and from 6.2% to 8% for
France. There is a smaller rise for Germany: from 6.3% to 7%.
As far as the EATR is concerned, the rise is even more spectacular. Compared with the situation shown
in Table 24, there is a substantial rise in the average EATR for outbound investment from Finland and
France - from 29.7% to 46.7% in Finland and from 29.4% to 48.9% in France. Again, the rise for
outbound investments from Germany is smaller - from 22.2% to 33.2%. In the case of Finland, this
exacerbates the average discrimination against outbound investments. In Germany it reduces the average
discrimination in favour of outbound investment. And in France it turns the discrimination from being in
favour of outbound investment to being in favour of domestic investment.
 (IIHFWVRIWKH*HUPDQWD[UHIRUPRQLQWHUQDWLRQDOLQYHVWPHQWV
7KH SXUSRVH RI WKLV VHFWLRQ LV WR H[DPLQH the impact of the German tax reform on international
investment. First, the case of inbound investment to Germany and outbound investment from Germany
are considered. Then, the impact of the German tax reform on the overall means and standard deviations
in the EU is analysed.
A) The case of a marginal investment
Table 27 presents estimates of the average cost of capital for domestic investment, inbound investment
to, and outbound investment from, Germany. It also presents the standard deviations for both inbound
investment and outbound investment and the average position for the EU as a whole. It does so for the
two cases in which the subsidiary is financed by an average of retained earnings, new equity and debt,
and for the case in which the most tax efficient form of financing is chosen. The top half of the Table
summarises the position before the reform. These are taken from Tables 23 and 25 above. The bottom
half of the table summarises the position after the reform.
The domestic position is the same as shown in more detail in Section 4. The position for inbound
investment into Germany is fairly similar to the position for domestic investment. That is investment
financed by retained earnings in the subsidiary will tend to face a lower cost of capital due to the lower
tax rate. But where the subsidiary is financed by debt the cost of capital tends to increase slightly, and
when it is financed by debt, it tends to increase rather more substantially, due to the lower tax rate and
hence higher cost of paying interest. The net impact is a very small reduction in the average cost of
capital for inbound investment averaged across the three types of finance. However, the average cost of
capital for domestic investment falls rather more, and so post-reform inbound investment will have a
very slightly higher cost of capital than domestic investment (instead of a slightly lower cost of capital).146
The average cost of capital for outbound investment, again averaged over the three sources of finance of
the subsidiary, is virtually unchanged by the tax reform. This is partly because Germany largely exempts
foreign source dividends. The lower tax rate on the receipt of interest from subsidiaries tends to reduce
the cost of capital. However, this is offset by the reduction in the value of the deductibility of interest
paid by the parent, and the abolition of the split rate system, which pre-reform gave an advantage to new
equity financing of the parent.
However, this is only true on the assumption that all distributions are financed from the domestic income
of the corporation. If we assume instead that distributions are financed from foreign source income, then
the discrimination of foreign investment which was analysed in the section 6.3 above no longer exists -
because under the reformed system, distributions are treated in the same way irrespective whether they















































Germany 7.3 7.0 6.3 0.3 0.6





Germany 7.3 5.7 5.5 0.6 0.8






Germany 6.8 6.9 6.3 0.3 0.6





Germany 6.8 6.5 6.0 0.4 0.8




Note. These are averages across either host (for outbound) or home (for inbound) countries of an overall average cost of
capital for each pair of home and host countries. This overall cost of capital is found by taking an unweighted average of each
element of Tables 17, 18 and 19.
There is a greater effect on the tax efficient form of financing of the subsidiary. This is because of the
reduction in the value of interest deductibility. Pre-reform, the most tax advantageous form of finance for
a German subsidiary was debt. Reducing the tax rate reduces this advantage, so that the tax efficient cost148
of capital rises, and the tax efficient form of finance may in any case also change. The average cost of
capital for the tax efficient form of the outbound investment also rises.
However, these changes in Germany are not large on average. In no case does the average cost of capital
change by more than one half of one percent. As a result, the position for the EU as a whole is virtually
unchanged.149















































Germany 39.1 38.5 22.2 0.9 7.4
EU Mean 29.5 30.2 30.2 2.7 5.8
EU Standard Deviation 6.5 5.7 2.6
7D[(IILFLHQWVRXUFHRIILQDQFHRIVXEVLGLDU\
Germany 39.1 34.9 19.0 1.7 8.3
EU Mean 29.5 28.1 28.1 3.1 6.0
EU Standard Deviation 6.5 5.9 2.8
$)7(55()250
$YHUDJHRYHUVRXUFHVRIILQDQFHRIVXEVLGLDU\
Germany 34.8 35.6 30.2 0.9 6.1
EU Mean 29.2 30.6 30.6 1.8 5.5
EU Standard Deviation 6.1 5.4 1.4
7D[(IILFLHQWVRXUFHRIILQDQFHRIVXEVLGLDU\
Germany 34.8 34.2 28.9 1.3 7.0
EU Mean 29.2 28.7 28.7 2.0 5.8
EU Standard Deviation 6.1 5.7 1.4
Note. These are averages across either host (for outbound) or home (for inbound) countries of an overall average cost of
capital for each pair of home and host countries. This overall cost of capital is found by taking an unweighted average of each
element of Tables17, 18 and 19.150
Table 28 presents a similar analysis to the one in Table 27, this time for the EATR. For inbound
investment the EATR tends to fall for investment financed by retained earnings and new equity, and to
rise for investment financed by debt. Overall, the reduction in the tax rate causes the average EATR for
inbound investment financed by an average of the three types of finance to fall, although by less than the
fall in the average domestic cost of capital.
However, there is a significant rise in the EATR on outbound investment. Pre-reform the EATR on
outbound investment was considerably lower than the EATR on domestic investment, thereby inducing
German firms to invest abroad. This rise can be traced largely to the reduction in the value of the
deductibility of interest paid by the parent and the abolition of the split rate system. However, as with the
cost of capital, this is only true for the case in which dividends are paid from domestic source income.
A similar pattern is found for the tax efficient financing of the subsidiary, both for inbound and outbound
investment. The larger changes in the EATR as a result of the reform create some impact on the overall
EU averages, as shown in the Table.
 1HXWUDOLWLHVDQGGLVWRUWLRQVLQ WUDQVQDWLRQDO LQYHVWPHQWV FRQFOXGLQJ UHPDUNV IURP
WKHLQWHUQDWLRQDODQDO\VLV
The results for the international case, show that the co-existence of the Member States tax regimes may
have an influence on transnational investment patterns and financing decisions.
The data arising from the quantitative analysis, and notably from Tables 17 to 22, illustrate a variation in
the way in which each country treats other countries. Thus, the effective tax burden of subsidiaries of a
parent company in one country depends crucially on where that subsidiary is located. The range of
variation in the effective tax burdens of subsidiaries located in different host countries can rise above 30
points regardless of the method of financing of the subsidiary. This provides an incentive for companies
to choose the most tax-favoured location for their investment, which may not be the most favourable
location in absence of taxes. Similarly, subsidiaries operating in a given country face different effective
tax burdens depending on where their parent company is located. Even in this case the range of variation
can reach more than 30 points.
As a result, capital export neutrality and capital import neutrality are never respected and the EU
averages hide considerable variations across potential host/home countries. This implies that tax
arbitrage may have an important impact for companies considering in which country to undertake an
investment and that subsidiaries which operate in the same country face different effective tax rates
according to the residence of their parent.
Moreover, to the extent that companies are free to choose the most tax-favoured form of investment,
then the international tax system works such that foreign multinationals operating in a host country are
likely to face a lower cost of capital than domestic companies.
The spread observed between domestic, outbound and inbound investments is the result of complex
interactions between different national tax regimes and cannot be explained by just one feature of
taxation. However, as was the case for domestic investment, the analysis presented above tends to show
that the relevant component that is most likely to be responsible for distortions with respect to incentives
for cross-border location and financing decisions is the national profit tax rate, although the tax base may
have a greater impact in particular, specific situations.151
As said already in commenting on the results of the domestic analysis, neutrality of taxation systems is
one of the goals of taxation policy and this has to be balanced against other legitimate goals. However, to
the extent that the absence of neutrality determines movements of capital which are not justified by
economic efficiency and that involve welfare losses, the picture presented in this section deserves
attention. To what extent differences of the considerable size observed in this quantitative analysis and
the consequent possible losses in welfare can be justified by the need to maintain national autonomy in
view of national goals attached to taxation policy is, ultimately, a matter of political choice.
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 3XUSRVHRIWKHVLPXODWLRQV
The previous sections have clearly shown that the actual tax treatment of investment strongly differs
across countries in the EU. In particular, the effective tax burden for cross-border investments in the EU
considerably differs according to the home country of the parent companies and the location of their
foreign subsidiaries.
This situation is not optimal with regard to the proper functioning of the Internal Market. Indeed, the
absence of capital export neutrality may lead to distortions in the international allocation of investment
as, ceteris paribus, investments may take place not in the lowest FRVW locations but in the lowest WD[
locations. This in turn potentially limits growth in productivity and employment in the EU.
It is therefore particularly useful to consider how the measures of the cost of capital and effective tax
rates presented above would be different in the event of various hypothetical tax policy scenarios.
In what follows, 15 hypothetical policy scenarios are considered. Each of the simulations is based on a
particular element of the tax regimes being harmonised across the EU. This helps to identify the
importance of specific features of tax regimes, notably for capital export and capital import neutrality.
The simulations are divided into three groups (see Box 8). The first group of simulations examines the
impact of elements of the "domestic" corporation tax regime, that is the statutory tax rate and the value
of capital allowances. The second group turns to elements of the "international" corporation tax regime,
such as the treatment of interest payments from one Member State to another, and the taxation of income
received in the home country. The third group examines the relationship between corporation tax and
personal taxes.
The impact of the hypothetical policy scenarios considered here of course depends on the tax treatment
of domestic, inward and outward investment, and on the specific features of each of the tax systems that
have been presented above. In this respect, it should be noted that, as before, the simulations are based
on the tax regimes as they existed in 1999 and which generally are quite similar to the situation in 2001.
However, for Germany, simulations explicitly take into account the situation for 2001, in order to fully
incorporate the recent tax reform. Contrary to the limited changes in other EU countries, reforms in
Germany are such that basing simulations on the pre-reform situation could modify somewhat the global
results of hypothetical reforms.
An exhaustive analysis of every possible case is not provided here for the sake of conciseness. Instead,
only the most striking results are presented in order to highlight some of the pros and cons of the various




1. Common corporation tax rate, incl. surcharges. Rate is EU average of 32.28%.
2. Common corporation tax rate, incl. surcharges and local taxes. Rate is EU average of 33.84%.
3. Common corporation tax rate, incl. surcharges and local taxes. Rate is 25%.
4.  Band of corporation tax rates, incl. surcharges and local taxes. Rates permitted between 25% and 35%. Countries outside
this band move to nearest limit.
5. Harmonisation of capital allowances. Common rules for depreciation, inventories and investment incentives.
6. Common tax base. Depreciation based on true economic depreciation.
%,QWHUQDWLRQDO(OHPHQWVRI&RUSRUDWLRQ7D[
7. Abolition of withholding taxes on interest paid by subsidiary to parent within EU.
8. Limited credit system for foreign source dividends received by parent from EU subsidiary. No discrimination in
imputation systems against foreign source income originating in the EU.
9. Full credit system for foreign source dividends and interest received by parent from EU subsidiary. No discrimination in
imputation systems against foreign source income originating in the EU.
10. Exemption for foreign source dividends received by parent from EU subsidiary. No discrimination in imputation systems
against foreign source income originating in the EU.
11. Taxation according to parent country rules. Subsidiary taxed using the tax base of the home country of the parent but the
tax rate of the host country. No interest deductibility by the subsidiary.No taxation of foreign source income received by
parent. No discrimination in imputation systems against foreign source income originating in the EU
&5HODWLRQVKLSRI3HUVRQDODQG&RUSRUDWH7D[HV
12. Classical system. Double taxation of dividends. Personal tax rates for taxpayers (not including zero-rated shareholders)
set to highest income tax rate on labour income. Equalisation taxes abolished. Capital gains taxes and personal property
tax rates unchanged from base case.
13. Full imputation system for dividends paid out of domestic and EU foreign source income. Tax credit set to parent’s
corporation tax rate. Otherwise as 12.
14. Shareholder relief system. Personal tax rates for taxpayers (not including zero-rated shareholders) set to 50% of highest
income tax rate on labour income. Otherwise as simulation 12.
15. Comprehensive Business Income Tax. Interest deductibility abolished. All personal tax rates set to zero. Exemption for
dividends and interest paid by subsidiary to parent within EU.153
 6FHQDULRVLQYROYLQJGRPHVWLFHOHPHQWVRIFRUSRUDWLRQWD[
 7KH%DVH&DVH
A number of simulations based on harmonization or approximation of the statutory corporate tax rate
and the definition of the tax base are considered first. In the hypothetical policy scenarios listed in Part A
of Box 6, the international elements of tax regimes - such as withholding taxes and the taxation of
foreign source income - and the personal tax regimes are left unchanged.
The first row of Table 29 reproduces the average across the 15 EU Member States for the EATRs and
the cost of capital as well as the standard deviation of the distribution across the 15 EU Member States in
the current situation (including the German reform). The subsequent rows in the Table show how these
summary measures change in the presence of various hypothetical policy scenarios.
As shown in section 6 above, the existing system (the “Base Case”) clearly does not exhibit either capital
export neutrality or capital import neutrality. For the measures based on the average source of financing
of the subsidiary for outbound and inbound investments, the average cost of capital is only slightly
higher than the average domestic cost of capital. The same is true of the average EATR. However, these
averages hide considerable variations across countries, which are summarised in the figures for the
standard deviations for both inbound and outbound investment. As explained in more detail in section
6.3,the figure for standard deviation for outbound investment expresses the average deviation in the cost
of capital or EATR for an investment made in 14 potential host countries by a parent company based on
their territory. The standard deviation summarises the variability in the tax treatment of foreign
investments across the EU. It is therefore the focus of the analysis of the impact of hypothetical reforms
presented below.
Comparing inbound and outbound investment, it is clear that there is significantly more variation across
potential host countries for a company based in a specific home country compared to the variation across
potential home countries of an investment taking place in a specific host country, i.e. standard deviation
for outbound investment is higher than that for inbound investment. The Base Case therefore suggests
that the EU tax regime is closer to exhibiting capital import neutrality than capital export neutrality. As
underlined in section 6.3, the absence of capital export neutrality can give rise to economic
inefficiencies.
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Base Case 6.3 6.5 6.5 0.3 0.6 29.2 30.6 30.6 1.8 5.5 5.9 5.9 0.4 0.6 28.7 28.7 2.0 5.8
1 Common CT rate, excl 6.4 6.6 6.6 0.3 0.3 29.9 30.7 30.7 1.0 2.9 6.3 6.3 0.1 0.3 29.8 29.8 0.5 2.6
Local taxes, at EU mean
2 Common CT rate at 6.4 6.6 6.6 0.3 0.3 30.0 30.7 30.7 0.9 1.2 6.4 6.4 0.0 0.3 30.1 30.1 0.3 1.2
EU mean
3 Common CT rate of 6.0 6.1 6.1 0.2 0.3 22.4 23.0 23.0 0.7 1.2 6.0 6.0 0.0 0.3 22.6 22.6 0.3 1.2
25%
4 Band of CT rates 6.2 6.4 6.4 0.3 0.5 28.1 29.1 29.1 1.2 3.1 6.1 6.1 0.3 0.5 28.0 28.0 1.1 3.0
Around EU mean
5 Common tax base 6.3 6.5 6.5 0.3 0.6 29.2 30.5 30.5 1.8 5.7 5.9 5.9 0.4 0.6 28.7 28.7 2.0 6.0
6 Common tax base, with 6.9 7.0 7.0 0.3 0.6 31.1 32.4 32.4 1.8 6.0 6.5 6.5 0.4 0.7 30.6 30.6 2.0 6.4
Economic depreciation
1. The mean EU tax rates used in the simulations are: (1) 32.28%  (2)  33.84% (3) rates between 25% and 35%.
2. The allowances rates and valuations in simulation 5 are: (a) machinery - declining balance at 2 times straight line over 7 years. (b) buildings – straight line at 4%. (c) intangibles – straight line at 7
year’s life. (d) Inventories – LIFO. The rates in simulation 6 are the assumptions regarding true economic depreciation rates set out in Appendix B155
 $SSUR[LPDWLRQRUKDUPRQLVDWLRQRIWD[UDWHV
The first four simulations consider cases of approximation or harmonisation of the statutory tax rates. At
one extreme, a full harmonisation of the rates is considered (scenarios 2 and 3). This implies setting a
common statutory rate, including surcharges and local taxes, at the same level in all the Member States.
However, an approximation of tax rates could exclude local taxes. This case of partial harmonisation is
considered in scenario 1. At the other extreme, a limited approximation of the rates via the setting of a
band of permitted tax rates is considered (scenario 4).
Three main conclusions can be drawn from this set of simulations :
·  First, unsurprisingly, an approximation of the statutory rates leads to a reduction in the dispersion of
EATRs and the cost of capital across the Member States for all the types of investment considered in
the four simulations. This result is mostly due to the fact that those countries with the more extreme
average costs of capital move towards the middle of the distribution, with a consequent reduction in
the standard deviation.
As the various simulations show, the changes in the EATR dispersion tend to be greater than changes
in the dispersion of the cost of capital. The scale of the differences in the impact on the cost of capital
and the EATR reflect the differences in these two measures, discussed above. In particular, since the
EATR measures the effect of tax on a more profitable investment, the importance of allowances is
rather less than it is for the cost of capital, and so the impact of the statutory tax rate is
correspondingly greater.
This result is fundamental. Indeed, concretely it implies that a consequence of the approximation of
the statutory rates in the EU is an increased capital import neutrality. In other words, there is less
variation in the costs of capital and the EATRs faced by parents from alternative home countries
choosing to locate a subsidiary in the same host country. Moreover, the differences between the
potential locations faced by a parent in a specific country in simulations 1 to 4 are lower than under
the current system, implying also a movement towards capital export neutrality.
To illustrate why this happens suppose there is complete harmonisation of the tax rate in the EU. If
all countries have the same statutory tax rate, then the distinction between, say, taxing foreign source
dividend income with a limited credit system as opposed to an exemption system would disappear. In
the absence of personal taxes, equalising statutory corporate tax rates is therefore close to introducing
source country taxation for equity financed investment - with each source (ie. host) country having
the same rate of tax. This clearly corresponds to a move towards capital import neutrality. It is worth
noting, however, that home country taxation still matters in some cases. For example, several
countries disallow interest payments made by the parent if the loan is used to finance outbound
investment. Also, some countries impose local taxes on interest receipts from the subsidiary. Finally,
some countries do not operate a pure exemption system.
The above analysis is also true for debt financed investment: the rate at which the subsidiary receives
relief for the payment of interest to the parent is the same as the rate at which the parent pays tax on
the interest receipt. In this case, however, there may also be withholding taxes on interest, which may
differ according to the home country.
·  Second, the reduction in the dispersion of EATRs and the cost of capital is a function of the degree
of approximation of the statutory tax rates across the Member States. A full harmonisation of the tax
rates leads to a lower dispersion of EATRs and costs of capital than a partial harmonisation, and the
latter has a larger impact than the setting of a tax rates band.156
The comparison of scenario 1 with scenario 2 easily illustrates that result. Indeed, one can see that
imposing identical local taxes in addition to a basic common corporate tax rate, moves the overall
position within the EU still closer to source-based taxation, as there is then no difference in statutory
tax rates between countries. As would be expected, the results are broadly similar in the two cases.
However, the most striking difference between simulations 1 and 2 is that the standard deviation of
EATRs across host countries for outbound investment falls further. This again reflects the greater
dependence of the EATR on the statutory tax rate. While significant differences in the cost of capital
across potential host locations is still strongly influenced by the definition of allowances (which are
still allowed to differ between countries), allowances are rather less important for the EATR.
·  Third, in the partial analytical framework of this study, driving down an already common tax rate
would have little impact on economic efficiency. It is mostly by reducing the dispersion of effective
tax rates that gains in economic efficiency can be realised.
This is illustrated by a comparison of scenarios 2 and 3. The only difference between the two
simulations lies in the statutory rate which is imposed to Member States (25% instead of 33,84%).
Unsurprisingly, choosing a lower rate reduces the average cost of capital and the average EATR for
all forms of investment: domestic, inbound and outbound. For example, the average domestic cost of
capital across all countries falls from 6.4 to 6.0, and the average domestic EATR falls from 30.0% to
22.4%. Similar falls occur for inbound and outbound investment. However, the dispersions of both
measures is virtually unchanged from the previous case of a higher statutory tax rate. This is true of
the dispersion of domestic measures across each countries, the dispersion across possible locations
for outbound investment and the dispersion across possible home countries for inbound investment
(although in this case there is a small reduction in the dispersion of the average EATR for the case of
the average source of subsidiary financing).
Comparing simulation 3 with simulation 2 is nevertheless illuminating. Indeed, a large part of the
discussion in this study is concerned with economic inefficiencies arising as a result of differences in
taxation between types of investment, or between countries. A process of tax competition which
simply drove down an already common tax rate (for example, comparing this simulation with the
previous one) would have little impact on economic efficiency: it is only by reducing the GLVSHUVLRQ
of effective tax rates that gains in economic efficiency can be realised.
%R[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Finland and France impose an equalisation tax on distributions from foreign source income, to ensure that any tax credit
available to the shareholder is matched by a tax payment to the home government. In the simulations it is generally assumed
that parent companies resident in these countries can distribute dividends from domestic source income, in which case these
special rules do not apply. Here we investigate what happens to the results in the case in which parent companies in Finland
and France are required to make distributions from foreign source income. That is, we assume that the marginal dividend in
each period is financed from foreign source earnings, and is therefore subject to the equalisation tax.
In examining the impact of the hypothetical policy scenarios under this alternative assumption, most of the preview
conclusions continue to hold. The only significant difference in the pattern of results is that the average standard deviation of
costs of capital and EATRs for inbound investment is higher both in the Base Case and in each of the simulations. Although
the cost of capital and EATR on inbound investment from other countries may fall as a results of some of the reforms, it does
not fall so sharply for investment from Finland and France. These features of the tax systems therefore move the overall EU
tax regime further away from both capital export neutrality and capital import neutrality.157
 +DUPRQLVDWLRQRIFDSLWDODOORZDQFHV
A number of the remedies to tax obstacles suggest an approximation or even a harmonization of the tax
bases across the Member States. This is in particular so in the case of comprehensive options, such as
those presented in Part IV. It is therefore interesting to examine the impact of harmonising the main
elements of the tax base taken into account in the model, namely the rules for depreciation of assets and
for inventories (see Box 4 in section 3.2).
Simulation 5 presents the impact of a harmonization of capital allowances. Allowances are assumed to
take the following values in every EU Member State :
·  machinery - declining balance at 2 times straight line over 7 years
·  buildings - straight line at 4%
·  intangibles – straight line at 7 years life
·  inventories – LIFO valuation allowed
·  financial assets - zero.
All other aspects of EU tax regimes - including the statutory rate and other aspects of the tax base - are
as in the existing systems discussed above. This falls well short of proposals to create a consolidated tax
base throughout the EU, where any individual company would need to calculate its taxable profits only
according to one set of rules.
The results of this simulation show that harmonising the capital allowances has almost no impact on the
average cost of capital or the average EATR. The averages and standard deviations shown in Table 29
are almost identical to the Base Case. If anything there is a slightly greater dispersion of EATRs across
both host and home countries. This may reflect that tax regimes are designed as a whole - a high tax rate
tends to go with a more generous structure of allowances and vice versa, a conclusion already made in
section 4. Harmonising only allowances may increase differences in effective tax rates between
countries, unless such a reform is accompanied by an approximation in the tax rates. Furthermore, this
reform has only small effects in any Member State. Part of the reason for this result is that allowance
rates are already broadly similar throughout the EU.
Going one step further, simulation 6 also examines the impact of a partial harmonization of the base
including, this time, depreciation rates set at the assumed rate of true economic depreciation. Such a
simulation is interesting for two reasons. First, it enables a comparison of the depreciation assumptions
underlying the tax systems with the assumed true economic depreciation. It then gives an indication of
the tax incentives linked to depreciation for different types of assets. Second, it gives useful indications
of the possibly distortive impact on the allocation of investments of the deprecation rules in the Member
States.
Setting values for allowances in line with what is assumed to be true economic depreciation rates46 gives
almost the same basic results as in simulation 5. However, a slight increase in the average costs of
capital and EATRs compared to this simulation and to the Base Case can be observed. To the extent that
the estimates of depreciation used for the allowances are closer to true values, this would suggest that, on
average, EU tax regimes are relatively generous in their choice of capital allowances. The standard
                                                
46  In common with the rest of the report, the allowances are assumed to take the following values: machinery - declining
balance at 17.5%; buildings - declining balance at 3.1%; intangibles - declining balance at 15.35%; inventories - LIFO
valuation allowed; financial assets - zero.158
deviations also tend to be slightly higher. The conclusion from the previous simulation - no discernible
gain in economic efficiency from harmonising the tax base - therefore would also apply even if capital
allowances were set closer to true economic depreciation.
%R[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Simulations 1 to 6 have also been considered in the presence of personal taxes (see appendix F). As earlier in the report, it has
been assumed that the company maximises the wealth of a resident, possibly tax-paying, shareholder, taking into account
personal taxes on dividends, interest and capital gains.
The actual results presented below are based on an unweighted average over three types of shareholder (a zero-rated
shareholder, a non-qualified top-rate shareholder, and a qualified top-rate shareholder) for the two following cases: (a) the
parent distributes all dividend payments out of domestic source income, and (b) at the margin the parent distributes dividend
payments from foreign source income.
As explained in section 4, compared to the Base Case, the costs of capital are lower on average, and the EATRs slightly
higher, when personal taxes are taken into account. There also tend to be higher standard deviations especially for inbound
investment. This is true for both cases (a) and (b). In fact, for case (a), unlike the case in Table 29, the standard deviation
across potential home countries for inbound investment is now generally higher than that across potential host countries for
outbound investment.
In general though, personal taxes have little effect on the impact of hypothetical policy scenarios to corporation tax. The most
striking difference from Table 29 when personal taxes are introduced is that the standard deviation for inbound investment
does not generally fall when corporation tax rates are harmonised within the EU. The reason for this result is clear: there is
still substantial variation due to personal taxes being different across home countries. In other words, tax systems have to be
considered as a whole. Simply harmonising one element of the tax system, without taking into account its relationship with the
other elements thereof, notably personal taxes,  could lead to inconsistencies.
 6FHQDULRVLQYROYLQJLQWHUQDWLRQDOHOHPHQWVRIFRUSRUDWLRQWD[
Table 30 considers the international elements of corporation tax regimes. The abolition of withholding
taxes on interest is examined first (simulation 7). Next, it examines three possible ways in which the
treatment of foreign source dividend income (from an EU subsidiary) could in principle be harmonised
within the EU: a limited credit system in all countries, a full credit system in all countries, and
exemption in all countries (simulations 8-10). Lastly, simulation 11 assumes the application of parent
country tax rules to the taxation of subsidiaries (see also part IV).
As with the investigation of hypothetical policy scenarios involving domestic elements of corporation
tax, the main analysis here is presented in the absence of personal taxes. Again, this is consistent with
the existence of an international capital market in which there is no reason to suppose that the
shareholders of a parent company are domestic residents. If they are not, then the prospect of the parent
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Base Case 6.3 6.5 6.5 0.3 0.6 29.2 30.6 30.6 1.8 5.5 5.9 5.9 0.4 0.6 28.7 28.7 2.0 5.8
7 No withholding taxes 6.3 6.5 6.5 0.3 0.6 29.2 30.5 30.5 1.8 5.5 5.9 5.9 0.4 0.6 28.7 28.7 2.1 5.8
on interest
8 Limited credit system 6.3 6.6 6.6 0.3 0.5 29.2 33.2 33.2 2.0 2.2 5.9 5.9 0.4 0.7 30.9 30.9 2.1 2.7
for dividend income
9 Full credit system 6.3 6.4 6.4 0.4 0.6 29.2 29.7 29.7 6.5 1.9 5.7 5.7 0.5 0.8 27.3 27.3 7.1 2.7
for foreign income
10 Exemption system 6.3 6.5 6.5 0.3 0.6 29.2 30.0 30.0 0.9 6.1 5.9 5.9 0.4 0.6 28.3 28.3 1.4 6.3
for dividend income
11 Taxation according to the 6.3 6.9 6.9 0.8 0.9 29.2 31.1 31.1 2.6 7.5 6.7 6.7 0.8 0.9 30.5 30.5 2.7 7.5
parent country rules160
 $EROLWLRQRIZLWKKROGLQJWD[HVRQLQWHUHVW
Abolishing withholding taxes on the payment of interest from a subsidiary to its EU parent has almost no
effect on any of the measures presented in this report. As can be seen from Table 30 (simulation 7), there
is virtually no change in any of the averages or standard deviations in this simulation.
The reason for this lies in the tax treatment of the parent in the home country. All EU Member States tax
interest receipts from EU subsidiaries in the hands of the parent. All Member States use a limited credit
system, so that taxes paid in the host country are credited against home country taxation. However, all
Member States also permit interest payments to be deductible from corporation tax. So the only tax
which the interest payments may face in the host country is a withholding tax when the interest is paid to
the parent. In Germany, however, half of interest payments are subject to trade tax. This clearly limits the
advantages of debt financing of a German subsidiary. But in virtually all cases, the rate of withholding
tax is lower than the home country tax rate. As a result, the withholding tax does not increase the overall
tax liability; it merely shifts revenue from the home country to the host country. But the measures
presented here are not affected by which revenue authority receives the tax payment. As such, they are
almost completely unaffected by the abolition of withholding taxes on interest payments from
subsidiaries to parents.
There is one exception to this within the EU. Ireland has a 10% corporation tax rate, and three countries
levy a withholding tax on payments to an Irish parent at a higher rate than this: Belgium (15%), Greece
(20%) and Portugal (15%). In these cases, Ireland does not offer a full credit for the withholding taxes
paid, and so these withholding taxes do affect the overall tax liability of the Irish parent. Analysis of the
impact of this scenario on individual countries confirms that only these four countries are affected by the
reform. An implication is that the same effect on effective tax rates in the EU could be generated by
simply reducing these three withholding tax rates to 10% or less.
 +DUPRQLVLQJWKHWUHDWPHQWRIIRUHLJQGLYLGHQGV
Currently, only 3 Member States tax dividends received by a parent from an EU subsidiary on the basis
of a limited credit system (Greece, Ireland and the UK). The other 12 Member States all use some form
of an exemption system. Simulations 8 to 10 show the impact of an identical system for the 15 Member
States, that is, either a credit system or an exemption system.
Consider first a full credit system applied to the 15 Member States (simulation 9). Instead of limiting the
credit given for foreign taxes to no greater than the underlying home country tax liability, a full credit
system would reimburse any additional tax paid. This is automatically the case for interest income in all
countries except Ireland, where the corporation tax rate may be lower than the withholding tax rate
charged by the host country. If this system were introduced on an accruals basis, that is, if it applied to
profits at the point at which they were earned, rather than when repatriated to the parent, then this system
would effectively be taxation in the home country. As such there would be full capital export neutrality
at the level of the parent firm, i.e. the parent firm would simply pay the home country tax wherever it
chose to locate its investment.
However, consistent with the operation of most international taxation, dividends and interest are taxed
only when repatriated to the parent. In this case, taxation in the host country is still important. Consider,
for example, the cost of capital for an investment financed by retained earnings in the subsidiary. To
finance such an investment, the shareholder gives up the post-tax value of the dividend which would
otherwise have been paid by the subsidiary to the parent. When the eventual return on the investment is
distributed by the subsidiary, the shareholder only receives the post-tax value. In this case, the cost of161
capital is independent of the taxation of the dividend paid by the subsidiary – since the same tax rate is
applied both to the cost and the return, it nets out of calculation.
This suggests that, for a marginal investment, reflected in the cost of capital, the international tax regime
becomes a mixture of a residence-base and a source-base. Take the example of Ireland as a home
country, for the average of possible sources of finance of the subsidiary. Where the subsidiary of an Irish
parent is financed with retained earnings, the Irish tax rate is irrelevant, and so the cost of capital reflects
only the host country tax system (which has not changed). But where the investment is financed by new
equity provided by the parent, for example, the fact that there is a full credit system - and that the Irish
tax rate is only 10% - implies that there is a significant reduction in the cost of capital.
These effects are partly reflected in results presented in Table 30. For outbound investment, there is a fall
in the overall average cost of capital and of the average EATR across Member States in simulation 9
compared to the Base Case. At the same time a substantial fall in the standard deviation can be observed
for the EATR. This is consistent with a move towards capital export neutrality. For inbound investment,
the average cost of capital and EATR also diminish, but the standard deviation increases. Therefore,
introducing a full credit system leads to less capital import neutrality.
%R[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Where the home country tax rate is lower (higher) than the host country tax rate, a limited credit system will not result in any
further tax (reimbursement) in the home country. In this case, it therefore has the same impact as an exemption system. The
main effects of the introduction of a limited credit system for the 15 Member States is therefore to increase the tax liability on
the receipt of dividends from EU subsidiaries of parents in home countries with high statutory tax rates.
This scenario therefore pushes the overall system towards capital export neutrality, in that the gap in the impact of tax
between domestic and outbound investment is narrowed. This does not show up clearly in the average results of Table 30,
however. This is because cross-border investment (based on the average of the subsidiary sources of finance) already has, on
average, a higher cost of capital and a higher EATR than domestic investment. Any increase in the average effective tax rate
for cross border investment therefore increases this disparity.
Consider now a full exemption system for all the EU Member States (simulation 10). At first sight, this
may seem to imply that, for equity-financed investments, the EU tax system should become entirely
source-based, especially in the absence of home country personal taxes. However, some countries do not
permit the deductibility of costs borne by the parent against the parent's tax liability where the cost
supports outbound investment (see Annex B, table 13).
Overall, this policy scenario does move the EU tax system in the direction of capital import neutrality,
especially as measured by the EATR - for which the average standard deviation for inbound investment
for the average source of finance of the subsidiary falls from 1.8 to 0.9. There is a corresponding slight
move away from capital export neutrality.
 7D[DWLRQDFFRUGLQJWRWKHSDUHQWFRXQWU\UXOHV
This simulation is in many respects close to the concept of "Home State Taxation" explained in Part IV.
Any parent company within the EU has to compute its EU taxable profit once only, applying the162
definition of the home country tax base to its EU-wide profits. The tax base for each company would be
allocated between different countries, which would apply their own tax rates to their allocated tax base.
In order to do this, it is necessary to make some assumptions about how the subsidiary is taxed. The first
stage is that the profits of each subsidiary are consolidated in the whole groups’ EU-wide profits. For this
purpose, the relevant tax base rules are treated as those of the parent’s home country. However, a further
assumption is that there is no difficulty in allocating the EU-wide profit to individual countries. That is,
it is assumed that the whole of the taxable profit earned by the subsidiary is allocated back to the host
country, to be taxed at the host country corporation tax rate. There is then no further tax on repatriation
of dividends or interest from subsidiary to parent; nor is there any further tax on the corporation on
payment of dividends to the shareholders. Essentially, then, the host country tax rate is applied to the tax
base as defined by the home country. Moreover, due to the consolidation process, interest payments from
the subsidiary to the parent company are not deductible in the host country. This tends to increase the
host country’s tax base.
It is worth noting that two advantages of Home State Taxation are that it permits loss consolidation and
that any parent would have to calculate its EU-wide profits according to only one set of rules. However,
these advantages are not captured by the model used in this report, since it makes no allowance for the
compliance and administrative costs of implementing taxes and considers only profitable situations.
To understand the impact of Home State Taxation, it is useful to consider the position if the proposal
were taken one step further. Suppose instead that the home country tax rate was applied to the EU-wide
profit, rather than the host country tax rate. In this case, the tax regime in the host country would be
irrelevant; in effect there would be residence taxation at the corporate level; hence there would be capital
export neutrality.
As Table 30 (simulation 11) makes clear, however, applying the tax rate of the host country makes a
substantial difference. Instead of achieving capital export neutrality, the resulting tax regime is actually
further from capital export neutrality than the existing regime. That is, the average dispersion of effective
tax rates facing parent companies on outbound investment within the EU is higher than in the Base Case.
This is true on every measure. Thus, the standard deviation of the costs of capital is higher - both for the
tax efficient and average form of financing of the subsidiary. And the average dispersion of the EATR is
also higher in both cases.
This again suggests a connection between the tax base and tax rates in individual countries: if a high tax
rate is applied to a low tax base, then the average cost of capital may not appear to be particularly high.
For example, a parent company in a home country with, say, a low tax base may invest in another
country which has a high tax base but a low tax rate. But, under the Home State Taxation proposal, the
parent would apply the low tax rate in the host country to the low tax base in the home country. Overall,
on outbound investment, the results suggest that differences in tax rates alone may create substantial
differences across potential locations for investment in both the cost of capital and the EATR. As would
be expected, taxation according to parent country rules also moves the EU tax regime further away from
source-base taxation, and hence further away from capital import neutrality.163
 6FHQDULRVLQYROYLQJWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQFRUSRUDWHDQGSHUVRQDOWD[HV
Much of the debate on the co-ordination of taxes on capital in the EU in the past has been concerned
with the relationship between personal and corporate taxes. In a closed economy, this is a vital ingredient
of the overall effective tax rate, since the overall level of saving and investment should depend on both
forms of taxation.
But, as argued elsewhere in this study, the role of personal taxes for cross-border flows of capital is
much less clear. Indeed164
 personal taxes levied on domestic shareholders may well affect the cost of capital and the EATR on
domestic and outbound investment. But with an open capital market, there is no particular reason why
the company may not be owned by foreign shareholders. Further, as already noted in Box 8, personal
taxes in the home country do not play a very significant role in affecting the main conclusions of the
analysis. This is mainly because personal taxes typically apply to all forms of profit, and hence do not
discriminate between domestic and outbound investment.
This section nevertheless briefly reviews the impact on the measures described above of harmonising the
relationship between corporate and personal taxes. Table 31 presents results for four hypothetical policy
scenarios. It should be noted that the Base Case includes personal taxes, contrary to the Base Case in
Tables 29 and 30.
The first hypothetical scenario is to introduce a classical relationship between the corporate and personal
taxes (simulation 12). Under a pure classical system, company profits are taxed twice - once at the level
of the firm, and once when distributed as dividends. Top-rated shareholders would pay the full top rate
of income tax on dividend income. This is higher than the rate actually levied in several countries, since
such countries reduce the double taxation of dividends by reducing the rate of personal income tax.
However, it is assumed that zero-rated shareholders continue to pay no tax.
Given that many EU countries either allow a tax credit associated with a dividend payment, or levy a
lower rate of income tax on dividends, harmonisation based on a classical system generally increases the
size of the tax burden, unless tax rates are adjusted. This is reflected in the impact on the average EATRs
shown in Table 31. Such a harmonisation tends to reduce the dispersion of the average EATRs across
countries, and to reduce the average standard deviations for outbound and inbound investment. Thus, to
the extent to which the overall tax systems become more similar to each other, there is a movement
towards both capital import neutrality and capital export neutrality. Again, however, it should be noted
that the importance of this result depends on the extent to which such personal tax rates are relevant in
an international context.
However, it should be noted that with a classical system, the average costs of capital tend to be lower
than in the Base Case. This is because it is assumed within the simulation that interest receipts are also
taxed at the top personal tax rate. Where this raises the existing personal tax rate on interest income, then
because the post-tax return to lending, i.e. the alternative use of funds, falls, the required post-tax return
to investment in equity also falls, and hence the cost of capital tends to fall.
The next hypothetical scenario is to introduce a full imputation system in every country (simulation 13).
This would offer a tax credit to all shareholders equal to the underlying rate of corporation tax in the
home country. For domestic source income distributed to shareholders, the overall tax rate would then be
simply the shareholder’s personal tax rate. However, when the tax credit is also available for foreign
source income distributed to shareholders, the overall tax rate on such income will also reflect the tax
rate in the host country.165
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Base Case 5.2 5.4 5.4 0.6 0.5 33.0 34.0 34.0 5.6 4.9 4.8 4.8 0.7 0.6 32.5 32.5 5.4 5.1
12 Classical system 4.7 4.9 4.9 0.5 0.5 42.2 43.1 43.1 2.7 3.7 4.4 4.4 0.5 0.6 41.9 41.9 2.9 3.9
13 Full imputation system
withholding taxes
4.4 4.6 4.6 0.5 0.5 24.2 25.0 25.0 7.1 5.7 4.0 4.0 0.5 0.6 23.3 23.3 6.8 6.0
14 Shareholder relief system 4.4 4.6 4.6 0.5 0.5 21.8 23.1 23.1 2.8 5.9 4.0 4.0 0.5 0.6 21.3 21.3 2.9 6.1
15 Comprehensive Business
Income Tax
7.5 7.5 7.5 0.0 0.7 33.1 33.1 33.1 0.0 6.9 7.4 7.4 0.0 0.8 33.0 33.0 0.0 6.9166
This scenario involves a reduction of the overall tax liabilities, as measured by the EATR. The cost of
capital is also reduced, even though this reform only affects the cost of capital when the parent finances
the investment by new equity. However, the dispersion in either measure in the standard deviations on
inbound and outbound investment, is generally at least as high as in the Base Case. This should not be
surprising. Consider, for example, the variation in the EATR faced on inbound investment into the same
host country by different parents. With a full imputation system in the home country, the effective tax
rate in the home country more closely reflects the personal tax rate than the corporate tax rate. Since
these tend to vary more between countries, so the average standard deviation of the EATR on inbound
investment tends to increase relative to the Base Case.
A similar position is true of the next hypothetical scenario: a classical relationship between the corporate
tax and the personal tax, but a personal tax rate on dividend income set at only 50% of the shareholder’s
normal income tax rate (simulation 14). Following OECD (1991), this is known as a shareholder relief
system. On average, this generates similar costs of capital and EATRs as the full imputation system.
However, compared to the full imputation system the overall effective tax rate depends less on the
personal tax rate of the shareholder and more on the corporation tax rate. As a result, the dispersion of
the EATR for inbound investment into a particular host country by different parents is lower than in the
case of the full imputation system.
The final hypothetical policy scenario is based on a proposal considered by the US Treasury in 1992.
This proposal - the comprehensive business income tax - was to abolish interest deductibility, and hence
put equity and debt finance on the same footing (simulation 15). The reform analysed here extends this
basic version to eliminate personal taxes entirely. In effect there is therefore only corporate level
taxation, levied on profit before interest payments. Further, source country taxation is imposed by
making each country exempt dividends and interest receipts from a subsidiary in the EU. Hence the
single level of tax applies essentially in the host country.
As might be expected in such a scenario, capital import neutrality is completely achieved. All
subsidiaries in a given host country face the same tax regime, irrespective of the nationality of the parent
companies. Further, on average, the cost of capital for domestic investment is the same as the cost of
capital for cross-border investment, and the same is true for the EATR. However, the reform also moves
the EU tax regime away from capital export neutrality. That is, the dispersion in effective tax rates across
possible locations for investment available to a parent company is greater than in the Base Case.
 &RQFOXVLRQV
This section of the report has examined the role of specific features of the tax regimes in the EU. It has
done this by simulating the impact of hypothetical policy scenarios on the measure of effective tax rates
set out earlier in the report. Of course, a vast range of different investments has been considered in this
report; only a summary picture can be provided of the effect of any hypothetical scenario (more details
are given in Annex F).
Nonetheless, the results of considering hypothetical policy scenarios are striking.
·  Introducing a common statutory tax rate in the EU would have a significant impact by decreasing the
dispersion of effective tax rates across Member States. There is a significant fall in the average
dispersion of both the cost of capital and the EATR facing parent companies between alternative
Member States. There is also a fall in the dispersion between subsidiaries located in a given Member
State which are owned by parents located in other Member States. To the extent that taxation
matters, such scenario would be likely to go some way in reducing locational inefficiencies within
the EU.167
·  By contrast, no other scenario would have such a significant effect. For example, introducing a
common tax base while leaving tax rates unchanged tends, if anything, to increase the dispersion in
effective tax rates.
·  Since withholding taxes on dividends between subsidiaries and their parents have been abolished
within the EU, the international features of corporation taxes do not play a significant role in
increasing distortions. Introducing a common means of taxing foreign source income, for example,
has little impact on the dispersion of effective tax rates.
·  Similarly, introducing a common form of integration of corporate and personal taxes in each
Member State does not tend to reduce the dispersion of effective tax rates between Member States.
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As in the case of the hypothetical investment approach, the purpose of simulations is to identify the
weight of the different tax drivers in the effective average tax burden, i.e. to compute the relative weight
of the tax bases, the tax rates, the different types of taxes and the corporation tax system in the EATR
separately. Therefore, the scenarios are divided into three categories: elements of the tax base, the
corporation tax rate including local taxes and the corporation tax system. By setting just one element of
the different tax regimes equal across countries, it is possible to identify the effect of this particular
element on the level and also on the variation of the effective tax burdens and, hence on the possible
distortion of competition within the countries under consideration.
Each simulation considers only the medium-sized company in the base case using typical data for the
manufacturing sector. Except for Germany, the scenarios are based-as in the previous boxes Tax
Analyser- on the tax regimes which were effective in the fiscal year 1999.
&ODVVLILFDWLRQRIVLPXODWLRQV
$&RUSRUDWLRQWD[EDVH
1.  Common depreciation on intangibles. Straight-line over 5 years (20%).
2.  Common depreciation on buildings. Straight-line over 25 years (4%).
3.  Common straight-line depreciation on tangible fixed assets. Straight-line over the estimated periods of
economic use (5 to 10 years depending on type of asset).
4.  Common declining balance depreciation on tangible fixed assets. Declining balance at 3 times straight-line
over the estimated periods of economic use, at a maximum of 30%.
5.  Common valuation of inventories. Full costs and LIFO allocation.
6.  Common allocation of pension costs (book reserve German type). Allowing to build up a book reserve for
pensions as in Germany.
7.  Common allocation of pension costs (pension fund US type). Allowing funded schemes as in the Anglo-Saxon
countries (UK and Ireland).168
8.  Common book reserves for bad debts. Future guarantee payments within next 2 years, 2% of annual turnover.
9.  Common overall tax base (IAS). Depreciation methods according to (1)-(3) above, depreciation periods are 5
years for intangibles, 40 and 50 years for buildings, 5 to 10 years for tangible fixed assets, valuation of
inventories according to (5), allocation of pension costs according to (7), no provisions for bad debts.
%&RUSRUDWLRQWD[UDWHDQGORFDOWD[HV
10.  Common corporation tax rate, including surcharges but excluding local taxes, at EU average of 32.28%.
11.  Common corporation tax rate, including surcharges and local profit taxes, at EU average of 33.84%.
12.  Common corporation tax rate of 25%, including surcharges and local profit taxes.
13.  Common corporation tax rate of 25%, including surcharges and all (profit and non-profit) local taxes.
&&RUSRUDWLRQWD[V\VWHP
14.  Common corporation tax system. Classical system (only corporate taxes).
15.  Common corporation tax system. Classical system (corporate and personal taxes).
A) Scenario involving the corporation tax base
The following table presents simulations referring to the corporation tax base. The first 8 of these
simulations consider only a single element of the tax base. By contrast simulation 9 analyses the effects












Base case 39.7 30.1 8.3 24.0 21.0 24.6 10.4 29.7
1. Common depreciation on
intangibles 39.7 30.1 8.3 24.0 21.0 24.6 10.4 29.7
2. Common depreciation on








41.0 28.4 7.9 22.3 19.7 23.9 10.9 29.8
5. Common valuation of
inventories 38.0 29.7 7.9 21.8 19.2 23.3 10.1 27.5
6. Common pension scheme
(book reserve) 44.5 30.1 9.2 27.1 24.0 27.0 11.3 34.1
7. Common pension scheme
(pension fund) 39.7 26.2 8.3 24.0 21.0 23.8 10.1 29.7
8. Common book reserves
for bad debts 36.2 26.6 7.9 21.4 18.8 22.2 9.3 26.6
9. Common overall tax base
(IAS) 46.7 29.7 8.7 24.5 21.4 26.2 12.4 32.3
As far as the depreciation rules are considered, several conclusions can be drawn from the results. First,
with respect to the changes in the national EATR, it is evident that depreciation practices on tangible
fixed assets are still quite different throughout the EU-5 Member States. France seems to be in a
relatively favourable position and Ireland in a relatively disadvantageous position. Second, with respect
to the level of change in both the national EATR and the EU5 average EATR, the different depreciation
rules on tangible fixed assets have a noticeable impact on the effective tax burdens. This can also be
explained by the high weights of tangible fixed assets as a proportion of the total investment of the
model firm. Third, with respect to the increases in the standard deviations, it is evident that common
methods and allowance rates for tangible fixed assets would increase differences in the EATR between
countries if all other elements of the tax regimes remained unchanged.
With respect to the valuation of inventories, it is assumed that production costs are valued at IXOOFRVWand
that /,)2is allowed as an allocation method in each country. This harmonisation scenario tends to
decrease all national EATRs and the EU-5 average EATR (by 1.3 percentage points) as well as the170
standard deviation (by 0.3). Full cost tends to increase the tax burden and LIFO tends to decrease the tax
burden. Obviously, for the base case model firm, the increasing effect of applying full cost is more than
compensated for by the decreasing effect of applying LIFO allocation. Moreover, the calculation of
production costs on a full cost basis tends to smooth the differences between different capital allowances
and other elements of the production costs (such as pension costs) if the finished goods are stored for a
certain period of time. This explains the decrease in the standard deviation.
The harmonisation of occupational pension schemes’ allocation of pension costs considers two different
scenarios: (6) a common regime for building up a pension reserve (book reserve) as in Germany and (7)
a common regime for a funded system that allows the deduction of annual (periodical) payments to a
pension fund as prevails in the Anglo-Saxon countries . In the case of ERRNUHVHUYHV, the national EATR,
except in Germany, the EU-5 average EATR (by 2.4 percentage points) and the standard deviation (by
0.9) increase. The reason for this considerable increase is a broader tax base in each country except
Germany and the high portion of pension costs in the total costs of the model firm. A common system
for pension funds would only affect the position of Germany since it is already applied in the other
countries. Therefore, the impact on both the EU-5 average EATR and the standard deviation is only
minor.
It is always very arbitrary to specify conditions under which bad debts occur. Therefore, bad debts were
not considered in the base case at all. The European Tax Analyzer model, however, can account for bad
debts. To analyse the effect of such provisions on the tax burden, the build-up of a book reserve for bad
debts is now allowed in all countries. In doing so it is assumed future warranties which amount to 2% of
the annual turnover of the model firm have to be fulfilled within two years. Accounting for a book
reserve for bad debts under these conditions decreases both the national EATR and the EU-5 average
EATR (by 2.4 percentage points). The decrease is highest in France and Germany (3.5 percentage points)
and lowest in Ireland (0.4 percentage points). This result clearly reflects the (corporation) tax savings due
to the deduction of the annual contributions to the book reserve from the tax base. The amount of tax
saving increases with the statutory tax rate on profits, which is highest in France (40%) and Germany
(39.3%) and lowest in Ireland (10%). The asymmetric decrease of the national EATR is also reflected by
the lower standard deviation (9.3 compared to 10.4 in the base case). As a general conclusion from this
example, it seems likely that both the national EATR level as well as the dispersion of the EATR across
countries are lower compared to the base case if book reserves for bad debts are taken into account.
However, with respect to the extreme assumptions in our example – the bad debts amount to 2% of the
annual turnover –a considerable variation of the EATR still remains.
In order to get a better idea about the impact of the corporation tax base on the EATR compared to other
elements of a corporate tax regime that constitute the effective tax burden (i.e. tax rates, local taxes,
corporation tax system), finally a harmonisation scenario with a uniform tax base in all countries is
considered. In doing so, it is assumed that the provisions of the International Accounting Standards
(IAS) form, without exception, the basis for the determination of taxable profits in the six countries. In
particular, the following rules are considered simultaneously relevant:
-  Depreciation of intangibles, buildings and tangible fixed assets only on a straight-line basis over the
estimated periods of economic use – 5 years for intangibles, 40 and 50 years for buildings and 5 to 10
years for tangible fixed assets.
-  Valuation of inventories is based on the full costs with FIFO as the allocation method.
-  Costs for occupational pension schemes are deducted from the annual taxable profits according to a
funded scheme as prevails in the Anglo-Saxon countries
-  Provisions for bad debts are not permitted.171
The results presented in Table F indicate that, with the exception of Germany, the national EATR would
rise if the IAS were relevant for the determination of taxable profits. As a consequence, the EU-5
average EATR increases by 1.6 percentage points. Thus, by taking the IAS as a benchmark, we can
conclude that the national accounting provisions are currently more generous. However, since the
changes in the EATR in Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and the UK are only minor, it is only France
that seems to be in a relatively favourable position with respect to the tax base. Therefore, the change in
the EU-5 average EATR can be above all attributed to the large change in France. As far as the Anglo-
Saxon countries and the Netherlands are concerned, the minor changes of the EATR can be attributed to
the fact that the tax bases in these countries already correspond to the IAS to a greater extent than the tax
bases in European continental states (e.g. France), except in the USA. Germany’s result also suggests
that the tax base corresponds with the IAS. Since the German EATR decreases, the national tax
accounting rules are even a bit less generous. Although the broadening of the tax base according to
international standards was one of the aims of the German tax reform, a lot of differences, which would
compensate for each other considerably if the IAS became relevant still exist. However, with respect to
these compensating effects, it is also clear that it is not sufficient just to compare the individual elements
of the tax base (e.g. depreciation rules or provisions) when analysing the impact of the tax base on the
effective tax burden.
The most striking result of this harmonisation scenario is, however, the increasing standard deviation (by
2.0) which is greater than in all previous simulations. This indicates that with a harmonised overall
corporation tax base the differences between the national EATR would, ceteris paribus, not only remain,
but that these differences would even increase since the variation in the EATR across countries
increases. The remaining variations in the EATR can be attributed to the different statutory tax rates,
local taxes and the corporation tax systems. In the case of a uniform tax base, the real effects resulting
solely from these differences are clearly demonstrated. As pointed out earlier, higher tax rates tend to be
combined with lower tax bases and vice versa (see the first box Tax Analyser). This correlation might
explain the increasing dispersion of the EATR when tax bases are harmonised: in such instances the
compensating element (i.e. a more generous tax base) disappears.
B) Scenarios involving the corporation tax rates and local taxes
 In order to separately identify the impact of the relevant provisions on the EATR, single elements of the
tax rates as well as combinations of the corporation tax rate and local taxes are considered. The results of
each simulation are listed in Table G and compared with the results obtained from the existing tax
regimes (base case).172
7$%/(* 5HVXOWVIRUVLPXODWLRQVLQYROYLQJWD[UDWHVDQGORFDOWD[HV
- effective average tax rates
- only corporation taxes







Base case 39.7 30.1 8.3 24.0 21.0 24.6 10.4 29.7
10. Common CT rate, at EU
mean 36.7 34.1 23.6 21.8 22.7 27.8 6,3 28.4
11. Common CT rate incl.
local profit taxes, at EU
mean
37.1 24.0 24.5 23.1 24.0 26.5 5.3 25.3
12. Common CT rate of 25%
incl. local profit taxes 33.6 17.0 18.3 16.6 17.5 20.6 6.5 19.7
13. Common CT rate of 25%
incl. all local taxes 9.6 17.0 16.2 16.2 14.8 14.8 2.7 16.2
Simulation 10 introduces a common corporation tax rate of 32.28% including all surcharges levied in
France and Germany. The rate of 32.28% is the average rate across all 15 EU Member States for the
fiscal year 1999 - except for Germany where the rates applying after the tax reform in 2001 have been
used. However, this simulation does not imply that in all Member States all profits will be taxed at the
same rates. Since local profit taxes are still levied, differences will remain.
Introducing such a common corporation tax rate increases the EU-5 average EATR significantly, by 3.2
percentage points. At the same time, however, there is also a considerable reduction of the standard
deviation from 10.4 to 6.3 indicating less variation of the EATR across EU Member States. In fact, since
the EATR does not change significantly in France, the Netherlands and the UK, these changes are mainly
caused by Germany and Ireland. The EATR in Germany increases by 4.0 percentage points. Since there
is an extra burden imposed by the trade tax on income in Germany, the statutory tax rate on profits
would rise from 39.3% to 44.2%. However, the most significant change is in Ireland with an increase of
the EATR by 15.3 percentage points from 8.3% to 23.6%. This is because the advantage of the 10%
corporation tax rate would now disappear.
It should be noted that – in contrast to all simulations considering the tax base – the ranking of the
countries would be different from the base case. Ireland would drop back from first to third place
whereas the Netherlands would improve from third to first place. The other countries would keep their
positions. Since only the corporation tax rate is harmonised, this country ranking reflects the remaining
differences between the effects of the tax base, the local profit and non-profit taxes and the corporation
tax systems.
Simulation 11 is based on the previous one, but now local profit taxes are included in the common
statutory tax rate. For the countries considered here, this implies that the trade tax in Germany and the
franchise tax on income in the USA are assumed to be abolished, or alternatively, credited against173
corporation tax. The uniform tax rate chosen is 33.84%, which represents the average statutory tax rate
across the 15 EU Member States.
Since only Germany levies a local profit tax within the EU-5 Member States, this harmonisation scenario
would significantly reduce the EATR in Germany. By contrast, there would only be moderate increases
of the EATR in the other countries. Germany would improve two positions to second place, bringing it
to a level equal to that of the UK. Altogether, the EU-5 average EATR would be reduced moderately and
the standard deviation of the EATR across countries would fall further. The new value of 5.3 is almost
50% lower than the standard deviation of the EATR for the existing tax regimes (base case). Compared
to the existing tax regimes, introducing a harmonised statutory tax rate on profits would therefore
substantially reduce distortions resulting from differences between the EATR for domestic investment in
Europe.
However, not all distortions would disappear. The remaining differences can be attributed to the tax
bases, the local non-profit taxes and the corporation tax systems. France in particular, would still be in a
very disadvantageous position with respect to the levy of non-profit taxes.
Compared to the previous case, simulation 12 simply reduces the common statutory tax rate on profits
from the EU average rate of 33.84% to 25%. As a consequence of the lower tax rate all of the national
EATRs as well as the EU-5 average EATR would be further reduced. However, with respect to the
increasing standard deviation, the more striking result of this simulation is that the dispersion of the
EATR rises. This happens because the tax saving due to the deductibility of local non-profit taxes
becomes smaller as the statutory tax rate on profit decreases. In other words, the effects of the different
non-profit tax levels emerge more obviously if the statutory tax rate on profits is reduced.
The result of this simulation is also important since it reveals the effects of the tax rate on the variation
in the effective tax burdens. The comparison with the previous simulation makes clear that a further
reduction of a statutory tax rate on profits, which is already harmonised, to a level significantly lower
than the average across countries, will only reduce the average effective tax burden. However, the
economic distortion will increase, since the standard deviation rises.
In addition to measures considered in the previous case, simulation number 13 abolishes non-profit taxes
(e.g. real property tax). This implies that the only tax that exists in each country is a tax on profits which
is levied at a uniform rate of 25%. Since there are no other taxes, the remaining differences between the
EATR are the result of the different tax bases and the corporation tax systems. As a result of this
simulation, all of the national EATRs and the EU-5 average EATR would be further reduced. Moreover,
the standard deviation of the EATR falls to 2.7, by far the lowest value obtained in any of the 15
simulations.
This scenario illuminates the remaining dispersions of the effective tax burdens across countries which
can be attributed to the tax bases and the corporation tax systems.
In the country ranking France moves from last to first position. But this result is not surprising, since
France has the lowest tax base and is the only country that uses an imputation system.
C) Scenarios involving the corporation tax systems
The following table presents the impact of a common classical tax system on the level and dispersion of
companies’ effective tax burden. All the other elements of the tax regimes remained the same. Since the
corporation tax system is the linkage between corporate and personal income taxes, personal taxes have174
been introduced in a separate step. In the case of personal taxes, the amount of dividends is the same as











Base case (only corporate
taxes)


















14. Common CT system,
classical system (only
corporate taxes)
48.0 30.1 8.3 24.0 21.0 26.3 13.0 29.7
15. Common CT system,
classical system (corpo-
rate and personal taxes)
55.7 32.0 17.2 37.4 26.6 33.8 12.8 32.0
At the corporate level the introduction of a common classical system would only affect the EATR in
France. This is because all of the countries considered here except France already apply a kind of
classical system at the corporate level. The abolition of the imputation system, in general, would increase
the EATR. The reason is that if the tax credit is denied, a relatively higher cash distribution will be
required to pay the same amount of dividends as before. As a result of the increasing French EATR, both
the average EU-5 EATR and the standard deviation of the EATR across countries rises.
Introducing an EU-wide classical system and including personal taxes would leave only the effective tax
burden in Ireland (and in the USA) unaffected. By contrast, since none of these countries operates a pure
classical system, the EATR in all other countries would rise. The EATR increase would be most
significant in France (from 48.8% to 55.7%) due to its high average income tax rate. There would be
only minor increases in the EATR in Germany and the UK. Altogether, the EU-5 average EATR at the
overall level would rise. The same is true for the standard deviation, which increases from 10.4 to 12.8.
To summarise, it seems reasonable to conclude that the introduction of a common corporation tax system
without modifying other elements of the tax regimes at the same time would increase distortions,
resulting from different levels of company taxation, within the EU. There are different reasons for this
result. At the corporate level the effects resulting from the different tax rates, tax bases and local taxes
would emerge if there were a common corporation tax system. At the overall level it is the different
structure of the income tax rates that increases the variation of the EATR.175
D) Concluding remarks
A major finding of the analysis of the effective tax burdens by means of the Tax Analyser model is that
all tax regimes seem to be designed as more or less integrated systems. This means that there is a
particular relationship between the tax rate, the tax base and the corporation tax system. As a broad
conclusion, it is possible to say that, in general, a higher statutory tax rate on profits correlates with a
lower taxable base and vice versa.
The simulations presented in this box help to understand the weights of each of the most important
elements of a tax regime in the effective tax burden.
Introducing a FRPPRQFRUSRUDWHWD[EDVH (simulation 9) clearly helps to achieve more transparency in
the calculation of effective tax burdens. However, the outcome of this simulation indicates that such a
change would result in increasing values both for the average effective tax burden and – what seems
more important – the dispersion of the EATR across EU Member States.
Similarly, a FRPPRQFODVVLFDOFRUSRUDWLRQWD[V\VWHP (simulation 14) tends to increase both the average
effective tax burden in Europe and the dispersion of the EATR across EU Member States.
By contrast, the introduction of a FRPPRQ VWDWXWRU\ WD[ UDWH RQ SURILWV (simulation 11) would
significantly reduce the dispersion of the EATR across the EU Member States. None of the other
hypothetical scenarios considered here reduced the variation of the effective tax burdens in a comparable
way. The effects on the EATR of a common statutory tax rate on profits depends on level of the tax rate.
In our example, the average EATR increases. Although a lower common tax rate would reduce the
average EATR, the dispersion of the EATR across countries tends to rise again. Therefore, reducing
statutory tax rates on profits significantly does not simultaneously ensure greater neutrality towards
taxation.176
 620( ())(&76 2) 7$; 237,0,6$7,21 %< 0($16 2) ),1$1&,$/ ,17(50(',$5,(6 21 7+(
())(&7,9(7$;5$7(62175$161$7,21$/,19(670(176%<*(50$1$1'8.&203$1,(6
 ,QWURGXFWRU\UHPDUNV
The potential distortions highlighted in the analysis of cross-border investments indicate that there can
be considerable incentive for companies to alter their behaviour in order to minimise their global tax
burden.
Section 6.3.3 showed that companies can considerably minimise their effective tax burden if they choose
selected forms of finance for the subsidiaries, the most tax convenient form of finance depending on the
result of the interaction of the taxation regimes of the home/host countries. The results of the analysis
indicate that this situation corresponds to a degradation of capital export and capital import neutralities.
Companies may also use more complex financial arrangements and group structures in order to minimise
their effective tax burdens. The area of financing offers many possibilities, in particular for multinational
companies. In general, the implementation of an intermediary financial company is advantageous if the
relevant income bears a lower tax burden compared with the direct financing of a foreign subsidiary by
the parent company.
Therefore, the purpose of this section is to understand to what extent the tax optimisation strategy of
companies -by means of an intermediary financial company- affects their effective tax burden and, in
general, the results arising from section 6, in terms of tax induced distortions in the allocation of
resources.
The most tax efficient strategy for cross border financial arrangements through financial intermediaries
depends on the tax burden in all countries involved and on the provision of the tax treaties between these
countries. It is therefore obvious that there is no universally valid tax optimisation strategy for
international financing (see Box 10).
In order to work out the most relevant tax driven factors influencing this strategy and keeping the
analysis still manageable, Germany and the UK only are taken as examples for the location of the parent
company (the subsidiary being located in all Member States). For the intermediary financial companies,
the case of a Belgian co-ordination centre and a Dutch finance company are considered.
As is the case for the main body of the quantitative analysis, the tax regimes considered here are those in
operation in 1999. Thus, the two countries differ with respect to the national profit tax rate (30% in the
UK and 52.35% in Germany), the method for eliminating the international double taxation of dividends
(exemption in Germany and credit with limitation in the UK) and the provisions for withholding taxes
on interest payments in their tax treaties concluded with the other Member States. All this will clearly
have an impact on both the choice of location of the financial intermediary and the use of the source of
finance.
It is worth noting that the situation has dramatically changed since 1999. The German tax regime has
been subject to a fundamental reform and the UK has reviewed its legislation in the area of tax planning.
Moreover, there have been developments in tax co-ordination at the EU level, involving, among other
things, the scheduled rollback of the Belgium co-ordination centre and of the Dutch finance companies.
It is however still very useful to consider the results of the analysis of the cases presented in this section.
They can illustrate whether, and to what extent, the strategies considered here have an impact on the
analysis above which showed that countries are competing mostly with their tax rates for attractive177
conditions as a place of location for foreign investors. It can, therefore help to understand whether
removing these forms of financial intermediaries, for example in the context of the Code of Conduct for
business taxation, helps to solve the problem of tax-induced resources misallocation.
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-  New equity / New equity: The transfer of new equity capital via a financial intermediary could be more tax efficient
if the tax treaty between the country of the subsidiary and the parent eliminates the double taxation of dividends by
granting a limited tax credit, whereas the tax treaty between the country of the subsidiary and the country of the
intermediary company as well as between the country of the intermediary company and the parent provide the exemption
method. Moreover, the financial intermediary could be used as a “mixer company” in order to avoid excess foreign tax
credits. If the dividends from different subsidiaries are pooled at the level of the financial intermediary the parent company
benefits from the averaging of foreign tax credits when double taxation of dividends is avoided by the credit with
limitation on a per-country basis. Finally the above strategy is advantageous when the country of the subsidiary uses a
split-rate corporation tax system.178
-  Debt / Debt: A financial intermediary that is used as a conduit company for interest payments typically gains an
advantage from the reduction of withholding taxes on interest (treaty shopping). This can be achieved if the tax treaty
between the state of residence of the subsidiary and the intermediary company allows to collect lower or even no
withholding taxes on interest compared to the tax treaty between the state of residence of the subsidiary an the parent
company.
-  New equity / Debt: Where debt capital is transformed into new equity capital there is an advantage to an intermediary
company if the tax saving from the interest deduction at the level of the intermediary is higher than the tax burden on the
interest receipts at the level of the parent.
-  Debt / New equity: The transformation of equity into debt financing offers advantages if the financial intermediary
pays taxes at a lower rate than the subsidiary would have to pay on its profits and the parent company would have to pay
on receipt of the interest. Moreover, the ultimate repatriation of the equity funds to the parent should bear no further tax





In 1999 Germany has a comparably high national tax rate on profits. International double taxation of
dividends is eliminated by the exemption method. One might reasonably argue therefore that the
principle aim of German multinationals is to establish financial intermediaries as base companies
(asymmetric financing) in order to shelter the low taxed income from taxation in Germany. The
predominant way of financing is that the German parent contributes new equity funds to the intermediary
company and the intermediary company transforms these equity funds into debt financing of the
subsidiary (i.e. new equity / debt from box 12). Figure 3 summarises the sources of finance and the
resulting cash flows.
From the perspective of a German parent company Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands are the most
important countries for the location of financial intermediaries. The following analysis concentrates on
Belgium and the Netherlands which allows the fundamental principles of the German taxation of foreign
financial intermediaries in 1999 to be highlighted.179
)LJXUH*HUPDQSHUVSHFWLYHRILQWHUQDWLRQDOILQDQFLDODUUDQJHPHQWV
A) The case of a Belgian co-ordination centre
Subject to certain prerequisites a Belgian Co-ordination Centre (BCC) can be formed by a foreign (i.e.
non-Belgian) parent company either as a Belgian corporation or a branch. The BCC must be a member
of a multinational group and carry on only the development and centralisation of certain activities
including financial operations for the sole benefit of the group (so-called “intra-muros” requirement).
Limits are imposed as a BCC may not own shares of other (Belgian or foreign) corporations. Therefore,
the BCC can only act as a financial intermediary but not as an intermediary holding company.
Although, like every Belgian corporation or branch, a BCC is liable to corporation tax at an effective
statutory rate of 40.17% (corporation tax of 39% plus surcharge of 3%), there is a special tax benefit
resulting from the definition of the tax base. The tax base is computed on a cost-plus basis rather than on
realised profits. The costs that are taken into account is the sum of the BCC’s operational expenses
excluding personnel or financial charges. Due to this definition of the tax base interest payments
received by the BCC from other group members are in principle not taxable in Belgium. Moreover,
distributed dividends are not subject to Belgian withholding tax which results in a quasi-exemption from
any Belgian taxes for the financing activities. On the other hand, withholding taxes on interest payments
from the subsidiaries to the BCC deducted in the state of residence of the subsidiaries become final and
















As a general rule, retained profits of the BCC are only taxable in Belgium (deferral principle) and,
according to the Belgian-German tax treaty, distributed profits are exempt from corporation tax and trade
tax at the level of the German parent.
The deferral principle is violated to a certain extent by the German Controlled Foreign Companies (CFC)
legislation including Passive Foreign Investment Company (PFIC) rules. Accordingly, following the
German “deemed dividend approach”, retained profits of a foreign company resulting from passive
income are attributed to the German parent company and are subject to corporation tax and trade tax if
the shareholding in the financial intermediary is at least 50% (controlled foreign company) and the total
(effective) tax burden on the profits is less than 30% (low tax jurisdiction).
As passive income is defined, inter alia, as income realised by the foreign financial intermediary from
holding of liquid funds or the lending of equity capital received by a parent company, a BCC earns
passive investment income. The German legislation explicitly provides, however, that the tax treaty
provisions applicable to distributed dividends also apply to deemed dividends under CFC legislation. As
the Belgian-German tax treaty does not contain an “activity proviso” the passive income of a BCC would
be – as a first step – exempt from German taxation.
With regard to capital investment income, however, the German PFIC rules set out of force treaty
provisions which provide the exemption method. To the extent that the capital investment income is
stemming from the financing of a foreign based company which is engaged in active business, 60% of
the investment income is treated as passive income and attributed to the German shareholder (i.e. the
parent company). Although the amount of 60% is entirely subject to corporation tax it is exempt from
trade tax. To mitigate double taxation an indirect foreign tax credit is granted to taxes paid by the BCC
and to taxes withheld on investment income received by the BCC. The remaining 40% of the capital
investment income are treated as ordinary passive income so that the participation exemption according
to the Belgium-German tax treaty applies. Moreover, a genuine distribution of the profits (part of the
60% profits) of the financial intermediary company which have been already attributed to the German
shareholder according to the PFIC rules are explicitly exempt from corporation tax.
Depending on the location of the subsidiary that is financed by the BCC the financial operation bears
different tax burdens: The (minimum) statutory corporation tax rate including the solidarity levy is
42.2% (40% * 1.055) plus trade tax in the case of a German subsidiary and 25.32% (60% * 40% *
1.055) in the case of a foreign based subsidiary. Therefore a German parent does not benefit from a BCC
with regard to the financing of its domestic subsidiaries. The tax burden will be the same. With regard to
the financing of foreign subsidiary, however, the tax burden is significantly lower compared to both
domestic subsidiaries and direct financing by the German parent. In the latter case the interest receipts
from the foreign subsidiaries would also be subject to the statutory tax rate of 42.2% plus trade tax.
B) The case of a Dutch finance company
The Netherlands are the most common place for the location of financial intermediaries of German
multinationals. A Dutch Finance Company (DFC) like every other company is subject to corporation tax
with its profits at a nominal rate of 35%. As this tax rate is very close to the EU-average, the main tax
advantages are therefore an extensive network of tax treaties and the possibility of informal advance
rulings with the Dutch tax authorities with respect to the taxation of profits. A special tax incentive for a
DFC, however, is the creation of a so-called financial risk reserve which enables a DFC to put up to 80%
of the taxable income from annual group financing into a book reserve and to deduct the annual
contribution from taxable income. Depending on the contribution to a risk reserve a DFC is able to arrive
at an effective statutory corporation tax rate between 35% and 7%. This is also the final tax liability in
the Netherlands. Withholding taxes on interest receipts are creditable against Dutch corporation tax and
distributed dividends to a German parent company are not subject to withholding tax in the Netherlands.181
With regard to the taxation of profits of a DFC the general rule is that they are not taxable in the hands of
the German shareholder as long as they are retained (deferral principle). In case of a distribution the
dividends of a DFC are exempt form corporation tax and trade tax according to the Dutch-German tax
treaty.
As the DFC in principle is always resident in the Netherlands and the effective tax burden usually is
above 30%, there is no taxation in Germany either due to a German place of residence or according to
the German PFIC rules. The latter rules are likely to apply, however, if the DFC makes contributions to a
risk reserve resulting in an effective statutory corporation tax rate below 30%. The critical contribution is
around 14.3% (35% * 85.7% = 29.995%). As any contribution above this amount would result in an
even higher tax burden due to the PFIC rules compared to the situation in which no contributions to the
risk reserve are made at all, the most tax efficient strategy would be to contribute such an amount so that
the effective corporation tax rate is just above 30%.
Although this strategy bears certain risks as the total profits of the DFC could be treated as capital
investment income it is assumed to prevail in the case where the DFC is granting loans to its
subsidiaries. Moreover, it is assumed that the reserve can be released tax free (e.g. a purchase of
participation is assumed) so that the Dutch corporation tax rate will be fixed at 30%.
 5HOHYDQWHFRQRPLFPHDVXUHV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Tables 32, 33 and 34 compare the cost of capital and the EATR of a German parent and its EU
subsidiaries both for the most tax efficient way of financing the subsidiaries by the parent and for the
case of a financial intermediary. The financial intermediary can be either a BCC or a DFC, financed by
the German parent with equity capital, and which transfer the money as debt capital to other group
members located in the Member States47. For each way of financing averages and standard deviations are
calculated.
As a consequence of the high German statutory tax rate the most tax efficient direct way of financing an
EU subsidiary from the perspective of a German parent is always profit retention of the subsidiary (see
section 6).
Compared to this, the use of a financial intermediary results in a lower cost of capital/EATR in 10 out of
14 cases if it is assumed that distributions are financed out of domestic earnings (see table 32). Only for
subsidiaries located in Ireland, Italy, Sweden and the UK is direct financing by the German parent still
more favourable. On average, the use of a BCC is more tax efficient than direct financing. A DFC only
offers very minor advantages. However, with regard to the standard deviations the dispersion is reduced
significantly if a financial intermediary is used. This is due to the fact that for the marginal return (cost of
capital) or interest payments (EATR) a uniform statutory tax rate of 25.32% (in case of a BCC) or 30%
(in case of a DFC) applies.
The most important reason for the advantage in using a financial intermediary compared to direct
financing is a reduction of the statutory tax rate on company profits where they are channelled through
an intermediary. Debt financing by a BCC turns out to be more advantageous than profit retention in the
subsidiary if the statutory tax rate in the host country of the subsidiary is higher than the effective
statutory tax rate on interest after the German Passive Foreign Investment Company (PFIC) rules are
                                                
47  Although a DFC may also hold participation in other companies and therefore provide a subsidiary with new equity
capital, this way of (equity financing) is not considered here. The reason is that there are no additional tax advantages
compared to the direct supply of new equity capital by the German parent as Germany exempts the resulting dividends182
applied (as shown above the effective tax rate is around 25%). All Member States except Ireland and
Italy impose corporation tax rates above 25%.
Compared to a BCC a DFC might be expected to offer a less favourable tax effect as the relevant tax rate
on the interest income is higher (as shown above, the effective tax rate is around 30%). For four Member
States, however, the opposite turns out to be true. This result is explained by the levy of withholding
taxes on interest payments in the host country of the subsidiary to the financial intermediary. In case of a
DFC these withholding taxes are not relevant as they can be credited against Dutch corporation tax on
the interest income. In case of a BCC, however, the withholding tax becomes relevant for that part of the
underlying income that is not covered by the PFIC rules (i.e. 40%).
As only 60% of the income attributed to a BCC is taxable and 40% exempt, in Germany 40% of the
withholding tax deducted cannot be credited against German corporation tax and thus becomes final. In
the case of France, Greece, Portugal and Spain the 15% withholding tax on interest payments to a BCC
overcompensates for the advantage of a lower effective statutory tax rate on profits as compared with a
DFC.
The ranking of the host countries for the subsidiaries from the perspective of a German parent company
differs between the cost of capital and the EATR.
In the case of a financial intermediary the cost of capital of a cross-border investment is determined by
the (individual) tax base in the host country of the subsidiary and the (uniform) effective tax rate
imposed on profits of the financial intermediary. Therefore, in the case of a marginal investment,
Member States only compete as places of location in their rules for determine corporate profits (i.e. their
tax bases). This is demonstrated by the BCC case where Belgium (4.5%) has a lower cost of capital than
Luxembourg (4.6%) and Denmark (5.2%).
For a more profitable investment the EATR is relevant. Although with respect to the EATR the changes
in the country ranking are only minor, one important aspect has to be considered. As the economic rent
cannot be shifted from the subsidiary to the financial intermediary by means of financial arrangements
based on the arm’s-length-principle (the possible shifting by transfer prices is not considered here), the
economic rent is always taxed at the statutory rate in the host country of the subsidiary. As the national
tax rates on profits are lower in Denmark (EATR of 16.8%) and Luxembourg (EATR of 19.2%) both
countries can improve their position in the ranking compared with Belgium (EATR of 21.2%).
Therefore, as has already been demonstrated in the base case and for several of the simulations attempted
in section 7 above, countries are competing with their tax rates for attractive conditions as a place of
location for foreign investors. The use of a financial intermediary cannot change the country ranking. It
only reduces the EATR by a certain amount as the profits that are transferred by the financial
arrangement are subject to a lower tax rate. The predominant role of the tax rate in comparison with the
tax base is also demonstrated by the significant reduction of the standard deviations of the cost of capital.
All in all this reveals a greater disparity of the tax rates than of the tax bases among Member States.
The introduction of personal taxes has no effect on the country ranking and the relative advantages of the
different ways of financing if it is assumed that all distributions to the ultimate shareholder of the










































































































































5.6 6.0 5.7 5.5 7.0 ./. 5.5   5.7 5.8 5.9 5.8   5.5 0.8 Financing in most
tax efficient way 20.1 26.4 18.8 14.3 29.8 ./. 25.4   23.4 21.6 23.8 21.7   19.0 8.3
    6.2 ./. 5.0 6.3 5.2   5.4 5.6 5.0 6.1 5.3 0.5 Co-ordination-
Centre (Belgium)     27.0 ./. 23.7 3.4 23.9   22.0 20.8 11.2 18.8 18.4 5.7
5.4 5.1 5.7 5.8  ./.  6.2 5.1 5.2 5.5   5.5 6.1 5.5 0.4 Financing Comp.
(Netherlands) 19.4 23.3 18.8 15.9  ./.  3.2 23.7 21.3 20.5   13.3 18.6 18.9 5.4
4.9 4.5 5.2 5.3 6.1 ./. 4.8 4.5 3.4 4.6 4.9 5.3 5.5 5.0 5.9 5.1 0.6 Minimum
17.3 21.2 16.8 13.8 26.8 ./. 17.6 -5.7 17.9 19.2 18.4 21.8 20.6 11.0 17.7 16.7 7.2
Personal Taxes
4.0 4.3 4.2 3.9 5.3 ./. 3.9   4.1 4.2 4.2 4.2 3.6  3.9 0.7 Financing in most
tax efficient way 19.9 26.1 18.9 14.4 29.2 ./. 25.4   23.1 21.3 23.4 21.3 11.6  19.0 7.9
    4.5 ./. 3.3 4.9 3.5   3.6 3.9  4.5 3.7 0.6 Co-ordination-
Centre (Belgium)     26.4 ./. 23.2 4.0 23.7   21.6 20.3  18.5 18.2 5.5
3.8 3.4 4.2 4.2  ./.  4.9 3.4 3.5 3.8   4.0 4.5 3.9 0.5 Financing Comp.
(Netherlands) 19.1 23.1 18.8 15.7  ./.  3.7 23.5 21.0 20.1   13.5 18.3 18.7 5.2
3.2 2.8 3.7 3.7 4.4 ./. 3.1 3.2 1.8 2.9 3.2 3.6 3.8 3.5 4.3 3.4 0.6 Minimum










































































































































6.1 6.5 6.2 5.9 7.5 ./. 5.9   6.3 6.3 6.4 6.3 5.4 6.3 6.0 0.8 Financing in most
tax efficient way 30.0 35.2 28.7 25.0 38.2 ./. 33.0   32.7 31.2 33.1 31.3 22.2 27.9 28.9 7.0
     ./.  6.3 5.3       5.3 0.6 Co-ordination-
Centre (Belgium)      ./.  14.4 31.9       26.7 5.0
5.9 5.6 6.2 6.3 6.7 ./. 5.3 6.6 5.7 5.7 6.0 5.8 6.0 6.0 6.5 6.0 0.4 Financing Comp.
(Netherlands) 29.4 32.6 28.8 26.4 35.6 ./. 27.8 15.6 33.0 30.9 30.3 31.4 30.3 24.1 28.6 28.9 4.6
4.7 4.3 5.1 5.2 6.3 ./. 5.2 4.9 3.9 4.4 4.8 5.5 5.7 4.9 6.2 5.1 0.6 Minimum 25.4 28.8 25.1 22.5 34.5 ./. 27.8 8.0 28.0 27.1 26.4 30.2 29.2 20.3 27.5 25.8 5.9
Personal Taxes
4.3 5.1 4.7 4.8 5.0 ./. 4.7   4.1 4.4 5.2 5.0 4.6 5.0 4.6 0.4 Financing in most
tax efficient way 42.5 46.9 42.2 40.4 46.7 ./. 44.1   43.6 43.1 45.9 44.4 39.1 42.0 42.6 3.9
     ./.  5.0 3.7       3.4 0.9 Co-ordination-
Centre (Belgium)      ./.  32.4 44.3       40.0 3.5
5.4 5.2 5.7 5.8 6.2 ./. 4.9 6.1 5.2 5.2 5.5 5.3 5.5 5.5 6.0 5.5 0.4 Financing Comp.
(Netherlands) 44.8 47.1 44.4 42.8 49.0 ./. 43.9 35.6 47.4 45.9 45.4 46.1 45.4 41.4 44.3 44.5 3.1
2.5 2.0 3.0 3.1 4.6 ./. 3.7 4.5 3.6 2.2 2.5 3.8 4.0 2.9 4.7 3.4 0.9 Minimum 38.5 41.0 38.5 36.5 46.0 ./. 41.9 30.7 44.2 39.7 39.1 43.1 42.3 35.1 41.2 39.8 3.8185
If we now consider that distributions to the ultimate shareholder are also financed from foreign profits
and ignore personal taxes for the moment, we can see from the results shown in Table 33 that a BCC
does improve its relative position in comparison with both the most tax efficient direct way of financing
and the use of a DFC. This can be explained by the German PFIC rules that add 60% of the profits of a
BCC to the German corporation tax base. As these profits are subject to corporation tax they qualify for
the reduction of the corporation tax rate for distributed profits. On the other hand, both profits resulting
from the most tax efficient direct way of financing and distributed dividends from a DFC are exempt
from corporation tax in Germany and therefore cannot take advantage from the split-rate corporation tax
system. As a consequence, only in the case of Greece, Ireland and Italy will a BCC offer fewer
advantages. (Compared with the other scenario that assumes that distributions are taken from domestic
earnings, a BCC now is also more attractive for subsidiaries in France, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the
United Kingdom).
Moreover, if we take personal taxes into account, a BCC would even become more attractive as only
certain dividends taken from profits of a BCC (i.e. those 60% of the profits covered by the PFIC rules)
qualify for the domestic German corporation tax credit.
Finally, Table 34 compares the cost of capital and the EATR on domestic investment and on outbound
investment depending on the assumptions of the financing of profit distributions. The results are overall









































































(1) Member States’ mean of the most tax-efficient way out of the three possibilities
Compared with domestic investment in Germany, tax optimisation reduces the cost of capital and the
EATR on outbound investment. The advantage for foreign investment increases significantly if it is
assumed that in the case of outbound investment the distributions are taken from domestic profits. If
instead the distributions have to be taken from foreign profits, outbound investment is still more tax
efficient than domestic investment if the focus is on corporate taxes only. Tax optimisation again186
increases the advantage of outbound investment. In addition, if personal taxes become relevant,
outbound investment can now be in a better position with respect to the cost of capital if a BCC is used.
Tax optimisation can therefore overcompensates for the disadvantages of foreign source income that
does not carry a tax credit within the imputation system. However, with respect to the EATR, domestic
investment remains in a better tax situation. The reason is that the economic rent distributed from the




In contrast to Germany the effective statutory tax rate on profits in the UK (currently 30%) is below the
EU-average. Another important difference that has an impact on any tax planning strategy is the method
for eliminating international double taxation of foreign dividends. Instead of the exemption method the
limited foreign tax credit method applies. Having regard to the comparably low corporate tax rate in the
UK it is therefore less attractive to establish a foreign intermediary as a base company. Sometimes,
however, an intermediary is used as a group financing company following in principle the same structure
as was suggested for a German multinational (i.e. asymmetric financing of new equity / debt - see figure
3). Having regard to the application of the tax credit method the principle aim of a UK multinational
ought to be to optimise its position towards foreign tax credits. This can be achieved by an intermediary
holding company that serves as a so-called “Mixer Company”. Recalling the principle forms of financial
arrangements set out in box 10 this structure belongs in the category of symmetric financing (new equity
/ new equity). Figure 4 summarises the sources of finance and the resulting cash flows.
)LJXUH 8.SHUVSHFWLYHRILQWHUQDWLRQDOILQDQFLDODUUDQJHPHQWV
From the perspective of a British parent company the Netherlands, Ireland or Jersey are important
countries for the location of intermediary companies. The following analysis concentrates on the























A) The case of a Dutch Finance Companies (DFC)
The interposition of a Dutch Finance Company (DFC) between a UK parent and another EU subsidiary
follows the same structure as set out in section 8.2 on Germany. Moreover, the Dutch taxation of UK
owned Dutch finance companies is exactly the same. Contributions to a risk reserve are also the same
and it is assumed that the risk reserve can be released tax free so that the effective corporation tax rate of
the DFC is 30%.
Under the UK controlled foreign companies legislation, the profits of the DFC would not be imputed
back to the UK if it was a “holding company” within the meaning of the relevant provisions. This could
normally be achieved relatively easily. If and when the finance company declares a dividend to the UK
parent, that dividend will be subject to UK corporation tax at 30% less a credit for the underlying tax
borne by the finance company. Assuming a fixed Dutch corporation tax rate of 30% there will be no
further UK tax liability.
B) The case of a Dutch Mixer Company
Against the background of tax optimisation for foreign tax credits under the UK method for eliminating
double taxation of foreign dividends, the use of an overseas holding company was a relatively common
tax planning strategy for UK multinationals. Although this structure has been legislated against in the
UK Finance Act 2000, it was the standard tax planning for UK based multinationals up to 1999 and is
therefore considered here.
When a UK company receives a dividend from an overseas subsidiary, that dividend is subject to UK
corporation tax at 30%. The UK eliminates double taxation of foreign dividends by granting a tax credit
for the underlying foreign tax. However, this credit is calculated on a per-source basis and limited to the
UK corporation tax on the grossed-up amount (i.e. dividend plus underlying tax). Therefore, optimum
efficiency arises where the overseas subsidiary’s underlying rate of tax is equal to the UK tax rate of
30%. To the extent that the underlying rate is greater than 30%, some of the credit is effectively wasted
since the first 30% of the underlying tax is sufficient to prevent any further UK tax liability on the
dividend arising. Correspondingly, to the extent that the underlying tax rate is less than 30%, UK tax is
payable. UK law did not permit the averaging out of underlying tax rates at the UK company level.
If a “mixer” company was incorporated in the Netherlands, these inefficiencies could be minimised and
the effective rate of tax on overseas dividends reduced to 30%, thus ensuring that no further UK tax was
payable, and that no overseas tax was ‘wasted’.
The Dutch mixer would receive dividends from high-tax (e.g. EU) subsidiaries and also hold shares in
companies in low-tax jurisdictions. Due to the Dutch participation exemption there was no Dutch tax
payment on the dividends. At the level of the Dutch holding company dividends from the low-tax
companies (with low foreign tax applied to them) could be mixed with dividends from the high-tax EU
subsidiaries. The mixer company would then pay a single dividend to the UK parent.
The dividends from the Dutch mixer company is the total amount of dividends that was received by the
UK parent from the various overseas subsidiaries At the level of the UK parent, in calculating the
underlying tax borne by the Dutch mixer company, the average rate of tax on the dividends determines
the amount of foreign tax credit available. Judicious adjustment of the timing and amount of dividends
would ensure that the overall rate was 30%. This was extremely advantageous for UK parents of groups
with subsidiary companies in jurisdictions with varied local tax rates, since the effect of this is to average
out the level of underlying tax, so a well-structured group could ensure that profits were only repatriated
which were subject to an underlying rate of approximately 30%.188
The use of mixers to smooth the rate of tax on overseas subsidiaries could be extended by the
introduction of subsidiaries with artificially low rates of tax, effectively money-box companies, where an
appropriate amount of zero-taxed income could be mixed with ‘real’ foreign income to achieve a 30%
rate.
Although in an optimum situation there is an effective tax rate of 30% on all overseas subsidiaries it is
not clear to which subsidiaries the benefits should be attributed. They could be attributed to those
subsidiaries located in high tax jurisdictions (i.e. with statutory tax rates above the UK rate of 30%) as
their tax burden is effectively reduced to 30%. However, the benefits could also be attributed to
subsidiaries in low tax jurisdictions (i.e. with statutory tax rates below the UK rate of 30%) as a further
UK tax on their dividends is avoided due to mixing. Economically, the latter dividends are thus exempt
from UK tax. In the following, however, the first interpretation is used.
 5HOHYDQWHFRQRPLFPHDVXUHV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Tables 35 and 36 compare the cost of capital and the EATR of a UK parent and its EU subsidiaries both
for the most tax efficient way of financing the subsidiaries by the parent and for the case of a financial
intermediary. The financial intermediary can be either a DFC or a Dutch mixer company that are both
financed by the UK parent with equity capital. However, different forms of finance are used by the
intermediaries: whereas the DFC transfers the money as debt capital to other group members the mixer
company injects new equity capital into the subsidiaries. In case of a mixer company the subsidiaries can
also retain their earnings. In addition to the country results, averages and standard deviations for each
way of financing are calculated.
Table 35 shows that, as a consequence of the comparably low UK statutory tax rate and the limited tax
credit on foreign source dividends the most tax efficient way of directly financing an EU subsidiary from
the perspective of an UK parent is, on average, debt financing. Only in source countries with an even
lower statutory tax rate does profit retention in the subsidiary turn out to be more tax efficient. This is the
case for Finland, Ireland, Italy and Sweden. The advantage of profit retention over new equity financing
and debt financing can be attributed to the fact that the foreign subsidiaries do not pay the higher UK tax
rate on profits.
Compared to the most tax efficient way of direct financing, the interposition of a mixer company is more
advantageous in 11 out of 14 cases. Only for subsidiaries in the countries imposing lower tax rates than
the UK (Finland, Ireland and Sweden) will tax optimising strategies offer no further advantages. Unlike
the German situation, the interposition of a DFC has no tax benefit. This is explained by the UK tax
credit system. The profits of a DFC cannot be effectively deferred from UK taxation because they are
distributed to the UK parent and therefore always liable to the UK corporation tax.
The reason for the advantage of a mixer company compared to direct financing is the limited UK tax
credit on dividends in the case of direct financing. As the statutory tax rates in those foreign countries
where the interposition of a mixer company offers advantages are higher than the UK tax rate, there will
always be excess foreign tax credits in the UK. This is also true in case of debt financing of a foreign
subsidiary (which is the most tax efficient way of direct financing in most cases), as the foreign profits
above the interest rate are distributed as dividends which only carry a limited tax credit. Mixing
dividends reduces the tax rate attributed to foreign dividends to the UK rate of 30% and thus avoids any
excess tax credits.
The total avoidance of excess tax credits explains the reduction of the cost of capital in case of a mixer
company. In general this reduction compared with the most tax efficient way of direct financing
increases with an increase in the statutory tax rate of the foreign subsidiary (i.e. the reduction is higher in189
the case of a Belgian subsidiary (corporation tax rate of 40.17%) compared with an Danish subsidiary
(corporation tax rate of 32%)).
Looking at the results for a German and Italian subsidiary, specific features of these two tax systems
come up. In the case of Germany the cost of capital for the most efficient way of direct financing (i.e.
debt financing) are increased by 50% of the local trade tax (because 50% of the interest payments have to
be added back to the base of the trade tax). With the interposition of a mixer company, however, new
equity financing becomes advantageous as all German taxes including trade tax can be credited against
UK corporation tax. In the case of Italy the result can be attributed to the dual income tax (DIT) which
lowers the cost of capital of an Italian subsidiary. In case of a mixer company it is assumed that Italian
corporation tax can be credited against UK corporation tax at the statutory rate leaving the DIT
advantage unaffected.
In contrast to the tax optimising strategy of a German parent company (where debt it used as the only
source of finance of a foreign subsidiary), the interposition of a mixer company also reduces the effective
average tax rate by a considerable amount. This can be attributed to the fact that not only the foreign
corporation tax on the marginal return but also the foreign corporation tax on the economic rent can be
credited against UK corporation tax. The ranking of the host countries for the subsidiaries from the
perspective of a UK parent company, do not differ between the cost of capital and the EATR. With
respect to the cost of capital and the EATR among Member States, however, differences remain. These
are explained by the differing domestic tax bases (rules for computing taxable income) which are still
relevant. This also explains the greater standard deviation.
The introduction of personal taxes has no effect on the country ranking and the relative advantages of
different ways of financing. This is because the shareholder relief system means all distributions are










































































































































6.0 5.7 6.3  6.8 5.5 5.5  4.3 5.8 6.1 5.9 6.1  ./. 5.8 0.6 Financing in most
tax efficient way 29.0 32.3 28.3  35.3 34.1 30.0  28.3 30.6 29.9 31.0 29.9  ./. 29.4 3.3
              ./. 5.5 0.9 Mixer Company
(Netherlands)               ./. 24.1 3.2
6.0 5.7 6.3 6.4 6.8 5.5 5.5 7.1 5.8 5.8 6.1 5.9 6.1 6.1 ./. 6.1 0.4 Financing Comp.
(Netherlands) 29.0 32.3 28.3 27.5 35.3 34.1 30.0 29.8 32.6 30.6 29.9 31.0 29.9 26.5 ./. 30.5 2.4
5.9 5.4 6.2 6.2 6.5 4.4 5.2 4.9 2.8 5.6 6.0 5.7 6.0 5.7 ./. 5.5 0.9 Minimum 25.8 23.9 26.8 26.5 27.6 20.3 23.4 22.1 14.8 24.5 25.9 25.0 26.0 24.8 ./. 24.1 3.2
Personal Taxes
5.1 4.8 5.4  5.8 4.5 4.5  3.3 4.8 5.1 4.9 5.1  ./. 4.8 0.6 Financing in most
tax efficient way 33.8 36.8 33.4  39.4 38.5 34.8  33.6 35.3 34.6 35.6 34.6  ./. 34.4 2.7
              ./. 4.6 0.9 Mixer Company
(Netherlands)               ./. 29.9 2.6
5.1 4.8 5.4 5.5 5.8 4.5 4.5 6.1 4.8 4.8 5.1 4.9 5.1 5.2 ./. 5.1 0.4 Financing Comp.
(Netherlands) 33.8 36.8 33.4 32.5 39.4 38.5 34.8 34.4 37.2 35.3 34.6 35.6 34.6 31.8 ./. 35.2 2.1
5.0 4.6 5.4 5.3 5.6 3.6 4.4 4.3 2.0 4.7 5.1 4.8 5.1 4.9 ./. 4.6 0.9 Minimum 31.2 29.9 32.1 31.9 32.9 27.0 29.2 28.8 22.2 30.2 31.3 30.6 31.3 30.6 ./. 29.9 2.6191
Table 36 compares the cost of capital and the EATR on domestic investmentD Q G on outbound
investment






































(1) Member States’ mean of the most tax efficient way out of the three possibilities
Compared with a domestic investment in the UK, the cost of capital on foreign investment is lower if the
most tax efficient way of financing or tax optimisation are considered. However, the EATR on outbound
investment is always higher except in case of a mixer company. This is simply explained by the
mechanism of the limited UK tax credit for foreign income which now becomes relevant.192
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The strategy of tax optimisation depends on the tax system in the home country (in particular on the
method for eliminating international double taxation) and the relative ranking vis-à-vis the statutory tax
rate. For German and UK parents is has been shown that tax optimisation in the field of financing does
reduce both the cost of capital and the effective average tax rate on outbound investment. However, there
are still differences between the host countries, which can be attributed to the domestic tax bases in these
countries and their statutory tax rates. The tax base always has an impact. However, this impact is only
minor. The tax rate becomes important for profitable investments, as pure profits cannot be shifted from
one country to another by simple financial arrangements. Therefore, tax optimisation cannot remove all
tax obstacles for cross-border investment caused by different tax rates and different tax bases. Moreover,
under specific circumstances there is a significant impact from withholding taxes on interest payments.
Compared to domestic investments the cost of capital and the EATR on outbound investments can be
significantly reduced by the use of financial intermediaries. The advantage is more substantial in the case
of a German parent which is explained by the higher tax burden on domestic investments. Given the fact
that mixer companies will not be allowed in the UK in the future, only minor advantages from the use of
financial intermediaries will remain. It seems likely that a UK multinational bears the same cost of
capital and effective average tax rate on investment whether these investment are financed directly (by a
loan) or a financial intermediary is interposed.
The effects of abolishing tax-reducing financing structures in Europe and elsewhere will depend on the
location of the parent company. From the above results it seems reasonable to conclude that the tax
burden for multinationals will be increased in those countries imposing high taxes on domestic
investment. In contrast, there will be only minor effects for multinationals resident in low tax countries.
Therefore, removing these financial intermediaries will not contribute, per se, to solve the problem of
tax-induced resources misallocation. Taking into account that the main tax driver for effective tax rates
differentials is the overall tax rate, companies located in "high tax" countries will have the possibility to
compensate for the removal of financial intermediaries by exploiting the possibility of tax arbitrage
arising from those differentials.193
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This section presents estimates of the costs of capital and effective average tax rates which apply to
small and medium sized enterprises in Germany, Italy and the UK. First the tax regimes which apply in




Entrepreneurs in Germany may set up the legal form of their firm as a corporation or partnership (or as a
sole trader). For the purposes of the analysis it is assumed that there are restrictions on the sale of the
shares and participations. Hence the entrepreneur is assumed not to sell the firm, with the consequence
that the effective capital gains tax rate is zero.
Small and medium-sized corporations are taxed in the same way as large corporations. However,
depending on the book value of their assets, small corporations are permitted a 20% accelerated capital
allowance for machinery. In addition, they can establish a tax-free reserve of 50% of the initial cost two
years in advance of the purchase of the asset. This reserve is reversed when the first depreciation
allowance is granted.
Partnerships are not subject to an income tax directly; instead the income is imputed to the partners.
However, for the purposes of the trade tax and the real estate tax, the partnership itself effectively is
subject to tax. Both taxes are deductible from the income tax base of the partners. The income tax base
of the partners is determined in the same way as the corporate profit tax for a corporation. The
accelerated capital allowance also applies. The tax base of the trade tax and the real estate tax are also
determined in the same way as they are for corporations. However, the trade tax has a tax exempt
amount, which means that for small partnerships the marginal rate can be zero. To allow for this, results
below are presented for both a zero-rate and top-rate trade tax.
As the personal income tax follows a progressive schedule from 0% to 53% (in 1999), the marginal
statutory tax rate depends on the overall personal income. A 5.5% solidarity surcharge on the income tax
is also levied. However, for most partnerships the marginal tax rate on trade profits is limited to 45%
plus the solidarity surcharge.
The analysis below is presented for shareholders with the following tax rates: (a) zero (b) 35.1% (the
marginal rate on taxable income of 30.000 Euro) and (c) 45% (the top rate). Allowing for local taxes,
this results in the following overall tax rates:194
overall CT rate on
retained earnings






corporation 52.35 43.7 0 ; 35.4 ; 54.3 0 ; 35.4 ; 54.3
partnerships:
no trade tax - - 0 ; 37 ; 47.5 0 ; 37 ; 55.9
with trade tax - - 17.6 ; 48.1 ; 56.7 0 ; 37 ; 55.9
The income tax rates shown correspond to each of three cases (a), (b) and (c) described above.
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As in Germany, small and medium sized enterprises can take the form of a corporation or a
partnership/sole trader. The tax regime for corporations is the same as for larger corporations.
Also as in Germany, the profits of a partnership are imputed to the partner and taxed according to the
personal progressive income tax with rates ranging from 19% to 46%. Partnerships pay the regional tax
(IRAP) and the tax on immovable properties (ICI). Neither is deductible from the personal income tax.
To be eligible for the Italian DIT (dual income tax) relief, partnerships must comply with two rules.
First, partnerships must use ordinary (not simplified) accounting. Second, the “ordinary return” must be
within the first bracket of tax - and hence taxed at 19%. It is assumed that, in the case of debt finance,
partnerships borrow from banks, implying that the tax rate charged is 12.5%, as for corporations.
As with the German case, we analyse shareholders with three different personal income tax rates (zero;
marginal rate on taxable income of 30,000 Euro; top rate). The results are as follows:
overall CT rate overall  income  tax
rates on profits
imputation  rate overall income tax
rates on interest
corporation 41.3 0 ; 34.0 ; 46.0 0 ; 37 ; 37 12.5
partnerships 4.3 ; 38.3 ; 50.3 0 12.5195
c) The United Kingdom
In the UK, most small and medium sized enterprises take the legal form of a corporation. Corporation
tax differs in two respects from that levied on larger companies. First, the tax rate applied is lower: here
it is assumed to be 20%. Second, plant and machinery receives capital allowances at the rate of 40%,
rather than 25%.
The personal tax rates for the three types of shareholders (zero; marginal rate on taxable income of
30,000 Euro; top rate). Considered here are:




imputation  rate overall income tax
rates on interest
corporation 20 0 ; 10 ; 32.5 0 ; 10 ; 10 0 ; 20 ; 40
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This section presents measures of the cost of capital and the effective average tax rate for each of the
three countries considered. There are three tables, corresponding to three possible income tax positions
of the owner of the firm: a zero rate, a top rate, or a medium rate. In the first two cases, the results for
small and medium sized enterprises can be compared with the results for large companies.The types of
assets and sources of finance as well as their weights are the same as for the base case. This results in 15
types of investment.
Given the different legal forms available to small enterprises and the differences in the tax treatment
described above, tax measures for a number of cases are presented. Thus, in Germany, a company is
considered, and the company may or may not benefit from the accelerated depreciation allowances and
the tax-free reserve. Both positions for a partnership are also considered. In addition, partnerships which
are liable, and those which are not liable, to trade tax are considered. This gives six separate categories
for German enterprises.
For Italy, there are three categories. An enterprise may be a company. Alternatively, it may be a
partnership, in which case it may or may not receive the benefit of the DIT regime. For the UK, only a
company is considered.
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Table 37 analyses the situation of a zero-rated entrepreneur. It gives measures for each of the categories
described above, as well as, for comparison, the case of a large company undertaking domestic
investment in the same country.
Beginning with Germany, the cost of capital for a small or medium sized company which receives no
incentives is equal to that for a similar large company. The same is true of the EATR. However, if the
small company does receive these incentives, it faces a lower cost of capital, and a slightly lower EATR.
However, both the cost of capital and the EATR are much lower for partnerships. In the absence of trade
tax and personal income tax, essentially only the real estate tax is paid, which has only very small effects
relative to no tax at all. If the partnership has a liability to trade tax as well, the cost of capital and the










Small and Medium-sized Enterprise
Base Case corporation partnership


































-- - - -
Note. Only Germany levies a trade tax. The "incentives" are as follows.
Germany: 20% accelerated capital allowance for machinery; tax-free reserve of 50% of investment two years in advance of
the purchase of the asset, which is reversed when the first capital depreciation allowance is granted.
Italy: the "incentive" refers to when the DIT relief is available.
UK: corporation tax rate of 20% and 40% capital allowances for plant and machinery.
In Italy, the tax system has the same impact on small and medium-sized companies as on larger
companies. Note here that in the table, both types are assumed to benefit from the DIT relief. This
implies that the tax system provides an incentive to invest in Italy relative to the case of no tax (where
the cost of capital would be 5%). In turn, this implies that the cost of capital is actually higher for
partnerships with zero-rated shareholders than it is for small companies. However, by contrast, since the
income tax rate is zero, then the EATR on such partnerships is also zero. The comparison between large
companies and small and medium sized partnerships (with zero personal income tax rates) in Italy is
therefore subtle. At the margin, the Italian corporation tax regime effectively subsidises investments, and
so treats marginal investments more generously than the regimes for partnerships. However, for more
profitable firms and investments, the lack of income tax on the partnerships implies that they are more
favourably treated than larger companies.
In the UK, the comparison is straightforward. Small and medium-sized companies receive the benefit of
a lower statutory tax rate and higher allowances. Both the cost of capital and the EATR are therefore
lower than for larger companies.197
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Table 38 analyses the situation of entrepreneurs who pay income tax at the highest rate. In general, the
costs of capital are lower in Table 38 than in Table 37 while the EATRs are higher. This reflects the
discussion in Section 4. The shareholder is assumed to compare the return which can be earned on the
hypothetical investment analysed here, with some other financial investment, such as a bank account
which pays interest. Introducing tax on the interest receipt from the bank implies that the post-tax rate of
return from the alternative asset is now much lower. Other things being equal, this reduces the required
return - ie. the cost of capital - from the hypothetical investment. On the other hand, an extra layer of tax
must raise the EATR.
The relative position of large companies, small companies and small partnerships in Germany and in the
UK is similar to that shown in Table 37. The small company is assumed to have non-qualified
shareholders, and so the cost of capital and the EATR in the absence of the incentives are the same as for
the large company. The incentives marginally reduce the cost of capital and the EATR. The figures for
the partnership are lower than those for the companies. Similarly, in the UK, the small company again








Large Corporation Small and Medium-sized Enterprise
Base Case corporation partnership
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Note. See notes to Table 37. In this table, the results for the large company are split into those for qualified shareholders and
non-qualified shareholders.
However, in Italy, the position is a little different. The DIT relief still has the effect of reducing the cost
of capital for companies to be below 5%. However, this is now also the case for partnerships (which
receive the DIT relief). In fact the net impact of the differences in rates faced by companies and198
partnerships is that the cost of capital is lower for the partnerships. The same is true of the EATR. Part of
the difference between large and small companies is that the owners of the latter are assumed not be
liable for capital gains tax.
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Table 39 presents the results for "medium" rate (the average of the zero and top rate) entrepreneurs. The
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corporation partnership




























-- - - -
Note. See notes to Table 37. In this table, there are no results for large companies, as the analyses of shareholders in such
companies elsewhere in this study are limited to zero-rate and top-rate shareholders199
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To conclude, the results of this section show that the specific tax rules applied to SMEs in the countries
analysed have the effect of lowering the effective tax burden. In Germany (1999) and in Italy the
parternships bear a lower tax burden in comparison to companies whatever the position of the
shareholders.
But, when comparing the results of this section with those shown in section 6.3.3, which examined the
tax minimisation approach, it is worth noting that small and medium sized enterprises in Germany, Italy
and the UK bear a higher tax burden than multinationals investing abroad.
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This section presents estimates of the cost of capital and of the marginal and average effective tax rates
for the EU Member States in 2001. The purpose of this section is to give a summary update of the 1999
picture in order to highlight the principal changes in individual positions and of the overall picture
during the last two years. The case presented is that of a domestic investment taking into account
corporate taxes but not personal taxes. In fact, the detailed analysis presented for 1999 has shown that
the general conclusions arising from the domestic and international analysis are broadly similar in terms
of the range of variation, the ranking of Member States and the principal tax driver.
The hypotheses underlying the definition of the investment and of the economic framework in which the
investment takes place are the same as in the 1999 analysis. The same tax parameters are also applied,
updated to take into account the 2001 tax regimes. Annex B details the tax parameters applied in the
present computation.
Tables 40 and 41 present 2001 country data and correspond to Tables 7 and 8 shown in section 4.3.
Table 40 shows the cost of capital and the EMTR for the level of corporation and compares these data













































































































































Austria 6.3 20.9 5.7 12.6 5.3 5.8 5.2 6.6 5.6 6.6 6.6 4.1
Belgium 6.4 22.4 6.4 22.4 5.2 7.0 5.3 8.0 6.7 8.0 8.0 3.5
Denmark 6.4 21.9 6.4 21.6 4.3 8.1 5.6 6.9 6.9 7.3 7.3 4.6
Finland 6.2 19.9 6.4 21.3 6.1 6.4 5.6 6.8 6.8 7.3 7.3 4.6
France 7.5 33.2 7.3 31.8 5.2 8.4 8.5 7.6 7.0 8.7 8.7 4.8
Germany 7.3 31.0 6.8 26.1 5.4 7.1 6.1 8.2 6.9 8.0 8.0 4.4
Greece 6.1 18.2 6.0 16.9 6.7 5.1 6.0 5.2 7.1 7.4 7.4 3.5
Ireland 5.7 11.7 5.7 11.7 5.3 6.8 5.2 5.5 5.5 5.9 5.9 5.2
Italy 4.8 - 4.1 4.3 -15.9 2.4 4.0 3.2 7.5 4.4 4.7 4.7 3.6
Luxembourg 6.3 20.7 6.3 20.7 5.2 6.8 5.3 7.7 6.5 7.7 7.7 3.7
Netherlands 6.5 22.6 6.5 22.7 5.1 7.0 5.9 7.4 6.9 7.8 7.8 4.1
Portugal 6.5 22.5 6.3 21.0 6.5 6.1 5.1 7.5 6.4 7.6 7.6 4.0
Spain 6.5 22.8 6.5 22.8 6.5 6.7 5.4 7.4 6.4 7.7 7.7 4.1
Sweden 5.8 14.3 5.8 14.3 5.0 6.0 5.0 6.6 6.6 6.7 6.7 4.3
UK 6.6 24.7 6.7 24.8 5.5 8.3 5.6 6.9 6.9 7.7 7.7 4.8
Table 40 shows that 7 Member States (Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain and
Sweden) have the same cost of capital in 2001 as in 1999. Five Member States have minor changes.
Finland and the UK show a slight increase in the cost of capital and in the EMTR due to an increase in
the corporation tax rate from 28% to 29% and a minor increase in real estate tax (Finland) and a minor
increase in real estate tax (UK). France, Greece and Portugal have a slight decrease in the cost of capital
and in the EMTR. In the case of France this is due to a reduction in the corporation tax rate from 40% to
36.43% which is compensated to a small extent by a reduction in the coefficient of declining-balance
depreciation by 0.25%. The reduction for Greece and Portugal is due to a reduction in the corporation tax
rate from 40% to 37.5% and from 34% to 32% respectively. It is worth noting that Denmark has the
same cost of capital in 2001 as in 1999 and a very minor reduction in the EMTR, which is almost
unchanged. This is due to the combination of a reduction of the corporation tax rate from 32% to 30%
almost entirely compensated for by lower allowances for machinery.
For Germany, Austria and Italy there are some substantial difference between 2001 and 1999.
The reasons for the reduction of the cost of capital and of the EMTR for Germany have been widely
commented on when presenting the effects of the German tax reform in section 4. As already underlined,
this reform seems to have only limited effects on the ranking of Germany.
In 2000 Austria introduced a reform of the corporate tax in the form of a dual income tax. This reform
included a reduction of corporation tax rate from 34% to 25% on deemed profits that can be attributed to
the increase of equity capital. Moreover, a reduction in straight-line depreciation on buildings from 4%
to 3% was approved in 2001. As a result, the Austrian cost of capital and EMTR have substantially201
decreased. The aim of the introduction of a dual system was to ensure a more homogenous treatment
between debt and equity financing as is the case for the Italian dual income system. When comparing the
EMTR for the different forms of finance in 1999 (see Table 7) and in 2001 it can be observed that the
reduction in the Austrian EMTR is the result of the reduction of the EMTR on retained earnings and new
equity whereas the EMTR on debt financing is practically unchanged. Therefore, the reform does seem
to result in a more homogeneous treatment of the different sources of finance.
The reduction in the Italian cost of capital and EMTR in 2001 is the result of a reduction of the
corporation tax rate from 37% to 36% and, more substantially, of an increase in the equity base
concerning the calculation of the allowance for the dual income tax from 100% to 120% in 2000 and
140% in 2001. It is worth noting that, following the 2001 spring elections, the new Italian government
has "frozen" the dual system as of the 30 June 2001 and has introduced other forms of tax incentives. It
is therefore rather difficult, at this stage, to define precisely the tax code applied to Italian investments in
2001.
Overall, the picture for 2001 shows that a number of Member States have a lower cost of capital and
EMTR as a result of changes in the tax codes aimed at reducing the corporate tax rate or introducing or
modifying the dual income system. These changes have not fundamentally affected the ranking of
Member States nor reduced the dispersions of the EMTRs inside the EU. The most evident change is the
remarkable reduction in the Austrian effective tax burden, which now places Austria at the lower end of
the ranking together with Italy, Ireland and Sweden.
As far as the situation of the different taxation of specific forms of investment by assets and sources of
finance is concerned, the picture is not very different from that of 1999. Only Austria and Italy, due to
the implementation or modification of the dual system, seem to have in 2001 a considerably more
balanced taxation of the different sources of finance. However, due to the reduction of the statutory tax
rates in a number of Member States, the benefit of debt finance on equity finance decrease as the value
of the tax deductions decrease.
Table 41 presents a summary of the effective average tax rate for each Member State in 2001 for
investment where the pre-tax real rate of return is 20% and compares these data with the overall country
data presented in Table 8.
Considering that the EATR is more closely tied to the statutory tax rate than is the cost of capital or the
EMTR, the large reduction in the statutory tax rate in Germany generates the largest fall in the average
EATR, despite the decrease in allowances. In terms of reduction in the average EATR, this is followed
by France because of the reduction in its statutory rate of just over 3.5 percentage points.
In contrast, it is the EMTR that is more affected under the dual income system in Italy and Austria than
the EATR. Therefore, although the modification (Italy) and the introduction (Austria) of the dual income
system lowers their respective EATRs, the effect is not so great as the effect on their EMTRs and the
Irish and Swedish EATRs (unchanged in comparison to 1999) remain the lowest.
As a result, when the pre-tax real rate of return is fixed at 20%, the EU 2001 differential is reduced
mainly due to the effect of the reduction of the German and French effective tax burden, whereas the
lowest effective average tax rate remains the Irish rate. Apart from this reduction in the range of rates of
about 4 percentage points, the global picture arising from 2001 in terms of countries at the highest or


























































































































Austria 29.8 27.9 26.4 28.2 26.2 30.9 27.6 30.7 30.7 22.6
Belgium 34.5 34.5 30.7 36.1 31.0 39.2 35.3 39.1 39.1 25.8
Denmark 28.8 27.3 19.9 33.3 24.7 29.3 29.3 30.7 30.7 21.0
Finland 25.5 26.6 25.7 26.6 23.9 28.3 28.3 30.0 30.0 20.2
France 37.5 34.7 27.8 38.2 38.4 35.6 33.8 39.0 39.0 26.8
Germany 39.1 34.9 30.8 36.0 33.0 39.2 35.4 38.7 38.7 27.7
Greece 29.6 28.0 33.3 28.5 31.3 11.9 34.8 32.4 32.4 19.7
Ireland 10.5 10.5 8.9 15.8 8.2 9.8 9.8 11.7 11.7 8.2
Italy 29.8 27.6 22.5 27.1 24.9 35.1 28.4 28.7 28.7 25.5
Luxembourg 32.2 32.2 28.6 33.7 29.2 36.6 32.9 36.6 36.6 24.0
Netherlands 31.0 31.0 26.7 32.6 29.2 34.2 32.5 35.2 35.2 23.3
Portugal 32.6 30.7 31.3 30.1 26.9 34.4 30.9 34.8 34.8 23.0
Spain 31.0 31.0 31.1 31.8 27.4 34.2 30.7 35.2 35.2 23.3
Sweden 22.9 22.9 19.6 23.4 19.7 25.7 25.7 26.0 26.0 17.1
UK 28.2 28.3 24.2 34.0 24.7 29.3 29.3 31.8 31.8 21.7
Almost all the changes to corporation taxes in the EU between 1999 and 2001 have resulted in a
reduction of tax liabilities. In two of these cases, Austria and Italy, reforms have been directed towards
reducing the tax burden on marginal investments. Consequently, the reforms in these two countries have
a greater effect on the EMTR than the EATR.
However, six other countries have reduced their statutory tax rates, albeit with relatively small reductions
(the main exception being Germany which reduced its rate from 40% to 25%). In some of these
countries, governments have offset the reductions by also reducing allowances (again to the greatest
extent in Germany). In general, this has resulted in relatively small reductions in the EMTR, but rather
larger reduction in the EATR.
The trend analysed here is consistent with a pattern of generally declining statutory tax rates and hence
generally declining EATRs, notably for high tax rates countries. It is possible that this decline in the
effective tax burdens is a result of tax competition between the Member States as they attempt to attract
investments.203
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During the last decade a number of studies have presented international comparisons of effective
corporate tax burdens. For the reasons outlined in Section 3, the most commonly used approaches for
international comparisons have been based on general forward-looking frameworks partly similar to the
approach taken in this study. At the European level, the most well-known studies are the Report of the
Ruding Committee of 1992 (to which the mandate given to the Commission from the Council for the
current study explicitly refers) and the Baker & McKenzie study commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of
Finance in 1999.
The purpose of this section is to compare the principal results arising from these two studies with those
presented in the above analysis.
As already explained in Section 3, the application of the forward-looking approach, common to all these
studies, gives synthetic measures of the effective tax burdens based on hypothetical situations. In
practice, it consists in defining a hypothetical investment identical in all countries and then applying to
this identical hypothetical investment the different national tax codes. This "isolates" the taxation
elements among all the other factors influencing the effective tax burdens and can thus help identify the
most important tax drivers influencing the effective tax burdens and their differences.
The results obtained by the application of this approach depend, therefore, on the hypotheses and
assumptions underlying the definition of the hypothetical investment considered and the economic
framework.
Consequently, when comparing different studies using this methodology, it should always be borne in
mind that the aim of these approaches is not to give universally valid values of the effective tax burden
for each country considered, but to allow comparisons between countries on the basis of the same
investment. In fact, the individual measures of effective tax burdens rely on the specific assumptions
used when applying the model. Therefore, when comparing the results of these different studies, the




The scope of the mandate received by the Ruding Committee in 1990 covered some of the aspects that
this study is addressing: in particular, the effects of differences in business taxation on incentives to
invest and the way to alleviate distortions deriving from business taxation differentials.
In order to investigate the overall effect of taxation on the incentive in each country to undertake new
investment, either at home at abroad, the Ruding report presented an analysis based on forward-looking
indicators related to the taxation of a hypothetical investment. Only the case of a marginal investment
was covered and, thus, the computation presented evidence of the cost of capital and marginal effective
tax rates for the 12 Member States of the 1992 European Community and some selected main economic
partners, on the basis of the theoretical background presented above. The Report assessed also the
contributions of particular features of taxation to the lack of neutrality of taxation systems on capital
flows by means of simulations.204
The present report has gone beyond this approach to also consider effective average tax rates both on
hypothetical investments and hypothetical model firm behaviour.
As far as the hypotheses and assumptions are concerned, the Ruding report presented results related to a
simple investment in the manufacturing sector taking into account the effects of corporate taxes and
ignoring all personal taxes, but considering the effects of imputation credits. The Ruding report
considered three forms of assets (machinery, buildings and inventories) whereas the present study takes
into account two more forms of assets: intangible and financial assets. For the simulations, the personal
taxation of the suppliers of fund was included. The present report has considered the effects of overall
corporate taxation (statutory tax rates, surcharges and local taxes) on a simple investment in the
manufacturing sector and has also included, separately, the effects of personal income taxation of
dividends, interest and capital gains.
Concerning the other tax parameters used in the calculation, the Ruding report and the present report rely
on the same framework.
B) Baker and McKenzie study
As with the current study, the purpose of the Baker & McKenzie study was to compute the differences of
the EU countries corporate effective tax burden in order to underline the principal tax drivers for these
differences.
The Baker & McKenzie study presented an analysis based on the King and Fullerton methodology
related to the taxation of a hypothetical investment. Only the case of a marginal investment was covered
and, thus the study presented evidence of effective marginal tax rates for the 15 EU countries using the
tax codes in force in 1998. Effective marginal tax rates were computed for all the 15 countries in the
domestic case. For the transnational investment only the cases of Germany, the United Kingdom and the
Netherlands were analysed. The report did not assess the contributions of specific features of taxation to
the lack of neutrality by means of simulations.
As far as the hypothesis and assumptions are concerned, the hypotheses related to the hypothetical
investment considered are very similar to those used in the present study. The main difference is that the
Baker & McKenzie study considered a pre-tax real rate of return of 10% against the 5% post-tax rate of
return considered in this study and in the Ruding report and an inflation rate of 1.1% against the 2% used
here.
The Baker & McKenzie report considered a simple investment in the manufacturing sector composed of
5 assets taking into account the effects of corporate taxes and, separately, of personal taxes.
The following box summarises the main differences of the hypothesis and assumptions used in the three
studies compared in this section.205
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Commission study(2001) Ruding report (1992) Baker & McKenzie study (1999)
Methodology Devereux & Griffith:





Type of analysis Domestic analysis








(only UK, D and NL)





Sensitivity analysis for services
Manufacturing Manufacturing
Sensitivity analysis for services














Source of finance New equity, retained earnings, debt New  equity,  retained
earnings, debt
New equity, retained earnings, debt











Inflation rate 2% for all countries 3.1% for all countries 1.1% for all countries
Rate of return Post-tax rate:5% Post-tax rate:5% Pre-tax rate:10%
Tax  parameters Overall corporation tax rates
including surcharges and local
taxes;
Corporate real estate taxes, net
wealth taxes and other non-profit
taxes on wealth;
Tax credit associated with dividend
and equalisation tax;
Personal income tax rates, including
withholding taxes on dividend,
interest and capital gain;
Individual net wealth taxes on
shareholdings and lending
Withholding taxes on dividends and
interest
Treatment of foreign source
dividends and interest received by
parent companies
Capital allowances for industrial
buildings, machinery and
intangibles. Tax treatment of






interest received by parent
companies. (only in the
simulations)
 Capital  allowances  for
industrial buildings,
machinery and intangibles.
Overall corporation tax rates
including surcharges and local
taxes;
Corporate real estate taxes, net
wealth taxes and other non-profit
taxes on wealth;
Tax credit associated with dividend
and equalisation tax;
Personal income tax rates, including
withholding taxes on dividend,
interest and capital gain;
Individual net wealth taxes on
shareholdings and lending
Withholding taxes on dividends and
interest
Treatment of foreign source
dividends and interest received by
parent companies
Capital allowances for industrial
buildings, machinery and
intangibles. Tax treatment of
financial assets and inventories206
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Tables 42 and 43 present a comparison of effective tax burdens across the three studies considered. The
Ruding report presented only cost of capital indicators. Therefore Table 42 compares the cost of capital
presented in Section 4 of this study with those computed in the framework of the Ruding report. The
Baker & McKenzie study presented only effective marginal tax rates. Table 43 thus compares the EMTR
































































































































































































Austria 6.3 5.9 6.1 5.9 7.3 6.3 7.5 7.5 4.0 5.3 5.4 4.0 8.3 6.8 6.8 2.6
Belgium 6.4 5.2 7.0 5.3 8.0 6.7 8.0 8.0 3.5 5.4 5.4 4.2 8.3 6.9 6.9 2.8
Denmark 6.4 4.2 8.1 5.4 7.1 7.1 7.5 7.5 4.4 5.8 6.0 5.3 6.8 7.2 7.2 3.2
Finland 6.2 6.1 6.1 5.6 6.8 6.8 7.2 7.2 4.5 - - - - - - -
France 7.5 5.2 8.5 8.4 8.0 7.4 9.0 9.0 4.6 5.4 5.4 4.6 7.3 7.0 3.5 3.5
Germany 7.3 5.4 7.2 5.8 10.0 7.9 9.7 7.6 3.2 5.6 5.1 5.2 6.9 8.8 2.2 1.4
Greece 6.1 6.8 5.1 6.1 5.1 7.4 7.6 7.6 3.4 5.1 5.0 4.8 5.9 7.1 2.7 2.7
Ireland 5.7 5.3 6.8 5.2 5.5 5.5 5.9 5.9 5.2 5.1 4.9 5.0 5.5 5.4 5.0 4.6
Italy 4.8 2.9 4.6 3.8 7.7 5.0 5.5 5.5 3.6 6.0 6.7 5.5 6.3 8.8 2.6 2.6
Luxembourg 6.3 5.2 6.8 5.3 7.7 6.5 7.7 7.7 3.7 6.2 6.9 4.9 8.4 7.8 7.8 3.4
Netherlands 6.5 5.1 6.9 5.9 7.4 6.9 7.7 7.7 4.1 5.7 6.0 5.2 6.2 7.0 7.0 3.2
Portugal 6.5 6.7 6.2 5.2 7.7 6.5 7.9 7.9 3.9 5.7 6.1 5.2 6.4 7.3 7.3 2.9
Spain 6.5 6.5 6.7 5.4 7.4 6.4 7.7 7.7 4.1 6.1 5.7 5.5 7.9 7.5 7.5 3.5
Sweden 5.8 5.0 6.0 5.0 6.6 6.6 6.7 6.7 4.3 5.0 5.1 4.5 6.3 6.4 4.3 3.1
UK 6.6 5.5 8.2 5.6 6.9 6.9 7.7 7.7 4.8 5.9 5.8 5.2 7.4 7.4 4.7 3.7208
Table 42 shows a rather different picture across the two studies. In general, the cost of capital is lower in
the figures arising from the Ruding report and the ranking of the Member States is different in the two
computations. The differences in the tax parameters considered may have a great influence on these
results, notably on the observed levels of the cost of capital. As was shown in Box 11 the present study
considers a broad range of taxes levied on companies, whereas the Ruding report considered just the
statutory corporate tax rate. Section 4 of this study underlined the weight that taxes other than the
corporate tax may have on the level of the effective tax burden, in certain countries in particular.
Therefore, it cannot be concluded, simply by comparing the results of Table 42, that the cost of capital is
generally higher now than ten years ago.
It is interesting to observe that differences due to different assets and weight of assets seem to play a
lesser role in determining differences in the results. In fact, Section 5 (sensitivity analysis) showed that
the results of the present study would not be fundamentally affected by using the same weights as those
used in the Ruding report. By contrast, when using the "Ruding report" weights for the sources of
finance the cost of capital of the present study would be slightly lower. (See sensitivity analysis number
5 in section 5.1).
The fact that the ranking of the Member States is also different may be due, on the one hand, to the
differences on the tax parameters used and, on the other hand, to the number of tax reforms undertaken
by Member States this last decade. It is difficult, just on the basis of the results shown in Table 42, to
infer which is the relative weight of these two factors in determining differences in the picture presented
now and the situation of ten years ago. It is evident that national tax reforms may have had a
considerable effect in determining ranking differences.
One useful way to compare the results presented in Table 42 is to analyse whether the global picture in
terms of influence of the tax systems on the incentives to invest and financing decisions has evolved
since early 1990s.
The analysis of Section 4 suggested that the tax systems tend to create a misallocation of resources by
favouring certain forms of assets and certain sources of finance. The same patterns are observable in the
figures of 1992. Today, however, the differences in the effective tax burdens held by different forms of
investment or financing are smaller then ten years ago, although still considerable. This seems to suggest
that the tax reforms undertaken during the last decade may have in part contributed to make more neutral
the influence of taxation on the organisation of domestic investments. Nevertheless, the persistence of
high differences reopens the debate on the possible distortive effects of taxation on the allocation of
resources within the EU and on the possible frustration of equity goals of policymakers by tax arbitrage
arrangements.
When comparing the size of the Member States’ differentials, it is worth noting that the magnitude of the
variation of the cost of capital between countries has not diminished. On the contrary the range between
the lowest and highest value is wider. At the corporate level, the Ruding report presented a range of the
average countries’ cost of capital between 5% and 6.2%. The present report shows a range between 4.8%
and 7.5%. Once again, it has to be underlined that the current study takes into account a broader range of
taxes levied on companies and that the Member States with the highest cost of capital are countries
which levy high non-corporate profit taxes. The difference with the situation ten years ago is that now it
seems to be a group of "core countries" which have very similar costs of capital.
Table 43 compares the effective marginal tax rates computed in the Baker & McKenzie study with those
arising from the current study.







































































































































































































































Austria 20.9 15.2 18.0 15.2 31.5 20.6 33.3 33.3 -25.0 27.0 28.4 25.4 23.7 28.2 28.2 38.1 38.1 6.1
Belgium 22.4 3.8 28.6 5.7 37.5 25.4 37.5 37.5 -42.9 23.5 10.9 30.2 8.4 26.3 26.3 37.9 37.9 -3.9
Denmark 21.9 -19.0 38.3 7.4 29.6 29.6 33.3 33.3 -13.6 22.8 -17.8 35.9 14.9 22.3 24.5 34.5 34.5 0.7
Finland 19.9 18.0 18.0 10.7 26.5 26.5 30.5 30.5 -11.1 18.1 18.4 17.3 12.0 18.4 21.8 27.8 27.8 -0.3
France 33.2 3.8 41.2 40.5 37.5 32.4 44.4 44.4 -08.7 40.7 25.9 47.2 37.3 39.4 42.3 52.4 52.4 18.4
Germany 31.0 7.4 30.6 13.8 50.0 36.7 48.4 35.5 -56.2 37.0 20.8 34.7 26.7 40.4 40.4 54.2 54.2 4.4
Greece 18.2 26.5 02.0 18.0 2.0 32.4 34.2 34.2 -47.1 13.7 23.1 5.9 18.0 5.2 25.2 27.3 27.3 -11.9
Ireland 11.7 5.7 26.5 3.8 9.1 9.1 15.2 15.2 3.8 22.3 21.1 29.1 15.5 21.0 25.1 33.1 33.1 1.7
Italy -4.1 -72.4 -08.7 -31.6 35.1 0.0 10.0 10.0 -38.9 17.7 8.9 24.5 4.9 17.7 22.8 27.3 27.3 -0.5
Luxembourg 20.7 3.8 26.5 5.7 35.1 23.1 35.1 35.1 -35.1 23.5 12.5 18.3 16.1 26.6 26.6 38.1 38.1 -4.2
Netherlands 22.6 2.0 27.5 15.2 32.4 27.5 35.1 35.1 -21.9 23.2 23.1 26.0 18.0 22.9 25.2 35.2 35.2 0.3
Portugal 22.5 25.4 19.3 3.8 35.1 23.1 36.7 36.7 -28.2 22.5 24.8 19.9 16.5 24.5 24.5 35.8 35.8 -2.6
Spain 22.8 23.1 25.4 7.4 32.4 21.9 35.1 35.1 -21.9 32.8 35.0 35.6 23.7 34.5 34.5 43.3 43.3 12.8
Sweden 14.3 0.0 16.7 0.0 24.2 24.2 25.4 25.4 -39.5 17.2 6.2 17.5 7.6 18.4 21.7 27.0 27.0 -1.4
UK 24.7 9.1 39.0 10.7 27.5 27.5 35.1 35.1 -25.0 22.3 14.5 35.2 14.6 20.3 24.3 32.8 32.8 2.5The main difference between the Commission report and the Baker and McKenzie report is that the first
considers a fixed post-tax return (the real interest rate) and the second a fixed pre-tax rate of return. It is
noteworthy that the results of the quantitative approaches depend on the interest rate assumption adopted
as the real interest rate corresponding to the post-tax rate of return. This study uses a post-tax rate of
return of 5% as the base reference case for real investment decisions and computes the range of effective
tax rates applicable at the fixed post-tax rate of return. The Baker and McKenzie study, contrary to the
prevailing practice, use a fixed pre-tax rate of return typically set at the higher rate of 10% and compute
the range of effective tax rates applicable at the fixed pre-tax rate of return. This explain to a large extent
the different numerical results of the two studies.
The differences of the values arising from the two computations are also partly due to the different
hypothesis in terms of the considered investment and tax parameters.
Notwithstanding these differences, there is a remarkable similarity in the general conclusions arising
from the two pictures.
First of all, the ranking of countries is consistent in the sense that, even if the individual country
positions can vary (for instance France has the highest EMTR in the Baker & McKenzie study and the
second highest EMTR in the present study), we find the same group of countries at the top and at the
bottom of the scale (apart from Ireland). It should be underlined that when countries have a very similar
cost of capital (see previous Table) even a small change in the assumptions and parameters is likely to
affect the ranking of these countries.
Notwithstanding the difference in the relative position of Ireland due to the important difference in the
tax rate considered, the lowest EMTR countries in both studies are Italy, Sweden, Greece and Finland
and the highest EMTR countries are France, Germany and Spain. The results of both studies reveal a
considerable range of around 30 points between the highest and lowest values. Moreover, the Baker &
McKenzie study stressed that the principal tax driver for these differences is, above all, the overall
corporate tax rate and that differences in the tax base can play an important role in specific individual
situation. The present study comes to at the same conclusions.
The two studies also show similar results for the differences in the effective tax burden on different
assets and sources of finance, and therefore similar conclusions can be drawn from the two studies. It is
worth noting that the Baker and McKenzie study considered an inflation rate of 1.1%, against 2% in the
present study. A higher rate of inflation exacerbates the differences between debt and equity finance.
This is due to the fact that nominal interest rates are assumed to rise in line with inflation; since these are
deductible in the case of debt financing, the EMTR falls for debt financing.
In general, the two studies make similar statements on the ranges of tax differentials, the country ranking
and the reasons for these differentials.
Baker and McKenzie has recently published an updated version of its study, taking into account the
Member States’ tax codes for the year 2001. This updated version also applies some different economic
and tax parameters. In contrast to the 1999 study the updated version considers a broader range of non-
profit taxes including the payroll taxes. Moreover, for Ireland the rate of 12.5% (rate which will be in
force in 2003) is taken into account in the 2001 version, as against 28% in the 1999 version. The
inflation rate is now fixed at 2% (as against 1.1% in the 1999 version).
As was the case for the 1999 study, the computation is based on a fixed pre-tax rate of return of 10%. It
includes sensitivity analysis for different levels of the pre-tax rates of return. As mentioned above this
study uses a fixed post-tax rate of return of 5% as the base reference case.211
The following table shows the Member States’ effective marginal tax rates computed by Baker and
McKenzie for 2001 where the pre-tax rate of return is fixed at 10% and 6% respectively. These data are






Tax code of year 2001
&200,66,216WXG\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Tax code of year 2001
PRE-TAX RATE OF RETURN (p) POST-TAX  RATE  OF
RETURN (r)
10% 6% 5% (base case)
COUNTRY
Austria 18.25 20.42 12.6
Belgium 18.89 17.22 22.4
Denmark 18.81 19.79 21.6
Finland 18.09 18.58 21.3
France 30.11 36.84 31.8
Germany 25.20 23.80 26.1
Greece 6.76 4.89 16.9
Ireland 9.43 10.64 11.7
Italy 13.74 11.54 - 15.9
Luxembourg 18.98 17.12 20.7
Netherlands 20.67 19.94 22.7
Portugal 18.15 16.55 21.0
Spain 18.30 16.56 22.8




Due to the differences in the hypothesis (fixed pre-tax rate of return as against fixed post-tax rate of
return) the results of the Baker and McKenzie and of the current study are not directly comparable. The212
case in which the pre-tax rate of return is fixed at 6% is the closest to the case considered in this study
where the post-tax of return is fixed at 5%, accordingly these two situations forms the basis of the
present comparison.
The differences in individual results of the two studies are due not only to the different fixed pre-
tax/fixed post-tax assumptions but also due to differences in a range of other assumptions.
The Baker and McKenzie study for 2001 considers a broader range of non-profit taxes including the
payroll taxes and the rate applied to Ireland is 12,5% as against 10% rate in force in 2001 for the
manufacturing sector. Moreover, the "dual income" system in force in Italy has been applied in a
different way in the two studies. The Italian "dual income" tax systems splits the tax base for profits into
two components, taxed at different tax rates. Very broadly, the ordinary return, calculated as the interest
rate multiplied by equity invested into the company, is taxed at 19%, while the residual profit is taxed at
37%. However a rule applied in the past and abolished in 2000, stated also that, whatever the result of
the application of the dual system, at the end the average rate applied (resulting in the application of
these two different rates according to the method of financing and the amount of residual profit) should
not be less than 27%. This study has not taken into consideration this "minimum" global corporate rate
of 27% and in the marginal case (no extra-profits) the rate of 19% has been applied. Instead, the Baker
and McKenzie study applies this "minimum" rate of 27%. As a result the EMTR in this study is lower
than the EMTR in the Baker and McKenzie study. And, finally, the weights of the five assets composing
the hypothetical investment considered is different in the two studies.
Notwithstanding these differences, there is a remarkable similarity in the general conclusions arising
from the two pictures for 2001, as it was the case for 1999. The same conclusions drawn from the
comparison with the 1999 results remain valid for the 2001 results.
 &RPSDULVRQVRIWKHUHVXOWVLQWKHWUDQVQDWLRQDOFDVH
As, in the transnational case, the Baker & McKenzie report computed effective marginal tax rates only
for three countries (D, NL and UK), this section does not make a comparison between the results of the
present study and those arising from the Baker & McKenzie study. The comparison is thus limited to the
results of the Ruding report.
The present study showed, in section 6 (Tables 17 to 19), that there is a large variation in the way each
Member State treats other Member States. Each Table presented the cost of capital for each country
averaged across the five different assets and the three sources of finance of the parent and showed
separately the three different ways in which the subsidiary is financed.
Table 45 shows the cost of capital for transnational investment presented in the Ruding report. This table
shows average cost of capital for each Member State across the sources of finance and the assets

























































































Belgium 5.4 6.7 6.2 5.4 7.5 7.0 5.6 7.2 6.5 6.1 7.2 6.4
Denmark 6.6 5.8 6.1 6.5 5.6 6.5 5.3 6.7 6.4 5.9 5.7 5.9
Germany 7.7 7.5 5.5 4.9 7.2 7.7 6.1 9.5 6.9 7.4 8.1 6.9
Greece 6.7 9.3 6.5 5.1 8.8 10.3 9.1 7.4 6.5 6.4 8.4 7.0
Spain 6.6 6.7 6.4 6.5 6.1 7.2 6.7 7.0 6.7 6.3 6.0 6.7
France 6.2 6.0 5.2 6.0 7.2 5.4 5.4 6.7 6.5 6.2 6.5 6.4
Ireland 6.6 6.7 6.4 11.7 14.2 7.3 5.1 6. 7.0 6.8 14.0 7.3
Italy 7.2 7.7 5.4 7.2 8.5 9.5 9.6 6.0 8.0 8.3 7.6 9.0
Luxembourg 6.4 6.5 6.4 6.5 7.0 7.0 5.5 7.1 6.2 6.3 7.7 6.2
Netherlands 6.1 6.2 6.4 5.7 7.0 7.0 5.5 6.3 6.7 5.7 8.4 6.2
Portugal 6.6 6.7 6.4 10.9 7.0 7.6 8.4 7.1 9.5 11.1 5.7 7.0
UK 5.9 6.0 5.9 5.9 6.9 7.0 7.0 6.1 6.5 6.2 6.6 5.9
                                                
48  Assuming the subsidiary is financed by one-third retentions by the subsidiary, one-third new equity from the parent and one-third debt from the parent; investment in a
weighted average set of assets; inflation of 3.1% everywhere; real interest rate of 5% everywhere; personal taxes are zero; parent raises finance in weighted average of debt,
new shares and retained earningsTables 17 to 19 and Table 45 are not directly comparable, for three main reasons. First, as was the case
for a domestic investment, differences in the parameters used, and notably the number of taxes levied on
companies, can explain some differences in the results between the two studies.
Second, the tax reforms of the last decade and notably the reforms related to the tax regimes can explain
the different results in individual Member States in 1999 compared with those of ten years ago.
Third, the fact that these matrices summarise all the domestic and international features of taxation
makes it very difficult, when comparing the figures from the two studies, to attribute to one factor or
another the origin of differences in the results.
All that said, two observations can be made. Tables 17 to 19 show that subsidiaries located in some host
countries, and notably Ireland and Italy, always have a lower cost of capital than subsidiary located in
other host countries. On the other side, subsidiaries located in Germany and France always have a higher
cost of capital. Table 45 presents a more mixed picture and it is impossible to say that some host
countries are generally more or less attractive.
As far as the size of variation is concerned, the picture arising from Tables 17 to 19 shows considerable
variations within columns and rows. Therefore, on the one hand, there is considerable incentive for
companies to choose tax favoured locations and, on the other, the effective tax burden of a subsidiary
depends heavily on the home country of the parent company. When looking at Table 42, it does not seem
that such incentives have diminished compared to the situation of ten years ago.
Table 46 compares the figures in the Ruding report and the present study which assess the extent to
which the tax treatment of transnational investments gives incentives to undertake transnational, as























































































Austria 6.3 6.5 7.1 0.2 0.6 5.3 6.7 6.7 1.1 0.5
Belgium 6.4 6.7 6.3 0.3 0.6 5.4 6.6 6.5 0.5 0.7
Denmark 6.4 6.6 6.3 0.3 0.6 5.8 6.9 6.1 0.9 0.4
Finland 6.2 6.4 6.3 0.3 0.6 - - - - -
France 7.5 7.7 6.2 0.3 0.5 5.4 7.6 6.2 1.1 0.5
Germany 7.3 7.0 6.3 0.3 0.6 5.6 6.1 7.3 0.4 1.1
Greece 6.1 6.4 6.6 0.3 0.6 5.1 7.0 7.9 2.1 1.3
Ireland 5.7 5.9 6.4 0.4 0.6 5.1 6.7 8.6 1.5 2.9
Italy 4.8 5.0 6.5 0.3 0.4 6.0 7.1 8.0 0.8 1.1
Luxembourg 6.3 6.5 6.7 0.3 0.6 6.2 7.0 6.6 0.9 0.5
Netherlands 6.5 6.6 7.1 0.2 0.6 5.7 7.0 6.5 1.5 0.8
Portugal 6.5 6.7 6.3 0.3 0.6 5.7 7.9 8.0 2.1 1.6
Spain 6.5 6.7 6.3 0.3 0.6 6.1 8.0 6.6 2.1 0.3
Sweden 5.8 6.0 6.3 0.3 0.6 5.0 6.4 6.5 1.5 0.5
United Kingdom 6.6 6.8 6.4 0.3 0.5 5.9 6.8 6.4 0.8 0.4216
As is the case now, both capital export and capital import neutrality were absent ten
years ago. The Ruding report showed differences between domestic, outbound and
inbound cost of capital that were larger than the differences found in the present study.
Moreover, the standard deviations for inbound and outbound costs of capital were also
higher. It seems, therefore, that the reforms undertaken during the last decade had a
positive influence in reducing, on average, the incentives to undertake domestic
investments as opposed to transnational investments.
But, as pointed out above, the averages presented in the current study mask large
differences across the possible home/host countries. A lot of information is lost, in
particular the variation between countries and sources of finance. There is, in fact, a
remarkable range of variation in the effective tax burden of subsidiaries located in
different host countries or for subsidiaries operating in a given country.
Moreover, it has to be stressed, once again, that the different picture arising from the
two studies is at the same time the result of evolving tax systems and of different
economic assumptions and parameters underlying the computations.
One important difference in the results of the two studies is that, while ten years ago all
Member States had a cost of capital for domestic investment lower than the outbound
cost of capital, now, there are some Member States for which outbound investment is
less heavily taxed than domestic investment. These are the Member States with the
highest national profit rate. On the other side, Member States with the lowest national
profit tax give a marked advantage to domestic investment.
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The results of the simulation presented in section 7 of this study are generally in line
with the impact of hypothetical reforms simulated in the Ruding report.
In particular, the importance of the harmonisation of statutory corporate tax rates to
increase the degree of locational tax neutrality is one of the main conclusions of the
Ruding report. In addition, that report similarly demonstrated that "harmonisation of
certain aspects of the tax base in isolation does not always increase neutrality".
The limited impact of the abolition of withholding taxes on cross-border interest
payments is underlined in the Ruding report, as is the potentially large positive impact
of the abolition of withholding taxes on dividend payments between related companies.
It is likely that further progress in this respect, beyond that currently provided for in the
Parents-Subsidiaries directive could still bring some benefit as far as locational
neutrality is concerned.
As to the possible adoption by all EU Member States of a common exemption system
for foreign source income, the Ruding report noticed that this would have improved
capital export neutrality and capital import neutrality. The current study (see simulation
10 in section 7) however produces the opposite result for capital export neutrality.
Similarly, for a common credit method, the Ruding report presented unambiguously217
positive results, both for capital export and import neutrality, while simulation 9 in
section 7 shows a move away from capital import neutrality.
Lastly, the conclusion, made in the Ruding report, that the adoption of a common
classical corporation tax or a common imputation system would not improve the overall
degree of locational tax neutrality slightly differs from the results presented in the
current study. Indeed, simulation 12 in section 7 suggests that a common classical
system could improve the overall allocational neutrality in the EU.
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Measuring the effects of corporate income taxes on the cost of capital is a standard way
of assessing the potential impact of corporate taxation on investments.
During the last few years a number of studies have presented estimates of effective
corporate tax burdens at national and international level by means of the application of
approaches similar to that used in the present report.
In particular, the French Sénat (1999) published a report on tax competition in Europe
which includes a comparison of domestic and international effective corporate tax
burdens for the EU Member States in 1998. More recently Bond and Chennels (2000)
published a comparative study of effective corporate tax burdens for seven selected
world economies (five EU Member States plus USA and Japan) with the purpose of
studying the trends in effective corporate taxation over the last thirty years.
As already underlined above, the numerical results arising from the application of
forward-looking methodologies and therefore also the country ranking can differ due to
different hypotheses concerning the economic environment in which the investment
takes places and the specific investment considered.
A detailed analysis of the different numerical results of studies published over the last
few years would demand a detailed assessment of the different hypotheses and goes
beyond the scope and purpose of the present report. It is nevertheless useful to compare
the general statements arising from these different studies in order to understand
whether the different applications give coherent answers to the question of the potential
role of taxation on investments.
The quantitative results presented in the French Sénat report showed tax differentials as
high as the differentials arising from the computation in the present study. They
confirmed that capital export and import neutrality are never attained and that the
average values for each country in the international case hide considerable bilateral
variations. Moreover, they pointed out that the present tax regimes give a strong
advantage to debt financing and tend to favour investment in machinery (intangibles
have not been included in the considered investment).
The Bond and Chennels comparisons, which also confirm the size of tax differentials
and the nature of imbalances, goes a step further in showing a decline and a marked
convergence in the cost of capital measures over the last ten years in particular.218
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This is the first time a comprehensive study has analysed such a broad range of
indicators of the effective company tax burden, both marginal and average, for the
Member States of the European Union. These different indicators reflect different
hypotheses related to the underlying methodology, as well as to the domestic or
international localisation of the investment, the profitability of the investment or of the
firm considered, and the size and behaviour of the companies. The computations have
been supplemented by "sensitivity analysis" which tests the impact of different
hypotheses on the results.
The broad range of data computed is not intended to give "universally valid values" for
the effective tax burden in different countries, but rather to give indicators, or illustrate
interrelations, in a series of relevant situations. In fact, effective tax rates may vary
depending on the characteristics of the specific investment project concerned.
A number of general conclusions regarding both the differences in the effective tax
burdens and the identification of the most relevant tax drivers which influence these tax
burdens, can nevertheless be formulated on the basis of the results. Therefore, coherent
explanations can be given of how Member States’ tax regimes create incentives to
allocate resources. The most striking feature of the quantitative analysis in this study is
that, across the range of different situations, the relevant conclusions and interpretations
remain relatively constant.
This study does not aim to estimate quantitatively the impact of differences in effective
tax rates on the actual location of investments. The data arising from the application of
the principles and assumptions underlying this study give summary measures of the
incentives (or disincentives) to undertake different investments but do not provide
empirical evidence of the impact of taxation on actual economic decisions. The
empirical studies which have attempted to study the relevance of tax considerations in
investment decisions show that there is, to differing degrees, a negative correlation
between the size of taxation and location decisions. Nevertheless, certain
methodological weaknesses and data shortages which affect these studies make it
difficult to define "the" quantitative indicator which summarises this relation.
When domestic investments are considered, (see section 4) the analysis for 1999
suggests that there is a variation in the effective tax burden faced by investors resident in
the different EU Member States, depending on the type of investment and its financing.
However, the Member States tax codes tend to favour the same forms of investment by
assets and sources of finance.
The range of the differences in national effective corporate taxation rates, when personal
taxation is not taken into account, is around 37 points in the case of a marginal
investment (between -4.1% for Italy and 33.2% for France) and around 30 points in the
case of more profitable investments (between 10.5% for Ireland and 39.1% for Germany
when the hypothetical investment methodology is applied and between 8.3% for Ireland
and 39.7% for France when the "Tax Analyser" model is applied). In the "Tax Analyser"
model France shows a higher effective tax burden than Germany (which is second in the
ranking) because this model takes into account a high number of non-profit taxes which
are particularly relevant in France.219
Germany and France are always at the upper range of rankings of the Member States
and Ireland is, in general, at the lower range of these rankings, apart for the case of a
marginal investment where Italy shows a considerably lower effective marginal tax rate.
The advantage of the Italian tax regime for marginal investments can be largely traced to
the Italian "dual income" tax system. At the margin the Italian corporation tax regime
effectively subsidises investment. But, when the profitability of the investment rises the
effective tax burden rises and for an intra-marginal investment the Italian effective tax
burden is in the middle of the EU range. In general, there are not substantial differences
in the ranking of the Member States when comparing marginal and infra-marginal
indicators.
The analysis suggests also that, in practically every situation analysed, on the one hand,
the tax systems tend to favour investment in intangibles and machinery and, on the other
hand, debt is, by far, the most tax-efficient source of finance for all Member States.
The introduction of personal taxation substantially increases the effective tax burdens
and the observed differences. In this situation the ranking of Member States by effective
tax burden is very different from the case in which only corporate taxation is considered.
Moreover, it is no longer true that debt is always the form of finance which minimise
the effective tax rate, even if for a majority of Member States debt is still the most
favoured form of finance.
It is worth noting that the values of the effective tax burden for each Member State can
vary according to the definition of the economic variables and parameters underlying the
application of the methodology and, as mentioned above, there is no universally valid
value in one country. However, the sensitivity analysis in section 5, suggests that the
ranking of Member States is largely unaffected by changes in the assumptions used in
the base scenario.
Differences between the effective tax burden in the EU Member States may be
important for two reasons. First, differences in effective tax rates faced by companies
located in different Member States, but competing in the same market, may affect their
international competitiveness: two different companies, competing in the same market,
may face two different tax rates. Second, when multinational companies face only the
tax rate of the country where the activity takes place then differences in the effective tax
rates between countries could also affect the location choice of individual activities.
This can occur either as a result of the provisions of international tax codes, for example
when the repatriation of profits by way of dividend from a subsidiary to a parent results
in no further taxation because the dividend is exempt, or as a result of tax planning. A
multinational company may therefore face different tax rates, depending on where its
activities are located.
The EU wide spread cannot be explained by one single feature of the national tax
system. However, the analysis tends to show that the different national tax rates on
profits (statutory tax rates, surcharges and local taxes) can explain most of the
differences in effective corporate tax rates between Member States.
Therefore, although tax regimes are designed as more or less integrated systems (in
general high tax rates on profits seem to correlate with a narrower taxable base and vice
versa), tax rate differentials more than compensate for differences in the tax base. This220
is particular relevant when discussing the compensatory effects of a generous tax base
compared to a relatively low tax rate on the effective tax burden.
The quantitative analysis also shows that the relative weight of rates in determining the
effective tax burden of companies rises when the profitability of the investment rises
and that, consequently, the compensatory effects of a lower tax base in countries with
high tax rates on effective tax rates tend to disappear when the profitability rises.
When transnational investments are considered, (see section 6) the data for 1999 arising
from the quantitative analysis illustrates a variation in the way each Member State treats
investments in or from other countries. Thus, the effective tax burden of a subsidiary of
a parent company in one country depends crucially on where that subsidiary is located.
The range of variations of the effective tax burdens of subsidiaries located in different
host countries can reach even more than 30 points regardless of the method of financing
of the subsidiary. This suggests that there is considerable incentive for companies to
choose the most tax-favoured locations for their investment, which may not be the most
favourable location in the absence of taxes. Similarly, subsidiaries operating in a given
country face different effective tax burdens depending on where their parent company is
located. Even in this case the range of variation can reach more than 30 points.
The analysis of the effective tax burden of transnational investment also allows an
assessment of the allocation effects of international taxation by capturing the extent to
which the tax treatment of transnational investments gives incentives to undertake
transnational, as opposed to domestic, investment. The data show that, on average in the
EU, outbound and inbound investments are more heavily taxed than otherwise identical
domestic investments and, therefore, the additional components of the transnational
system add somewhat to the effective tax rates on investment.
But, to the extent that companies are free to choose the most tax-favoured form of
finance, then the international tax system works such that foreign multinationals
operating in a host country are likely to face a lower effective tax burden than domestic
companies. This is true even when the treatment of multinationals is compared with the
more favourable domestic treatment allowed for small and medium sized companies
(see sections 6 and 9).
The spreads observed between the effective rates of taxation in the international analysis
are the result of complex interactions between different tax regimes and cannot be
explained by just one feature of taxation. However, as was the case for the domestic
investment, the analysis tends to show that the relevant component that results in
distortions with respect to cross border location and financing decisions is, above all, the
overall national tax rate. This is, in general, the most important tax driver when the
incentives of taxation to use particular sources of finance and specific locations are
considered. The tax base does however have a greater impact in specific situations - for
example when a Member State applies a particularly favourable depreciation regime as
is the case in Greece, and to a lesser extent in Finland and Sweden.
It is worth noting that across the range of domestic and cross-border indicators
presenting the effective tax burden at the corporate level, there is a remarkable
consistency as far as the relative position of Member States is concerned, notably at the
upper and the lower ranges of the ranking. In general, Germany, and France tend to
show the highest tax burdens while Ireland, Sweden and Finland tend to be at the lower221
range of the ranking. (The particular situation of Italy in the marginal case has been
commented on above).
When the domestic analysis is updated to take into account the 2001 tax regimes
(section 10), the overall picture shows that a number of Member States have a lower
cost of capital and effective marginal tax rate as a result of changes in the tax codes
aimed at reducing the corporate tax rate or introducing of modifying the dual income
system. These changes have not fundamentally affected the ranking of Member States
nor reduced the dispertion inside the EU. The most evident change is the remarkable
reduction in the Austrian effective tax burden, due to the introduction of the dual
income system, which now places Austria at the lower end of the ranking together with
Italy, Ireland and Sweden.
In the case of a more profitable investment, the EU differential is reduced mainly due to
the effect of the reduction of the German and French effective tax burden, whereas the
lowest effective average tax rate remains the Irish rate. Apart from this reduction in the
range of rates of about 4 percentage points, the global picture arising from 2001 in terms
of countries at the highest or lowest range of the ranking and principal tax drivers is
fundamentally unchanged in comparison to the 1999 picture.
The German tax reform that entered into force on 1.1.2001 is undoubtedly a significant
reform which implies a substantial cut in the corporation tax rate and in income tax
rates, partly financed by the broadening of the tax base, including the abolition of the
split rate system and the imputation system. However, despite these changes and the
considerable reduction of the average effective tax burden at the corporate level, the
German tax reform has only minor effects on the relative position of Germany in the EU
country ranking. In fact, the overall national corporate rate in Germany remains high by
the standards of the EU. Consequently, the effective tax burden remains among the
highest in the EU.
When the role of specific features of the tax regimes is examined by simulating the
impact of hypothetical policy scenarios on the measure of effective tax rates by means
of harmonisation of particular features of taxation in isolation (see section 7), the results
of the application of the two methodologies underlying this study show that:
·  Introducing a common statutory tax rate in the EU would have a significant impact
by decreasing the dispersion - both between parent companies and between
subsidiaries - of effective tax rates across the Member States. To the extent that
taxation matters, such reform would be likely to go some way in reducing locational
inefficiencies within the EU.
·  By comparison, no other scenario would have such a significant impact. For
example, introducing a common tax base or applying the definition of the home
country tax base to the EU-wide profits of a multinational would tend to increase
the dispersion in effective tax rates if tax rates were kept constant. Two remarks
have to be made concerning these results. First, the methodologies applied do
not take into consideration all the elements of the tax base. However, the "Tax
Analyzer model", the results from which are similar to those arising from the
simulations of hypothetical investment, does consider a significant number of
elements of the tax base. Second, benefits which would arise under either a
common consolidated tax base or a home country tax base approach such as loss222
consolidation and simplified transfer pricing cannot be modelled using the
methodologies used in this report.
·  Introducing a common form of integration of corporate and personal taxes, other
than a pure classical system, would not tend to reduce the dispersions of effective
tax rates between Member States.
It should be noted that these conclusions are the result of a static analysis. They
therefore do not assess the dynamic effects and possible reactions induced by the
harmonisation of particular features of taxation in isolation.
The potential distortions in the allocation of resources found in the analysis of
transnational investments indicate that there can be a considerable incentive for
companies to alter their behaviour in order to minimise their global tax burden.
Therefore this study considered some stylised examples of tax optimisation strategies of
companies by means of an intermediary financial company, focusing on the likely
effects of an abolition of these tax reducing financing structures (see section 8). The
study shows that preventing such tax optimisation strategies will not contribute, per se,
to solving the problem of tax-induced resources misallocations. Taking into account that
the main tax driver for effective tax rates differentials is the overall tax rate, companies
located in "high tax" countries will have the possibility to compensate the removal of
financial intermediaries by exploiting the possibility of tax arbitrages arising from those
differentials.
The size of tax differentials and dispersions in the EU measured in this study deserves
attention. The principal tax driver for these differences is, above all, the overall national
corporation tax rate. Although the existence of market failures can justify a certain
degree of tax differentials in order to offset these externalities, the size of the differences
observed in this study is likely to impact on economic efficiency. This study has not
attempted to quantify the size of any efficiency loss that might be associated to existing
differences in effective corporation tax rates in the European Union.
But taxation ultimately involves a political choice and may entail a trade-off between
pure economic efficiency and other legitimate national policy goals and preferences.
The objective of neutrality of taxation systems within the Internal Market has therefore





The Council mandate given to the Commission defines "the remaining tax obstacles to
cross-border economic activity in the Internal Market" as "tax provisions that may
hamper cross-border economic activity in the Internal Market". This description of tax
obstacles is rather broad. Hence, the present study focuses on additional tax or
compliance burdens which companies incur as a result of doing business in more than
one Member State and which therefore represent a barrier to cross-border trade,
establishment and investment.
The underlying cause of those additional tax and compliance burdens is the existence
within the Internal Market of 15 separate tax systems. First, the fact that each Member
State is a separate tax jurisdiction has a number of consequences. In particular:
·  companies are obliged to allocate profits to each jurisdiction on an arm’s length
basis by separate accounting, i.e. on a transaction by transaction basis;
·  Member States are reluctant to allow relief for losses incurred by associated
companies whose profits fall outside the scope of their taxing rights;
·  cross-border reorganisations entailing a loss of taxing rights for a Member State are
liable to give rise to capital gains taxation and other charges;
·  double taxation may occur as a result of conflicting taxing rights.
Moreover, each Member State has its own sets of rules, in particular laws and
conventions on financial accounting, rules for determining taxable profit, arrangements
for collection and administration of tax and its own network of tax treaties. The
imminent enlargement of the EU makes it all the more urgent to address the underlying
problems.
The need to comply with a multiplicity of different rules entails a considerable
compliance cost. To face this multiplicity of approaches at all levels is an important
obstacle to cross-border economic activity, involving not only financial costs, internal
and external, but also significant frictional losses and braking effects. The costs and
risks associated with complying with more than one system may even discourage small
and medium-sized enterprises from engaging in cross-border activity.
These fundamental problems mean European multinational companies are in a more
difficult competitive situation in comparison to third country businesses, especially
when the latter enter the European market for the first time, as they are free in their
location decisions and can develop a tax-optimal structure. Interestingly enough, once
established in the EU, the US business community is often complaining about having to224
cope with 15 different tax systems in the EU as well and pleads, for instance in the
Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue, for a simpler EU system.49
In a broader perspective, the tax obstacles to the Internal Market may also result in
economic terms in a loss of potential EU welfare. In setting a tax incentive towards
domestic economic activity the obstacles violate the basic neutrality criterion explained
in Part I of this study. Moreover, they may result in an overall economic situation of the
EU and its citizens that is less efficient, equitable and effective than it could be and thus
reduces the general well-being. However, in order to determine the size of these welfare
effects, it would in particular be necessary to quantify the compliance cost inherent in
the existence of 15 different tax systems within the Internal Market or, in other words,
the fiscal surcharge for international activities.
Currently, such calculations are not available for the EU and there is certainly scope for
future economic research in this area. The present study could not embark on such a
demanding exercise. The available studies50 on compliance cost mostly concern the
USA, Canada and Australia, i.e. countries which are economically broadly comparable
to the EU economies. It is difficult to draw firm detailed conclusions from these studies.
Nevertheless, they show that tax compliance costs for international and cross-border
activities are substantial. Moreover, such costs are regressive to size, which means that
FHWHULVSDULEXV they hit small and medium-sized enterprises relatively harder than bigger
companies.
Against this background, the following analysis of company tax obstacles in the Internal
Market focuses on the company tax issues encountered by groups of companies active in
the Internal Market. This includes the tax rules governing mergers and acquisitions,
capital gains taxation, transfer pricing, the cross-border off-setting of losses as well as
the taxation of all forms of cross-border flows of income, notably dividends. Company
tax obstacles in the Internal Market also concern possible hindrances to cross-border
economic activity resulting from the taxation of specific forms of remuneration (notably
stock options, etc.) and of posted and migrant workers in the EU (notably concerning
supplementary pensions). Finally, the specific situation of small and medium-sized
enterprises and partnerships is considered and a section on value-added tax completes
the overall picture of tax obstacles hampering cross-border economic activity. It is not
attempted to provide a detailed classification of any of the obstacles that are presented.
Where appropriate, however, indications are made of whether a given obstacle is related
to one-off or to ongoing measures and an attempt is made to elaborate on concrete
welfare effects.
                                                
49 For a broader discussion of the competitiveness of the tax systems within the European Union see:
Lodin, S.-O., 7KH&RPSHWLWLYHQHVVRI(87D[6\VWHPV, European Taxation, May 2001
50 An overview about the available studies in this respect is presented in Annex 2.225
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A basic concern of companies operating within the Internal Market is the flow of
(correctly taxed) income between associated companies free of (additional) tax.
Payments of interest and royalties between associated companies of different Member
States are often still subject to withholding taxes that effectively create situations of
double taxation. The Commission has already presented a proposal for a directive on
this subject [COM(1998)67], and it is expected that this proposal will be adopted in the
context of the "tax package". The usefulness of the Directive will however be
undermined by its relatively narrow scope. While the Commission proposal would apply
to direct or indirect holdings of 25% or more, the Council has decided to limit the scope
of the directive to direct holdings.
Cross-border dividend payments still cause problems which are considered in detail
below. Industry sees these, despite certain achievements at the EU level, as a major
impediment to cross-border activities in the EU.
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There is a general risk of (economic) double taxation inherent in dividend payments.
The dividends are paid out of profits which have usually already been subject to
corporation tax. At the shareholder level, the dividends are then liable for income or
corporation tax. Unless some form of relief applies, this means that the profits are taxed
twice: at company and at shareholder level.
Dividends paid to Member State companies by other Member State companies are in
principle covered by Council Directive 90/435/EEC (the "Parent-Subsidiary Directive"),
which requires double taxation to be avoided either by exempting the dividends or
granting a tax credit equivalent to the tax already paid on the distributed profits. The
directive covers dividends paid between associated companies where the recipient
company has at least a 25% holding in the company paying out the dividends. However,
where dividends are not covered by the Directive, for example where the holding is less
than 25%, there is no obligation for Member States to avoid double taxation. Such
dividends may still be subject to withholding taxes which often give rise to interest costs
(for the period before the other state gives relief) or in certain circumstances even
become definitive. In any event, they create additional compliance costs and distort
allocational efficiency.
Dividend payments between companies may therefore either be covered by the
Directive, or not covered by the Directive. However, dividends paid to individuals are
completely outside the Directive. As this present study specifically addresses company
taxation the main issue concerns dividends between associated companies. However
dividend payments to individuals cannot be ignored as their tax treatment might




1.  The Directive applies to distributions of profits.
2.  Profit distributions must be effected between associated companies from different Member States.
a)  Distributions covered by the Directive
Profit distributions must meet all the following conditions:
-  they must be between companies from different Member States;
-  they must be effected by companies subject to corporation tax and made to companies also subject to
corporation tax;
-  they must be effected between companies with a legal form listed in the Annex to the Directive;
-  they must be made to associated companies with a minimum direct holding of 25% in the capital of
the companies paying the dividends. Member States have the option of not applying the Directive if
this minimum 25% holding is not maintained for a period of at least two years.
b)  Profit distributions not covered by the Directive
The Directive’s tax rules do not apply:
-  to distributions of dividends between companies of the same Member State;
-  to distributions of dividends paid to partnerships not subject to corporation tax;
-  to dividends paid between companies subject to corporation tax where one of the companies
concerned does not take one of the legal forms listed in the Annex to the Directive;
-  if the company receiving the dividends has a direct holding of less than 25% in the company paying
the dividends. Indirect holdings by other companies in the same group are not taken into account;
-  if the 25% holding is not maintained for an uninterrupted period of at least two years. However,
although Member States have the option of not applying the Directive if the minimum holding has
been maintained for less than two years on the date of payment of the dividends, they must apply it
retroactively if the holding is still maintained when the two-year period expires (Court of Justice
ruling, 17 October 1996, Joined Cases C-283, 291 and 292/84 'HQNDYLW9LWLFDQG9RRUPHHU).
Member States also have the option of not applying the Directive in the case of fraud or abuse.
The Directive’s tax rules
1.  For the Member State of the company paying the dividends
The Member State of the subsidiary paying the dividends may not charge withholding tax on the
dividends paid. Transitional measures were provided for Greece, Portugal and Germany but they are
no longer being applied.
2. For the Member State of the company receiving the dividends
There are two options:
(a) the dividends received may be exempted from corporation tax;
(b) the dividends received are taxed but a tax credit equivalent to the corporation tax paid by the
subsidiary on the profits distributed to the parent company is granted. The tax credit may not exceed
the amount of tax due on the dividends.
Member States may also exclude the management costs relating to the holding from the parent company’s
taxable profit. These management costs may be fixed as a flat rate but the flat-rate amount may not exceed
5% of the dividends.227
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The taxation of dividend payments has not yet been harmonised at Community level.
Traditionally there are two systems of taxation, the so-called “classical” system and the
“imputation” method. There are also a number of varieties of the two systems but the
basic problems can be usefully discussed by examining the effects of the two
fundamental methods.
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Under the imputation system the shareholder includes the dividends he receives in the
tax base for income or corporation tax but is granted a tax credit equivalent to all or part
of the corporation tax paid by the company distributing the dividend on the profits from
which the dividends derive.
The classical system, on the other hand, does not neutralise double taxation as
shareholders receiving the dividends are taxed on them without being granted a tax
credit to offset the corporation tax already levied on the profits of which the dividends
form a part. However, in some Member States modified systems are applied and double
taxation is mitigated by applying a lower rate of tax to the dividends, by taxing only a
proportion of the value of the dividends or by granting a specified imputation tax credit
in the amount of a percentage of the dividend received - so called ‘shareholder relief’.
Moreover, the Scandinavian countries apply a 'dual income tax system' which generally
provides for a progressive tax rate for employment income and taxes capital income
separately, at a lower proportional rate.
The various systems exist side by side in the Community. However the current trend
seems to be towards a partial or total switchover from the imputation to the (modified)
classical system or shareholder relief system. Nevertheless, irrespective of the particular
system used by a Member State dividends paid to shareholders are often taxed
differently depending on whether they are domestic or cross border, i.e. foreign
dividends. Two examples illustrate this: first a shareholder in two companies, one
domestic, one foreign, receiving dividends may receive on the domestic dividend a tax
credit (imputation system) or some form of shareholder relief (modified classical
system), but on the foreign dividend an unusable or only partially repayable tax credit
(imputation system) or no or a reduced form of shareholder relief ((modified) classical
system)). Second, two shareholders resident in two different states who own shares in
the same company may be taxed differently, one making use of the tax credit, the other
unable to and/or receiving a partial repayment (imputation system) or one receiving
shareholder relief, the other not or only a reduced form of relief ((modified) classical
system)). In principle these differences could be considered discriminatory, and hence
an obstacle to the Internal Market.
                                                
51  For a detailed comparison see, for instance: Gangemi, B., ,PSXWDWLRQYHUVXV&ODVVLFDO6\VWHP
+RZWRDYRLG'LVFULPLQDWLRQEHWZHHQ7D[DWLRQRI'RPHVWLFDQG)RUHLJQ6KDUHKROGHUV,
contribution for the CFE Forum 2000, Brussels 2000228
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Usually the tax credit is granted to shareholders receiving the dividends only if they are
established in the same Member State or there is a permanent establishment there. The
shareholder established or resident in a different Member State is not usually able to
make use of it against his own ‘local’ tax. Where this is the case Member States argue
that this is because the tax has been paid to another Member State. Neither is the
shareholder often able to obtain a repayment from the State levying the initial tax.
Member States argue that this is justified on the grounds that residents are liable to tax
on dividends and benefit from a tax credit, whereas non-residents are not liable to tax on
the dividends and hence not able to benefit from the tax credit.52
Thus - depending on their precise design - imputation systems often create inequalities
of treatment between resident and non-resident shareholders that many commentators in
the literature consider discriminatory.53
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A French company holds shares in a French company and in a Danish company which both pay a dividend
of 100. Corporation tax in France in 1999 was 40% (including surcharges) for large companies. No
withholding tax is levied on the dividends paid. The tax credit granted by France in 1999 is equal to 45%
of the dividend received where the shareholder is a legal person.
The French company pays the following corporation tax on dividends it receives:
-  On the dividend of 100 received from the French company: 100 + 45 (tax credit) = 145. Gross tax =
145x 40% (rate of corporation tax) = 58.Net tax to be paid = 58 – 45 (tax credit) = 13.
-  On the dividend of 100 received from the Danish company: 100 x 40% = 40.
It should be noted that France has meanwhile changed this system and notably reduced the tax credit (25%
in 2001; 15% in 2002) as well as additional social security contributions.
It is true that some double-taxation treaties provide in certain cases, generally on the
basis of reciprocity, for a tax credit or repayment for foreign shareholders. However, this
is not the general rule and often the tax credit or repayment that is granted is smaller
than the one received by shareholders who are resident in the same country as the
company concerned. Also, where the double-taxation treaties of two Member States
effectively extend this tax credit cross-border, this is usually subject to an extremely
cumbersome and slow procedure which is, in itself, a disincentive for and obstacle to
foreign investment. Moreover, this system does not provide for an equal treatment
within the Internal Market and even creates inequalities in the sense that some foreign
shareholders of a given company receive a tax credit or repayment whereas others do
not.
                                                
52  For a more detailed assessment of the arguments, also in the light of recent jurisprudence by the
ECJ see, for instance, Lupo, A., 5HOLHIVIURP(FRQRPLF'RXEOH7D[DWLRQRQ(8'LYLGHQGV,PSDFW
RIWKH%DDUVDQG9HUNRRLMHQFDVHV, European Taxation, July 2000
53  See, for instance, Lodin, S.-O., 7KH,PSXWDWLRQ6\VWHPVDQG&URVV%RUGHU'LYLGHQGVQHHGIRU
QHZVROXWLRQV, in: International Studies in Taxation – Law and Economics, liber amicorum for Leif
Mutèn (pp.199-242), Kluwer, 1999 (also published in EU Tax Review 1999)229
Clearly, such divergence of treatment and its economic effects are difficult to explain to
the shareholders who do not receive a tax credit or repayment and which therefore have
a clear incentive to invest in Member States which do give some form of relief.
By contrast, where the situation of non-resident taxpayers is the same as that of resident
taxpayers, the tax credit must be granted under the same conditions to resident and
non-resident taxpayers (as confirmed by the Court of Justice judgement of 28 January




Insurance companies with registered offices in France, including French subsidiaries of foreign
companies, receive a tax credit for dividends paid by French companies. French permanent establishments
of insurance companies with registered offices in another Member State are not granted a tax credit.
7KH&RXUW¶VUXOLQJ
French tax law does not distinguish between companies which have their registered offices in France and
French-based permanent establishments or branches of companies whose registered offices are in other
countries for the purposes of establishing the corporation tax base. By treating the two forms of
establishment in the same way for the purposes of taxing profits, the legislator has acknowledged that
there is no objective difference between their positions which could justify different treatment. It is hence
not possible to treat companies and permanent establishments differently as regards the granting of a tax
credit without creating discrimination contrary to the principle of the freedom of establishment.
This difference in treatment can also seriously affect cross-border mergers and
exchanges of shares as the shareholders of a company resident in one Member State can
be expected to be reluctant to accept a merger under which the dividends on their new
shares will arise in another Member State and therefore without (or with a smaller) tax
credit attached. This is a very important practical problem that in economic terms leads




The expert panel has considered several practical examples highlighting the impact of differing dividend
taxation systems on mergers and other cross-border restructuring actions. For instance, the friendly
takeover (by means of a merger through exchange of shares) of an Italian company by a German
competitor, in principle agreed by all parties and commercially very sensible, collapsed for the simple
reason that the German imputation system applicable before 2000 did not give credit to foreign investors
which is why the Italian shareholders would have suffered disproportionate losses on the dividend
payments from the newly set up German holding company.
In the Finish/Swedish merger of the Merita Bank and Nordbanken it is said that the Finnish imputation
system obliged the new MeritaNordbanken to take its seat, at least initially, in Finland instead of Sweden
thus prejudicing a purely commercial assessment. Similarly, in the merger of Daimler-Benz with Chrysler
from a taxation point of view there was no alternative to establishing the headquarters in Germany as
otherwise, because of the German imputation system, the German shareholders would not have received
the tax credit. In the Rhone-Poulenc/Höchst-merger it was possible to overcome this difficulty because the
German/French double-taxation-treaty contains a (very rare) appropriate provision for extending the credit
cross-border.230
 2EVWDFOHV UHODWLQJ WR PRGLILHG FODVVLFDO V\VWHPV RU VKDUHKROGHU
UHOLHIV\VWHPV
Under this system dividends are included in the taxable profits and no tax credit is
granted. There are, however, ways of mitigating double taxation such as taxing
dividends at a lower rate than that normally applying or granting other forms of tax
relief on dividend payments – so called ‘shareholder relief’.
However such preferential tax arrangements sometimes apply only to domestic
shareholdings and not to dividends from foreign shares. Where this is the case, such
discrimination usually concerns individuals but may also apply to company dividend
payments. As confirmed by the European Court of Justice in its judgement of
6  June  2000 in Case C-35/98 6WDDWVVHFUHWDLUHV YDQ )LQDQFLHQ Y 9HUNRRLMHQ, these




Dutch legislation exempts income tax on the first NLG 1 000 of dividends paid by Dutch companies
(NLG 2 000 for married couples). This relief does not apply to dividends paid by companies from other
Member States.
7KH&RXUW¶VUXOLQJ




The system operated by the Parent-Subsidiary Directive has generally been well
received by the companies concerned and appears to work relatively well. Although the
Directive could be improved, it effectively eliminates double taxation of dividends paid
between associated companies from different Member States. Business agrees that no
radical changes are required. However, like the Merger Directive (about which see
section 3 below), the Parent-Subsidiary Directive currently applies only to operations
between companies liable to corporation tax who do not enjoy the right to opt to be so
liable and who take one of the legal forms set out in the list attached to the Directive.
Consequently some dividend distributions are not covered by the Directive even where
the companies concerned are wholly liable to corporation tax and pay or receive
dividends. Companies which adopted a corporate form created after 1990 (e.g.
simplified joint stock companies in France) or corporate forms which, for one reason or
another, were omitted from the list in 1990 (e.g. Belgian co-operative societies, some
Irish banking companies, etc) are excluded from the Directive.231
Similarly, partnerships which in some Member States are liable to or may opt to be
liable to corporation tax are excluded from the scope of the Directive even where
national legislation and bilateral double taxation treaties treat profits distributed by such
companies to their associate companies as dividends.
To overcome this problem the Commission presented a proposal for a directive on
26 July 1993 (COM(93) 293 final) amending the 1990 Parent-Subsidiary Directive to
extend it to all companies subject to corporation tax irrespective of their legal form. The
stalemate reached in discussions within the Council in mid-1997 means some
companies are still unjustifiably excluded from its scope.
7ULDQJXODUFDVHVDQGWKHFDOFXODWLRQRIWKHWKUHVKROG
Moreover, the Parent-Subsidiary Directive does not cover shares held through
permanent establishments. However, such cases are dealt with to a large extent by the
above-mentioned interest and royalty payments proposal as permanent establishments
often receive or pay interest or royalties.
Although it is rare for permanent establishments to have holdings covered by the
Directive, this can occur (see Case C-307/99 &RPSDJQLHGH6DLQW*REDLQY)LQDQ]DPW
$DFKHQ,QQHQVWDGW). Views are often divided on how to apply the Directive in the case
of permanent establishments and different approaches are taken by national law. It
would therefore be useful to clarify this matter.
At present the Parent-Subsidiary Directive applies where the parent company has a
direct holding of 25% in the subsidiary located in another Member State. This can create
cross-border problems, particularly in the case of restructuring, because indirect
holdings are not taken into account to calculate the Directive’s threshold. As explained
in more detail below, this can have undesirable implications for the internal organisation
of groups of companies and hamper restructuring operations. Some Member States do
apply thresholds of 5% or 10%, which are lower than the Directive’s 25%, but not all.
&UHGLWYHUVXVH[HPSWLRQPHWKRG
If a subsidiary of a parent-company is in turn parent to another (sub-) subsidiary, the
question arises whether under the credit method the parent company can credit the tax
paid by the sub-subsidiary or whether it has to limit the credit, as currently provided by
the directive, to the tax paid by its immediate subsidiary.
In the latter case, the objective to eliminate double taxation is not achieved. The tax due
for the subsidiary is reduced by means of applying the parent-subsidiary directive to the
dividends paid by the sub-subsidiary. This automatically reduces the tax credit available
for the parent company which can be credited against the tax due on the dividends
received from the subsidiary.
Article 2 of the above-mentioned proposal for a directive of 26 July 1993 seeks to
remedy this by modifying article 4 of the existing Parent-Subsidiary Directive such that
the tax credit granted to the parent-company also includes the tax due by the sub-
subsidiaries when they pay dividends under the Directive to the subsidiary. However,
despite the positive stance taken by Member States on this part of the proposal it has not
yet been adopted.232
Member States may permit the deduction of management costs from related taxable
dividend income. These management costs may be calculated on a flat-rate basis but the
flat-rate amount may not exceed 5% of the dividends (article 4 (2) of the directive). The
fact that management costs are deductible from the related income is generally accepted.
However, when the flat-rate method of calculation is adopted it is sometimes criticised




Some national legislation seems to contain provisions whose compatibility with the
Parent-Subsidiary Directive is doubtful. This applies in particular to national legislation
applying the “anti-abuse” clause contained in the Directive. Article 1(2) of the Directive
does not preclude the application of domestic or agreement-based provisions to prevent
abuse or fraud, but the implementation of this is not always consistent.
Some national legislation appears to make the application of the Parent-Subsidiary
Directive subject to conditions which are not contained in the Directive. For example
the provisions of the Directive may not be applied when the capital of a Community
company is held by non-Community residents. This is considered to be a presumption of
tax evasion or avoidance and the provisions of the Directive only apply when proof is
provided to the contrary. The existence of such restrictive national legislation reduces
the intended effect of the Directive.
 &RQFOXVLRQ
The taxation of dividends in the EU is still not completely in line with Internal Market
requirements. There are clear examples of both economic and legal double taxation at
the level of both the corporate and individual shareholder. The Parent-Subsidiary
Directive seems to work reasonably well but only in a limited sense. It does not cover all
the companies it could and it does not address all the situations it could. Its
implementation at Member State level also raises doubts, in particular in relation to
specific anti-abuse rules. In addition to the obstacle of "double taxation", obtaining
relief where it is available involves an unnecessarily high compliance cost. Economic
decisions such as mergers or investments are distorted and efficiency at the EU level is
therefore potentially reduced.
 7+(7$;$7,212)&5266%25'(5%86,1(665(6758&785,1*23(5$7,216
 &RPSDQ\ WD[ DUUDQJHPHQWV LPSHGLQJ FURVVERUGHU EXVLQHVV
UHVWUXFWXULQJRSHUDWLRQV
As outlined above, many EU businesses are in process of profound restructuring in
order to realign their organisational structures to the Internal Market. However, business
                                                
54  A detailed overview of Member States’ provisions can be found in Fédération des experts
comptables européens, 6WXG\RQWKHDOORFDWLRQRIH[SHQVHVUHODWHGWRFURVVERUGHUGLYLGHQG
LQFRPHFRYHUHGE\WKHSDUHQWVXEVLGLDU\GLUHFWLYH, Brussels 1999233
representatives strongly deplore the fact that company tax arrangements often create
obstacles to a commercially straightforward organisation of their business.55
Generally, cross-border restructuring is one of the few areas of direct taxation where
there has been harmonisation at Community level. The relevant Community instrument
is Council Directive 90/434/EEC on the common system of taxation applicable to
mergers, divisions, transfers of assets and exchanges of shares concerning companies of
different Member States, more commonly known under the name "Merger Directive".
Other important tax aspects of cross-border business restructuring are not regulated in





Companies from different Member States must be involved in the restructuring operations. These
companies must
-  be subject to corporation tax;
-  take one of the legal forms listed in the Annex to the Directive;
-  be registered for tax purposes in a Member State.
The following are excluded from the Directive:
-  restructuring operations involving companies from the same Member State;
-  operations involving companies which are not subject to corporation tax (partnerships, natural
persons, etc);
-  companies which are subject to corporation tax but take a legal form not listed in the Annex to the
Directive.
Restructuring operations concerned:
-  mergers of companies;
-  divisions of companies;
-  transfers of assets whereby a company transfers one or more branches of its activity to another
company in exchange for the transfer of securities representing the capital of the company receiving
the transfer;
-  exchange of shares whereby a company acquires a majority of the voting rights in a company in
exchange for the issue to the shareholders of the company acquired of securities representing the
capital of that company in exchange for their securities.
In the case of mergers and divisions assets and liabilities must remain connected with the permanent
establishment of the receiving company in the Member State of the transferring company.
The Directive does not cover:
operations which do not involve an exchange of shares and in particular operations involving cash
payments: sales even if they are within the same group of companies;
restructuring operations which do not involve the creation of a permanent establishment in the Member
State of the transferring company: mergers and divisions which do not involve the creation of a permanent
establishment in the Member State of the transferring company (mergers or divisions of holding
companies, mergers or divisions following cessation of business in the Member State of the transferring
company).
                                                
55  See: UNICE position papers, Obstacles to cross-border business integration, Brussels, 1999; The
lack of community action and its attendant costs for European business and industry, Brussels,
1996234
7KH'LUHFWLYH¶VWD[UXOHV
Mergers, divisions and transfer of assets
1RFDSLWDOJDLQVWD[FKDUJHGRQDVVHWVUHFHLYHG
Member States cannot charge capital gains tax on assets received. However, the receiving company must
compute depreciation and capital gains according to the rules that would have applied to the transferring
company if the merger, division or transfer of assets had not taken place.
Special rules apply to triangular operations (mergers, divisions or transfer of assets by a company with a
permanent establishment in another Member State).
1RWD[DWLRQRIWD[H[HPSWSURYLVLRQVRUUHVHUYHV
These provisions or reserves are not taxed at the time a merger, division or transfer of assets takes place.
However, the receiving company must assume the rights and obligations of the transferring company as
regards the restatement of these provisions or reserves in its taxable profit.
7UDQVIHURIORVVHV
Member States must ensure that cross-border operations covered by the Directive are subject to the same
national rules relating to the transfer of losses from the transferring company to the receiving company
that they apply to domestic mergers, divisions or transfers of assets.
Exchanges of shares
No tax is charged at the time shares are exchanged but Member States may tax the profit generated by the
subsequent disposal of shares received in exchange in the same way as they would tax the profit from the
disposal of the shares exchanged.
Anti-abuse clause
Member States have the option of not applying the Directive or excluding profit:
-  if the merger, division, transfer of assets or exchange of shares has as its principal or one of its
principal objectives fraud or tax evasion;
-  if the operation is intended to prevent employees from being represented on the company’s
management bodies.
 /LPLWVWRWKHWD[VROXWLRQUHJXODWHGLQWKH0HUJHU'LUHFWLYH
Although the Merger Directive has improved the situation, it is not wholly satisfactory
and does not enable companies to undertake cross-border restructuring operations in the
way they would wish. Despite the Directive, cross-border restructuring operations can
still involve significant tax costs.
 7KHODFNRI&RPPXQLW\OHJLVODWLRQRQFRPSDQ\ODZ
Although tax arrangements applying to cross-border restructuring operations covered by
the Directive have existed since 1990, the Directive on company law which is intended
to permit and regulate cross-border company mergers has still not been adopted (tenth
proposal for a Council directive on cross-border mergers on public limited companies
(COM(84) 727 final of 8  January 1985), due to difficulties concerning the issue of
worker involvement.
Consequently cross-frontier mergers and divisions are still hampered by the fact that
some national legislation does not allow companies to be absorbed or divided by foreign
companies. If cross-border mergers or divisions of companies are not legally possible
the 1990 Tax Directive has no effect. The lack of progress on company law is
regrettable. The inability to undertake mergers is of course a source of extra costs for235
companies who are unable to improve their organisation. Currently only cross-border
transfers of assets or exchange of shares can be undertaken in all Member States.
The adoption of the European Company Statute will, however, change this situation and
clearly calls for adaptations of the existing body of tax law, both at EU level and in
Member States, in the area of company taxation. Therefore, the are good reasons to
believe that the lack of EU company law on mergers will soon no longer raise problems:
as from 2004 cross-border mergers will be possible under the form of European
Companies.
 7KHQDUURZVFRSHRIWKH'LUHFWLYH
At present the Merger Directive does not cover certain company restructuring operations
even though the companies in question may be wholly subject to corporation tax.
Companies which have adopted a corporate form created after 1990 (e.g. simplified
joint stock company in France) or corporate forms which for various reasons were
omitted from the 1990 list annexed to the Directive (Belgium cooperative societies,
certain Irish banking companies, etc.) are excluded. Similarly partnerships, which in
some Member States are or may be subject to corporation tax, are excluded from the
Directive’s scope.
The Commission presented a proposal for a Directive [COM(93)293] to remedy this
situation. It would amend the 1990 Merger Directive to extend it to all businesses
subject to corporation tax irrespective of their legal form. However, a stalemate was
reached in discussions within the Council in mid-1997. The main problem concerns the
extension of the Directive’s scope to partnerships. Consequently businesses subject to
corporation tax are still excluded for no good reason from the Directive’s scope. The
conclusions of the ECOFIN Council of 26 and 27 November 2000 state that priority
should be given to updating the list. It goes without saying that the new list will have to
include the European Company statute.
%R[
([DPSOHRISUREOHPVRZLQJWRWKHIDLOXUHWRXSGDWHWKHOLVWRIFRPSDQLHVFRQWDLQHGLQWKH'LUHFWLYH
The SAS (simplified joint stock company) was set up in France in 1993, i.e. after the Merger and Parent-
Subsidiary Directives had been adopted, and does not therefore appear on the list of companies annexed
to the Directive. It is very similar to the public limited company which appears on the list but has
simplified operating rules as it cannot make public offers for securities. This corporate form is very
popular in groups of companies for subsidiaries with only minority shareholders. Such companies are still
excluded from the scope of the 1990 Directive for no objective reason other than that they did not exist in
1990 and no agreement has been reached on updating the list. France appears to grant unilaterally the
benefits provided for under the Directive to the simplified joint stock companies.
The Directive does not cover partnerships if they are not subject to corporation tax but
their profits are taxed at partner level. Cross-border restructuring of such businesses
could involve an extremely large tax burden for their associates. Moreover, transfers of
assets by natural persons who own a business which is not operated as a company and
who wish to transfer it to a company in consideration for shares of that company are not
covered by the Directive.236
 ,QVXIILFLHQWFRYHUDJHRIUHVWUXFWXULQJRSHUDWLRQVE\WKH'LUHFWLYH
There are doubts about whether the “subsidiarisation” of companies’ branches is
covered by the Merger Directive. This involves the transfer by means of a transfer of
assets within the meaning of the Directive of a permanent establishment located in a
Member State to a new company established in the same Member State. For example, a
company headquartered in Member State A has a permanent establishment in Member
State B and wishes to transform this permanent establishment into a company of country
B. If Article 4 of the Directive which applies to transfers of assets under Article 9 is
applied literally the Directive would not cover such operations. Article 4 of the
Directive makes the deferral of capital gains tax conditional on the assets continuing to
be effectively connected with a permanent establishment situated in the Member State
of the transferring company, i.e. Member State A in the above example.
The Commission takes the view that, given the Directive’s purpose, Article 4, which
was designed to cover mergers and divisions of companies, cannot be intended to
exclude the conversion of permanent establishments into subsidiaries from the
Directive’s scope. The conversion of a branch into a subsidiary does not affect the
taxation right of the State where the former permanent establishment was located and
cannot be interpreted as excluding it from the Directive’s tax neutrality principle.
Generally, the objective of the 1990 Directive is to guarantee the tax neutrality of
restructuring operations covered by the Directive and, at the same time, safeguard
Member States’ financial interests. Consequently - for mergers, divisions or transfers of
assets - the assets transferred by the receiving, divided or transferring company must
remain effectively connected with a permanent establishment of the receiving company
located in the Member State of the acquired, divided or transferring company. The
Directive does not apply when there is no permanent establishment.
%R[
([DPSOHRIFURVVERUGHUUHVWUXFWXULQJQRWFRYHUHGE\WKH'LUHFWLYH
An industrial group has a number of manufacturing and distribution companies located in various Member
States of the Community for the same product. In order the rationalise its activities production is
centralised in one single production unit located in one single Member State and distribution is carried out
either by the same manufacturing company or by external companies.
The Merger Directive’s neutrality principle does not apply where restructuring does not result in the
transfer of assets and maintenance of a permanent establishment in the Member State of the transferring
company. In practice no activities have been maintained in the Member States where production or
marketing has been abandoned. The client base (goodwill) of the manufacturing and marketing companies
has been transferred to a single company which is responsible for production and, in some cases,
distribution of the products. Companies transferring their client base may therefore be liable for capital
gains tax on the value of the client base transferred to the company located in another Member State
which retains its activities.
The mergers and divisions of holding companies which do not result in the creation of a
permanent establishment in the Member State of the company concerned are equally not
covered by the Directive. Similarly, the transfer of cash between companies of a same
group but situated in different Member States often cannot benefit from the exemption237
of capital gains taxation whereas it is common that in the framework of group taxation
schemes within Member States such transfers do not give rise to capital gains taxation.
 8QVDWLVIDFWRU\RXWFRPHRIWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRIWKH0HUJHU'LUHFWLYH
Even where restructuring operations can be undertaken the results are not always
satisfactory. A brief analysis of national measures transposing the Merger Directive has
revealed important divergences. This is due to two different reasons.
In some cases national legislation seems to have adopted transposition measures which
raise doubts concerning their compatibility with the Directive. In others, divergent
legislation has been adopted because of the Directive’s lack of clarity on some  -
particularly important - points. The Directive has not necessarily been misinterpreted
but the lack of uniformity in national legislation is unhelpful and undermines the
practical usefulness of the directive.
 'RXEWVFRQFHUQLQJWKHLQFRPSDWLELOLW\RIVRPHQDWLRQDOOHJLVODWLRQ
ZLWKWKH'LUHFWLYH
The present study does not make an exhaustive analysis of national transposition
measures but the following impediments for cross-border economic activity are very
apparent.
7KHDQWLDEXVHFODXVH
Some national legislation makes the application of the Merger Directive subject to
conditions which are not laid down in the Directive. According to the Member States
concerned these are based on Article 11(1)(a) of the Directive which allows them not to
apply the Directive or to deny its benefit where the merger, division, transfer of assets or
exchange of shares has as its principal objective or as one of its principal objectives tax
evasion or tax avoidance ("anti-abuse-clause").
The case most often cited is where a number of Member States require that shares
received under a transfer of assets or an exchange of shares be kept for a certain period
which varies from three to seven years. The rapid disposal of shares received as a result
of a transfer of assets or exchange of shares could be an abuse within the meaning of
Article 11 of the Directive. However, in its judgement in Case C-28/95 /HXU%ORHP
(1997), the European Court of Justice ruled that such abuse had to be assessed on a
case-by-case basis. A blanket refusal to apply the Directive where shares received are
disposed of before a particular deadline without giving taxpayers an opportunity to
prove that such disposals are not of an abusive nature is therefore unlikely to be be
consistent with the Directive. Moreover, minimum holding periods that are particularly
long - up to five or seven years after the initial operation - appear to be difficult to
justify on the grounds of preventing abuse.
([FKDQJHRIVKDUHV
Article 8(1) of the Merger Directive provides that the exchange of shares within the
meaning of the Directive may not give rise to taxation of the associate company
relinquishing its shares for exchange. However, Article 8(2) states that Member States238
may subsequently tax the gain arising out of the subsequent disposal of shares received
in the same way as the gain arising out of the transfer of shares existing before the
acquisition.
In some Member States shareholders exchanging shares in the acquired company for
shares in the acquiring company are taxed before disposing of the shares received in the
acquiring company, especially if shares in the acquired company are transferred by the
acquiring company before shareholders dispose of shares in the acquiring company.
Such an approach does not seem to be fully in line with Article 8 of the Merger
Directive which does not provide for any form of taxation before a shareholder sells




Company A of Member State A holds shares in company X. Company A exchanges its shares in company
X with company B situated in Member State B for shares in company B. Article 8(1) of the Directive
provides that the exchange of X shares for B shares may not give rise to taxation of associate A which
relinquishes its shares. However, Article 8(2) stipulates that the Member State of company A may still
apply capital gains tax on the disposal of B shares by A in the same way as the gain arising out of the
disposal of X shares existing before the exchange of shares.
The imposition by Member State A of capital gains tax on X shares which were not taxed in the exchange
of shares before company A had disposed of B shares received in exchange is questionable. This would
be, for example, where company A is taxed by Member State A when company B disposes of X shares
even if it had not disposed of B shares received in the exchange of shares.
 3UREOHPVQRWUHVROYHGE\WKH'LUHFWLYH
'RXEOHWD[DWLRQRIFDSLWDOJDLQV
In the case of transfers of assets some Member States have introduced provisions into
their national law requiring capital gains on the disposal of shares received in exchange
for a transfer of assets to be calculated on the basis of the book value of the assets
transferred on the date of transfer.
Similarly, in the case of exchanges of shares, some Member States require the acquiring
company, when the shares in the acquired company are disposed of, to calculate the
capital gains on these shares on the basis of the book value they would have had for the
shareholder on the date of exchange.
Consequently the same capital gains resulting from the transfer of assets or exchange of
shares may in the following two cases be taxed twice for two different shareholders:
-  Transfer of assets: the beneficiary company is taxed on the capital gains which had
been neutralised at the time the assets were transferred when the assets transferred
are disposed of; the acquiring company is taxed on the same capital gains which had
been neutralised when shares received in exchange under the transfer of assets are
sold.239
-  Exchange of shares: the shareholder is taxed on the capital gains on which taxation
had been deferred when shares in the acquiring company received in exchange for
shares in the acquired company are disposed of; the acquiring company is taxed on
the same capital gains when shares in the acquired company are sold.
%R[
([DPSOHRIGRXEOHWD[DWLRQLQWKHFDVHRIWUDQVIHUVRIDVVHWV
Company X which has its activities in Member State A transfers assets to company Y situated in Member
State B. Following this transfer of assets the activities are transferred to the permanent establishment of
company Y situated in Member State A. Company X receives in exchange for the transfer of assets shares
in company Y. The assets transferred by X to Y have a net book value of 100. At the date of the transfer
these assets are worth 300. The capital gains on the assets transferred are hence 300 - 100 = 200.
Company X receives shares in company Y which have a value corresponding to that of the assets
transferred, i.e. 300.
Article 4(1) of the Directive prohibits Member State A from taxing company X on capital gains of 200
realised on the transfer of assets. However on the disposal of the assets transferred by company X, the
permanent establishment of company Y situated in Member State A may tax the capital gains in the same
way as company X would have done if the transfer of assets had not gone ahead, including on the capital
gains of 200 which had not been taxed on the transfer of assets.
If Member State A taxes the capital gains on the disposal of Y shares received by company X on the basis
of the book value of the assets transferred (100) and not their acquisition value of 300, Member State A
will tax the capital gains of 200 which had not been taxed on the transfer of assets twice: 1. in the hands of
company Y, when this company disposes of the assets transferred, and 2. in the hands of company X,
when this company disposes of Y shares received in exchange for the transfer of assets.
Such double taxation would not appear to conflict directly with the wording of the
Directive as it is not very specific about the value for tax purposes which must be
attributed to shares received by the acquiring company in exchange for the transfer of
assets or, in the case of exchange of shares, for shares in the company acquired received
by the acquiring company. Nevertheless in the cases described above it is clear that the
same capital gain is taxed twice, albeit for two different shareholders. This is not
acceptable from an Internal Market perspective and runs against the spirit of the
Directive.
/RVVHVSUHGDWLQJWKHUHVWUXFWXULQJRSHUDWLRQ
Article 6 of the Merger Directive only requires Member States to apply to cross-border
mergers, divisions or transfers of assets the national legislation applying to such
operations in a purely domestic framework. Usually national legislation either forbids
the losses of the acquired company to be transferred to the acquiring company or only
allows this to be undertaken subject to a number of restrictions. The fact that deferrable
losses cannot be transferred from the acquired company to the acquiring company is
clearly an impediment to restructuring operations. It means companies are more likely to
abandon or defer any restructuring operations they might have planned and thus
negatively influences the competitive situation of EU businesses.240
2WKHUWUDQVIHUWD[HV
Directive 69/335/EEC of 17 July 1969 (as amended) concerning indirect taxes on the
raising of capital has not allowed capital duty to be levied on mergers since 1986.
However Article 12(1)(b) authorises, by way of derogation, Member States to charge
transfer taxes, including land registration taxes, on the transfer of immovable property
or businesses to companies. In its judgment of 11 December 1997 in the 6,) Case C-
42/96 the European Court of Justice acknowledged that this provision allows
registration, mortgage and land registration fees to be charged in connection with the
capital increase of a company brought about by the contribution of immovable property
provided that such taxes do not exceed those applicable to similar transactions in the
Member States charging them.
Such taxes which can often account for 10% of the value of the immovable property
contributed in company mergers or transfers of assets may well increase the cost of
restructuring operations covered by the Merger Directive or be an impediment to them.
The panel of experts assisting the Commission with this part of the study strongly
underlined the importance and practical relevance of this problem.
%R[
([DPSOHRIWKHFRVWRIDFURVVERUGHUUHVWUXFWXULQJRSHUDWLRQ
The following recent real-life example of a large European multinational group has been presented by
business representatives to the Commission. It can only be re-produced in an anonymous form. This group
calculated the tax costs it would incur to restructure its European activities within one single company
with permanent establishments in the Member States. The cost would be even higher if the Merger
Directive had not been adopted.
The starting point is a Dutch holding company with shares in five national sub-holding companies situated
in different Member States which themselves have holdings in three operating companies in the same
Member State. The objective is to create a structure under which the parent holding company of the group
would remain unchanged but would hold shares in only one single “European” company with five
permanent establishments. The five national sub-holding companies and 15 operating companies would
cease to exist. The means of arriving at this reorganisation would be as follows:
1.  Create a new “European” company.
2.  Transfer the assets from the 15 operating companies to the “European” company in exchange for
the new company’s shares to the 15 operating companies.
3.  The 15 operating companies sell their shares in the “European” company to the group’s parent
holding company.
Taking advantage of existing Directives, this operation would result in the following tax costs:
-  Cost of transferring assets to the “European” company: Transfer taxes (on immovable property in
particular), tax costs involved in terminating a group scheme: total of ¼PLOOLRQ&DSLWDOJDLQVWD[
on transfers of shares in the “European” company to the group parent holding company: ¼PLOOLRQ
Total cost ¼PLOOLRQ
-  If the operation is halted in the first stage (without transferring shares) ¼PLOOLRQRIFRVWVDUH
avoided but there will be an annual cost of ¼PLOOLRQDVZLWKKROGLQJWD[RQGLYLGHQGVSDLGE\WKH
“European” company to the 15 former operating companies (the Parent-Subsidiary Directive does not
apply as the 25% holding threshold is not reached). The restructuring operation will therefore cost
¼PLOOLRQSOXV¼PLOOLRQHDFK\HDU
,PSOLFDWLRQVIRUWKH3DUHQW6XEVLGLDU\'LUHFWLYH
The Parent-Subsidiary Directive applies only where the company paying the dividends
directly holds at least 25% of the capital of the company receiving them (Article 3 (1)(a)
of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive). As indicated above, attention has often been drawn241
to the difficulties created in restructuring operations by the fact that only direct holdings
are taken into account when calculating whether the Directive’s threshold is met. The
sole inclusion of direct holdings may hamper restructuring operations.
A company may, for instance, decide not to undertake a cross-border transfer of assets
to a company whose capital is held by another company in the same group if the shares
to be received in exchange account for less than 25% of the capital of the beneficiary
company. The dividends that it will receive from this company are not covered by the
Parent-Subsidiary Directive even though the subsidiary is wholly owned by other
companies in the same group.
Similarly, a transfer of assets may dilute the shareholdings in the company receiving
assets from other companies in the group and reduce their holding below the 25%
threshold. This would mean they were no longer covered by the Parent-Subsidiary
Directive. This also forms an obstacle to restructuring.
%R[
([DPSOHRQUHVWUXFWXULQJRSHUDWLRQVDQGGLYLGHQGWD[DWLRQ
Company A in Member State A belonging to a group of companies A holds 26% of company B’s capital
in Member State B. The dividends paid by company B to company A are covered by the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive. Company A holds 100% of the capital of company C situated in Member State C.
Company C transfers assets to company B and receives in exchange 10% of company B’s original capital,
i.e. 9.09% of the capital after a capital increase (10% x 100/110). Following this capital increase company
A’s holdings in company B is reduced to 26% x 100/110 = 23.63%.
The transfer of assets has the following consequences:
1.  The dividends paid by company B to company C are not covered by the Parent-Subsidiary
Directive although company C holds only 9.09% of company B’s capital. The holding of other
companies of the group in company B, here the participation of A in B, are not taken into account.
2.  Company A’s holding in company B is reduced from 26 to 23.63%. Consequently the dividends
paid by company B to company A are longer covered by the Parent-Subsidiary Directive. The
holding of C in B is not taken into account for calculating the threshold of 25% although company
A holds 100% of C.
 &RQFOXVLRQ
Although the Merger Directive has improved the situation, it is far from offering the
kind of fiscal framework that is necessary to enable companies to undertake
cross-border restructuring operations in the way they would wish. Despite the Directive
cross-border restructuring operations can still involve significant tax costs. The
Directive covers neither all companies nor all situations nor all types of taxes that
should in principle be included. Its implementation by Member States gives rise to
doubts, in particular with a view to anti-abuse clauses.
Transforming existing business structures, which are to a large extent still based on a
"national" logic, into an Internal Market structure typically creates tax liabilities that
would not occur in a purely domestic context. This may result in double-taxation and
create significant compliance costs, including the opportunity cost of accepting sub-
optimal structures. All in all, restructuring operations are much more difficult if they
involve more than one country and, and even if they are possible, involve higher tax
costs than in a purely domestic framework. This conflicts with a basic Internal Market242
requirement and results in inefficient structures and welfare losses for the Community as
a whole.
 &5266%25'(5/266&203(16$7,21
Loss-compensation in general and the difficulties encountered by businesses with loss-
offset are a key element in the analysis of tax obstacles to cross-border economic
activity in the Internal Market. The panel assisting the Commission services with this
part of the study has identified the absence of cross-border loss-relief or full
consolidation at EU level as one of the major obstacles that requires action as a matter
of priority56. The relevant issues are therefore presented in some detail. Given the
considerable complexity of the issues, first some explanations about the technical





The rules on loss-compensation differ substantially for companies within a group (i.e.
incorporated companies with a proper legal personality) and for unincorporated separate
units of one company (i.e. branches). Broadly speaking, holdings in other companies
constitute subsidiaries whereas business units of a single company abroad form
permanent establishments.
The possibility to set off losses against profits for assessing the tax liability of a single
domestic company is a basic feature of any company tax system. On the domestic level,
it is available in all Member States and by definition includes losses from domestic
branches. The detailed conditions, however, differ substantially. All Member States’ tax
legislation allow, for varying periods, the carry-forward of losses. Only a few Member
States allow for loss carry-back. The basic functioning of the arrangements is illustrated
in the following box:
                                                
56  See also: UNICE position paper RQWKHFRQVROLGDWLRQRIORVVHV, Brussels 1990243
%R[
/RVVFRPSHQVDWLRQRQWKHGRPHVWLFOHYHO
In a given period, a single domestic company establishes the taxable income by taking into account all
profits and losses of the company headquarter and all branches in the national territory. The entity is taxed
as one company and thus by definition full loss-offset is ensured.
0HPEHU6WDWH$
If the overall result of the company is negative, the loss can be carried forward to future tax periods (or
carried back to previous ones) and thus reduces the taxable profits in other years.
Most Member States permit domestic group taxation (profit consolidation) but the
details differ substantially, for example concerning ownership thresholds and whether
both direct and indirect holdings can be amalgamated. More fundamentally, three
Member States (Belgium, Greece, Italy) do not have such schemes at all and within
these Member States a branch structure would have to be used for a ’group’ to achieve




Domestic group or consolidation taxation schemes provide full effective consolidation of profits and
losses. Tax is assessed for the group and not for the individual corporations forming the group. Therefore,
losses of the parent can be offset against profits of the subsidiaries (downstream vertical) and the other
way round (upstream vertical) and if, say, the parent is making neither a loss nor a profit or when its
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 /RVVHVLQ3HUPDQHQW(VWDEOLVKPHQWV
As regards cross border situations most Member States permit, subject to certain
conditions, losses from Permanent Establishments to be relieved. Immediate relief can
be obtained under two methods –
&UHGLW,PSXWDWLRQPHWKRG
The Permanent Establishment losses are included in the Head Office’s results and the
net profits taxed. If the Permanent Establishment makes profits any tax it has paid is
creditable against the Head Office’s tax liability. The basic functioning of the
arrangements is illustrated in the following box:
%R[
7UHDWPHQWRIORVVHVRISHUPDQHQWHVWDEOLVKPHQWVIRUHLJQEUDQFKHVFUHGLWPHWKRG
A single domestic company has foreign branch(es)/permanent establishment(s).
The parent company includes the income (positive or negative) of its permanent establishments and











As above but no credit is given for the Permanent Establishment tax. The basic






The losses incurred in a certain period by a permanent establishment (or a subsidiary) of a company are
credited. In the subsequent years, the profits of the permanent establishment (or subsidiary) are also
included in the taxable base of the company.
year 1 year 2
0HPEHU6WDWH$ SURILWV; SURILWV;
ORVVHV; SURILWV;






Therefore in both cases the losses of a Permanent Establishment are effectively
recognised at the Head Office level as incurred, as are any subsequent profits.
The rules are often complex and differ between Member States. For example not all
Member States permit unused tax credits to be carried forward and therefore where a
Permanent Establishment is profitable and pays tax, but the combined Head Office and
Permanent Establishment tax liability is less than the local tax suffered by the
Permanent Establishment part of the tax credit may be lost. Many Member States limit
the tax credit to the hypothetical domestic tax which would have been due on the
Permanent Establishment profits had it been a domestic branch rather than a foreign
Permanent Establishment.
A form of deferred relief for losses is available when a Member State applies a third
method – the exemption method. Neither profits nor losses are recognised at the Head
Office level. However, given that in many cases a newly established Permanent
Establishment will make losses in early years, followed by profits, this may be less
advantageous than the other two methods where recognition is immediate. The basic












Only two Member States (DK, F) extend immediate cross border loss relief to
subsidiaries (again this is subject to certain conditions) both under the
deduction/reintegration method.
A measure of relief is available in some Member States who permit the parent company
a tax deduction for a write down in the carrying value of its investment in a subsidiary
when it has made losses. However, such a deduction is limited to the carrying value in
the balance sheet, and would only be available after the losses had been incurred (and
the loss of value was considered permanent).
In most cases there is no provision for recognising losses incurred in a foreign
subsidiary and the situation can arise where the subsidiary makes losses in excess of the
parent company’s profits, ie the group is in an overall loss position, but tax is still due
because the parent is unable to relieve the losses against its profits and reports a taxable
profit.
 7KHFRPSXWDWLRQRIORVVHV
It is important to note that, given the absence of any approximation of rules in Member
States, a loss in one Member State is not necessarily recognised as such in another, as
there is no common definition of "losses" and the basic approaches vary. In some
Member States they are based on civil law categories whereas in others more economic
or fiscal concepts are applied. The question is also linked to Member States' approaches
on accounting standards. Where cross-border loss-compensation is available, it is
therefore most important to determine which country's rules are to be applied: those of
the parent company or those of the subsidiary/permanent establishment. Currently,






Logically, the issue of loss compensation cannot be separated from the general determination of the
taxable base and taxable income leading to a loss. Rules differ significantly between Member States in this
respect. There are various aspects to this: the definition of various categories of income, the recognition of
business expenses for tax purposes, the interrelation between specific (positive or negative) elements of
the tax base and the deductibility of the overall loss. Against this background, it is also important to make
sure that losses are not deducted (or offset) twice, in two different countries.
Some examples highlighting the difficulties and differences in this area are illustrated in the following
questions:
–  Are capital gains and losses included in the definition of "loss"?
–  What about imputed costs (e.g. the theoretical income from letting a house occupied by the owner)?
–  Are representation costs deductible? To what extent?
–  Can revenue in all income categories be offset with expenses from all income categories or are there
limits (e.g. between "active" and "passive" categories of income)?
–  Which is the tax period for assessing the revenue and for assessing the deductible expenses?
–  When are revenues and expenses (gains and losses) realized, i.e. accounted for, for tax purposes?
–  What is the territorial scope for revenues and expenses (gains and losses) to be taken into account?
Notwithstanding the different treatment in Member States, it should be noted that for many of the above
aspects a certain de facto approximation has taken place in Member States over the last few years. But the
inclusion of some losses seems to remain highly controversial (e.g. capital losses).
 &RQVROLGDWLRQRISURILWVDQGORVVHV
Finally, even within Member States there are a number of varying group taxation or
consolidation schemes. In some of them, a parent-company will include the income of
its subsidiaries in its profit-determination and pay tax accordingly, in others losses may
be ‘surrendered’ to other group companies. As mentioned above, in at least two Member
States group taxation provisions are extended to foreign subsidiaries, thus extending the
potential loss-relief cross-border (Denmark, France). In Denmark this applies to
subsidiaries and in France this applies because of a different notion of the territoriality
principle.
The offsetting of domestic losses at lower group levels, i.e. horizontal offsetting of
profits and losses between subsidiaries is in principle available in almost all Member
States. This implies that once a ‘group’ has been established one company (generally the
parent) can settle the tax for the whole combined group of companies. However, even
when the principle of consolidating the taxable results of several separate group
companies is accepted the detailed rules can create problems. Ownership thresholds may
differ, as may the rules for vertical or horizontal offsets. There is no generalhorizontal
EU cross-border offset of losses (which would imply that the group of companies can
determine at EU level the individual taxpayer within the group that will offset the results
of other group members).
Within a single Member State, in a domestic group of companies, whether loss offsets
are available both upwards and downwards (vertical) or sideways (horizontal) is perhaps
less relevant than the type of losses, and the amount of losses which can be offset. Full
consolidation is only achieved if losses brought forward can also be offset, or
surrendered; otherwise relief for these losses is only achieved when the individual248
company returns to profit. Similarly if the amount of losses which a subsidiary can
surrender to its parent is restricted to the current profits of the parent the routes
permitted become potentially important.
The same principles apply to cross border operations, and when assessing the
effectiveness of the various techniques currently available for cross border loss
compensation these factors must be taken into account.
The basic functioning of the consolidation is illustrated in the following box:
%R[
&URVVERUGHUFRQVROLGDWLRQRISURILWVDQGORVVHV
The existing consolidation schemes work vertical upwards, i.e. losses of the subsidiaries are taken into







The range of different domestic provisions on loss compensation (concerning both
losses resulting from domestic activities and foreign investment) is considered
detrimental to the good functioning of the Internal Market and may work as an obstacle
in the broad sense to cross-border economic activity. The same holds, at least in
principle, for the different group taxation schemes the detailed differences of which are
no doubt a feature taken into account in business location decisions. The effects of these
differences are also no doubt reflected in the group structure and in the choice of
permanent establishments rather than subsidiaries. This, of course, applies to all
differences in company tax systems in Member States. Loss-compensation is, however,
a particularly important element in these systems and the different prospective tax
treatment of possible losses resulting from the investment in different Member States
affects significantly investment decisions. Therefore, companies based in countries with
more generous rules for cross-border loss compensation will be put in a favourable
competitive position compared to those who are not. In this context it is noteworthy
Parent company
X
sub. X1 sub. X2249
that, subject to the appropriate Federal consolidation rules, US companies benefit from
offset of losses within their home market.
As regards the domestic loss-compensation arrangements, carry-forward and carry-back
are important criteria in deciding whether to take an economic risk in a country. Small
businesses are particularly hit by not being able to carry back losses, and small start-up
companies in particular risk losing the benefit of losses which they are not able to carry-
forward long enough for offsetting (or only when their value has effectively
diminished). According to the indications made by members of the expert panel
assisting the Commission services with this part of the study, the increasing importance
of cost centres (implying either cost-sharing/pooling arrangements or royalty payments)
in modern EU-wide branch structures tend to exacerbate these problems. Cost centres
for R&D are a good example. In this context, however, it should not be overlooked that
cost centres, whether organised as a subsidiary or permanent establishment, often also
give rise to transfer pricing problems which are considered below.
%LDVWRZDUGVGRPHVWLFLQYHVWPHQWDQGLQYHVWPHQWLQODUJHU0HPEHU6WDWHV
The current situation also implies a clear incentive for companies to invest in those
countries where sufficient taxable profits are available against which future losses can
be set off. In the absence of cross-border relief, investments in a location with an
existing tax base, mostly in bigger Member States, will tend to be favoured. Moreover,
the present arrangements put foreign investment at a disadvantageous position compared
to domestic investment. Loss-compensation is generally available domestically but not
always in cross-border situations and even when cross-border loss compensation is
available, the general conditions (timing, availability of profits etc.) are more generous
in the domestic context. Whenever, due to the above arrangements and their interplay,
losses that cannot be absorbed locally (either immediately or in later periods via carry-
forward) cannot be offset against profits within the same group of companies,
(economic) double taxation occurs. When loss-relief can only be obtained in the future
when an activity becomes profitable, there is no double-taxation but in cross-border
situations foreign losses may be offset later than domestic ones. The resulting interest






Company A possesses all shares of company B, purchased at a value of 500.000 ¼$JHQHUDWHVDSURILWRI
1.000.000 ¼DJLYHQ\HDUZKLOH%DVWDUWXSFRPSDQ\VXIIHUVDORVVRI¼,IFRPSDQ\%LV
resident in the country in which A is registered, under a Consolidated Tax Regime both companies are
considered as a single taxpayer (subject to certain conditions, e.g. if A holds at least a certain percentage
of the B shares). The consolidated group tax base is the result of the sum of the components’ tax bases, i.e.
400.000 ¼LQWKLVFDVH7KHORVVHVRIWKHGRPHVWLFVXEVLGLDU\DUHWKXVHQWLUHO\WDNHQLQWRDFFRXQWIRU
determining the parent company’s profits. A possible excess loss can be carried forward up to ten taxable
periods.
This group taxation is only available under the condition that all companies are tax residents in the same
country. If B is not tax resident, its tax base of - 600.000 ¼KDVWREHWDNHQLQWRDFFRXQWXQGHU%
VGRPHVWLF
tax law. However, A will, in certain Member States, be allowed to build up a provision reflecting the
lower value of B's shares. Generally, such a tax effective provision (book-reserve) for shares quoted on
the stock market is possible when the market value is lower than the acquisition value. For non-quoted
shares the provision is deductible for the difference between the theoretical value at the beginning and the
end of any given year. In both cases, the maximum provision possible is normally limited by the share
acquisition value (i.e. the loss in value is restricted to cost). Consequently, A's tax base amounts to
500.000 ¼ UHVXOWLQJ IURP WKH SURILWV RI  ¼ UHGXFHG E\ WKH SURYLVLRQ RI  ¼ ,I WKH
subsidiary is not tax resident, losses are taken into account through tax deductible provisions subject to the
shares’ acquisition value. The excess cannot be carried forward.
Even when the losses of foreign branches (permanent establishments) are immediately
transferable to the head office, the overall tax situation still works in favour of local
branches. For instance, in countries operating the tax credit method for permanent
establishments, the losses of foreign branches (permanent establishments) are an
integral part of the head office determination of the taxable base as are those from any
domestic branch. When, however, losses are made in the country of the head office and
taxable profits arise in the foreign branch country, the profits of the permanent
establishment often reduce the overall tax loss available for carry-forward in the home
country, even though tax has already been paid in the country of the permanent
establishment. This boils down to effective double-taxation of identical income in the
two Member States involved, which can only be avoided if the tax credit granted in the
headquarter state for compensating the foreign tax can be carried forward to subsequent
tax periods. This is currently not a common feature of Member States’ tax systems.
The basic problem is illustrated by the example in the following box:251
%R[
([DPSOHRQORVVFRPSHQVDWLRQ/RVVHVLQDGRPHVWLFEUDQFKYVORVVHVLQDIRUHLJQEUDQFK
A Belgian company sets up a branch in Rotterdam. The losses which the company suffers in Belgium are
available for carry-forward and set-off against future profits, but only after being reduced by the profits
made in the foreign branch (even when these profits have been taxed there). If the branch is set up in
Antwerp, the amount of losses of the head office that may be set off against future profits is the same as
for a branch in Rotterdam but the profits of the branch are not taxed. This situation may also illustrate why
industry representatives constantly suggest that the permanent establishment should be able to offset the
head office losses against its profits.
5HODWLRQWRGRXEOHWD[DWLRQFRQYHQWLRQV
Generally, the varying availability of loss-compensation is often influenced by the
arrangements in double-taxation treaties and the double taxation relief method
(exemption vs. credit method) applied. It may therefore change even for identical
transactions within one country, thus creating significantly different competitive
conditions for competing EU businesses.The respective advantages and disadvantages
of the exemption method and the foreign tax credit system are not discussed here.
However, some points for discussion should be noted. The above example comparing
domestic and foreign branches illustrates a peculiarity of the functioning of credit
methods. Moreover, it is logical to argue that under the exemption method foreign
branch profits are not subject to tax in the head office country and that consequently the
losses should not be taken into account either. In any case, this situation provides an
obstacle to cross-border expansion inasmuch as the benefit of start-up losses is lost (or
the losses can only be offset after a long period when they have lost their value).
It follows from the foregoing that the differing loss-compensation arrangements do not
only impact on the decision on where to locate but also on how to carry out an
investment. This is, for instance, an effect of the different treatment of cross-border
losses of permanent establishments (which can immediately be transferred to the parent-
company) and subsidiaries (which can generally not be offset against parent profits).
Where operations are initiated abroad with foreseeable substantial start-up losses, the
possibility of cross-border loss compensation offered by branches (forming permanent
establishments) will induce companies to opt for this legal form rather than for
immediate incorporation of the foreign operation (as a subsidiary), even though the
latter may well be the preferred structure for other reasons. It is therefore not uncommon
to see permanent establishments being transformed into subsidiaries when they become
profitable (an activity is initially operated via a permanent establishment so that its
losses can be offset in the head office but when it moves into profitability it is converted
into a subsidiary). It should however not be overlooked that in many situations
companies effectively do not have a choice between the two legal forms of running





The issue of cross-border losses was first considered by the European Court of Justice in Case C-250/95
Futura Participations, where it held that Luxembourg was entitled to demand that losses of a French
company with a permanent establishment in Luxembourg should have an economic link with its territory
in order to be taken into account. The limitation was said to be justified because Luxembourg only
exercised source taxation. The Court considered that, provided residents who were liable for tax were not
given more favourable treatment, this condition was compatible with Article 52 of the Treaty because it
was in line with the principle of tax territoriality.
The second time that the European Court of Justice dealt with the issue was in its judgment of 14
December 2000 in the case C-141/99 Algemene Maatschappij voor Investering en Dienstverlening NV
(AMID) v Belgische Staat. In this case, the Court had to consider the following situation: The Belgian tax
legislation establishes an order of set off for losses which in the AMID case had the effect of requiring
AMID’s Belgian Head Office losses be set off against its Luxembourg Permanent Establishment’s profits,
even though these profits were exempt from Belgian tax under the Double Tax Agreement between
Belgium and Luxembourg. Therefore these losses were not available for offset against subsequent Belgian
Head Office profits, and in effect were never relieved against taxable Belgian profits. In contrast, had
AMID’s permanent establishment been Belgian then the Head Office losses would have been relieved
against the permanent establishment profits. Despite the fact that the legislation could also produce a
situation where a company benefited (a profitable Belgian Head Office with a lossmaking Luxembourg
permanent establishment could relieve the Luxembourg losses against both the Belgian Head Office
profits for Belgian tax purposes and also relieve them against subsequent Luxembourg permanent
establishment profits for Luxembourg tax purposes) the Court found that AMID suffered an inequality of
treatment in relation to companies without establishments outside Belgium. Since there was no objective
difference between such companies and no justification for this discriminatory treatment it created a
hindrance to the freedom of establishment guaranteed by Article 52 of the Treaty and such legislation is
therefore precluded by the Treaty. The AMID case illustrates the application of the non-discrimination
principle in relation to the taxation of permanent establishments. It may have wider implications for the
situation where losses incurred by foreign subsidiaries are currently not relievable against domestic
profits, but losses incurred either by foreign permanent establishments or by domestic subsidiaries are
relievable.
The European Court of Justice has not yet to rule on other cases in this area. In particular, it did not have
occasion to consider whether a residence state applying the credit method (and hence claiming taxing
rights over foreign profits) must take account of foreign losses incurred in another Member State.
 7KHFRVWRIWKHDEVHQFHRIFURVVERUGHUORVVFRPSHQVDWLRQ
The basic difficulties encountered by internationally active EU businesses are a very
frequent phenomenon. For instance, a recent survey by the Federation of Swedish
Industries reveals that for 96% of the participating companies having suffered cross-
border losses, it had not been possible or only partly possible to set off these losses
against profits of other companies in the group. According to the survey, in 56 % of the
cases this has resulted in permanent double taxation to at least some degree.
According to information provided by various members of the panel assisting the
Commission with this part of the study, EU-based multinationals could have made
considerable savings if they had been allowed to offset losses incurred by subsidiaries in
other EU Member States with the profits of the parent company (or even within the
group as a whole). The savings resulting from such an arrangement would be primarily
in terms of financing cost, as a consequence of advancing loss-compensation compared
to the current situation. There is clear evidence of numerous EU-based groups paying253
substantial amounts of corporate taxes in specific Member States while the overall EU
group result was negative. UNICE gives the example of a company having in 1993-1995
overall losses of 880 m. ECU in various EU Member States whereas it had taxable
profits in other Member States amounting to 870 m. ECU, resulting in the payment of
corporate taxes in the latter countries of 320 m. ECU. Clearly, full cross-border loss-
compensation would have prevented this tax payment in this period. It also mentions
one particular company with overall profitability in Europe but losses in some Member
States and profits and others. This overall company loss carry-forward is reported to be
820 m. ECU (1996) which gives an idea about the possible cost-savings that would be
achievable via immediate loss-compensation.
Loss-compensation arrangements are also very important in the case of mergers and
acquisitions. It is evident that while carrying out cross-border business restructuring
operations, companies try to preserve accumulated pre-conversion losses and ensure
their tax-effectiveness, i.e. current or future absorption. Generally, in some countries,
costs arising from the acquisition and holding of foreign equity are not or only to a
limited extent deductible which can lead to significant taxation of assumed gains. Under
specific circumstances, however, the post-merger situation can offer more possibilities
of loss-compensation than the pre-merger situation (e.g. when two associated companies
can reflect losses only via provisions before the merger whereas, at least in many
Member States, the permanent establishment created through the merger offers full
cross-border offsetting of losses).
%R[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Set up of the survey
In order to investigate the magnitude of this obstacle the Federation of Swedish Industries has made a
survey among its member companies. The Federation has approximately 6 000 member companies from
the manufacturing industry, transportation, telecommunication and information technology. The member
companies count for approximately 90 % of the industrial export from Sweden. The survey was carried
out by sending out a questionnaire concerning the frequency of losses on cross-border activities and
inquiring to what extent it had been possible to set off the losses suffered against profits in other Member
States. It was also asked to what extent these difficulties had influenced their activities and/or the
organisation of their businesses. The questionnaire was distributed to all member companies (or groups of
affiliated companies) having more than 25 employees, in all 1086 companies (only one questionnaire per
group of companies). Out of these 1086 companies 706, or 65 %, have answered the questionnaire. A
limited random telephone survey among the non-answering companies indicates that the main reason for
not answering was the fact that they had no affiliate companies in any other Member State than Sweden.
Therefore they had considered the survey not applicable to them.
Comments to the results of the survey
-  Out of the 706 responding companies 216 companies, 30%, had activities in other Member States.
46% of these companies were foreign owned and 54% Swedish owned. Some companies, not having
activities in other EU countries have nevertheless answered some of the following questions, which
explains that the number of total answers on the following questions sometimes exceeds 216. This has
been taken into account in the analysis.
-  Almost 50 % of the responding companies had activities in more than five Member States. That
shows that the average company has widespread international activities within the European Union.
33 % have activities in only one or two Member States.
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-  Out of the 216 companies having activities also in other Member States 172 companies, that is 81%,
have suffered losses in one or more Member States. 1/3 of the companies have suffered losses several
times.
-  In 166 companies, or 96% of the companies having suffered cross-border losses, it had not been
possible or only partly possible to set off these losses against profits of other companies in the group.
In 56 % of the cases this has resulted in permanent double taxation to at least some degree. Together
with the answers to other questions, this shows that 77 % of the companies having cross-border
activities within the European Union have suffered from a higher tax burden because of the
difficulties of setting off losses against profits in other Member States. In more than 50 % of the cases
the result has been permanent double taxation to some degree and in the remaining cases temporary
liquidity and interest losses.
-  Of those companies suffering losses on cross-border activities 73 companies indicated that the
difficulties to set off losses against profits in other Member States had influenced the organisation or
structure of their activities.
-  A breakdown of the figures in categories of small companies (less than 100 employees), medium
sized companies, (100-500 employees), and companies with more than 500 employees has been
made. The breakdown shows that small companies have fewer cross-border activities, only 13% of
the companies, than larger companies. However, the small companies have had greater difficulties
setting off losses against profits in other Member States. Those difficulties have not influenced their
organisation to any substantial degree (quite naturally as they have fewer options for restructuring
their businesses).
Comments by participating companies
The companies were invited to give comments on the causes and effects of the difficulties of cross-border
loss-setoffs. All together, 114 comments were given. Here they have been classified into 10 different
categories.
-  According to 29 comments the cross-border loss problems have caused the companies to choose a tax
motivated organisation of their businesses (e.g. national subgroups, holding company structures),
instead of a business motivated structure such as an organisation by business sectors. In some cases a
branch structure has been chosen instead of having the foreign operations organised in separate
subsidiaries which otherwise would have been the natural organisation.
-  According to 21 comments the cross-border loss problems gave rise to a higher over all tax burden
for European businesses and have also caused liquidity problems and reduced expansion possibilities.
Also, the survival of the business have been threatened. In two cases the problems have led to a
liquidation of the business.
-  In 16 comments transfer pricing problems have been listed as one of the main reasons for the cross-
border loss problems.
-  In 12 comments a system for group taxation within the Union is recommended as a solution to the
cross-border loss problems.
-  According to 8 comments the cross-border loss problems have caused a more complex and more
costly organisation of the businesses.
-  According to 9 comments the fragmentation of the European tax systems causes great problems for
European businesses and the organisation of the businesses.
-  According to 8 comments reorganisations and restructurings are hampered by the loss problems and
other tax obstacles. The Merger Directive does not work satisfactorily.
-  According to 6 comments the businesses have been organised with a sub-parent company in
Denmark, as Denmark applies international consolidation and allows offsetting of foreign losses.
-  According to 6 comments VAT problems are very serious.
-  According to one comment the time limitation for loss deductions, existing in some Member States,
causes severe problems.255
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The current situation in the EU leads to the taxation of company profits which, where
foreign investment is involved, do not reflect the overall result of the business activities.
In certain cases, this could result in discriminatory treatment. The non-availability or
limitation of cross-border loss-compensation thus results in (economic) double- and
over-taxation. Where limited cross-border compensation is available specific corporate
structures may be required, thus influencing commercial decisions. Industry considers
this one of the most important impediments to cross-border economic activities and in
conflict with the very concept of the Internal Market.
Moreover, there appear to be good grounds to conclude that generally the company tax
law of Member States contains a bias towards favouring domestic investment, thus
indirectly hampering cross-border economic activities. This is in particular true in the
larger Member States, because the domestic market of such States may be large enough
to accommodate one important enterprise, while an enterprise of the same size operating
from a smaller Member State is immediately confronted with the lack of cross-border
loss compensation of some parts of its business operating in other Member States.
The effects of the above arrangements culminate in what many commentators consider
violations of the basic right of free establishment (e.g. the economic problems resulting
from the different treatment of permanent establishments and subsidiaries).
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 7KH LQFUHDVLQJ LPSRUWDQFH RI WUDQVIHU SULFLQJ DV DQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO
FRPSDQ\WD[SUREOHPDQGLQWKH,QWHUQDO0DUNHW
It practically goes without saying that transfer pricing issues need to be considered when
analysing possible company tax obstacles to cross-border economic activity in the
Internal Market. Market operators emphasise the ever increasing importance of the
issue, citing unduly high compliance costs as well as clear instances of double taxation.
Some have even raised the more fundamental question whether the allocation of tax
revenues between Member States on the basis of the ’arm’s length principle’ and
’separate accounting’, which lie at the heart of transfer pricing, is still the most
appropriate way of "dividing the tax cake" within the EU. As a matter of fact, in the
Internal Market, with its increasing market integration as well as the increasing
importance of intangibles make it increasingly difficult in practice to divide profits on a
traditional transaction basis.
In principle, ’transfer pricing’ based on the ’arm’s length principle’ represents a coherent
and sound concept for establishing the correct attribution of company profits between
countries. Moreover, the general requirement to enforce tax legislation via such means
as particular documentation requirements and tax audits is not in question. However,
many experts are questioning whether these traditional means, as applied by tax
administrations in the field of transfer pricing within the Internal Market, are still the
most appropriate and efficient. Increasingly they produce inconclusive or even
contradictory results at a high cost and the potential problems, and potential ways of
resolving these are analysed below.256
The 1992 Ruding report identified transfer pricing as one of the most important areas for
the future in international taxation and for the Internal Market and made some
recommendations including, but not limited to, the ratification of the EU Arbitration
Convention. However, the Ruding report did not analyse in any detail the problem of
transfer pricing in the context of the Internal Market. As indicated in Part I of this study,
the completion of the Internal Market and other international developments like the
almost exponential growth of intra-group cross-border trade now call for a more
thorough analysis. This section therefore takes a more comprehensive look at whether
and how the tax arrangements concerning transfer pricing constitute an obstacle to the
Internal Market.
Given the objective of this study, this section does not explicitly cover transfer pricing
problems with third countries. However, transfer pricing is a global issue: double
taxation, high compliance costs etc. are obstacles to cross border trade, both within the
Internal Market and beyond the EU. It is nevertheless important to stress that Member
States have a responsibility to address existing tax arrangements, including those with
an impact on transfer pricing, which constitute an obstacle to the smooth functioning of
the Internal Market. In tackling these obstacles care must, however, be taken that the
LQWHUQDWLRQDO consensus on transfer pricing is not put into question.
 %DVLFFRQFHSWVRIWUDQVIHUSULFLQJDQGWKH,QWHUQDO0DUNHW
The taxation of transfer pricing is one of the most complex issues of international
taxation58. It may therefore be useful, as a basis for the following analysis, to explain





It is generally recognised that affiliated companies conducting cross-border business for
tax purposes must do this on market principles, i.e. act as if the business was being
conducted between independent parties. The price charged for goods and services - the
transfer price - therefore has to be in accordance with the so-called arm’s length
principle. The basis for the arm’s length principle is the separate entity approach; i.e.
each affiliated company in a group is for tax purposes treated as a separate entity and
taxed individually on the basis that it conducts business with other group members at
arm’s length. For the Internal Market this means that a company has to provide separate
accounting for the 15 Member States (or at least every Member State where it is active).
The separate entity approach and the arm’s length principle are globally accepted
principles in the area of international taxation. The arm’s length standard is evoked in
Article 959 of the OECD Model Convention60, and maintained and developed in the
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1995 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (Guidelines)61. The practical application of the
arm’s length principle is complex and the Guidelines provide guidance for its
application by tax administrations and taxpayers.
As indicated the application of the arm’s length principle is generally based on a
comparison of the conditions of transactions between affiliated parties (i.e. controlled
transactions) with the conditions of transactions between independent parties. The latter
transactions are generally referred to ascomparables.Comparables can be either internal
(i.e. transactions between the group company and third party) or external (i.e.
transactions between two third parties). The Guidelines include extensive guidance on
when a transaction between independent parties is sufficient comparable. Factors
determining comparability include the characteristics of the property transferred or
services provided, functions performed, risks assumed, contractual terms and economic
circumstances and business strategies. The Guidelines explicitly recognise that
comparability analysis is not an exact science, but requires an element of judgement.
Different methodologies can be applied to establish whether controlled transactions are
in accordance with the arm’s length principle. The methodologies are generally referred
to as transfer pricing methods. The Guidelines explicitly mention five transfer pricing
methods falling into two categories, which are the so-called traditional transaction
methods and the so-called ‘other’ or (transaction-based) profit methods.
                                                




The traditional transaction methods (hereinafter transaction methods) are the Comparable Uncontrolled
Price (CUP), the Resale Price Method (RPM) and the Cost Plus Method (CP). CUP compares the SULFH
for property or services transferred in a controlled transaction to the price agreed for property or services
in comparable uncontrolled transactions. If applicable, CUP is likely to be the most direct and reliable
method and is therefore preferred over all other methods. The RPM is based on the price at which a
product purchased from an affiliated company is resold to an independent enterprise. The gross margin on
a controlled transaction is compared with the gross margin of comparable uncontrolled transactions. The
resale price to a third party is then reduced by the resale price margin and the remainder constitutes the
arm’s length price at which the product is deemed to have been purchased from the related company, i.e.
RPM compares JURVVPDUJLQV The CP starts with the gross costs incurred by the supplier of property or
services in a controlled transaction. A cost plus mark is added to this cost in order to raise the price to the
level at which the product would had been sold in an uncontrolled transaction. The mark up must be
consistent with mark ups in comparable uncontrolled transactions. Consequently, the CP also compares
comparable JURVVPDUJLQV on costs. This method is most relevant for production companies or service
providers. The ‘other’ or profit methods comprise the so-called transactional profit methods (profit
methods) which examine the profits arising from controlled transactions. The Guidelines explicitly list two
profit methods, the Profit Split Method (PSM) and the Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM). The
PSM identifies the combined profit to be split between associated enterprises from a controlled
transaction, and then splits this profit between the associated enterprises on an economically valid basis
that approximates the division of profits that would have been anticipated and reflected in an agreement
made at arm's length. It is important to note that the PSM differs from all other transfer pricing methods,
including the TNMM, as according to the Guidelines it does not necessarily require the use of
comparables. PSM is also especially relevant when one or several of the parties hold valuable intangibles.
The TNMM examines the QHWSURILWPDUJLQ relative to an appropriate base (e.g. cost, sales, and assets)
that a taxpayer realises from a controlled transaction. TNMM is therefore largely similar to the RPM and
CP, the difference being that the first compares net margins, the latter gross margins. TNMM was a new
development introduced in the Guidelines and has the advantage, compared to RPM and CP, that it does
not require the same amount of detailed information concerning the cost base, i.e. direct costs and indirect
costs. Different profit based methods, in addition to the five explicitly mentioned (CUP, RPM, CP, PSM
& TNMM), although not specified in the Guidelines, may also be used provided they are consistent with
the specified profit based (methods PSM and TNMM). The most important example of such methods is
the so-called Comparable Profit Method (CPM) which originated in the U.S. CPM is to a large extent
similar to the TNMM, the difference being that TNMM stresses profit per transaction (product line etc.)
whereas CPM can be used on a more aggregated basis. It is sometimes argued that TNMM and CPM are
in practice identical although, in fact, TNMM constitutes a limited part of CPM. CPM is often used by US
companies63.
The transactional methods (CUP, RPM and CP) are, if applicable, preferred to the profit
methods (PSM, TNMM etc.). Profit methods are therefore only methods of last resort.
There are two main reasons for this. First, independent parties only rarely, if ever,
establish their prices based on a profit method. Second, profit margins or splits – and
thereby the transfer price - can be effected by factors irrelevant to the setting of transfer
prices, for instance management (in)efficiencies.
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The Guidelines introduce the so-called arm’s length range. This implies that often
comparables will produce a range of figures, which are relatively reliable, and that tax
authorities should not make adjustments provided the transfer prices are within the
range. In this way it is recognised that the application of the arm’s length principle is not
an exact science. This arm's length ‘range’ principle is also relevant for transaction
methods but is generally more important in the application of profit methods.
According to the Guidelines “practical experience has shown that in the majority of
cases, it is possible to apply traditional transaction methods”. The Guidelines reject the
use of global formula apportionment methods which work by allocating profits of a
multinational enterprise on a consolidated basis among each group member according to
a formula fixed in advance.
'RFXPHQWDWLRQUHTXLUHPHQWV
A key issue is the question of what kind of documentation a group company needs to





aim atmaintaining a balance between the right of tax administrations to obtain from tax
payers as much information as possible to ascertain whether the price is or is not of an
arm's length nature, and the compliance cost that any documentation rules imply for the
taxpayer. The Guidelines recognise that the tax payer should make reasonable efforts, at
the time transfer prices are set, to determine whether the arm's length principle is
satisfied, and that tax authorities can expect or require tax payers to maintain
documentation to support this. However, the amount and type of documentation
required should be in proportion to the circumstances of each case. In this context the
Guidelines introduce the important concept of the ‘prudent business manager’. This
implies that the process of considering transfer prices should be carried out in
accordance with the same prudent business management principles as would govern the
process of evaluating any other business decision of similar complexity and importance.
The Guidelines provide a list of items, which are likely to be useful in most cases, and
other types of information that will be useful in many cases; but they do not include an
exhaustive list of documents that the taxpayer should prepare. The Guidelines do
explicitly mention that enterprises are not required to use more that one transfer pricing
method, and also state that that there should be no contemporaneous requirement for
supporting documentation to be prepared either at the time the prices are set or when the




Member States’ legislation generally also obliges domestic intra-group transactions to
take place at arm’s length. However, in practice, transfer pricing is mainly a cross-
border issue which creates specific compliance costs and contains a risk of double
taxation. Multinational enterprises with cross-border transactions find themselves
confronted with a number of difficulties that are explored in detail below:
-  (sometimes heavy) documentation requirements,260
-  the risk of penalties and economic double taxation,
-  the costs of temporarily having to finance the same tax burden twice and
-  increased auditing by the tax authorities.
A general problem in this context for multinational enterprises is the one of uncertainty.
It is claimed by business that there is a risk of suddenly having a business structure
which has perhaps been in place for a number of years undermined by the tax authorities
who will - for transfer pricing reasons - no longer accept it from a tax point of view.
Moreover, according to the business representatives in the panel it is not uncommon that
a certain structure and/or transfer price (or the application of a specific method) might
be acceptable to one Member State but not to another.
Transfer pricing thus represents an additional burden for a company in one Member
State to set-up and/or conduct business with an affiliated company in another Member
State, and instead favours domestic investments/transactions. Furthermore, as
independent enterprises are not subject to transfer pricing regulations on cross border
transactions they will be in a better position than multinational enterprises. Transfer
pricing can also affect the location of cross border investments. All other things being
equal, a company would be less likely to set-up a subsidiary or branch in another
Member State with a stricter transfer pricing policy than in another Member State with
more lenient rules.
Small and medium-sized enterprises can be particularly hit by these problems.
Frequently they are not even familiar with the basic concepts of transfer pricing and do
not have the appropriate resources and structures to deal with the problem when they,
say, create a first subsidiary abroad.
The setting of intra-group transfer prices in accordance with the separate entity approach
and the arm’s length principle does not necessarily correspond to the prices set for
business reasons (effectiveness, performance measurement etc.). This has always been
the case. However, business representatives maintain that the very concept of the arm’s
length principle will in the future lose its underlying commercial rationale. This is
because large companies, in view of their EU-wide corporate restructuring, adopt so-
called Euro-pricing. As sketched out above in Part I, as a result of the price convergence
expected under the single currency, one transfer price is used per harmonised
(intermediate) product for the group in the whole of Europe, regardless of which
production facility the goods are purchased from. Business argues that from a
management point of view, this avoids intra-group disputes about price levels and
permits an optimum efficiency in the structure.261
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Multinational enterprises are usually organised in relatively autonomous divisions which are responsible
for the (non-strategic) commercial decision-making. This often includes responsibility of the division
management for their own profits (profit centre structure). On the one hand, this implies that every
division must be able to decide whether buying a certain (semi-finished) product with third parties or from
another related division. On the other hand, it must be ensured that the objective of profitability at division
level does not hamper the profit-maximising objectives of other divisions or the overall group. A fully
developed transfer pricing system of a multinational enterprise would have to motivate divisional
managers and employees, allow the headquarter to evaluate the performance of the divisional management
and link its remuneration to it, be perceived as fair by both the selling and the purchasing unit and allow
for an optimal allocation of resources within the group. It is often difficult to find a transfer price that
meets all these objectives. For instance, if there is an unused production facility it would make sense, in an
overall group perspective, to instruct the supplying unit to transfer its output to the down-stream affiliate
at only marginal or variable cost. This means, however, that the supplier cannot recover its fixed cost and
will incur a loss on this transaction. Thus, the objective of maximising the group profit conflicts with the
objective of maximising the divisional profit. This kind of question has received extensive attention in the
management literature. It shows that transfer prices that are set for commercial reasons are not necessarily
identical to the arm’s length price that is usually requested for taxation purposes.
Moreover, multinational enterprises will also have an incentive to apply non-arm’s
length prices in transactions with affiliated companies in those Member States who have
taken a ’robust’ line in the transfer pricing area. By providing affiliates based in these
‘robust’ Member States with more than an arm's length remuneration, transfer pricing
problems with those Member States’ tax authorities can be avoided.
3URILWVKLIWLQJWKURXJKWUDQVIHUSULFLQJ
This introduces the issue of profit shifting. Transfer pricing can of course be used as a
tax-planning tool not simply to shift profits into those Member States with a ‘robust’
approach but also to shift profit from high tax to low tax jurisdictions by charging non-
arm's length prices. It is, however, difficult to assess to what extent manipulation of
transfer prices is systematically used as a profit-shifting instrument.
The Ruding report mentions that transfer pricing manipulation in the early 1990s was
becoming less prevalent due to multinationals’ movement away from the concept of cost
centres towards that of profit centres, which make it more difficult to manipulate prices,
and because of the increased interest paid to the subject by tax authorities. These trends
have continued. The Ernst & Young survey presented below, a document commissioned
by a private tax consultancy firm which represents the only available large scale survey
in this area, supports the idea that transfer prices are not systematically used to shift
profit. According to the survey business consider transfer pricing mainly as a
compliance exercise and not a tax-planning tool. Prices are set to maximise operating
profit, not to lower the tax burden.
A certain narrowing of the range between effective company tax rates in the different
Member States in the last decade may also have reduced the incentive for transfer
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pricing tax planning and deliberate profit-shifting. Instead, when intra-group
transactions do not meet the arm’s length principle, this would mainly be caused by the
complexity of the transfer pricing rules, the difficulties in finding comparables, or
because no attempt to check whether intra-group prices are at arm’s length has been
made at all.
The introduction of new business structures - as part of a corporate reconstruction -
where an affiliate of a multinational enterprise has its functions or its risks reduced,
may, by some tax administrations, be considered to have been motivated mainly or
solely for tax purposes. This might particularly be the case in reorganisations where
functions and risks are transferred to one or several affiliates resident in tax havens or
subject to a preferential tax scheme. Business claims such business reorganisations are
done primarily for business reasons and not to save tax and that the tax authorities
generally should accept them. In this context it is also important to note that the
possibilities for such types of tax planning instruments will be reduced significantly by
the current exercises in the EU and in the OECD aimed at eliminating harmful tax
measures.
However, in contrast to the Ernst & Young survey comprehensive studies made by some
US researchers show that transfer pricing in a US context frequently is used to shift
profit from high to low tax jurisdictions. The tightening up of the US transfer pricing
rules in the early 1990s was based on studies showing that transfer pricing was used to a
large extent to avoid taxation in the USA. There is also some evidence on profit shifting
within the EU65. However, overall the available studies do not show uniform results on
this question. In short, one can therefore conclude that, while there is undoubtedly
evidence for aggressive transfer pricing by companies, there are equally genuine
concerns for companies which are making a bona fide attempt to comply with the
complex and sometimes conflicting transfer pricing rules of different countries.
7KHUROHRIWD[DGPLQLVWUDWLRQV
Although it is not directly an obstacle to the Internal Market, the effect of transfer
pricing on tax authorities should also be mentioned. Tax administrations also suffer
from the high compliance costs of transfer pricing. Transfer pricing auditing differs
from normal auditing by being complex and expensive, and by requiring highly skilled
tax auditors. It takes up a lot of resources, which in many cases can only be taken away
from other audit areas. Of course a Member State can reduce these “difficulties” - and
some have done so - by introducing robust transfer pricing rules, notably in the form of
tough (up-front) documentation rules backed up by penalties for non-compliance, which
transfers the burden to business and to other tax administrations.
It is important to stress that the above aspects must be seen in the context of Member
States’ increasing interest in transfer pricing. Most Member States have increased
auditing efforts in the transfer pricing area. These and other measures have been taken to
ensure that the Member State gets its fair share of the “global tax cake”. Some Member
States have found themselves in a situation where they had no other choice than to also
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introduce documentation requirements etc., the alternative being that tax would instead
be paid in those countries with stricter documentation requirements, stricter penalties
etc. There is a risk that this will lead to a kind of UDFHWRWKHWRS between Member
States, where business, the Internal Market and international trade in general can only be
the loser.
The following box illustrates the increased interest that governments have taken in the










Another problem is the different application of transfer pricing rules in Member States.
The Guidelines therefore do not eliminate all the differences between transfer pricing
rules in the Member States.
Based on this analysis there is little doubt that transfer pricing currently constitutes an
obstacle to exploiting the full benefits of the Internal Market as it represents a
significant compliance burden which does not arise in the domestic context. The






One of the most essential aspects of transfer pricing is that of the need for comparables
for benchmarking - the arm’s length concept as such is based on the existence of such
comparables. As indicated above in part I, it was generally assumed in the mid 1990s
that 60% of all global trade took place intra-group. The increased globalisation, which
has led to an increase in the number of mergers and acquisitions, implies that this figure
is now even higher. This trend will also be fuelled by the typical changes of business
organisations from horizontal to vertical structures, with fewer (but) bigger production
units. In the past, local subsidiaries carried out all the business functions (purchases,
production and sales etc). This is no longer the case to the same extent. Therefore the
volume of intra-group trade will have increased. On this basis the assumption must be264
that the scope for finding transactions between independent parties is not large and is
diminishing.
Another aspect is that multinational groups can conduct business in ways which
independent companies cannot and this can give rise to problems in finding
comparables. A standard example is the use of certain types of intangibles, e.g. know
how, where companies are normally not willing to allow independent parties access to
these intangibles which constitute business secrets. Other standard examples are
headquarter services (e.g. administrative and technical services), which by definition are
not relevant for independent companies, and cost sharing. Numerous other examples
exist, for instance the use of contract manufacturers and companies that perform
contract R&D – who carry few risks and therefore can be remunerated on a cost plus
basis. These are much more commonly used within multinational enterprises than
outside by independents. When the whole business structure of multinational enterprises
differs so fundamentally from that of independent parties it can reasonably be assumed
that it is difficult to find comparables. In sum, the fact that intangibles are becoming
increasingly important makes it more difficult to find comparables. Increased reliance
on intangibles (both production and marketing intangibles) is caused by the new
business structures, new technologies (Intranet etc.) and because products are becoming
more complex.
All these structural constraints affect the search for comparables and the quality of (any)
comparables which are identified. As mentioned above transaction methods are
generally preferred to profit methods and they rely to a great extent on multinational
enterprises having internal comparables. It is often the case that a multinational
enterprise does not have transactions with independent parties, other than when the
product etc. is sold to the ultimate end user, or that if it does, these transactions might
not actually be comparable, for instance because the sales to independent parties only
take place on marginal markets, because of low volume etc.
3UDJPDWLFVROXWLRQVIRUWKHODFNRIFRPSDUDEOHV
As a result multinational enterprises in practice often have to search for so-called
external comparables, i.e. comparables between two independents parties available from
commercial databases66. Apart from the fact that commercial databases in principle also
suffer from the problem that most global trade is intra-group, it is generally recognised
that their use can be problematic. Firstly because information obtained from commercial
databases is generally at a quite aggregated level, i.e. information on different product
lines etc, is not available, and secondly because there is no common definition of the
cost base within the Member States, i.e. what constitutes gross costs and operational
costs.
Therefore in practice multinational enterprises will often have no other possibility than
to use the profit comparables for benchmarking. This often gives rise to disputes with
tax authorities either because they do not agree on when to use profit methods, or they
do not agree on how to use them (including the choice between the various profit
methods), or because a particular tax authority does not accept the profit method which
has been applied (which is often the case for CPM). Obviously, another problem with
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the use of commercial databases is the costs of obtaining access to the databases and the
costs of performing the searches.
In short, it is difficult for business to find comparables and that the comparables
available generally are not the internal comparables at the transactional level which tax
authorities generally prefer to see. Often only external profit comparables from
commercial databases are available which then often give rise to disputes with and
between tax authorities.
&RPSDUDEOHVDQGWUDQVIHUSULFLQJPHWKRGV
It is often maintained that TNMM is much more widely used than generally expected,
for instance by multinational enterprises. In this context it is noteworthy that some tax
administrations – which tend to be Anglo-Saxon OECD members who are quite
experienced in the transfer pricing area - hold that business, via commercial databases,
has easy access to some of the information necessary to apply the TNMM, but that they
often do not apply the method in accordance with the Guidelines opting for a more
simplistic approach. Compared to transaction methods, TNMM therefore can be an
easier (cheaper) solution. The method is sometimes chosen even when transactional
methods (subject to necessary adjustments) actually could be used. Another reason
mentioned for using TNMM is its similarity with CPM, which is often used in the USA.
There are, however, good reasons to believe that the particular situation in the EU
Member States is still different from the USA in this respect and that profit methods are
not used. The Ernst & Young survey indicates that in practice transaction methods -
especially CUP and CP - are in fact the most commonly used methods for all transaction
types in clear preference to profit-based methods. It therefore seems that business in
general has, up until now, managed to overcome the theoretical problems of finding and
applying internal (or external) transactional comparables for setting transfer prices. It
should nevertheless be noted that the survey does not reveal the quality of these
transactional comparables. For instance it cannot be ruled out that in applying the CP,
business often apply a “standard mark-up” of for instance 5-15% without any support
from independent transactions or companies. More importantly, the tax problems
relating to transfer pricing can be expected to grow in the future. The debate on the




The OECD Guidelines provide the overall transfer pricing framework in all Member
States. The new set of transfer pricing guidelines forms a common set of ‘rules’ and
these Guidelines are generally applied. However, the Guidelines are a compromise
between the 29 Member Countries and are neither clear in all aspects, thus leaving
considerable room for different use and interpretation by Member States (and business).
Transfer pricing regimes in Member States are not identical and business therefore is
subject to 15 different transfer pricing systems. As transfer pricing by definition is a
“two-way” exercise, different transfer pricing rules will cause disputes between Member
States, potential double taxation for business and a negative effect on business
compliance costs.266
There are a number of examples of where Member States apply the Guidelines
differently. Furthermore, a number of Member States have not issued their own
guidelines or statements of practice stating their particular position in areas where the
Guidelines are not clear. One exampleof different treatment is intra-group services and
the question of whether the service provider shall earn a profit on the services or just
have his expenses covered. In practice a cost plus based approach is often used for intra-
group services and especially for management services by the headquarter. The question
therefore often arises whether the service provider (often the headquarters) must charge
a mark-up on services provided to foreign affiliates (often subsidiaries). The OECD
Guidelines deal with services in Chapter VII.
In paragraph 7.2. of the Guidelines it is mentioned that most multinational groups of
enterprises arrange for a wide scope of services to be available for its members, in
particular administrative, technical and financial services, and that such services also
may include management, co-ordination and control functions for the whole group. The
Guidelines address the issue of profit versus cost in paragraphs 7.33, 7.34 and 7.37. As a
general rule the service provider must make a profit, as an independent party will not
provide services at cost (7.33). However, there are exceptions (7.33 and 7.34), e.g.
where the value of the service provider does not exceed the costs. For instance for
headquarter services – provided to the whole group including the headquarters – it can
often be asked whether the value of the services exceeds the cost of providing the
service, or whether the “service” is in fact simply a sharing of costs.
Some Member States take the view that the service provider must make a profit, as an
independent party will not provide services at cost. This is also the case, where the
service provider itself also uses the services (which will often be the case for
headquarters). Other Member States take the position that if the service provider itself
use the services function, then the arrangement must be considered a cost sharing one to
which no mark-up can be added. The argument is that all parties including the service
provider will benefit from the services by reduced costs. The first approach does not
seem any more correct than the second, and vice versa. Sometimes there are ways of
getting around this problem, for instance by setting up a special entity, but these will
lead to additional costs and unnecessarily complicated business structures.
There are some other important issues where the Guidelines are not clear and/or where
they can be difficult to apply in practice. These concern, for instance intra-group
services in general, cost sharing and cost contribution agreements, losses, the detailed
application of profit methods and market penetration issues. In the context of this study,
the question arises whether EU Member States should develop a common stance on
these issues.
 'RFXPHQWDWLRQUHTXLUHPHQWV
As indicated above, business representatives strongly express the view that the transfer
pricing documentation requirements are increasingly onerous and create unduly high
compliance costs. Generally, it is said that they often go beyond the requirements which
can be met by management accounting, thus creating a substantial and growing
compliance cost for businesses (and tax administrations) involved in cross-border
activities. It is also maintained that some Member States do not follow the OECD267
guidelines and that there are significant differences in documentation requirements
between Member States.
As illustrated above, documentation requirements overall have increased within the EU
in the sense that some Member States either by legislation or by circular letters have
introduced whole new documentation rules or tightened existing requirements. This
trend will probably continue. The majority of the Member States have not (yet) taken
such initiatives. However, this does not mean that documentation requirements have not
increased in these Member States as such an increase also can take place via the audit
process.
 &RQFUHWHHVWLPDWHVRIWKHUHVXOWLQJFRPSOLDQFHFRVWV
According to information given by business representatives the tax compliance costs of
transfer pricing are quite material. This cost results from the obligation for enterprises to
determine what prices could be regarded as arm’s length including finding comparables,
assembling the related documentation and defending these prices in audits, etc.
According to some estimates, medium sized multinational enterprises spend
approximately 1 to 2 million ¼HDFK\HDURQFRPSO\LQJZLWKWUDQVIHUSULFLQJUXOHV/DUJH
multinational enterprises incur compliance costs related to transfer pricing of
approximately 4 up to 5.5 million ¼D\HDU7KHVHILJXUHVGRQRWLQFOXGHWKHFRVWVDQG
risks of double taxation due to transfer pricing disputes. Other estimates by
representatives of the manufacturing industries indicate even higher figures.
 4XDQWLWDWLYHLQIRUPDWLRQRQWUDQVIHUSULFLQJ
The views of the business community and of tax administrations on the crucial tax
problems on transfer pricing appear to differ significantly. While business
representatives maintain that double taxation cases and subsequent disputes are almost
daily practice, tax administrations claim that real double taxation cases are relatively
rare and always solved. According to tax practitioners this different perception can
partly be explained by the fact that in view of the insufficient redress possibilities
businesses often "give up" and accept double taxation which would be too costly and
burdensome to remove, if there is prospect of achieving this at all. Moreover, the
difference in perception may in part also stem from the fact that transfer pricing rules
must be applied on a self-assessment basis. Even if only a small proportion of
companies are audited for transfer pricing, every company must apply transfer pricing
rules in computing profits and maintain the necessary documentation in case of audit.
Thus the compliance burdens do not depend upon either an audit or (even if there is an
audit) a dispute over transfer pricing policy.
The Commission services have tried to obtain as much neutral evidence as possible on
this question. However, there is not much publicly available quantitative material on the
transfer pricing issues relevant for the study. It is therefore difficult to obtain
comprehensive hard facts on the link between transfer pricing and the smooth
functioning of Internal Market and the analysis and the conclusions of this report must
be read in that light. However, a recent comprehensive survey conducted by Ernst &
Young provides some factual information about how business views the transfer pricing
issue. In addition, to gain more information, the Commission Services distributed a
questionnaire in mid 2000 to the EU Member States on dispute settlement mechanisms268
in the area of transfer pricing. The findings of both the survey and the questionnaire
provide some relevant facts.
 7KH(UQVW	<RXQJWUDQVIHUSULFLQJVXUYH\
Ernst & Young published their latest survey on transfer pricing at the end of 199967. The
1999 survey includes 19 countries including 9 Member States: Argentina, Australia,
Brazil, Canada, 'HQPDUN )LQODQG )UDQFH *HUPDQ\ ,WDO\, Japan, Korea, Mexico,
1HWKHUODQGV, Norway, 6SDLQ6ZHGHQ, Switzerland, the 8. and the United States. The
survey was conducted by Consensus Research International, a London-based Research
Agency, and included interviews with the person responsible for international tax
matters in leading multinational organisations. 582 parent company interviews were
held, and telephone interviews were conducted with 124 subsidiaries of foreign-owned
parents. This survey, which was commissioned by a private tax consultancy firm,
represents the only available large-scale work in this area and its findings give valuable
insights to business perception of the subject.
The survey reveals that business considers transfer pricing to be WKH most important
international tax issue for the future. One of the reasons is that it sees a clear connection
between transfer pricing and double taxation. Business reports that LQRIFDVHVRI
DGMXVWPHQW WKLV UHVXOWHG LQ GRXEOH WD[DWLRQ. This is primarily because firms do not
generally refer cases to mutual agreement procedure, as they consider the procedures
take too long and take up too many resources in relation to the exposure. Advance Price
Agreements are increasingly considered as a possible solution to avoid double taxation.
Business, as in the 1997 survey, continues to identify maximisation of operating
performance, not optimising tax arrangements (i.e. tax planning), as the most important
factor in shaping transfer pricing policies; consequently the majority of companies do
not consider transfer pricing to be a tax planning instrument, but instead largely a
compliance exercise.
The survey also revealed that the number of transfer pricing audits has increased overall.
Nearly two-thirds of the multinational enterprises headquartered in the 12 countries
included in the 1997 survey, report in the 1999 survey that their transfer prices have
been subject to tax authority examination (40% of the multinational enterprises in the 7
new countries), and 75% of multinational enterprises expect to face a transfer pricing
audit somewhere in their organisation within the next two years.
As tax administrations increasingly focus on transfer pricing (including by introducing
documentation rules, increased auditing etc.), companies are also recognising the
advantages of a global approach to design and document transfer prices; however less
than 20% have actually managed to achieve global transfer pricing documentation.
Intra-group services as in 1997 continue to be viewed by business as the transactions
most susceptible to transfer pricing disputes, closely followed by the sales of finished
goods.
                                                
67 Ernst-Young  Survey:  7UDQVIHUSULFLQJ*OREDO6XUYH\3UDFWLFHV3HUFHSWLRQVDQG7UHQGVIRU
DQGEH\RQG. Similar surveys were published in previous years. The 1997 survey included 12
countries.269
Multinational enterprises, as in 1997, prefer the transaction based transfer pricing
methods (CUP, RPM, and CP) to the profit methods (TNM, PSM and CPM). However
there is still some confusion about the use of methods and quite a number of companies
still rely on historical practice or cost-methods (i.e. without profit element) as the price
setting mechanism.
 &RPPLVVLRQ 6HUYLFHV TXHVWLRQQDLUH RQ GLVSXWH VHWWOHPHQW
PHFKDQLVPVLQWKHDUHDRIWUDQVIHUSULFLQJ
In June 2000 the Commission Services circulated a transfer pricing questionnaire to the
tax administrations of the Member States68. 14 out of 15 Member States responded to
the questionnaire. In SDUW , RI WKH TXHVWLRQQDLUH, Member States were asked for
information on their experience with the mutual agreement procedure (within the
context of double tax agreements) from 1995-1999. The questions included: the number
of the mutual agreement procedures their tax administration had been involved in, the
number of these relating to other Member States, how many requests from tax payers
they had accepted, whether the mutual agreement procedures were initiated by the
Member State itself or by the treaty partner, to what extent it was possible to reach an
agreement, the length of the procedures (average, longest and shortest period), why the
mutual agreement procedures were not successful and in which areas tax
administrations tend to have the greatest difficulties in reaching agreement. Member
States were asked to complete a table.
Similar questions were asked in SDUW,, with respect to the EU Arbitration Convention
plus questions referring to the second phase (panel) in the Convention. 3DUW  ,,,
concerned administrative issues about co-operation with other tax administrations, the
use of penalties and the possibilities of suspension of tax collection in cases of income
adjustment.
The answers to part I and II are summarised in 3 tables at the end of this subsection. The
tables reveal that 127 intra-EU transfer pricing adjustments cases have been referred to
the mutual agreement procedures or to the EU Arbitration Convention from 1995-1999
(total number of cases, i.e. including third countries, is 413 cases). This gives an average
of approx. 25 adjustments per year within the EU (83 including third countries), or
approximately two adjustments per Member State. This does not seem to be an alarming
number of adjustments. Furthermore, although the number of adjustments from 1995-
1996 to 1997-1999 have gone up by more that 100%, this development seems to have
stopped in 1998.
It is, however, important to note that the Commission Services transfer pricing
questionnaire does not cover all transfer pricing adjustments, as adjustments accepted by
the taxpayer or domestically appealed against are not listed. The Ernst & Young survey
indicated that 42% of all adjustments led to double taxation, and the reason was mainly
that business did not request the mutual agreement procedure. On this basis, one could
argue that the figures mentioned above in general should be doubled.
The vast majority of the mutual agreement requests are being accepted by Member
States and the success ratio, i.e. cases where double taxation is relieved, is calculated at
                                                
68 For details see annex 3.270
90%. However, the ratios of both accepted and successfully completed cases are
probably less than 90%; an estimate of the success rate at about 85% does not seem
unrealistic. Opinions will be divided on whether 85-90% is a satisfactory outcome. With
respect to the length of the procedures, the calculated average duration of the mutual
agreement procedure intra-EU is 20 months.
In the context of the EU Arbitration Convention hardly any cases are being rejected, and
no Member States reports having used the so-called penalty-clause in Article 8. The
questionnaire does not reveal the average duration within the EU Arbitration
Convention, as it was expected that the vast majority of cases would be solved within 2-
3 years. However this is not the case. Of the 1995-cases only 67% have been solved
(1996; 48%, 1997; 48%), which must be considered to be quite disappointing.
Furthermore, no case has so far – despite the fact that a number of cases are well over 2
years old - reached the second phase in the sense that no advisory commission has been
set up to date (one Member State reported 3 cases where the second phase has been
initiated). The material does not reveal to what extent the lengthy procedures are
because businesses have appealed cases to the national courts etc. Despite that, it seems
fair to conclude that the objective of maximum 3 years of duration has not been
achieved, and that – for some reason – Member States do not initiate and progress the
second phase after the end of the 2 year negotiation period.271
7DEOH
0XWXDODJUHHPHQWSURFHGXUHV0$369
Procedure initiated Successful completion Period Total number
Of new cases Yes No Yes No
Closed
cases
1995 22 (74) 22 (73) 0 (1) 17 (60) 5 (13) 18 (63)
1996 15 (75) 15 (75) 0 (0) 12 (60) 3 (15) 12 (67)
1997 26 (76) 25 (75) 1 (1) 11 (40) 14 (35) 13 (43)
1998 41 (111) 40 (110) 1 (1) 12 (40) 28 (70) 12 (40)
1999 31 (85) 30 (84) 1 (1) 10 (38) 20 (45) 14 (42)
TOTAL I 135 (421) 132
(417)
3 (4) 62 (238) 70(178) 69 (255)
TOTAL II 6770 (35471) 64 (350) 3 (2) 31 (119) 35 (89) 35 (228)









1995 77 (82)% 77 (82) % 94 (95) %
1996 80 (80) % 80 (80) % 100 (90) %
1997 42 (53) % 44 (53) % 85 (93) %
1998 29 (36) % 30 (36) % 100 (100)%







18 (21) 1 (1) 60 (72)
                                                
69  Figures in brackets are total cases. i.e. also with non-member States.
70  Total I EU cases / 2. To take into account that a MAP registered in two Member States is in fact
the same case.
71  Total I new cases –Total II EU cases = 421 – 67 = 354.272
7DEOH
7KH(8$UELWUDWLRQ&RQYHQWLRQ







Still in the first
phase
Solved Failed
1995 18 (19) 18 0 6 12 0
1996 25 (26) 22 3 10 12 0
1997 40 (44) 39 1 18 19 2
1998 36 (43) 36 0 24 11 1
1999 47 (54) 47 0 38 9 0
Total I 166(186) 162 4 96 64 3
Total II 83 (93) 81 4 48 32 -
Second phase Success-rate in %




1995 0 0 0 67% 67%
1996 0 0 0 48% 55%
1997 2 0 0 48% 48%
1998 1 0 0 31% 31%
1999 0 0 0 19% 19%
Total I 373 0 0 30% 40%
Total II74 3 0 0 39% 40%
                                                
72  Cases in bracket include 20 cases from two Member States. The information given from these
Member States was not detailed enough to be included in the rest of the table, e.g. no information is
given on which 1995 cases have been solved/failed etc.
73  The same Member State reports the 3 cases. No other Member State reported cases having
proceeded to the second phase.











Total I 25475 (54076)
Total II 12777 (41378)
Part I and II of the questionnaire also gave some indications about where Member States
consider the application of transfer pricing rules to cause problems. These include:
disagreement of use of comparables, transactions involving intangibles, the fact that the
mutual agreements may concern periods in the past, for which enterprises didn’t have as
detailed documentation as today, use of profit methods (especially in the case where the
whole group is loss making) and lack of adequate information. One Member State
requested a co-ordinated approach with respect to conducting functional analysis.
Part III revealed information about co-operation between tax administrations, penalty
rules etc. With respect to co-operation between tax administrations, a number of
Member States expressly stated that they do not perform simultaneous audits. Some
Member States reported that they do co-operate (e.g. exchange information, perform
simultaneous audits etc.) in the transfer pricing area. However, these answers were fairly
general. The clear overall impression is that Member States are aware of the possibilities
(and sometimes they might also have entered into working agreements etc.) but that the
actual level of simultaneous audits etc. is modest.
Member States were asked to explain the principles for fixing penalties when transfer
pricing adjustments are made, and explain whether penalties were automatically applied
                                                
75  Total I EU MAP + Total I AC – Total UK AC (as UK cases listed both as MAP and as AC cases)
= 135 + 186 – 67 = 254.
76  Total MAP + Total AC – UK EU Cases  = 421 + 186 – 67 = 455.
77 To take into account that a case registered in two Member States is in fact the same case.
78  Total I new cases – Total EU II cases = 540 – 127  = 413.274
following the adjustment. Only four Member States seem to apply penalties in this strict
sense in transfer pricing cases. Most other Member States reserve the use of these types
of penalties for cases which involve an element of tax evasion or gross negligence, and
report that penalties are in practice not levied in transfer pricing cases.
With respect to the possibility of suspension of tax liabilities, it can – with care - be
concluded from the answers that some Member States in principle provide for
suspending of enforcement if the adjustment is appealed; however the practical
application of these rules are uncertain. In cases of requests for mutual agreement
suspension facilities are only rarely available.
 'RXEOHWD[DWLRQDQGGLVSXWHVHWWOHPHQWPHFKDQLVPV
 7KH QHHG WR DYRLG RU DW OHDVW VZLIWO\ UHPRYH GRXEOH WD[DWLRQ LQ
WUDQVIHUSULFLQJ
Double taxation is a serious obstacle to the Internal Market. Double taxation created by
transfer pricing rules (even if legal) should be avoided in principle. If this is not possible
in practice, then it is imperative to have appropriate dispute settlement mechanisms that
relieve double taxation as quickly and efficiently and in as many cases as possible, and
with the lowest possible costs for business and tax administrations.
When a tax administration makes an (upward) income adjustment (primary adjustment)
the multinational enterprise is immediately subject to double taxation. This double
taxation can be relieved if either the tax authorities of the other state accept a
(downward) income adjustment (corresponding adjustment), or if the tax authorities
making the primary adjustment subsequently reverse the adjustments.
There is the further problem that some tax legislation in order to make the actual
allocation of profits consistent with the primary adjustment might assert a constructive
transaction (as dividends, loans or equity contributions). The secondary transaction
might lead to source taxation or influence the availability of loss relief claims. This
secondary adjustment might not be accepted by the other tax jurisdiction involved.
It is fundamentally important that the double taxation is relieved, but other important
issues in this context include:
-  that double taxation be relieved within a reasonable time;
-  that collection of tax liabilities can be suspended until the double taxation issue is
solved;
-  that interest costs (or similarly payments) on the additional tax arising from the
primary adjustments is not higher than the interest payments etc. received on the tax
refund via the corresponding adjustment;
-  that the resources required by business to obtain the double tax relief are modest.
 ([LVWLQJGLVSXWHVHWWOHPHQWDYRLGDQFHPHFKDQLVPV
Generally, there exist four dispute settlement or dispute avoidance mechanisms to
resolve transfer pricing double taxation problems. These are:275
1.  Litigation at national courts.
2.  Mutual Agreement Procedures (MAP) which represent a special dispute
settlement mechanism vested in the bilateral double tax treaties.
3.  The EU Arbitration Convention (Convention)79 which is a special EU dispute
settlement mechanism. The convention only covers transfer pricing, i.e. whether
or not intra-group trade is at arm’s length.
4.  Advance Pricing Agreements (APA). These agreements form a means for the
taxpayer to request a 'binding transfer pricing ruling' from the tax administration(s)
on the treatment of a future transaction involving the setting of transfer prices.
The suitability of the various approaches within the EU is very different.
Transfer pricing cases are not suitable for litigation in national courts. This is because
transfer pricing is not a juridical discipline as it mainly focuses on economics
("fractional analysis") and because cases tend to be very fact specific with substantial
amounts of background material. Litigation of transfer pricing cases in national courts
therefore tends to be very lengthy. Furthermore, litigation is a one-sided approach that
only deals with the problem from the perspective of one of the jurisdictions. Hence,
litigation does not guarantee elimination of double taxation. On the contrary, if double
taxation is not (fully) relieved in national courts the possibility of avoiding double
taxation in a subsequent mutual agreement procedure will be reduced. Nevertheless,
there are significant number of transfer pricing cases pending at national courts.
Moreover, litigation of transfer pricing cases is often very expensive for both business
and tax administrations. Some indication of the costs of litigating transfer pricing cases
is given in the context of OECD meetings. In any event, all available figures suggest
that the costs for business (or for EU tax administrations) of preparing and litigating
transfer pricing cases is substantial. The general dispute settlement mechanism is
therefore unlikely to be litigation.
Advance Price Agreements differ from the other dispute settlement mechanisms as they
aim to avoid any dispute arising at all. APAs are generally not yet very developed in the
EU. They are considered in more detail below as a possible way forward.
A comparison of the Mutual Agreement Procedures within the bilateral double tax
treaties (concerning transfer pricing cases) and the arbitration convention, which
basically build on similar mechanisms, reveals that the arbitration convention is the
preferred instrument in the EU context. The EU Arbitration Convention basically
includes the same instrument as the MAP, notably the right for the taxpayer to initiate
the procedure and a negotiation process between the competent authorities. However, in
addition the Convention sets a deadline of two years for the negotiation process and lays
down an arbitration procedure when competent authorities cannot agree how to solve
                                                
79  Convention on the elimination of double taxation in connection with the adjustment of profits of
associated enterprises [COM(90/436/EEC]. The extension of the convention to Austria, Finland
and Sweden [OJ C 26 of 31/1/1996] is still pending ratification in some Member States as does the
prolongation of the convention via a protocol signed on 25/5/1999 at the Ecofin-Council [OJ C 202
of 16/7/1999]276
the case80. Timely decisions and guarantee for relief of double taxation are the two most
important objectives, and the EU Arbitration Convention should therefore be the
prevailing dispute settlement mechanism within the EU.
Business generally recognises the implementation of the EU Arbitration Convention as a
major improvement compared to the MAP; mainly because of the arbitration phase for
cases where the competent authorities cannot agree upon a solution. However, the EU
Arbitration Convention suffers from shortcomings as discussed below81.
                                                
80  It should be noted, however, that in a few double tax treaties the mutual agreement article provides
for the use of arbitration.






Most double tax agreements include a provision equal or similar to Article 25 of the
OECD Model Tax Convention providing for a mutual agreement procedure. It
should be noted that the double tax treaties between Member States can deviate
from Article 25 of the OECD model tax convention.
Coverage of transfer
pricing
Member States generally recognise that the MAP covers transfer pricing cases.
Right for taxpayer to
request for MAP
The taxpayer generally has the right to initiate the procedure.
When can the taxpayer
initiate the MAP?
Taxpayer can initiate before the primary adjustment is made; it is sufficient that an
adjustment is likely to take place. The taxpayer must request the procedure not later
than 3 years after this time.
Who does the taxpayer
contact?
The relevant authority is the so-called “competent authority”, which is appointed in
the double tax treaty. The competent authority is typically a section of the central
tax administration. The competent authority, does not normally, if ever, perform
auditing activity.
Description of the MAP
procedure
The MAP in principle comprises two phases/stages. In the LQLWLDOSKDVH the
competent authority contacted by the taxpayer is required to reconsider the case.
The second stage consists of the QHJRWLDWLRQSKDVH between the two competent
authorities.
Only obligation to
negotiate – not to reach
agreement!
The MAP only obliges competent authorities to negotiate, not to reach a solution.
Also, the MAP does not include any time limits within which agreement should be
reached.




No, the MAP provides for any agreement under MAP to be implemented
irrespective of national time limit rules. It should be noted however, that five
Member States had made reservations to this rule.
Link to proceedings at
national courts
The MAP is a supplement to the litigation at national courts, and MAP and
litigation can be proceeded in parallel. However, some competent authorities are
bound by court decisions. If a case at national courts is pending, the implementation







The EU Arbitration Convention is a convention between Member States. The legal
basis of the EU Arbitration Conventions is Article 293 (ex 220) in the EC Treaty.
The Convention is not yet applicable in Austria.
Generally the same
instruments as in MAP –
but an arbitration
procedure on top
The EU Arbitration Convention to a very large extent includes the same instruments
as the mutual agreement provisions in the double tax agreements. However – most
importantly – if competent authorities cannot agree to solve double taxation then the
case is referred to a so-called advisory panel (arbitration panel). Therefore, relief of
double taxation is in general guaranteed.
The remaining sections list the special features of the EU Arbitration Convention
(compared the normal mutual agreement procedure).
Four phases/stages Initial phase - The competent authority contacted reconsiders the case
1
st phase - Negotiation between the competent authorities – competent authorities
have 2 years to reach agreement. If they do not succeed they must set up an
advisory panel (arbitration panel)
2
nd phase - Advisory panel considers the case – the panel must make a decision
within 6 months
3
rd phase - When the advisory panel has made its decision competent authorities
have another 6 months to reach an agreement. If they fail to do so the decision from
the advisory panel becomes final and competent authorities must comply.
When does the 2-year
period of the 1
st phase
start?
Member States hold different opinions on the precise starting point.
If an adjustment is appealed to national courts/tribunals, the two-year period of the
1
st phase does not start running until the date on which the judgement of the final
court of appeal was given.
Penalty clause Member States are not obliged to initiate the mutual agreement procedure or to set
up the advisory commission if one of the enterprises concerned is liable to a serious
penalty. If proceedings on the penalty issue are pending, the competent authorities
may stay the proceedings until the penalty issue has been concluded. Member States
have, in an annex to the Convention, individually defined what they consider to be




The EU Arbitration Convention is, like the mutual agreement procedure, a
supplement to the litigation at national courts. However, if the internal laws of a
Member State does not permit the competent authority (of that state) to depart from
decisions from their judicial bodies such Member State are not obliged to set up a
panel, unless the enterprise of that state gives up its right of appeal. Some Member
States have used this possibility.
The (advisory) panel
phase
The EU Arbitration Convention includes rules on establishment of the panel and
some procedure rules of the panel, e.g. information, taxpayers right to appear or be
represented before the advisory commission, costs etc. No rules on how the panel
organises its work are included.
Will decisions from the
advisory panel be
published?
Publication of decisions by the advisory committees is not mandatory, but require
that both the competent authorities and the taxpayer agrees.
Can cases be referred to
the ECJ?
No. Neither the ECJ nor any other EU Institution has been given any competence in
the EU Arbitration Convention.279
 6KRUWFRPLQJVRIWKHDUELWUDWLRQFRQYHQWLRQ
6XVSHQVLRQRIWD[GHILFLHQFLHV
Member States normally immediately enforce an income adjustment, i.e. collect any tax
underpayment. The EU Arbitration Convention does not include rules on suspension of
the collection of tax and neither does the MAP. Sometimes multinational enterprises can
avoid having temporarily to finance the “same” tax burden twice by appealing to
domestic courts or tribunals. However, this generates other problems. According to
Article 7 (2), second sentence, when a case is referred to national courts/tribunals, the
two year-period of the first phase does not start running until the date on which the
judgement of the final court of appeal was given. Furthermore, as described below, in
some cases the second phase of the EU Arbitration Convention cannot be initiated
unless the enterprise gives up its possibility of a court appeal. In short, multinational
enterprises are trapped in a dilemma of either having to give up their right to have the
tax collection suspended or diminishing the possibility of having double taxation
abolished.
Transfer pricing cases differ from other tax disputes in the sense that the question is not
whether the tax payer (i.e. the multinational enterprises) should pay tax or not, but rather
whether the tax should be paid in state A or state B. The OECD transfer pricing
guidelines recognises the problem for business of having to (temporarily) pay the same
tax twice. The Guidelines recommend that countries adopt rules allowing for the
suspension of tax liabilities or underpayments:
“A first problem is that the assessed deficiency may be collected before a corresponding
adjustment proceeding is completed, because of a lack of domestic procedures allowing
the collection to be suspended. This may cause the multinational enterprises group to
pay the same tax twice until the issues can be resolved. Countries that do not have
procedures to suspend collection during a mutual agreement procedure are encouraged
to adopt them where permitted by domestic law, although subject to the right to seek
security as protection against possible default by the tax payer”82
,QWHUHVWFRVWDQGVXSSOHPHQWDU\SD\PHQWV
A problem closely linked to the issue of collection of tax liabilities is that of interest
costs - or similar supplementary payments - on these liabilities.As also described in the
OECD transfer pricing guidelines83, inconsistent interest rules (including different
practices concerning which income year the primary and the corresponding adjustments
are implemented) across two jurisdictions may result in an additional cost (or an overall
benefit) for the multinational enterprise group. In case of very lengthy proceedings there
is even a risk that the interest costs may exceed the income adjustment. Furthermore,
some Member States charge a higher interest rate (or other supplementary payments) on
tax liabilities than they pay out on a refund of surplus tax.
                                                
82  Paragraph 4.64. It is noteworthy that some non-EU OECD countries have implemented such
suspension rules. This is for example the case in the USA.
83  Paragraphs 4.65 and 4.66280
7KHSHQDOW\FODXVH
According to the so-called penalty clause in Article 8 of the Convention, Member States
are not obliged to initiate the mutual agreement procedure or to set up the advisory
commission where legal or administrative proceedings have resulted in a final ruling
that the actions giving rise to the adjustment of profits renders one of the enterprises
concerned liable to a serious penalty. If judicial or administrative proceedings are
initiated with this in view (serious penalty) and are being conducted simultaneously with
any of the proceedings of the Convention, the competent authorities may stop the latter
proceedings until the judicial or administrative proceedings have been concluded.
According to the above-mentioned Commission Services transfer pricing questionnaire,
Member States have not (yet) used this ‘serious penalty’ clause to refuse the use of the
EU Arbitration Convention. This, however, does not imply that one can automatically
conclude that the penalty clause does not restrict the use of the Convention. The
question of whether an enterprise is subject to penalty or not will have been decided
upon in parallel to the question of the income adjustment. Enterprises having their
taxable income adjusted and being subject to serious penalties cannot request
application of the Convention, and the competent authority therefore does not need to
specifically deny the use thereof84.
Member States have in individual declarations annexed to the Convention listed what
constitutes a serious penalty. The definitions of serious penalties differ among Member
States. For instance some Member States only include cases of intent whereas others
also include negligence. Another approach is to include cases where the enterprise has
been subject to a fine exceeding a certain threshold.
The penalty clause is problematic because the issue of penalties should not be linked to
the issue of the possibility of having double taxation abolished, as this has the effect that
double taxation becomes a penalty. Member States are, subject to restrictions of the EC
Treaty, free to penalise non-compliance with transfer pricing regulations. However, this
should take place openly and transparently and not be hidden or disguised as double
taxation. Furthermore, it is problematic that the definitions – and practices – of the
penalty clause are inconsistent among the Member States, as this leads to unequal
treatment among EU enterprises.
7KHVWDUWLQJSRLQWRIWKHWZR\HDUSHULRG
Business claims that Member States' interpretations of the starting point of the two-year
period of the first phase differs significantly. Business also claims some Member States
have taken a position that is not in accordance with the EU Arbitration Convention, as
they hold the opinion that the two-year period does not start until the other Member
State has formally notified that it does not accept the adjustment.
According to the Commission Services transfer pricing questionnaire only one Member
State takes this position, whereas three Member States mention that the two year-period
                                                
84  Furthermore, the new transfer pricing rules in the UK introducing penalties for non-compliance
with the documentation rules did not come into effect until 1999. The UK does not have a special
transfer pricing penalty regime. The rules applicable are the general rules for non-compliance with
tax rules.281
starts when the tax authorities receive a request from the taxpayer. This is also the
position of two other Member States which, however, express the view that a request
cannot be made until the tax authorities have actually made the adjustment, as no double
taxation will occur until this point. One Member State takes the position that the two-
year period does not start until all necessary information has been provided to the tax
authorities. The answers to the questionnaire thus confirm the differing views, and a
substantial number of Member States further respond that they would like to have
clarification on this point.
,QWHUSUHWDWLRQLVVXHV
Apart from the question of when the two-year period of the first phase starts, there are
other examples where the EU Arbitration Convention is not clear. For instance one
Member State would like a clarification of whether thin capitalisation rules are covered,
and another Member State would like to have a set of guidelines on the application of
the panel phase, including the establishment of the advisory commission.
Furthermore, according to Article 3 (2) of the Convention any term not defined in the
Convention shall, unless the context requires otherwise, have the meaning, which it has
under the double taxation convention between the Member States concerned. Examples
of terms not defined include “enterprise”, “permanent establishment” and when
companies are “associated”. The Convention as it stands does not therefore guarantee
relief of double taxation if Member States apply a different interpretation of these
definitions. The following describes the concrete problems that can arise.
The treaty network between Member States is not complete. In a potential case where
there is no double tax treaty between the Member States, it is therefore uncertain
whether these terms will be interpreted in line with the OECD model tax convention or
according to domestic legislation. Furthermore, key definitions in the double tax treaties
are not always defined in the treaty itself, but refer back to the domestic legislation of
each Member State85. The term “enterprise” and the question of when companies are
“associated” might therefore be defined according to each Member States internal
legislation. This lack of definition of “associated” might be problematic as Member
States apply different definitions in their domestic legislation. Some Member States
require a fixed threshold of the direct and indirect holding of share capital and/or voting
rights; the “normal” threshold is 25%, but in some Member States it is higher (e.g.
51%). Other Member States take into account the facts and circumstances of each case,
and apply a kind of de facto control. If for instance a Member State (applying a
threshold of 25% according to domestic rules) makes an adjustment in a case where a
parent company holds 45% of the shares in the subsidiary, whereas the other Member
State in its domestic rules applies a threshold of 51%, then there would be a risk that
this second State would not consider the companies to be associated and would thus
consider the Convention to be inapplicable.
                                                
85  According to Article 3 (2) of the OECD model tax convention, terms not defined in the convention,
shall unless the context otherwise requires, be defined according to each states internal (tax)
legislation. Generally, double tax treaties will include a provision identical to Article 3 (2) of the
OECD model tax convention.282
/DFNRIJXLGDQFHRQWKHSDQHOSKDVH
Only one Member State86 has (three) cases that have proceeded to the second Panel
phase. In its answer to the Commission Services transfer pricing questionnaire this
Member State suggested that the arbitration phase should be explained in more detail.
Procedures for setting up the advisory commission, in particular the appointing of the
chair87 could be included in a code of best practice. The EU Arbitration Convention
includes some procedure rules, e.g. information, business rights to appear or be
represented before the advisory commission, costs etc. It is also stated that the advisory
committee must deliver their opinion “within 6 months from the date on which the
matter was referred to it”. However, there are numerous other unresolved issues, some
of which are outlined below.
One is the important question of when precisely the 6-month period starts running. The
most obvious starting point would be the cut-off date of the two-year period of the first
phase, leaving it up to the involved Member States to get the second phase process
started quickly. However, it could also be argued that a case cannot be referred to an
advisory commission until this has been (finally) established.
In that context it should also be noted that the Convention does not include rules on how
the advisory commission organises its work. For instance who should call for meetings,
what notice periods are required etc. The deadline of 6 months is very tight (but there
are no consequences linked to non-compliance), and it therefore seems to be important
to establish rules which would improve the likelihood of meeting the deadline.
The advisory committee is not a fixed one; a new committee is set up for each case. As
different committees are not required to take decisions taken by other committees into
account, and as publication of decisions by the advisory committees are not mandatory,
there is a risk of different treatments. This could also mean that the possibility of
establishing a common ‘jurisprudence’ and series of precedents in the transfer pricing
area is missed.
5HGUHVVIRUWKHWD[SD\HUV
The EU Arbitration Convention provides business with a ULJKW to the procedures of the
Convention to be initiated and proceeded. However, the Convention does not include
provisions to deal with denial or undue postponement by Member States of business’s
access to the procedures of the Convention. In the response to the Commission Services
transfer pricing questionnaire one Member State reported that the main reasons for
procedures failing in the first phase was that the other Member State did not reply
within the two-year period (two cases). Another Member State that has been involved in
four cases replied that they are still considering these cases in order to decide whether
the procedure (first phase) should be initiated. Furthermore, it seems that the second
phase is not automatically initiated and progressed by Member States, when the two-
year period of the first phase elapses.
                                                
86  Surprisingly no other Member State seems to be the other party in these 3 cases.
87  The committee consists of 2 representatives appointed by each Member State involved plus an
even number of independent experts, plus a chair appointed by the above mentioned persons. No
rules exist for the situation that the commission cannot agree upon a chair.283
As mentioned above, according to Article 7(3) of the Convention, Member States whose
internal laws do not permit the competent authority to derogate from decisions from
their judicial bodies are not obliged to set up a panel, unless the enterprise of that state
gives up its possibility to court appeal. The UK and France in Declarations on Article
7(3) positively declared that they will apply this provision. Denmark and apparently
Belgium also use the provision88.
5DWLILFDWLRQSUREOHPV
Unlike an instrument of Community law, the Arbitration Convention needs to be ratified
by the Parliaments of all Member States. As mentioned above, the Ruding report already
referred to this problem and urged Member States to accelerate the sometimes lengthy
ratification procedure. Interestingly enough, currently both the extension of the
Convention to Austria, Finland and Sweden89 and the prolongation of the convention
beyond its original expiry date 200090 are again still not ratified in all Member States.
Therefore, transfer pricing dispute cases that have arisen since 2000 can currently not be
dealt with under the Convention. This will only be possible retroactively when the
prolongation has been ratified in all Member States. Evidently, this situation tends to
increase the compliance costs and general problems of uncertainty by business
operators. It should be noted, however, that the prolongation protocol contains a clause
which in future provides for the automatic prolongation of the Convention when there is
no timely objection raised by a Member State.
 &RQFOXVLRQ
Transfer pricing is not only a major issue in the international tax arena but also a
specific and important taxation problem within the Internal Market. The use of the arm’s
length principle is becoming increasingly difficult to apply, and transfer pricing rules
and practices among Member States differ significantly. One common feature among
tax administrations, however, is the increased focus on the issue, notably through
increased documentation requirements and audit efforts.
The effects for business are double taxation and, most importantly, high compliance
costs combined with penalty rules. Although, the EU Arbitration Convention constitutes
a major accomplishment compared to the traditional mutual agreement procedures
within the bilateral double tax treaties, it contains numerous technical difficulties and
features certain provisions that are dissuasive to companies. In sum, many aspects of the
tax treatment of transfer pricing constitute a complex obstacle for the Internal Market
which hampers efficiency, effectiveness, transparency and simplicity.
                                                
88  The remaining Member States seem not to have used the clause.
89 OJ C 26 of 31/1/1996
90 Via a protocol signed on 25/5/1999 at the Ecofin-Council; OJ C 202 of 16/7/1999.284
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 7KHUHTXLUHPHQWWRDYRLGGRXEOHWD[DWLRQLQWKH,QWHUQDO0DUNHW
Article 293 of the Treaty requires Member States ", so far as necessary, to enter into
negotiations with each other with a view to securing for the benefit of their nationals
[…] the abolition of double taxation within the Community". The purpose of this
provision is to ensure that cross-frontier activities are not at a disadvantage compared
with national activities. Generally, neither discrimination nor double-taxation resulting
from the transnational character of an operation can be tolerated in the Internal Market.
This marks an important difference in comparison to parties that are not linked in an
integrated market and conclude a double taxation treaty. Double taxation treaties are
designed to address double-taxation problems but in the case of divergent interpretations
and similar problems no "higher" treaty forces them to find a solution. EU Member
States must also however have regard to the Internal Market requirements concerning
non-discrimination and the four fundamental freedoms, enshrined in the EC Treaty. The
following box gives an overview about the relevant Treaty articles in this respect.
The existing network of bilateral tax treaties between Member States goes some way
towards meeting these objectives. However, these existing tax treaties are far from
sufficient to meet the requirements of the Internal Market. The following section
analyses the tax obstacles and double taxation cases which remain intrinsically
unsolved. Given the complexity and variety of the issues involved, it is not possible to
present a thorough analysis of the technical details. However, the essential nature of the
different obstacles to cross-border economic activity in the Internal Market that





-  Article 10 requires Member States to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to
ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaty or resulting from action taken by the
institutions of the Community
-  Article 12 of the Treaty prohibits any discrimination on grounds of nationality.
-  Article 39 guarantees freedom of movement for workers within the Community, including the abolition
of any discrimination based on nationality.
-  Article 43 prohibits restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the
territory of another Member State.
-  Article 48 requires that companies formed in accordance with the law of a Member State and having
their registered office, central administration or principal place of business within the Community are
to be treated in the same way as natural persons who are nationals of Member States.
-  Article 49 prohibits restrictions on freedom to provide services within the Community.
-  Article 56 prohibits restrictions on the movement of capital between Member States and between
Member States and third countries, subject to certain caveats contained in Article 58.
-  Article 94 requires the Council to issue directives for the approximation of such laws, regulations or
administrative provisions as directly affect the establishment or functioning of the Internal Market
-  Article 211 requires the Commission to take steps, including formulating regulations and delivering
opinions, in order to ensure the proper functioning and development of the common market.
-  Article 294 requires Member States to accord to nationals of other Member States the same treatment
as they accord to their own nationals as regards participation in the capital of companies or firms.
 7KHLQFRPSOHWHWUHDW\QHWZRUNZLWKLQWKH(8DQGLWVLQVXIILFLHQWVFRSH
The network of bilateral tax treaties on income and capital between Member States of
the European Union is still not complete. There are at present about 97 bilateral tax
treaties on income and capital in force between Member States one of which is a
multilateral convention involving three Member States. The total possible would be
105.
It is true that, even in the absence of tax treaties on income and capital, many Member
States apply a system of double taxation relief under their domestic laws. Many, for
example, apply the same system of credit for foreign tax to income from non-treaty
countries as they do to income from treaty countries. However, some countries only
apply a deduction in those circumstances (i.e. the income is taxed but the amount of
income is reduced by the amount of the foreign tax paid), thus limiting the relief and
discriminating against outward investment.
Furthermore, tax treaties are necessary not just to provide a system of credit for foreign
taxation. They also prevent or limit source country taxes which, if high, may not be fully
offset by a foreign tax credit, even if available. This is because source country taxes are
typically levied on the gross amount of income, whereas the same income is taxed in the
country of residence only on the net amount, after deductions.
Moreover, there are still only less than 30 tax treaties covering taxes on gifts and
inheritances in force out of a possible 105. The Ruding report suggested that the lack of286
agreements on inheritance and gift taxes is an impediment to the free movement of
persons within the Community, especially owners of enterprises and companies,
particularly of small and medium-sized enterprises. The members of the Panel that
assisted the Commission services with this part of the study also highlighted this issue,
pointing out that cross-border inheritance tax problems are increasing with the growing
numbers of company transfers. As explained in more detail below, this problem
primarily concerns small and medium-sized enterprises.
Generally, the absence of certain tax treaties can mean that substantial differences
between the taxation in an EU Member State of taxpayers resident in other EU Member
States with whom a tax treaty has been concluded compared with taxpayers of a third




Even where tax treaties are in place, there are a number of areas where they are
inadequate to meet the requirements of the EC Treaty, in particular concerning respect
for the four freedoms and the elimination of double taxation. It is self-evident that the
fact that some of the treaties are quite old tends to exacerbate the problem. Of the 97 tax
treaties on income and capital in force between Member States 36 are more than twenty
years old. At least some of the old treaties do not reflect the current tax law of the two
countries.
As already mentioned above as regards transfer pricing disputes, the Mutual Agreement
Procedure in tax treaties does not oblige the two Contracting Member States to
eliminate double taxation. While this procedure, which is contained in Article 25 of the
OECD Model Convention and is included in most tax treaties, must be initiated in all
cases of double taxation, it does not require the administrations concerned to reach an
agreement. In practice, therefore, this instrument is incapable of resolving all cases of
double taxation. This is incompatible with the Internal Market and effectively creates an
obstacle to cross-border economic activity therein.
A more general problem is caused by the growing complexity of treaty provisions that
often results in diverging interpretations of the treaty as well as uncertainty for
enterprises. Complex clauses on treaty shopping, anti-abuse and exceptions to general
rules on, for example, withholding tax exemptions and credit for foreign tax make it
difficult for enterprises to determine precisely the treaty benefits to which they are
entitled. Furthermore, the technological developments and the effects of globalisation
described in Part I of this study are calling into question crucial concepts in double
taxation treaties such as the definition of "permanent establishment". This matter is the
subject of intensive discussions in the wider forum of the OECD. It generates high
compliance costs for the companies concerned.
Moreover, the wording of the bilateral tax treaties does not always concur with the
national treatment and equal treatment principles derived from the EC Treaty. The
European Court of Justice has already established some consequences of the application
of these principles. For instance, it is clear that the rules prohibiting discrimination
contained in the Treaty are far-reaching and have an impact on many aspects of bilateral
tax conventions. This holds in particular for the persons who must be given the benefit287
of the conventions and the shaping of anti-abuse provisions such as limitation of
benefits clauses and the provisions safeguarding the application of thin capitalisation
and controlled foreign company rules.91
Hence, it appears fair to say that the equal treatment principle enshrined in the EC
Treaty will make it increasingly difficult to justify inequalities of treatment between
resident and non-resident individuals or companies in a similar situation under one
identical tax treaty. This should not be misread as meaning that any difference in
treatment of EU residents under double taxation treaties is automatically violating basic
Treaty rights. In many situations, however, this question may be legitimally raised.
7ULDQJXODUVLWXDWLRQVDQGWKLUGFRXQWULHV
More specifically, the equal treatment principle can influence the extent to which
Member States’ tax treaties can differ not only from each other but also and notably the
permissible extent of differences between treaties of Member States with third
countries. In this context it is noteworthy that already the Ruding Report suggested, in
an annex, that if capital-exporting Member States grant fictitious tax credits (tax
sparing) on income subjected to a special tax incentive in one other Member State they
should grant it to all Member States in approximately the same economic situation.
Moreover, bilateral tax treaties are not normally capable of addressing triangular
situations which can cause double taxation to go unrelieved. An example would be
where a corporation is incorporated in one Member State, managed and controlled in a
second and derives income from a third. The difficulty arises because two tax treaties
are involved - that between the first State and the third State and that between the
second State and the third State. The third State may withhold tax at source on the basis
of one of those two tax treaties which will not be credited by one of the other States
because it applies the other tax treaty which does not provide for a withholding tax at
source.
According to businesses representatives many of these complex (legal or practical)
problems ultimately boil down to a very fundamental and simple question. Say, Member
State A has, due to a strong negotiating position, reached an advantageous clause in its
bilateral tax treaty with a given third state. Member State B, on the other hand, had to
accept a less advantageous solution on this matter in its bilateral treaty with that third
state. Is it really in line with Internal Market requirements that companies resident in A
can benefit from this advantage whereas companies that are resident in B cannot? What
is the situation of permanent establishments that B-companies might have in A? Despite
their underlying legal complexity the basic relevance of these fundamental questions can
hardly be denied as, after all, EU Member States adopt a single common trade policy on
goods (and, according to the Nice-Treaty, also some services) towards the rest of the
world92. Moreover, it is beyond doubt that the current situation in this respect strongly
                                                
91  For a more detailed and broader discussion see, for instance, Lehner, M., /LPLWDWLRQRIWKHQDWLRQDO
SRZHURIWD[DWLRQE\WKHIXQGDPHQWDOIUHHGRPVDQGQRQGLVFULPLQDWLRQFODXVHVRIWKH(&WUHDW\,
European Taxation, January 2000
92 It is true that the EU trade agreements and the common trade policy contain carve-out clauses for
taxation but from a business perspective this is just one explanation, but no justification, for the
problems described.288
impacts on business behaviour and investment decisions, thus provoking economically
sub-optimal and welfare-reducing decisions. The existance of typical "treaty shopping
routes" for EU companies in designing their business relations with the USA is
revealing in this respect.
%R[
7KH6DLQW*REDLQWULDQJXODUFDVHIDUUHDFKLQJLPSDFWRQWD[WUHDWLHV
The "Saint-Gobain case" (case C-307/97) which concerned the justification for distinguishing for tax
purposes between permanent establishments and subsidiaries is an example of an issue which was
resolved by the European Court of Justice but where treaty practice still seems to be inconsistent.
Compagnie Saint-Gobain is the German branch of Compagnie de Saint-Gobain SA which is established,
managed and controlled in France. German domestic law, and German tax treaties with the United States
and Switzerland, allowed certain tax advantages to German resident companies receiving dividends from
abroad which were not available to a permanent establishment in Germany of a corporate enterprise
registered in another Member State. The Court noted that the position of companies not resident in
Germany but with permanent establishments there, and companies resident in Germany was objectively
comparable. Consequently, refusal to grant the tax advantages in question to the permanent establishments
meant that the latter were being treated differently from resident companies and amounted to restricting
the freedom of companies to choose the form of their secondary establishments.
Most commentators and scholars believe that this judgement will have a far-reaching impact on the tax
treaties of Member States. The ruling implies that the freedom of establishment laid down in Article 43 of
the Treaty must be interpreted as meaning that a distinction of any kind for tax purposes between
subsidiaries and permanent establishments will no longer be acceptable. It has already been clear, since
the "avoir fiscal case" (case 270/83), that Member States must grant permanent establishments situated in
their territory the same tax benefits as those applicable to resident companies. But the Saint Gobain case
goes a step further. It implies that a permanent establishment must be granted treaty benefits under tax
treaties, including those with third countries, concluded by the State where the permanent establishment is
located.
7KHRYHUULGLQJHIIHFWRI(8OHJLVODWLRQ
The fact that EC Directives and the Arbitration Convention take precedence over the
bilateral tax treaties but are not reflected in the provisions of the treaties also creates
complications and difficulties of interpretation for taxpayers. As regards new EU
proposals with an impact on company taxation, the proposed Interest and Royalties
Directive and the proposed Directive on Mutual Assistance in recovery, once they take
effect, should, for example, be reflected in bilateral tax treaties, as should the provisions
of the Code of Conduct for business taxation.
Some commentators even suggest that the application of anti-deferral or abuse
provisions to income from a source in another Member State which has been taxed at a
low rate in that other Member State under an approved state aid regime is also illegal.
Tax treaties often include a clause to permit the application of such anti-abuse
provisions notwithstanding any clauses of the treaties that could otherwise be
interpreted as preventing them. Again, however, this point has not yet been considered
by the Court of Justice.
In general, while it is clear that, in any event, the Treaty and decisions of the European
Court of Justice take precedence over bilateral tax treaties, there is a lack of clarity in
this area which is not satisfactory if the Internal Market potential is to be fully exploited.289
Finally, bilateral tax treaties based on the OECD Model Double Taxation Convention
often do not resolve many of the instances of double taxation which have been described
in other sections of this Part of the study. They do not normally provide a solution to the
problem of cross-border loss compensation, or a definitive solution to the costs and risks
of double taxation due to transfer pricing disputes. Some but not many tax treaties
include a clause to provide tax relief for cross-border pension contributions paid by
posted workers (see section 7.2 below), and the treaties do not normally include a
provision to deal with the tax treatment of stock options (see section 7.3 below). The
OECD Model and most double taxation treaties do not include procedures to ensure that
the more favourable treatment applicable under bilateral agreements as compared to
domestic rules is applied speedily and with the minimum of administrative complexity,
so as to facilitate cross-border investment.
 &RQFOXVLRQ
The analysis has shown that there are a significant number of issues of double taxation
which are not currently being properly addressed by the bilateral tax treaties in place
between Member States or by domestic tax provisions. This is because they do not cover
all bilateral relations between Member States, they do not achieve complete abolition of
either discrimination or double taxation and, in particular, they never provide any
uniform solution for triangular and multilateral relations between Member States. The
number and extent of the complexities and difficulties in this area will increase when
the European Union expands. Furthermore, where tax treaties exist, there are many
conflicts and inconsistencies between the provisions of these tax treaties and the
provisions contained in the Treaty and in EC Directives in the tax field.
Business organisations have on many occasions urged a clarification of the conflicting
rules in this area as well as the elimination of double taxation problems not addressed in
bilateral tax treaties. Many commentators, including some Members of the Panel
assisting the Commission services with the study, have gone so far as to suggest that
differences between Member States’ tax treaties with each other and between Member
States’ tax treaties with third countries create distortions and serious problems of treaty
shopping. As a result of these problems, the economic behaviour of EU companies is
unduly distorted, and overall, EU welfare is reduced.
 7$;5(/$7('/$%285&2676
 7D[UHODWHGODERXUFRVWVDVDWD[REVWDFOHLQWKH,QWHUQDO0DUNHW
Cross-border economic activities often lead to an increase in the tax-related labour
costs. In addition to the direct costs for keeping up to date and complying with the
various requirements imposed on employers by Member States, the general diversity of
the taxation systems both directly and indirectly gives rise to extra costs for companies
in their capacity as employers:
-  'LUHFWO\, since they have to set up multiple arrangements etc. to comply with the tax
legislation in each Member State where they have activities or employees.
-  ,QGLUHFWO\, since companies wanting to move an employee from one Member State
to another will typically be faced with demands for compensation for any extra290
costs, including increased taxes, that the employee may incur following such a
removal.
In addition, it is worth noting that any tax treaty issue facing the employee will normally
result in compliance problems for the employer. Among the various tax-related labour
costs connected with cross-border activities, the following two categories are worth
singling out:
-  FRVWV IRU RFFXSDWLRQDO SHQVLRQ DUUDQJHPHQWV, since they probably represent the
single most important cost; and 
-  FRVWVIRUHPSOR\HHVWRFNRSWLRQSODQV, since the use of such plans has become more
and more common over the last few years.
Furthermore, both in the case of pensions and stock options, there are considerable risks
that double taxation may occur.
There is only little empirical evidence on the relative importance of these problems but
both the legal analysis and the indications of the representatives of the various parties
concerned, i.e. employers, employees and tax administrations, support the view that the
cost related to these problems is substantial. Given the relatively recent character of the
phenomena underlying these problems, it is, moreover, only logical that the empirical
economic data is currently somewhat limited.
 &RVWVIRURFFXSDWLRQDOSHQVLRQDUUDQJHPHQWVLQFURVVERUGHUVLWXDWLRQV
As more and more companies and employees strive to take full advantage of the Internal
Market, resulting in an increased mobility of the work-force93, the problems relating to
occupational pension arrangements are growing in importance. Companies often
complain that the diversity, complexity and specificity of the provisions developed over
the years at national level are so great that they constitute a major obstacle to cross-
border activity.
In many cases Member States’ tax laws de facto prohibit cross-border membership of
occupational pension schemes. The result is that a company, or group of companies,
operating in several Member States have to establish separate pension arrangements or
pension schemes in each State where it has activities. The costs incurred may be
substantial. Calculations presented by industry indicate that the cost of setting up and
managing separate funds could amount to around ¼PLOOLRQSHUDQQXPIRUDODUJH
pan-European business94.
                                                
93  In the “Report of the High Level Group on Free Movement of Persons” - often referred to as the
“Simone Veil Report” - presented to the European Commission on 18 March 1997 (page 4), it was
estimated that at least 150 000 employees were on secondment to other Member States to assist
with the setting up or running of branches or subsidiaries. According to other estimates from the
same time the number of seconded persons was around 300.000 persons. Current statistics show
that around 5.1 million European citizens aged 15 years and over reside in a Member State other
than their Member State of origin (source: Newcronos database of Eurostat, domain Labour Force
Study).
94  The figure refers to a calculation made by British Petroleum.291
The problems are far from being limited to big multinational enterprises; in relation to
the resources to tackle the problems, they may be even more serious for small and
medium-sized enterprises operating cross-border on a small scale. The problems mainly
stem from the difficulty to obtain tax relief for employer and/or employee cross-border
contributions to supplementary occupational pension schemes.
In certain Member States there exist pension schemes that only accept members who are
resident in the State where the scheme is established. Even disregarding the tax aspects,
employees may therefore in practice not be able to remain affiliated to their old scheme
when moving to another Member State on a more or less permanent basis.
In this context it is worth recalling that through Council Directive 98/49/EC95 , which is
to be fully implemented by 25.7.2001, SRVWHG ZRUNHUV (as defined in Regulation
1408/71) will have the legal right to remain within their old scheme in the home State.
Still, a vast majority of Member States do not grant cross-border contributions paid by
or on behalf of posted workers the same tax privileges as for domestic contributions.
The inconsistent interplay of national tax arrangements will often lead to double-
taxation, since the employees may end up being taxed for pension contributions made by
them and/or by the employer on their behalf, while the pension benefits are also taxed,
although at a later stage. Companies frequently have to compensate their expatriates for
the extra taxes incurred (even if they are levied at different points in time). They may
also have to pay compensation where pension rights are lost due to long vesting periods
or because the employees cannot stay within their old scheme.
                                                
95  Council Directive 98/49/EC of 29 June 1998 on safeguarding the supplementary pension rights of
employed and self-employed persons moving within the Community, OJ 25.7.1998 L 209 p.46292
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7D[UHODWHGODERXUFRPSOLDQFHFRVWV
Employers involved in cross-border activities are faced with the problem of keeping up to date and
complying with a variety of obligations imposed on them in that capacity by Member States. These
typically include the liability to pay social security contributions and unearmarked payroll taxes as well as
the liability to withhold and pay wage taxes. To determine the liability in respect of wage taxes the
employer must in fact also have a clear picture of where the employees are liable to pay income tax on
their salaries. To get a better understanding of the difficulties facing an employer in the above respects,
short summaries of the various rules applicable are presented below.
6RFLDOVHFXULW\FRQWULEXWLRQV
Council Regulation EEC/1408/71 provides rules at Community level on the application of social security
schemes to workers moving between Member States. The main rule is that the place of employment
(activity) governs which scheme is applicable. In this way it makes no difference for the employer if he
hires people of one nationality or the other. Normally, the same rules will thus apply to all workers
employed at a certain work-place. Under Regulation 1408/71 frontier worker means any employed person
(or self-employed person) who pursues his occupation in the territory of a Member State and resides in the
territory of another Member State to which he returns as a rule daily or at least once a week. Such a
frontier worker will normally follow the main rule but has some additional rights in the Member State
where he/she is resident.
However, in the case of workers who are posted to another Member States under the conditions laid down
in Article 14(1) of the Regulation special rules apply: Posted workers will remain affiliated to the social
security scheme of the Member State from which they are posted, i.e. the Member State where they are
normally employed. The time limit laid down in Article 14(1) may, pursuant to Article 17, be extended
through an agreement between the Member States involved. In practice, these so called Article 17
agreements are often concluded for up to 60 months. The liability to pay social security contributions
follows indirectly from these Community rules; the contributions are thus payable to the Member State
whose scheme is applicable to the worker in question. Some Member States have very strict requirements
for the payment of these contributions. Although these are the same for domestic and foreign businesses,
the latter are faced with the additional problem of handling two or more systems. They may thus be forced
to bring in specialist advisers at an additional cost.
8QHDUPDUNHGSD\UROOWD[HV
“Social security taxes” are levied in a number of countries. They constitute a non-negligible part of non-
wage labour costs and could thus affect one-off localisation decisions.293
'HWHUPLQLQJ WKH 0HPEHU 6WDWH LQ ZKLFK WKH HPSOR\HH LV OLDEOH WR SD\ WD[ RQ KLVKHU VDODU\ DQG
FRQVHTXHQWO\WKHHPSOR\HU¶VOLDELOLW\WRZLWKKROGDQGSD\ZDJHWD[HV
Normally the division of taxing rights between Member States will be governed by double taxation
agreements: Out of 105 possible bilateral relations, 98 are presently covered by such agreements.
Generally, the division of taxing rights in respect of dependent activities (i.e. salaries and other
remuneration stemming from employment) follows the OECD model tax convention. Where the employee
is attached to a permanent establishment in the other Member State, as will normally be the case, his/her
remuneration will be taxable in that Member State (to the extent that it derives from activities
exercised/performed there). In the exceptional case where the worker is not attached to a permanent
establishment in the other Member State, the 183 days rule found in the OECD model tax convention
could come into play. Where the work lasts no more than 183 days, the worker (who would be regarded as
posted under the social security legislation) would remain liable to tax in his/her State of residence
(origin). In new tax treaties the counting of days is normally done on any twelve months basis, but there
still exist a number of treaties where the counting is per calendar year. Where the posting, due to
unforeseeable events, is extended beyond 183 days, the taxing right would normally, with retroactive
effect, pass to the Member State where the activity is exercised (the Member State of posting). Problems
will then often arise for the employer with respect to wage taxes due. All Member States except one
(France) oblige employers to withhold and pay wage taxes. The amounts will vary with the tax burden on
labour.
If the taxing rights move from France to another Member State, following such a prolongation of the stay,
a situation might arise where the employee will be able to claim reimbursement of taxes paid by him/her
in France, while the employer will be faced with an obligation to pay wage taxes in the other Member
State.
Whereas the division of taxing rights in respect of seconded workers is relatively similar under the
existing tax treaties, the taxation of workers crossing the frontier on a regular basis vary considerably.
Neighbouring countries, when concluding a double taxation agreement, often provide for special
provisions for such workers. Generally these provisions are linked to geographical notions such as where
the worker is living and where he/she is working; there are conditions relating to how often (daily or,
sometimes, weekly) the worker must return to his/her State of residence for the special rules to be
applicable etc. These workers are often referred to as frontier workers but, when referring to double
taxation agreements, the concept of frontier worker will more often than not be different from the one
used in Community acquis on social security (see above).
In the future, completely new questions may arise in the light of developments in communications
technologies (internet, e-mails, teleworking, video conferences, etc): How will the traditional cross-border
movements evolve and what criteria will be used to categorise "virtual" frontier work?
 (PSOR\HH6WRFN2SWLRQ3ODQV
The tax problems linked to HPSOR\HHVWRFNRSWLRQSODQV have come more and more into
focus during the last few years. This is due to
-  the increased use of employee stock options as a means of recruiting and/or
motivating staff while at the same time providing companies with venture capital;
-  the introduction of specific tax legislation in Member States DQG 
-  the lack of explicit regulation under double taxation conventions.
The granting of stock options creates a bond between the staff and the company while
ensuring that they have a stake in the company and can benefit directly from the
company’s success. An additional advantage for the company is that it can save money
in the early stages of growth which can be subsequently converted into profits.294
Companies making use, or wanting to make use, of employee stock option plans are in
practice faced with tax problems at two levels:
-  ILUVW there is the tax treatment of costs of the company for the employee stock option
plan itself
-  sHFRQG there is the tax treatment of the stock options in the hands of the employees,
which, indirectly, could have a significant bearing on the costs incurred by the
employer company.
'LIIHUHQWUXOHVLQ0HPEHU6WDWHV
A majority of the fifteen Member States have special rules in place (January 2001) as
regards the taxation of stock options. These may relate to the tax treatment of the costs
for setting up and running an employee stock option plan and/or the tax treatment of the
stock options in the hands of the employee. Some Member States make a distinction for
taxation purposes between approved and non-approved stock option schemes. In most
cases, these rules have been introduced or changed during the last three years. Those
Member States without special legislation tend to rely on their general tax rules relating
to earned income as regards the taxation of the stock options in the hands of the
employee.
The accounting costs, financial and legal costs etc. for setting up and running the
employee stock option plan do not normally constitute a problem with regard to the
right of deduction, at least not where the company incurring the costs is identical to the
employer.
However, practices seem to vary more as regards whether the employer is allowed to
deduct an amount corresponding to the benefit taxed in the hands of the employee. It
may, for instance, be decisive whether the shares granted under the plan are being issued
specifically for that purpose or whether they have been previously acquired, but,
whichever is the case, the picture seems to be far from clear-cut. In addition to the
compliance problems that could result from this, the deductibility or non-deductibility of
the benefits could have a bearing on the application of double taxation conventions; this
is especially the case where the stock options are issued to employees of a permanent
establishment.
Finally, where the benefits are deductible, there may be timing mismatches between the
granting of the deduction for the employer and the taxation of the benefit in the hands of
the employee.
The tax treatment of stock options in the hands of the employees may vary depending on
whether the options are offered to a wide category of employees or used on a more
selective basis.
Although stock options often are for shares in the employer company or another
company in the group, they may in some cases also be granted for other shares held by
the employer company or the group. The taxation provisions may vary depending on the
shares covered by the option. As stock options gain in importance as part of
remuneration policies and employees move more frequently from one Member State to
another, double or non-taxation is likely to arise, because almost every Member State
treats stock options differently. This is a serious concern for European business and
industry, in terms of both cost and hindrance to the free movement of employees. The295
variation in tax treatment is largely due to the fact that Member States identify (i)
different taxable events and (ii) different measures of income, although other factors
also play a role.
%R[
([DPSOHRQVWRFNRSWLRQV
X and Y are granted stock options by their employer, company Z, which has plants in Belgium, Finland
and Sweden. There are certain conditions linked to the stock options: the vesting period is two years,
meaning that the options cannot be exercised until two years after they are granted. Furthermore, X and Y
have still to be employed by Z when actually exercising the options, i.e. when acquiring the shares.
At the moment the options are granted, X is working and living in Sweden, and Y in Belgium. Towards
the end of the vesting period X moves to Finland, while Y goes to Sweden to replace X. After three years
both X and Y decide to exercise their options, at which point in time X is working and living in Belgium,
and Y in Finland. After yet another year (without change of residence) both X and Y sell their shares,
which have increased considerably in value.
X could escape taxation completely: When being granted the options X is living in Sweden, which
normally taxes when the options are exercised, but in cases of inbound or outbound transfers of residence,
taxes if the person was resident there when the options could first have been exercised, i.e. at the vesting.
At the vesting, X is however living in Finland, which taxes when the options are actually exercised; when
exercising the options, X is living in Belgium which taxes at the time the options are granted. Finally, the
sale of the shares may not trigger any tax since Belgium does not tax capital gains.
Y on the other hand risks being taxed three times: in Belgium since it taxes when the options are granted;
in Sweden since the options could have been exercised while Y was residing there; finally, Y may be
taxed in Finland, since it taxes when the options are actually exercised. However, Y should get at least
some relief since the gain will be time-apportioned, i.e. Y should only be taxed on the value accrued
during Y’s stay in Finland. Finally, Y will be subject to tax on capital gains when selling the shares.
Y’s situation of course raises the question whether no alleviation could be achieved under the double
taxation conventions between the Member States concerned. The problem then arises that there are no
specific provisions on the taxation of stock options in the conventions. In addition, there is the timing
problem.
Since there are conditions of continued employment linked to the stock options, it could be argued that the
benefit of the stock options refers not only to current or past employment but also to the vesting period of
two years or possibly to the whole period until the options are exercised. Furthermore, under Article 15,
Dependant personal services, of the OECD Model Convention, the taxation rights of the source country
are not formally restricted to income that arises during the time the employee is present in the source State
but refer to “remuneration derived from employment exercised in a State”.
Both under the credit method and the exemption method, crucial questions arise, such as how to take
account of (part of) a benefit, probably calculated under other rules, that will be taxed a later year, or that
has been taxed an earlier year, in another Member State.
7KHWD[DEOHHYHQW
There are various possibilities. One is to tax employee stock options at WKHSRLQWDW
ZKLFKWKH\DUHJUDQWHG. Where there are conditions linked to the option, taxation may
be postponed until these are fulfilled, i.e. until WKH YHVWLQJ of the options. Another
approach is to tax the options first at the moment of H[HUFLVH, i.e. when the option is
actually used to acquire shares. Moreover, taxes may be imposed only on WKHVDOHRIWKH296
VKDUHVDFTXLUHG under the option. Finally, countries may consider the leaving of the
country by an employee holding stock options as a taxable event.
In practice, it seems that none of the EU Member States (at least none of those having
special provisions in place) treats the sale of the shares acquired under the option as the
one and exclusive taxable event. In other words, where the option as such is deemed to
have a value, this will be taxed at an earlier stage. In this context it is worth noting that
the UK tax rules are designed in such a way that, where the conditions for favourable
tax treatment of the employee stock options are fulfilled, no benefit is deemed to have
arisen, and that for that reason taxation will only take place when the shares are sold.
In most Member States it is thus the exercise of the option that triggers taxation. Where,
however, the option is tradable or unconditional, or where the vesting period is very
long, taxation would in some of these States be brought forward to the granting. In one
Member State (Belgium) the granting is the main taxable event. Furthermore, a few
Member States, e.g. Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden have special rules relating
to transfers of tax residence, inbound as well as outbound (January 2001). On this basis,
the risk of non-taxation currently seems to be somewhat more frequent than that of
double-taxation.
7KHPHDVXUHRILQFRPH
The measure of income used is necessarily linked to the definition of the taxable event
and will thus also vary. If the options are taxed at the moment they are JUDQWHG, the
value would normally be estimated on basis of the value at that time of the underlying
shares (minus any amount paid for the options). For options not quoted on the stock
exchange the evaluation could pose considerable difficulties. Taxation at this point in
time may be advantageous where the value of the shares increases, but it also involves a
risk from the tax payer’s point of view, as he/she cannot be certain that it will ever be
favourable to actually exercise the option.
If the options are taxed at the moment of H[HUFLVH, the taxable benefit may be
determined as the value of the shares acquired (minus any amount paid for the options,
i.e. the strike price).
If taxation takes place when the shares are sold, the amount received for the shares are
taxed (minus the strike price or any amount taxed before as earned income in respect of
the options). In this context it is worth noting that the EU Member States normally
distinguish between the taxation of the value of the option and the taxation of the sale of
the shares themselves.
6RFLDOFRQWULEXWLRQV
Where, under the tax rules of a Member State, the option itself is deemed to have a
taxable value, this value seems without exception to be taxed as earned income. Social
security contributions may or may not be levied on this income.
When the shares acquired under the options are sold, capital gains taxation may be
triggered in those Member States that tax such gains. Of the Member States that have a
capital gains tax, some exempt the capital gain where the shares have been held for a
certain period of time.297
'RXEOHWD[DWLRQFRQYHQWLRQV
The division of taxing rights in respect of employee stock options has so far never been
expressly regulated under any double taxation convention concluded. Therefore, current
double taxation agreements are no guarantee against double taxation or non-taxation of
share options received by employees in one country and exercised in another.
First, there are the problems linked to the timing of the taxation under the various
systems applied by Member States as described above. Second, there are problems
linked to the categorisation of the income under double taxation conventions:
Generally, it would be looked upon as remuneration for services rendered. As such it
would normally fall under Article 15, Dependent personal services, of the OECD model
convention (or, in the case of board members, under Article 16, Directors’ fees).
Another possibility is that the advantage of (gains from) the stock option could be
viewed, wholly or partly, as capital gains falling under Article 13; the argument would
be that the holding of the option and the exercise constitutes an investment.
If categorised as remuneration for dependent personal services, the question could arise,
for someone moving (or having moved) from one country to another, whether the
advantage refers to past services, to future services (to be carried out by the employee
during the lifetime of the option), or, possibly, to both. This could be decisive for the
division of taxing rights between the contracting states.
Given the various factors involved, it is conceivable that one employee moving between
Member States may completely escape taxation while another could, in extremis, be
taxed three times (or, if taking into account capital gains taxation, even four times) for
the same stock options. Furthermore, there is no guarantee whatsoever that a Member
State taxing the stock options at some stage, would take account of taxes paid earlier or
later, in other Member States, in respect of the same stock options.
 &RQFOXVLRQ
The incompatibility of Member States’ taxation systems, both as regards RFFXSDWLRQDO
SHQVLRQV and HPSOR\HHVWRFNRSWLRQSODQV, constitutes a serious barrier to cross-border
economic activities. The situation is aggravated by the risks that double taxation may be
incurred. Furthermore, in the occupational pensions area, the difficulty to get tax relief
for cross-border contributions can be questioned from an EC law point of view; unless
justified, discriminatory tax treatment would be contrary to the free movement of
workers and thereby to the right of establishment; in addition, from the pension
provider’s point of view, the freedom to provide services would be set aside.
 60$//$1'0(',806,=('(17(535,6(6
The analysis of tax obstacles in the Internal Market has to consider the particular
situation of small and medium-sized enterprises from three different angles. First the
mere size of small and medium-sized enterprises means that obstacles may have a
different or stronger effect on them. Second, small and medium-sized enterprises are
often run under the legal form of a partnership, thus mostly falling outside the scope of
corporation tax. Third, the importance of the tax obstacles for small and medium-sized298
enterprises can only be properly assessed by examining the cumulative effects resulting
from the current structure of value added tax (VAT).
 7KHSDUWLFXODUVLWXDWLRQIRUVPDOODQGPHGLXPVL]HGHQWHUSULVHV
There is no common Community WD[ definition of small and medium-sized enterprises.
At EU level, small and medium-sized enterprises are generally defined as an enterprise
which has fewer than 250 employees and an annual turnover not exceeding 40 m. ¼RU
an annual balance sheet total not exceeding 27 m. ¼DQGLQZKLFKQRHQWHUSULVHRU
enterprises which themselves are not small and medium-sized enterprises own 25% or
more of the capital or of the voting rights96. In 1998, more than 99.8% of the 17.9
million enterprises in the EU were small and medium-sized enterprises under this
definition, employing 66% of the private-sector workforce and generating 56.2% of total
turnover97.
"Small and medium-sized enterprises" include a broad variety of businesses, ranging
from traditional craftsmen doing occasional business abroad to international start-up
companies created by big multinationals (although the latter are not really covered by
the above EU definition in the strictest sense). Small and medium-sized enterprises are
often run as non-incorporated companies that are not subject to corporation tax (this
aspect is considered separately below). As alluded to in Part I of the study, in
comparison to the situation at the beginning of the 90s, small and medium-sized
enterprises today need to "go international" much earlier, thus accentuating their
possible specific cross-border tax problems.
All the various tax obstacles considered above also concern small and medium-sized
enterprises with cross-border activities. Their relative importance and assessment may,
however, differ. Due to the smaller business size, some tax obstacles may be more
relevant than others. The often specific nature of their business activities means it that
some of the cross-border tax obstacles are particularly felt by small and medium-sized
enterprises (and in particular technology-driven start-up companies). Moreover, in the
domestic context most Member States apply special tax arrangements for small and
medium-sized enterprises that need to be taken into account. These arrangements
essentially concern the determination of the tax base, flat-rate arrangements and other
simplified methods of profit determination. Some Member States also grant specific
lower rates. The combination of both effects - the particular importance of cross-border
obstacles for small and medium-sized enterprises and relief for domestic tax problems -
may even increase the hurdle for starting cross-border business for small and medium-
sized enterprises.
The cross-border company tax obstacles that have been identified above are generally
more burdensome for small and medium-sized enterprises than for big companies. This
is simply due to the limited size of the business and the related shortage of economic
and human resources which inherently limits the possibilities to avoid some obstacles.
                                                
96  Commission Recommendation on the definition of small and medium-sized enterprises addressed
to the Member States, the European Investment Bank and the European Investment Fund; OJ L
107 of 30.4.1996, p.4.
97  European Commission, The Fourth Report on the Co-ordination of Activities in favour of SMEs
and the Craft Sector, published in 1998299
Generally, small and medium-sized enterprises have particular difficulties in meeting
the compliance costs resulting from the need to deal with up to 15 different taxation
systems. This will sound obvious to most tax practitioners. However, this is also
supported by scientific and quantitative evidence because, as indicated above, all
available studies suggest that compliance cost are regressive to size and put a
disproportionately higher or even prohibitively high burden on small and medium-sized
enterprises compared to bigger companies98.
More specifically, particularly burdensome compliance costs relate to the lack of
transparency and the variety of domestic tax laws (including on other taxes than
company taxation), administrative structures and administrative requirements, including
differences in accounting and bookkeeping rules, as well as frequent changes to those
same laws, etc. Moreover, many administrative aspects of company tax law directly
impact on the cash-flow of the enterprises. The costs of timing differences between the
receipt of income and the payment of the taxes levied thereon as well as time lags in the
reimbursement of tax paid are important examples. Similar refund problems arise with
the wrong levy of taxes which are not due or the amount of which has been assessed
incorrectly by the tax authorities. The same holds for taxes which have to be refunded
because of jurisprudence. Given their limited reserves, small and medium-sized
enterprises are particularly hit by these delays in general tax reimbursements and the
recovery of wrongly levied taxes (including VAT). The Commission services are aware
of concrete cases in which national tax administrations refuse to accept the deductibility
of business expenses unless the complete bookkeeping of the foreign enterprise and all
relevant documents are presented in a certified translation into the language of the
Member State in question. For small and medium-sized enterprises such costs can be
extremely difficult to bear and put into question the commercial rationale of doing
business in that state.
The effects of tax competition, as outlined above, appear in most cases to put small and
medium-sized enterprises at a relative disadvantage as they are often not in a position to
exploit the opportunities opened by appropriately designed tax schemes. Generally,
small and medium-sized enterprises do not have tax planning possibilities which match
those of big companies99. This can be illustrated with regard to dividend taxation:
Usually, under imputation systems, the tax credit applies only to dividend distributions
within the Member State concerned. Big foreign shareholders can circumvent this
disadvantage by means of relatively complicated practices which are often not in reach
for small and medium-sized enterprises (e.g. "dividend stripping").
Among the priority issues in the analysis of tax obstacles to cross-border economic
activity in the Internal Market, the cross-border offsetting of losses is no doubt the most
important from the perspective of small businesses. Given their usually limited capital
cover, it is particularly important for small businesses to be able to carry back losses.
Moreover, losses often occur at the beginning of an activity in a foreign country, i.e.,
precisely when these activities are typically still run in a smaller enterprise. Again,
bigger companies are usually in a position to make sure that all losses are eventually
                                                
98 see Annex 2.
99  In specific cases, however, it may precisely be small businesses which, on the basis of good tax
advice, are in a position to take flexible and inconspicuous advantage of tax breaks which large
companies open to public scrutiny are unable to benefit from.300
offset against profits. This is far from being true for small and medium-sized
enterprises. In this context, it is important to remember that business start-ups are almost
by definition small- and medium-sized enterprises.
Last but not least, small and medium-sized enterprises face specific cross-border
problems relating to other taxes than company taxation. For instance, VAT is a problem
of particular relevance to small and medium-sized enterprises. It should also be noted
that the transfer of small and medium-sized enterprises, often family businesses, entails
a number of tax problems that are often more difficult and onerous than for big publicly
quoted companies. Cash-effective gift and inheritance taxes are a prominent example.
There is anecdotal evidence of small and medium-sized enterprises relocating to other
Member States mainly to ensure that the later succession of the business to the family
heirs takes place without a tax burden that is perceived as being disproportionate if not
confiscatory. These problems fall outside the scope of the mandate for this study and are
therefore not considered in detail. They should, however, not be overlooked100
In short, the assessment of the tax obstacles is to some extent different for small and
medium-sized enterprises. It may be recalled, however, that the Ruding report found that
EU corporate tax systems are mostly neutral with respect to the size of the business.
Specific tax incentives for small and medium-sized enterprises do not alter these
findings. The above reflections do not provide any reason to question this analysis.
 &RPSDQ\WD[REVWDFOHVDQGSDUWQHUVKLSV
The importance of partnerships varies considerably between Member States. For
instance, in Germany, +/- 85% of all businesses, some of which are large multinational
enterprises, are run under one of the various legal forms of ’partnership’ available under
German company law whereas in other Member States only small groups of individual
entrepreneurs or very small businesses choose this legal form. Recently, partnerships are
becoming increasingly important as legal form for business start-ups in the "new
economy" and/or for joint ventures of large multinational enterprises involved in R&D,
telecommunications, e-business and similar commercial fields101. There the intention is,
among other things, to spread the burden of initial losses (between companies in
different jurisdictions) as such ’joint branches’ allow losses to be shared with another
partner and for cross-border loss compensation102. More traditionally, temporary ’ad-hoc
partnerships’ are often established for the co-operation of building companies on big
construction sites. In all Member States, partnerships (of various forms) are a common
legal form for intellectual and liberal professions (which are not directly covered by the
mandate for the study).
Generally, ’partnerships’ can be defined as economic entities formed by more than one
entrepreneur and in which at least some partners have unlimited liability. The various
legal forms vary substantially within Member States and between Member States. The
                                                
100 Reference is made to the FEE Survey on the Fiscal Treatment of the Transfer of Small and
Medium-Sized Enterprises; Fédération des Experts Comptables Européens, 2000.
101  Obviously, these businesses do not comply with the above-mentioned EU definition of small and
medium-sized enterprises in the strict sense.
102  On the condition that a 'partnership' is chosen that is recognised as such also in the country of the
parent company.301
definition of ’partnership’ in the various Member States is very complex and far from
being homogenous. Frequently, what is considered a ’partnership’ in one Member State
would be considered a ’company’ by another. For instance, it is unimaginable under, say,
Italian law that a hybrid legal form like the 
*PE+ 	 &R .*’ in Germany is a
partnership (which is its legal status under German company law). Agreement on a
precise definition seems almost impossible as these terms are embedded in deeply
rooted cultural, company law and civil law traditions. Whereas stock corporations and
other forms of incorporated limited liability companies can relatively easily be defined,
it is generally possible to distinguish on an EU-wide basis:
-  CIVIL LAW PARTNERSHIPS - in some Member States with a civil law tradition, any
gathering of a group of people for a common purpose which is not organised in a
specific legal form constitutes such a partnership which may, dependent on the
nature of its activities, generate taxable business income;
-  GENERAL OR ORDINARY PARTNERSHIPS - like an individual entrepreneur, all partners
have unlimited liability;
-  LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS - some partners have unlimited liability, some have limited
liability only; in some countries it is not uncommon that the partner with limited
liability is a limited liability company;
-  SILENT PARTNERSHIPS - the enterprise does not act as such towards third parties; at
least one partner has unlimited liability; the other partners have either unlimited or
limited liability;
-  SLEEPING PARTNERSHIPS - the ’sleeping’ partner is not made known to third parties;
-  EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUPING (EEIG) - a Community law103 instrument
for facilitating co-operation between firms established in a number of Member
States.
In most countries, ’partnerships’ are treated as ’transparent’ entities, i.e. they are not
taxable entities but used for the purpose of computing taxable income to be attributed to
the partners. The profit share attributed to the individual partners is then subject to
personal (in most cases progressive) income tax, or corporate income tax when the
partner is an incorporated company104. In some Member States, however, (e.g. Belgium,
Spain, Portugal) partnerships engaged in a business are subjected to corporate income
tax and in France they have the possibility to opt for either one or the other.
The domestic taxation of ’partnerships’ is complex and varies significantly between
Member States in the details. For instance, sometimes, the tax return is filed by the
entity, sometimes by the partners. The tax may be assessed on the income of the entity
itself or on the income arising to the partner. The partner’s income can be classified
differently: as investment income, business income or other. The applicable rate can be
determined on the basis of the entity or on the basis of the situation of the partners. The
                                                
103  Council Regulation (EEC) No 2137/85 of 25 July 1985 on the European Economic Interest
Grouping (EEIG), OJ L 199, 31/07/1985 p.1 - 9.
104  However, the capital gains realised on the disposal of partnership shares are not ’transparent’.302
entity’s income can be taxed (or not) when distributed to the recipient (as dividends or
another form of profit-distribution). Those are only some criteria for categorising the tax
treatment of partnerships in Member States.
In cross-border situations, this gives rise to a significant risk of double taxation.105
Member States may or may not consider a ’partnership’ to be a company for the purposes
of their tax treaties. And even when the classification of a ’partnership’ is the same in the
residence country and in the source country, as shown above, the tax treatment can be
different. Member States’ qualification of partnerships as resident for treaty purposes
may also be different as either the residency of the entity or that of the partners can be
relevant. As regards the taxation of non-resident holders of partnership interests, again
whether the partnerships is ’transparent’ or a taxable entity is decisive and can lead to
double-taxation in a cross-border situation (taxation of the income both at the level of
the partnership and the partner). Similarly, double taxation can arise in transactions
between the partnership and its partners. A good example of this is the treatment of
cross-border interest payments on a loan from a partner to the partnership: in principle
the interest is taxable in the hands of the partner and should be deductible while
computing the income of the partnership; without deductibility, double taxation occurs.
Other problems relate to the granting of tax credits.
It clearly follows from the foregoing that partnerships need to be taken into account
when considering possible targeted or comprehensive remedial measures to the various
tax obstacles. It is noteworthy that the OECD is considering these questions with a view
to possible changes of the OECD model tax convention. In this context, it has published
a comprehensive report on the subject106.
 7KHFXPXODWLYHHIIHFWVRI9$7GLIILFXOWLHVIRUVPDOODQGPHGLXPVL]HG
HQWHUSULVHV
Strictly speaking, value added tax (VAT) falls outside the scope of an analysis of
company tax obstacles in the Internal Market. Some of the basic problems encountered
by enterprises are however similar and/or linked to company tax issues. Moreover, it
would look somewhat odd to neglect VAT, the application of which is so closely linked
to the technical functioning of the Internal Market. In particular, the impact of
difficulties encountered especially by small and medium-sized enterprises in the field of
direct taxation can only be evaluated properly if seen in the context of the cumulative
effects resulting from the current structure of VAT. Generally, indirect taxes are
relatively more important for the service industry and for retail trade. But all companies
are subject to VAT and thus confronted with any problem that the application of the tax
might give rise to resulting from cross-border economic activity within the EU.
However, small and medium-sized enterprises are particularly hit by such problems.
Unlike large multinationals, small and medium-sized enterprises usually do not have
permanent establishments or any other stable business activity abroad. So their export
activities regularly imply particular VAT obligations in "foreign" Member States. Many
                                                
105  See, for instance, Confédération fiscale européenne Letter submitted by the C.F.E. to the European
Commission concerning tax treatment of partnerships in an international context, Bonn 1999
106  OECD, Issues in International Taxation No.6, The Application of the OECD Model Tax
Convention to Partnerships, Paris 1999303
international activities by small and medium-sized enterprises are undertaken under the
form of sub-contracts requiring the application of specific (complex) VAT rules.
Generally, the fixed cost caused by VAT obligations constitutes a larger share in the
relatively small turnover of small and medium-sized enterprises as opposed to larger
companies. Therefore, this section focuses on the specific VAT problems of small and
medium-sized enterprises. This does not mean that large companies do not face the
same or similar problems, they can build on a bigger infrastructure to deal with them in
practice.
As already suggested in the case of direct taxation, for VAT purposes, small and
medium-sized enterprises are not confronted with a single market but - despite the
degree of harmonisation achieved in the VAT field - 15 different jurisdictions and 15
different sets of rules. However, in respect of VAT, the difficulties for small and
medium-sized enterprises begin even earlier, since almost all cross-border supplies of
services and goods are governed by VAT rules. The complexity of the VAT rules,
generating high expenditure on specialist tax advice and high compliance costs, create
access barriers for small and medium-sized enterprises to setting up business in or with
another Member State.107
Small and medium-sized enterprises when considering supplying services or goods into
another Member State, must first identify the correct jurisdiction in order to determine
the applicable VAT rules. The jurisdiction is determined by the place of taxable
transactions108. Under the current VAT system, there are some 25 rules applicable to
determine the place of supply of taxable transactions. The various thresholds for the
application of specific rules that are provided in the 6
th VAT Directive are also
implemented differently in various Member States.
Thus, this is the moment when small and medium-sized enterprises realise that they are
about to enter a tax jungle of complex and complicated rules in which they need
professional tax advice. At this early stage and long before any profit is realised, small
and medium-sized enterprises already have to invest considerable financial resources for
the acquisition of special tax know-how, creating an access barrier to doing business in
or with another Member State. This barrier is substantial, because the expense at
acquiring this specialised tax knowledge is also considerable.
Mail order deliveries to non-taxable persons established in another Member State, such
as private buyers and public authorities expose small and medium-sized enterprises to a
considerable risk of non-compliance, because of the special distance selling rules.
Indeed, the administration of the “supply threshold”, which varies according to the
Member State concerned, is virtually impossible to deal with.
If more than one Member State is involved, the cost of specialist tax advice can easily
double or triple. Indeed, where the nature of the supply changes (e.g. more maintenance,
less supply of goods), the place of taxable transaction may also change, making further
                                                
107  See Verwaal, Ernst and Cnossen Sijbren, "Europe’s New Border Taxes", OCFEB Research
Memorandum 0008, 2000, which indicate that the compliance cost resulting from the requirements
of the EU VAT system of 1992 represent on average 5% of the value of intra-EU trade of Dutch
businesses.
108  TITLE VI and XVIa of the 6th VAT Directive.304
tax consultation necessary. Once the place of taxable transactions is established, the
obligations under the rules of the jurisdiction of establishment have to be understood
(tax representation, invoicing, declarations, payments, deduction or reimbursement
procedures, etc.). And even then, in practice many technical questions will be handled
differently by the tax administrations of the different Member States concerned, leaving




A small but expanding Dutch business (A) decides to explore other Member States for supplying remote
controlled alarm and surveillance systems, their maintenance, and also for supplying technical and legal
advice for making best use of these systems (negotiation with insurance companies, trade unions, etc).
If A presents his goods and services to a potential client in another Member State, he may incur business
expenditure (fuel, food, hotel accommodation) there. The VAT on this expenditure can only be recovered
by means of a lengthy and complicated procedure.
If A succeeds in finding a client in another Member State, he will have to find out where the place of VAT
taxation of his own supplies is. He may have to register in one or even more Member States and/ or pay a
fiscal advisor to obtain a clear picture on the rules to be applied.
Where his supplies turn out to be taxable outside the Netherlands, he may - at least currently - have to
nominate a fiscal representative in the country/ countries of supply. Even if A can escape that obligation,
the complexity of the rules will force him to pay a fiscal advisor to comply with his fiscal obligations in
the country of supply (invoicing, tax declaration, tax payments etc.).
It is here that the access barrier to cross-border trade becomes fully visible to small and
medium-sized enterprises. Where fiscal representation is obligatory (e.g. building
services or building related services, including the setting up of stands for exhibitions
and fairs, an area in which many small and medium-sized enterprises are doing
business), the costs of that tax representation usually cover or even exceed the profit
which could be gained from doing business in another Member State. This obligation,
still applicable in some Member States, will however disappear shortly109.
Even where fiscal representation in another Member State is not obligatory, the costs of
supplementary requirements for documentary proof related to business with persons
established in other Member States are huge. Member States require considerable
documentary proof for exemptions on intra-Community supplies of goods; small and
medium-sized enterprises are confronted with considerable additional record keeping
and declaration requirements (own ID-no., listings, client-identification no., dispatch,
transport or movement of goods over intra-Community borders must be provided,
Intrastat, supplementary invoicing requirements, etc.), increasing administrative costs
for this kind of operation. Indeed, the isolation of certain data relating to business with
other Member States usually requires sophisticated software solutions for the record-
                                                
109  On the adoption of directive 2000/65/CE of 17/10/2000, this obligation will be abolished by
01/01/2002.305
keeping and well-trained staff to operate them. These additional administrative costs
often equal or exceed the expected profits.
Similarly, the costs of documentary proof for intra-Community acquisitions of goods are
huge (returns, id.-no, supplier-id., Intrastat, etc.) and often equal or exceed the benefits
of lower prices for imports from other Member States.
The conditions and requirements of proof demanded for reclaiming input taxes under
the 8
th VAT Directive create another costly barrier for small and medium-sized
enterprises. The procedural requirements differ from Member State to Member State,
there are long processing times and considerable language barriers for claiming back
input taxes. This often leads to additional need for tax advice and increases costs as well
as cash flow problems. In particular, small and medium-sized enterprises have
considerable cash flow problems when VAT is charged on the basis of estimates and
payment is due prior to receipt of payment from the customer.
 &RQFOXVLRQ
Due to their size and limited resources, small and medium-sized enterprises are
particularly hit by the various company tax obstacles that have been identified so far and
suffer from disproportionately high compliance costs for cross-border economic
activities. The overall welfare losses implied by the need to deal with a multiplicity of
tax jurisdictions are strongly felt by small and medium-sized enterprises which are
indeed often deterred from entering the Internal Market, although the economic pressure
on them for doing precisely this is constantly growing. Administrative burdens and
problems in relation with cross-border loss-offset are the most important obstacles in
this context.
VAT problems are a particular concern for small and medium-sized enterprises and
these significantly exacerbate the overall impact of cross-border company tax obstacles.
In an international context, the use of partnerships can cause numerous complex tax
problems. This is particularly true with regard to the application of double-taxation
treaties. Moreover, the question arises as to whether specific EU arrangements for
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There are in principle two types of measures to address the above tax obstacles. The first
possibility would be, on the basis of the separate analysis of the obstacles one by one, to
try separately finding a targeted solution for each specific problem. Thus, a number of
specific actions for improvement can be identified to minimise individual obstacles. The
second possibility would be to devise more comprehensive, all-embracing approaches
which could eventually minimise, or remove altogether, the obstacles in a more unified
manner. This approach would also, at least in principle, be more in line with the
philosophy of a Single Market. In this perspective the underlying idea of such
comprehensive approaches represents a legitimate ambition and ultimate goal for the
development of company taxation in the EU. These two basic approaches are not
mutually exclusive but priorities will have to be established. There are numerous
concrete suggestions put forward in the literature under both approaches.
On the one hand, there are good reasons to believe that some of the targeted measures
appear to be important regardless of whether or not comprehensive solutions are
introduced. Some of the above obstacles are, for various reasons, of a nature that makes
it almost impossible to address them by means of comprehensive schemes (e.g. those
relating to stock options, partnerships). Therefore, some targeted measures appear to be
necessary in any event. Moreover, as will be explained, most of the comprehensive
approaches may be conceptualised as optional schemes and would thus be operated as a
parallel system on top of the traditional domestic company tax system. Thus, the non-
participating companies would still be faced with at least some of the obstacles. It also
seems that certain types of companies, for instance in specific industries, would by
definition be excluded from comprehensive schemes. Finally, it is likely that any
comprehensive scheme would, at least to a certain extent and in a transitional phase,
create problems of its own and, possibly, fail to address the interplay of companies
operating under comprehensive but different schemes (e.g. mergers). These
considerations by no means put into question the value and potential benefits of
comprehensive approaches. It only underlines that accompanying targeted measures will
still be necessary even if comprehensive schemes are realised.
On the other hand, even if all the targeted measures were implemented, the EU
corporate tax system would still suffer from several basic shortcomings. In particular,
the fundamental problem and endemic cost of having to deal with 15 different tax
systems remains unsolved. Moreover, some of the targeted measures could perhaps be
seen as potential "building blocks" for the comprehensive strategic approaches.307
It follows from the foregoing that it is necessary to analyse ERWK basic approaches and
the various detailed technical ideas and suggestions behind them in this study. The final
assessment of which approach is better or whether a combination of both is appropriate
can, of course, only be made after having carried out this analysis. However, it is also
clear that only a truly comprehensive approach can eventually match the requirements of
the Internal Market.
Before starting to consider the two basic approaches for devising remedial measures in
detail, two important general issues are explored: the role of the European Court of
Justice in and the possible impact of financial accounting rules on remedying tax
obstacles in the Internal Market.
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Regardless of the basic approach to remedies, it is important for a proper assessment of
possible solutions to look first into the guidance given and limitations indicated by the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice. In the absence of political solutions
taxpayers have been compelled to have recourse to the legal process to overcome
discriminatory rules and other obstacles. In consequence, the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) has developed a large body of case law on the compatibility of national tax rules
with the Treaty. National courts are also increasingly being asked to give rulings in this
area. As repeatedly referred to in the analysis so far, since the publication of the Ruding
report, the law on direct tax matters in the EU has developed at an unprecedented rate,
and today the jurisprudence of the ECJ strongly influences almost all aspects of
company tax law. There is good reason to believe that this influence will continue to
increase. While the ECJ has unquestionably made a significant contribution to the
removal of tax obstacles for companies, it is unlikely that the interpretation of the Treaty
is sufficient to address all tax obstacles to cross-border activity.
These recent developments have two implications for this part of this study. First, any
possible solution to the existing tax obstacles must take account of the existing
judgements of the ECJ. Secondly, it is necessary to analyse to what extent the European
Court of Justice jurisprudence calls for further co-ordination between Member States,
i.e. beyond the mere correction of a Treaty infringement.
It should be noted that unavoidably this section contains a certain number of "overlaps"
with other sections of this study which include references to specific rulings by the
European Court of Justice.
 7KHSDUWLFXODUSRVLWLRQRI&RPPXQLW\ODZDQGWKH(XURSHDQ&RXUWRI
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In attempting to understand the role of the European Court of Justice, whether it is in the
process of removing obstacles to cross-border economic activities or in any other
context, a natural starting point is to consider how its role and jurisdiction are defined in
the EC Treaty. Community law is a separate legal system which is distinct from, albeit308
closely linked to, both international law and the legal systems of the Member States110.
Since the creation of the European Communities this hybrid nature of Community law
has required clarification by an independent and non-political institution. In the Treaty
this role is assigned to the Court, which under Article 220 has the primary tasks of
interpreting Community law and ensuring its uniform application throughout the
Community.
By carrying out these tasks the Court has actively contributed to the development of
Community law. In addition to the questions of law on which it has ruled, the Court has
acknowledged and confirmed that a number of general principles of law are inherent in
the Community legal order. By far the most fundamental of these general principles are
the supremacy and the direct effect of Community law. The principle of supremacy
ensures that Community law has primacy over conflicting national law, while the
principle of direct effect means that individuals can invoke their Community rights
directly before national courts111.
These two principles, derived by the Court from the Treaty, are essential elements of the
DFTXLVFRPPXQDXWDLUH (the state of Community law to date) and the reason why the role
of the Court in the Community legal order has been and continues to be so important.
They provide for full and effective protection of Community rights and have established
a framework for review by national courts of all national measures that fall within the
purview of Community law. Without them, Community law would be of greatly less
significance.
The role of the Court can be observed from many different angles, but this section
focuses on its case law, particularly that which has tested the compatibility of national
tax rules with Community law. As the Court actively contributes to the development of
Community law and the interpretation of Community law falls, in the last resort, within
the exclusive competence of the Court, its role has often been assimilated with that of a
supreme or constitutional court within national legal systems. Its jurisprudence has
established a number of precedents which are not only referred to and followed by the
Court itself, but also provide guidance to national courts when they, in accordance with
the principle of supremacy, apply Community law and set aside conflicting national
rules.
An important part of the Court’s jurisprudence is concerned with the provisions of the
Treaty which establish the Internal Market: “the four freedoms” (free movement of
goods, services, persons and capital). Between them, the four freedoms cover all forms
of cross-border activity and investment and, in conjunction with another principle
central to the DFTXLVFRPPXQDXWDLUH, the principle of equal treatment, they impose a
prohibition on tax provisions which may pose obstacles to cross-border economic
                                                
110  See Van Gend en Loos, Case C-26/62, where the Court held that the treaties establishing the
European Communities had created a new legal order of international law. Also Costa v. ENEL,
Case C-6/64, in which the Court held that, unlike ordinary treaties, the Treaty created its own legal
system.
111  Van Gend en Loos, Case C-26/62, where the Court held that Member States had limited their
sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and that Community law is intended to confer rights
on individuals which become part of their legal heritage. Community law therefore not only
imposes obligations and confers rights on Member States, but can also be relied upon before
national courts by individuals.309
activity within the Internal Market. The four freedoms take precedence over conflicting
national law (including double taxation conventions) and they also have direct effect.
The tangent at which Community law and national laws on direct taxation meet is a
result of the combined application of the four freedoms and the principle of equal
treatment. In 1986, the Court extended its case law on the four freedoms to the sphere of
direct taxation when it gave judgement on Case C-270/83 &RPPLVVLRQ Y )UDQFH,
commonly known as ³DYRLU ILVFDO´. The Court held that a national tax law which
refused a dividend imputation tax credit to permanent establishments of foreign (non-
resident) companies, whilst granting it to resident companies, was contrary to
Community law. Unsurprisingly, this decision caused a great deal of confusion among
practitioners of international tax law at the time as for them it was practically unheard of
that non-residents and residents could not be subjected to different treatment.
Since the decision in DYRLUILVFDO, the jurisprudence in this area has developed rapidly
and it is perhaps fair to say that of all the Community institutions, the Court has so far
proved to be the most efficient at removing tax obstacles to cross-border economic
activities within the Community. The reminder of this section thus extracts recurrent
themes from the Court’s case law in order to establish what progress it has made, and to
consider how this progress could be furthered and reinforced.
 7KHSULQFLSOHRIHTXDOWUHDWPHQWDQGWKHIRXUIUHHGRPV
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The principle of equal treatment, which the Court has derived in part from the Treaty112
but also from the national laws of Member States, has had a decisive influence on the
interpretation of the Treaty itself. It is of particular importance to, and forms a
fundamental element of, the provisions of the Treaty which establish the Internal
Market. As pointed out repeatedly above, violations of the equal treatment principles
generate tax obstacles to cross-border economic activity in the Internal Market.
In general, discrimination can be defined as treating similar situations differently, or
different situations alike. This definition is used in both Community law113 and
international tax law but the notion of discrimination in Community law differs from
that of international tax law. Under Community law it is sufficient that situations are
materially similar, whereas international tax law rules are based on the assumption that
residents and non-residents are in a different situation and can therefore legitimately be
subject to different treatment114. The difference between these two approaches results
from the difference between the principal objectives of the relevant Community law
provisions and international tax law, respectively. While the four freedoms provisions
aim at removing the borders between the Member States, in as much as possible, for
                                                
112  The principle of equal treatment finds expression in a number of provisions of the Treaty (see for
example Articles 12, 34, 39, 43, 49, 56 and 58).
113  See, for example, Case C-279/93 Schumacker, in which the court said that discrimination only
arises through the application of different rules to comparable situations or the application of the
same rule to different situations.
114  Unless specifically prohibited by virtue of a double tax treaty provision.310
intra-Community economic activities, the very starting point of international tax law is
the existence of these borders.
7KHIRXUIUHHGRPV
In Community law prohibition of discrimination is a common thread for the four
freedoms provisions (the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital, and the
right of establishment). They give specific expression to the prohibition of
discrimination on grounds of nationality in Article 12 of the Treaty, itself a
manifestation of the general principle of equal treatment. Nationality is a concept
commonly attributed to natural persons but Article 48 of the Treaty includes as
beneficiaries of these provisions also companies constituted in accordance with the law
of a Member State and having their registered office, central administration or principal
place of business within the Community. Accordingly, a company is considered a
national of the Member State in which it has its seat.
Thus Article 43 of the Treaty prohibits a Member State from imposing discriminatory
restrictions on the freedom of companies of other Member States to establish
themselves within the territory of the first Member State through a branch or subsidiary.
Restrictions on the freedom to provide services are prohibited under Article 49. Article
56, in conjunction with Article 58 prohibits discriminatory restrictions on the free
movement of capital and payments. So far the Court has found cases in the area of direct
taxation to be within the scope of the four freedoms provisions of the Treaty and the
prohibition of discrimination as reflected in them has therefore been sufficient. To date
the Court has not examined Member States’ tax laws directly in the light of Article 12
of the Treaty, the general prohibition of discrimination in Community law.
In a tax context, differences in treatment include increasing the tax burden (due to a
higher rate or wider base) and procedural disadvantages, for example in the way the tax
is assessed or collected. In its case law the Court has acknowledged that residents and
non-residents may be in materially dissimilar situations because of the differences in
taxing rights exercised over them. Nevertheless, it looks closely to see whether the
differences are in fact material. In accordance with the objectives of the Treaty the Court
has adopted a narrow interpretation of derogations from its fundamental principles of
free movement and thus has taken the view that it is sufficient that the situations of the
resident and non-resident individuals or undertakings are substantially the same. For
example, the advantages commonly refused to permanent establishments under
domestic rules and double taxation conventions have been considered discriminatory
even though there are differences in the treatment of permanent establishments and
subsidiaries. It is sufficient that both are subject to tax on profits115.
2YHUWDQGFRYHUWGLVFULPLQDWLRQ
The notion of discrimination in Community law encompasses not only overt
discrimination on the grounds of nationality, but also covert discrimination116. This
                                                
115  See Case C-270/83 Avoir Fiscal, and Case C-307/97 Compagnie de Saint-Gobain.
116  See Case C-152/73 Sotgiu in which the Court held that the Treaty provisions establishing the four
freedoms not only forbid overt discrimination on the grounds of nationality but also all covert
forms of discrimination which, by application of other criteria of differentiation, lead in fact to the
same result.311
dimension of the prohibition of discrimination in Community law is of particular
importance to its relation to direct taxation rules. This is because, in principle, none of
the Member States imposes its taxing rights by reference to the nationality of the
taxpayers but operate with the concept of residence. Under Community law special
treatment of a certain group which is not defined according to nationality, but is likely to
be comprised of a high proportion of foreign nationals constitutes covert discrimination
as it has in fact the same effect as a measure overtly targeted at foreign nationals. In a
tax context this means that, at least in principle, differences in the treatment of non-
residents, being mainly foreign nationals, are likely to be considered discriminatory.
-XVWLILFDWLRQV
The principle of equal treatment can only be overlooked if the discriminatory national
rule can be justified on the ground of “imperative requirements of public interest”
(objective factors other than nationality) and the adverse treatment is proportionate to
the objectives pursued by the rule117. In order for the adverse treatment to satisfy the
proportionality test it must be necessary in the sense that there would be no other, less
restrictive means to protect the public interest in question. An insight into the case law
concerning national rules on direct taxation shows that the Court has enforced the
principle of non-discrimination very strictly. In line with general principles developed
outside the tax field, the Court has rejected a number of justifications for discriminatory
measures advanced by Member States and many of them repeatedly. These include for
example:
-  the need, in the absence of harmonisation, to take account of differences between
national tax rules;
-  the fact that a non-resident could have avoided the discrimination e.g. by setting up a
subsidiary company rather than a branch;
-  economic aims or the protection of tax revenue;
-  the absence of reciprocity;
-  the existence of discretionary or equitable procedures to ensure appropriate fiscal
treatment.
The Court has expressly refused to accept arguments based on the factual overall
treatment of a non-national taxpayer as compared with nationals of a Member State. For
example, in DYRLUILVFDO118the Court held that adverse treatment (non-availability of tax
credit based on dividends received) cannot be justified by the fact the tax system could
be considered to contain other benefits offsetting the disadvantages due to the
                                                
117  Some of the imperative requirements protecting public policy interest are expressly mentioned in
the Treaty provisions. For example, Article 46 of the Treaty states that the provisions in the
Chapter concerning the freedom of establishment and the measures taken in pursuance thereof shall
not prejudice the applicability of provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action
providing for special treatment for foreign nationals on grounds of public policy, public security or
public health. Some others have been developed by analogy, on the basis of the Treaty provisions,
by the Court in its jurisprudence.
118  Case 270/83, cited above.312
discriminatory rules. However, when considering whether adverse treatment can be
justified, account can be taken of the taxpayer’s position in both (or all) of the Member
States concerned. Thus, for example as held by the Court in 6FKXPDFNHU, (full) personal
reliefs granted to resident taxpayers of the Member State may be refused from a non-
resident taxpayer if he/she is entitled to such reliefs in the Member State of which
he/she is a national.
The Court has generally been reluctant to accept justifications put forward on the basis
of the administrative difficulties involved in ensuring efficient fiscal supervision or the
prevention of tax avoidance. It has taken the view that Member States should, if need
be, provide each other with mutual assistance to overcome such difficulties. In two
earlier cases (one of them commonly known as %DFKPDQQ) the Court did hold that a
discriminatory provision could be justified by the public interest in preserving the fiscal
coherence of a Member State’s tax system119. In these cases concerning Belgian tax
rules the proportionality test was considered to be met and the justification was accepted
on the ground that there was a need to ensure that a tax deduction granted in respect of
pension or life assurance premiums was matched by ultimate taxation of the benefits
paid out under the relevant policy.
These two cases have, however, been widely criticised and the Court has indeed shown
great reluctance to accept the fiscal coherence type of justification argument ever since.
The Court begun to limit the scope of the fiscal coherence as an imperative requirement
since 1995120 and many commentators now question whether the scope of that principle
remains good law. As also more recently demonstrated by the opinions of Advocate
General in 9HUNRRLMHQ121 and Advocate General in *XLS~]FRD122 the applicability of the
%DFKPDQQ defence is limited to situations where a discriminatory rule refusing a
deduction for a payment is justified by inability to tax the recipient of the payment.
Hence, a justification of a discriminatory measure on the grounds of “fiscal coherence”
requires the existence of a direct link between deduction and taxation within the same
tax system and as expressed by the Court in (XURZLQJV123 when referring to %DFKPDQQ,
a “tax disadvantage …[PXVWEH] compensated for by a corresponding tax advantage for
the same person”.
In national rules, there is rarely a strict correlation between deductions and benefits.
This is even less so if one takes account of bilateral conventions. As the Court noted in
:LHORFN[124, “the effect of double-taxation conventions which follow the OECD model
is that the State taxes all pensions received by residents in its territory, whatever the
State in which the contributions were paid, but, conversely, waives the right to tax
pensions received abroad even if they derive from contributions paid in its territory
which it treated as deductible”.
                                                
119  See Case C-204/90 Bachmann; Case C-300/90 Commission v Belgium.
120  C-80/94 Wielockx; C-279/93 Schumacker; C-484/93 Svensson; C-107/94 Asscher; C-264/96 ICI.
121 Case  C-35/98.
122  Joined Cases C-400/97 and C-402/97.
123 C-294/97  Eurowings
124  C-80/94, cited above.313
([DPSOHVIURPWKHMXULVSUXGHQFH
The archetypal form of discrimination that the Court has found unlawful arises in
situations where the tax treatment of nationals of a Member State is less burdensome
than that to which non-nationals of that Member State are subjected. For example, the
Court has in several occasions found that less favourable tax treatment by a Member
State of a permanent establishment of a company established in another Member State is
discriminatory and incompatible with the Treaty freedoms125.
Although much of the case law is concerned with non-residents who are nationals of
another Member State, the Treaty also protects individuals from measures adopted by
their own Member State which restrict the exercise of Treaty freedoms. Thus, for
example, the Court has confirmed that tax measures designed to allow groups of
companies to be taxed in broad terms as single entities in a Member State (group reliefs
and tax deductible transfer of assets between group companies) may not be construed so
as to discriminate against group structures that involve companies having their legal
seats in other Member States126.
Moreover, Member States have, within the framework of Community law, the
competence to conclude double tax treaties. However, as demonstrated by the decision
of the Court in &RPSDJQLHGH6DLQW*REDLQ127, this competence does not mean that the
Member States would be entitled to impose discriminatory restrictions against nationals
of other Member States.
Against this background, among others the following national measures have been
found to be incompatible with the Treaty freedoms:
-  a dividend tax credit granted to companies resident in France but refused to the
branch of a company having its seat in another Member State;
-  a refund of overpaid income tax granted by Luxembourg to permanent residents but
refused to taxpayers moving to another Member State during the tax year;
-  personal reliefs granted by Germany to residents but refused to non-residents even
where they could not benefit from such reliefs in their State of residence;
-  a business relief (a tax deduction for transfers of funds to a pension reserve) granted
by the Netherlands to residents but refused to non-residents;
-  limitation by France of the deductibility of research expenditure to research carried
out within its territory;
-  refusal by the UK of loss and other relief for consortia whose subsidiaries were
predominantly located in other Member States;
                                                
125 See, for example: Cases 270/83 Avoir fiscal, C-307/97 Compagnie de Saint-Gobain, C-311/97
Royal Bank of Scotland,
126  See Cases C-264/96 ICI and C-200/98 XAB and YAB
127  See Case C-307/97.314
-  heavier taxation imposed by Germany on a company leasing goods from an Irish
company on the ground that the leasing company was subject to a low rate of tax in
the Republic of Ireland;
-  dividends received exemption refused by the Netherlands with respect to dividends
received from a company having its legal seat in another Member State whilst
granted in cases where such dividends have been derived on the basis of domestic
shareholdings;
-  refusal by Belgium to set off losses from a previous tax year because of profits
arising in a permanent establishment located in another Member States that same
year.
-  refusal by Germany of dividends received related double tax treaty benefits (deriving
from treaties with third countries) to a branch of a company having its seat in
another Member State.
%H\RQGGLVFULPLQDWLRQ"
The provisions regarding the Treaty freedoms refer generally to “restrictions” to the
exercise of the freedoms guaranteed by them. In its non-tax case law the Court has
repeatedly held that non-discriminatory restrictions to the free movement of goods, are
unlawful unless justified by defined imperative requirements of public interest. As early
as in 1974, in its decision in 'DVVRQYLOOH128, the Court held that all trading rules which
are capable of hindering directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community
trade are in contradiction with Article 28 of the Treaty.
In the widely cited decision in &DVVLVGH'LMRQ129, the Court qualified the compatibility
of such restrictions with the Treaty freedoms (because of their negative effect on trade)
to situations where they are necessary for the protection of certain public interests, such
as fiscal supervision, public health and consumer protection. Thus, for example,
domestic product regulations cannot be applied to products imported from other
Member States, even though they did not discriminate against imported goods, unless
such restrictions can be justified on imperative grounds such as fair trading, consumer
protection, environmental protection. In 6lJHU130, the Court transposed this “restriction
based approach” to cover the free provision of services.
In the direct tax sphere the Court has so far only applied this analysis unequivocally to
compliance issues (such as accounting records required of a branch to substantiate
losses131). However, there are hints of a broader approach and the tendency in the
Court’s analysis can be interpreted as being towards a restriction based approach. This
tendency could arguably be extracted from the generally narrow interpretation of
justifications for restrictive national rules but it is reflected more clearly in the relatively
                                                
128 Case  8/74
129 Case  120/78
130 Case  C-76/90  Säger.
131  See Case C-250/95 Futura Participations.315
recent decision in 6DILU132 In this decision the Court found as unlawful restriction to the
free provision of services:
-  national (Swedish) rules that had the effect of making the provision of services
between Member States (from UK) more difficult than the provision of services
exclusively within one Member State (Sweden).
It remains to be seen how far the Court is willing to go in adopting such analysis in the
field of direct taxation but if it were unequivocally transposed to this area, the removal
of the need to show discrimination would certainly broaden the range of obstacles
falling within the scope of the Treaty provisions.
8QUHVROYHGLVVXHV
As discussed above a generally important question to which clarification is still awaited
is that of the extent to which non-discriminatory restrictions to the exercise of the Treaty
freedoms will be considered unlawful. A particularly delicate area in this respect is the
interpretation of the free movement of capital and payments as provided for in Articles
56 and 58 as the latter makes an express reference to permissible non-discriminatory
restrictions whilst at the same time it prohibits arbitrary discrimination and disguised
restrictions.
More specifically there are a number of questions to which the answers depend on the
development of the restriction type analysis in the area of direct taxation. Further
guidance could be expected in such areas as restrictions on certain cross-border services,
Member States’ rights to retain their taxing rights following cross–border
reorganisations, compatibility of withholding taxes on interest and royalty income and
taxation of cross-border dividends.
As to the issue concerning tax treatment of cross-border dividends under systems which
integrate the tax treatment of direct investment both at the company and the shareholder
levels (but only as regards domestic situations), some light has been shed on by the
recent ruling in 9HUNRRLMHQ133. At issue in this case was the legality of Dutch rules
exempting (up to certain thresholds) dividends received from Dutch companies. The
Dutch Government argued that the exemption was intended to reduce economic double
taxation and that the limitation of the exemption to dividends from Dutch companies
was justified by the necessity of coherence of its tax system.
In the light of the development of the Court’s case law since the decision in
%DFKPDQQ134, it was not particularly surprising that the Court did not accept the
coherence argument. In its decision the Court expressed the view that coherence must be
examined for one and the same taxpayer: coherence based on different taxpayers
(shareholders and companies) cannot justify discrimination as shown by the clear and
consistent case law of the Court. This ruling can have profound consequences for any
system of tax integrating the tax treatment of direct investment both at the company and
the shareholder levels. It certainly supports the argument that eliminating wholly or
                                                
132  Case C-118/96, cited above.
133 Case  C-35/98
134  See discussion on this issue above.316
partly economic double taxation domestically but allowing it to persist in respect of
cross-border situations a Member State imposes (discriminatory) restrictions to cross-
border intra-Community direct investment.
Another potential issue is the extent to which EU Member States are obliged to accept
the tax systems applicable in other Member States as being adequate and thereby abstain
from the use of anti-abuse measures aimed at counteracting the use of base and conduit
companies. In order for such rules to be compatible with the principle of freedom of
establishment provided for in Article 43 of the Treaty, they must be shown to be
justified and proportionate to the aims sought by them.
Another set of open questions centre on issues traditionally dealt with in bilateral or
multilateral double tax treaties between independent tax jurisdictions. A general
question in this area is whether a failure of a Member State to prevent double taxation
entails discrimination or restriction contrary to the Treaty freedoms. Another undecided
issue is to what extent the Treaty limits the Member States’ external competence to
conclude double taxation treaties with other member States or third countries. There is
as yet no decision concerning the extent to which a Member State can offer differing
privileges to nationals of other Member States under its bilateral treaties with other
Member States or whether indeed the Treaty imposes an obligation to the Member
States to offer nationals of other Member States the most favoured nation treatment as
offered under their treaties with third countries.
Some recent case law comes close to these questions135 but it nevertheless remains
unclear whether all differences between tax treaties will be incompatible with the equal
treatment principle. In particular it is arguable that the equal treatment principle does not
allow reciprocal concessions which go beyond mere allocation of taxing rights, such as
differences in concessions to avoid economic double taxation (refunds of imputation
credits).
                                                
135  See Cases Gilly and Compagnie de Saint-Gobain. In Gilly the Court was asked whether the
different allocation of taxing rights under the Franco-German convention for different categories of
workers was compatible with Article 39 of the Treaty. The Court replied that, in the absence of any
unifying or harmonising measures at Community level, the Contracting Parties were competent to
define the criteria for allocating their powers of taxation as between themselves with a view to
eliminating double taxation. In Compagnie de Saint-Gobain, the Court found impermissible the
refusal by Germany of double tax treaty benefits (based on double tax treaties concluded with third
countries) to a branch of a company having its seat in another Member State.317
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Notwithstanding that direct taxation largely remains part of the national sovereignty of
the Member States, national tax provisions may be incompatible with the requirements
of the EC Treaty and thereby void. This is because of the impact of provisions of
Community law and the general principles of law derived from it and from the national
legal systems of the Member States. It is not unprecedented that the Court, whilst being
mindful of the consequences of its decisions in respect of established patterns of
international tax law, dares to interpret Community law in favour of European
integration.
The Court has adopted a very narrow interpretation of derogations to the fundamental
principles of free movement of persons and capital, freedom of establishment and free
provision of services in the area of direct taxation. The relatively robust approach in the
recent case law is reflected in the Court’s decisions in which it has defined the limits of
the applicability of the "fiscal coherence" justification. The evolution of this view has,
however, taken some time and caused considerable uncertainty as to the meaning of the
prohibition of discrimination in the area of direct taxation. There is also a suggestion of
a tendency towards restriction type analysis by the Court in its case law concerning
direct taxation rules of the Member States.
Despite the significant potential of the Court for the removal of existing obstacles to
cross-border economic activities it is clear that tackling such obstacles exclusively
through judicial process before the Court cannot be sufficient. ECJ rulings are confined
to the particular case put to it and may therefore relate solely to individual aspects of a
more general issue, the implementation of ECJ rulings is left to Member States, who
often fail to draw the more general consequences which flow from them
Moreover, case law in the area of direct taxation has not reached maturity and the full
consequences for national tax rules remain uncertain. There are many reasons for this
but perhaps the most significant is the limitations inherent in the jurisdiction of the
Court. Case law concerning direct taxation results most often from actions begun in a
national court from which references for preliminary rulings are made to the Court as
provided under Article 234 of the Treaty. Only a few cases have been brought to the
Court as direct actions against the Member States. The potential incompatibilities of
national tax laws with Community law have therefore not been systematically detected
and tested. Equally, the jurisdiction of the Court does not permit it to rule beyond the
specific questions of law that have been posed to it.
Many important questions related to direct taxation lack guidance by the Court and,
partly due to this, the full implications of the case law have not been coherently and
uniformly implemented into national legislation. The shortcomings of the judicial
process as an exclusive means of promoting the integration of the Internal Market by
removing obstacles to cross-border economic activity within the Community would
therefore suggest a need for co-ordination at a political and at a technical level in order
to further and to reinforce the progress already made by the Court. There therefore
seems to be scope for introducing a Community framework for exchanging views of the
implications of significant ECJ rulings. The Commission, in addition to performing its
role as guardian of the Treaty by instituting infringement proceedings in appropriate
cases, could promote more uniform application of the law by issuing guidance on the
conclusions which it considers should be drawn from important rulings in the form of318
communications or recommendations. This approach seems to be necessary in order to
stop, from a Member States’ perspective, the Court from dismantling domestic tax
systems. Positive legislation in Member States in advance of Court rulings is therefore
the only constructive way forward. Areas of particular importance in this respect are
discussed in more detail in the following sections of this part of the study.
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One basic finding of the analysis of the tax obstacles was that many of them relate to the
multiplicity of the rules of 15 tax systems which, in turn, is - to a varying degree - linked
to different systems of financial accounting. At the same time, for many non-fiscal
reasons accounting harmonisation is still on the international agenda. Before devising
tax solutions, it is therefore necessary to consider these links in detail and to examine if
and how accounting harmonisation must or can contribute to remedying the tax
obstacles, before tax-specific remedies are considered.
In all Member States, the provisions for determining the corporate tax base and financial
accounting rules are linked to some extent. Accounting rules are based on the same
principles across the EU, but the details vary significantly from one Member State to
another. Formal bookkeeping requirements also differ. Since the Ruding report
important new developments have taken place in this area.
Generally, it is important to distinguish "financial accounting", i.e. the statutory
accounts that companies have to produce and publish regularly for informing the public,
and internal "management accounting", i.e. the continuous elaboration of cost
information for price-calculation, etc. In practice, both are to a large extent based on
identical data and in company practice the compiling of the accounts may be based on
similar procedures and carried out by the same persons. "Tax accounting" is required for
producing the accounting data that is needed for determining the statutory tax liability of
a company. Thus, the basic accounting approach to identical transactions can be very
different in different Member States. Transfer prices are a good example.
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Generally, for taxation purposes, the economic incentive is to minimise income in order
to minimise or postpone a tax liability, whereas for accounting purposes the economic
incentive is often to maximise or smooth earnings in order to satisfy the investors.
Member States traditionally deal with this dichotomy in different ways. Within the EU,
one can distinguish two essentially different structures of relationship between
accounting and taxation. The first structure can be labelled “independence”, the second
structure “dependence”.136
                                                
136  For an elaboration of this distinction and a general discussion of the relation between tax accounts
and commercial accounts, see Hulle, K. Van, &RQYHUJHQFHVLQDFFRXQWLQJUXOHVDQGLQFRPHWD[
OHJLVODWLRQ$(XURSHDQSRLQWRIYLHZ, in: "Tax Policy and the Impending Economic and Monetary
Union, Abraham, F., Stuyck, J. and Vanistendael, F. (Eds.), Leuven Law Series 12, Leuven
University Press (pp. 117-126), 1999319
Independence means that income determination for accounting purposes is in principle
independent from income determination for tax purposes. Companies may choose
different accounting policies for tax and for financial accounting purposes and the use of
special tax facilities is not linked to applying these facilities in the financial accounts.
However, the "independence" is never total: Accounting rules will take into account
structures which may have been set up for tax purposes and the other way round. The
separation of tax accounts and financial accounts is somewhat typical for common-law
countries applying an "over-riding principle" of a "true and fair view" in accounting law.
Dependence means that either the financial accounts follow the tax rules, or that income
determination for tax purposes is determined by the choices made in financial accounts.
This means that the computation of income for tax purposes has generally to follow
financial accounting standards and the financial principles of proper bookkeeping137
The linkage between accounting and taxation can go even further by insisting that an
accounting treatment available under tax law can only be exercised to the extent that the
same treatment has been followed in the financial accounts138. The linkage between tax
accounts and financial accounts is somewhat typical for civil-law countries. The
underlying idea is to prevent companies presenting different truths to different parties
(i.e. a big profit is shown to shareholders and potential investors and a low profit or
even a loss is presented to tax authorities), especially where companies have been able
to benefit from special tax facilities.
Normally, dependence only exists in individual accounts, because the consolidated
accounts are not usually the basis for the assessment of income tax. However,
companies may choose to apply the same accounting policies in individual and in
consolidated accounts. Consolidated accounts may therefore be influenced by tax rules
in those countries where dependence is prevalent. Generally, however, parent companies
tend to prepare consolidated accounts in a manner which takes out as much tax
influence as possible.
Within the EU, independence between accounting and taxation is prevalent in Denmark,
Ireland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, while dependence is prevalent in
varying degrees in the remaining Member States, with the strongest link between
accounting and taxation to be found in Germany. Given the enormous pressure to go to
global accounting standards there has recently been a trend in many Member States to
loosen this link but there are also recent developments in the opposite direction.
Against this background, the early EU accounting directives essentially represent a
compromise between the Anglo-Dutch and the continental-European and German
concepts of financial accounting. Taxation was not the primary concern when they were
adopted139. Although there are a number of articles on tax consequences in the 4
th
                                                
137  Reference is often made in this context to the German principle of “Maßgeblichkeit”
(authoritativeness) and the “Grundsätze ordnungsmässiger Buchführung".
138  This is often referred to as the principle of “umgekehrte Maßgeblichkeit” (reverse
authoritativeness).
139  For a detailed analysis of the relation between accounting and taxation in the EU accounting
directives see the above-mentioned publication by Prof. Karel Van Hulle.320
directive on individual accounts140, tax problems are the major reason why it has not
been seriously amended. The changes would have impacted on the tax revenues of many
Member States. The basic approach in the 7
th directive on consolidated accounts141 was
similar: Member States have the option to reflect "tax coloration" in the financial
accounts142. For instance, accelerated depreciation is accounted for in the parent-




According to business representatives in the panel of experts, matching the tax accounts and financial
accounts in a group of companies is just one practical problem among many in dealing with 15 tax
authorities. Solving it however generates considerable compliance cost. ICI, for instance, applies solely
UK accounting standards. Local accounts are then adapted according to local rules. The biggest problem
in this respect is not other EU countries (here overall differences are relatively limited) but the USA. An
UK accounting result of 150 may correspond to an US accounting result of +/- 110.
Unilever is a company whose headquarters are in two Member States and consequently faces both the NL
and UK accounting system. Being listed on the NYSE, the US accounting arrangements also need to be
taken into account, but Unilever still works with a single set of internal financial accounting rules.
The financial data are used to compile the accounts according to UK standards. Apart from minor
differences (e.g. treasury stock) which are accounted for separately, these accounts are used for both the
UK and the Netherlands. For the USA, however, a complete restatement of the balance sheet and the
profit&loss account is made.
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In the mid-90s, the Commission came forward a new accounting strategy which aimed
at incorporating European harmonisation within a broader international harmonisation.
In its Communication on the issue143, the Commission proposed to the Member States
to make it possible for "global players" to prepare their consolidated accounts in
conformity with International Accounting Standards (IAS). In its general
communication on accounting matters144 and the proposal for a regulation on the
application of international accounting standards145, the Commission takes the strategy
                                                
140  Fourth Council Directive (78/660/EEC) of 25 July 1978 on the annual accounts of certain types of
companies; O.J. L222 of 14 August 1978.
141  Seventh Council Directive (83/349/EEC) of 13 June 1983 on consolidated accounts; O.J. L193 of
18 July 1983.
142  Art. 29 of the Directive allows a parent-undertaking to use in its individual accounting rules which
are different from those in the consolidated accounts. This is a Member States option.
143  Communication from the Commission on accounting harmonisation: A new strategy vis-à-vis
international harmonisation, COM(95) 508, November 1995.
144  Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: EU Financial
Reporting Strategy: the way forward, COM(2000)359, June 2000.
145  Proposal for regulation of the European Parliament and the of the Council on the application of
international accounting standards [COM(2001)80] of 13 February 2001.321
chosen in 1995 one step further. It proposes that all listed companies would prepare
their consolidated accounts according to IAS-rules.
Given the global dimension of the issue, there is no point in developing a separate EU
accounting concept. As a matter of fact, the international development is to a significant
extent determined by the USA which represented until Economic and Monetary Union
the biggest single capital market in the world. This market attracts many EU
multinational companies seeking new equity. However, in the USA and in many other
English-speaking countries preference is given to an investor-driven conceptual
framework of financial accounting which emphasises potential future profits of the
enterprise. The stakeholder tax authorities are neglected.
Similarly, the IAS have been drawn up in a manner which is neutral from a tax point of
view. The application of those standards in individual accounts would, however, not
normally be possible in most Member States as it could result in adverse tax
consequences146.
In the EU, the relation of tax accounting and financial accounting will be significantly
influenced by the creation of an EU-wide capital market resulting from the set-up of
Economic and Monetary Union. As long as different accounting rules are followed, the
publication of financial statements by companies from the euro-zone in the same
currency might give a wrong impression of harmonisation. Markets clearly exercise
pressure to further harmonise the accounting rules. This trend will be reinforced by the
imminent creation of pan-European stock-exchanges for the +/- 7000 stock-listed
companies in the EU. There is good reason to believe that these developments will
increase the pressure towards a more investor-driven accounting framework (with
subsequent effects on tax accounting). However, it must be clearly said that the decision
to separate commercial from tax accounting is no foregone conclusion and that the pros
and cons are still being weighed.
The Council has recently adopted a directive147 allowing Member States to permit or
impose "fair value accounting" for certain financial assets and liabilities. This new
approach will essentially remove the traditional realisation principle (i.e. profits are only
accounted for when they are "realised" in a clear transaction). Instead of transactions
simple value changes would constitute the accounting base; financial instruments are
thus valued at market value (instead of historic cost). Thus, the linkage between
financial accounts and tax accounting becomes virtually impossible.148
                                                
146  Of course, those Member States, in which there is no linkage between accounting and taxation
might find it useful to allow the application of IAS also in individual accounts. At domestic level,
seven Member States already allow certain companies (primarily listed companies) to depart from
the national rules on consolidation in order to prepare their consolidated accounts in conformity
with IAS or with US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).
147  Adoption on 31 May 2001 of the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council amending Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC as regards the valuation rules for the
annual and consolidated accounts of certain types of companies, COM(2000)80, February 2000
[the adopted directive has not been published yet].
148  Currently, views still differ substantially within the EU on how the realisation principle is to be
applied in practice. Foreign currency translation is a good example.322
In the literature, there is even a growing trend to apply "fair value accounting" to other
assets and liabilities. Some scholars suggest that the traditional profit/loss-account does
not reflect the true economic operation of the enterprise. Investment properties, for
example, are held for investment purposes but are not accounted for at the market value.
Investment properties value changes could be mixed with transaction-based income and
results in the profit/loss-account or they could be separated but in any event then the
question arises, how do you measure the profit - excluding or including the value
changes? It is suggested that a new "statement of financial performance" is introduced to
address these problems. These views are of course not undisputed. In particular,
reference is made to the volatility of market values, especially for stocks. Moreover,
"fair value accounting" is said to influence what should be a purely financial business
decision which is generally a negative development.
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Generally, it is clear that there is no prospect of fully matching tax and financial
accounting in the future. To the contrary, "fair value accounting" and recent
developments in capital market regulations constitute steps which are likely to alienate
the two worlds further. "Fair value accounting" will most probably play a role for
consolidated accounts of EU multinationals and there are good reasons to assume that
the investor-driven IAS will become the basic standard for these consolidated accounts.
Generally, the need for more harmonisation to ensure greater comparability of EU
financial statement implies a severing of the link between tax and financial accounting,
at least unless Member States were prepared to change drastically their tax accounting.
Interestingly enough, however, recent developments in some Member States also show
that the separation of financial and tax accounting does not necessarily alienate the two.
IAS standards are sometimes also used for tax accounting purposes.
The effects of these developments are first and foremost felt in the consolidated
accounts but, at some stage, they will also have consequences for the individual
accounts (e.g. through the subsidiaries of multinational companies) which in most
Member States also provide to a varying degree tax-driven accounting information. The
dependence of financial accounts and tax accounts in many Member States will thus
continue to be challenged as the strong linkage between tax and financial accounting
makes it extremely difficult to change and modernise the accounting rules (because of
the implicit tax consequences).
There are two conclusions to be drawn for the analysis of possible company tax
obstacles in the Internal Market. First, inasmuch such obstacles are linked to the tax
base, i.e., the various components forming the taxable income, it becomes clear that
accounting harmonisation will not contribute towards approximation of company tax
bases in the EU. Second, there is good reason to believe that the number of options,
including tax options, will increase further in the future. This is because despite the
above trend most Member States appear to wish to keep some sort of linkage between
tax accounting and financial accounting.
Finally, with a view to the tax obstacles identified in Part III of this study it is important
to note that even when independence of financial accounting and tax accounting became
the prevailing pattern in the EU, factual links and problems remain. For instance, the tax
treatment of intangibles in all Member States follows the basic qualification for
accounting purposes. Another example is the tax treatment of leasing that is generally323
based on the distinction between operating leasing and financial leasing which is
different between Member States. As illustrated in the box below, this impacts strongly
on the (tax-effective) depreciation149.
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The differing tax treatment of intangibles (namely goodwill, trademarks and know-how) is a major
obstacle to cross-border business restructuring, in particular in situations in which intangibles are
sold/acquired in the framework of an asset deal. In some Member States, tax depreciation of acquired
intangibles is allowed, in others it is not. When accepted, different depreciation systems are provided in
different Member States. Furthermore, in most Member States capital gains upon the disposal of
intangible assets are taxable. As moving an intangible asset from a Member State where a capital gain on
an intangible is taxed to one where it cannot be depreciated is sometimes prohibitively expensive, the
difference in tax treatment is an issue that needs to be addressed.
Similarly, the tax treatment of leasing is not uniform across the EU, ranging from ordinary assets’
depreciation rules to immediate full deduction of payments. Thus, cross-border problems arise essentially
because of the differing qualification of contracts as financial leasing or operating leasing in the country of
the lessor and the country of the lessee. Thus, localisation as well as financing decisions are affected.
Companies may sometimes use the co-existence of differing rules of an identical leasing-situation for tax
planning purposes (namely concerning the leasing of aeroplanes or of big plants and machinery in general)
but generally leasing is a genuine cross-border tax problem. Leasing is becoming increasingly important
for infrastructure and big high-tech equipment and differences in the tax treatment can be decisive for
concluding or not a contract.
Another practical example of how financial accounting impacts on company tax issues
is the treatment of mergers and acquisitions.
                                                
149  It is however noteworthy that leasing is subject of a new debate in the accounting world and that
the current distinction between operating leasing and financial leasing will maybe replaced by an
approach under which all rights are put on the balance sheet. The lessee and lessor will put their
respective rights on the balance sheet.324
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The accounting treatment of mergers and acquisitions can be decisive for the tax treatment and financial
decisions in this area. The choice between the "acquisition method" and the "pooling of interests method"
for business combinations is a good example. This is because the "pooling method" is accepted for tax
purposes in some Member States whereas others allow it only in financial accounting. It may also be
noted that some EU companies apparently even only list at the NYSE because this allows them to acquire
US companies and apply the "pooling method".
Under the "acquisition method" the subsidiary (i.e. the acquired company) is integrated into the
consolidated accounts of the parent company (i.e. the acquiring company) as if the various assets and
liabilities of the acquired company had been purchased individually. They are valued at ’fair market value’
and the sum is confronted with the own equity according to the book value of the subsidiary. A possible
difference is attributed to the various posts of the balance sheet or it is put as "goodwill" or "badwill" on
the balance sheet. The cost of the merger are activated on the balance sheet.
Generally speaking, "pooling" is a merger of two companies in which the future parent company
exchanges at least 90% of the shares of the subsidiary against (mostly) newly issued own shares. Under
the "pooling of interests method" the participation at the subsidiary is valued only at its nominal value. In
the consolidation the book-value of the participation of the parent is simply compensated against the
equity of the subsidiary. All other assets and liabilities are valued at book value and simply added. A
possible difference between the consideration and the book value of the participation changes the
reserves. The cost of the merger can be immediately deducted.
As the "hidden reserves" are not made visible under the "pooling" method, it avoids subsequent taxation
at market values. Interestingly enough, there appears to be a strong lobbying in the USA to abolish
"pooling" domestically and to no longer accept it internationally.
The impending debate on the separation of tax accounting from financial accounting, to
be conducted at the European level, presents an opportunity for further approximation of
the tax bases of the Member States. To the extent that tax accounting will develop
independently from financial accounting, Member States will be obliged to find
autonomous rules for tax accounting purposes. In looking for such rules there is an
opening for co-ordination and co-operation to start with common base rules, instead of




The analysis in Part III of this study has clearly shown that many of the tax obstacles
concerning mergers and acquisitions and in the area of dividend taxation boil down to
the differing implementation by Member States of the Merger Directive and the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive. Such differences are of course to some extent intrinsic to the legal
instrument of a "Directive" but the analysis has revealed a number of issues that merit
further consideration.
While a limited degree of divergence of implementation and interpretation of a
Directive by Member States in drafting their national laws is inevitable, significant
differences in the conditions under which the benefits of the Directive are applicable
give rise to problems. Moreover, the substantially different implementation of EU law in
Member States increases further the compliance cost resulting from the existence of 15
tax systems within the Internal Market. A more uniform application of (existing and
future) EU company tax law could be an important step in order to reduce these
compliance costs and to make sure that where EU tax law is relevant comparable
situations are treated in a comparable manner. At the same time, the need for litigation
would be reduced.
One way of achieving these objectives and to tackle the various problems relating to the
divergence of the application of (both existing and future) EU taxation Directives across
Member States would be the introduction of some kind of collective monitoring of the
implementation of Directives. This would involve the creation of a mechanism for the
exchange of best practice and/or some form of peer review. After discussion with
Member States, the Commission could issue guidance on the interpretation of important
provisions of the Directives.
In this context, it is important to note that differences in the implementation of
Directives are often related to different legal traditions and concepts. In the two direct
tax Directives, for instance, many cross-border difficulties boil down to a varying
understanding of "tax avoidance" and anti-abuse practices150. The suggested mechanism
would give the opportunity to develop a more common understanding of these and other
important concepts in EU systems of company taxation. In the long run, the elaboration
of, for instance, binding guidelines, e.g. on minimum holding periods in the Merger
Directive, could help to find solutions to obstacles that respect the justified interests of
tax administrations in all Member States.
In view of past experience, one might consider involving a working party formed by the
heads of national (direct) tax administrations in this work. The former working group of
the Heads of Tax Administrations (HOTA) is a possible precedent. Another possibility
                                                
150  For a detailed discussion of these problems see Michelutti, R., 7KHDQWLDYRLGDQFHSURYLVLRQVLQ
WKHPHUJHUGLUHFWLYHDQGWKHSDUHQWVXEVLGLDU\GLUHFWLYH, IFA 2000 and Tiberghien, S. C., 7KH(8
GLYLGHQGDQGPHUJHUGLUHFWLYHVZLWKHPSKDVLVRQWKHDQWLDEXVHSURYLVLRQV, IFA 2000326
would be to follow the approach of the 6
th VAT directive which explicitly provides for a
VAT Committee as an interpreting body151.
Given the importance of the underlying problems, "collective monitoring" appears to be
a particularly appropriate means to deal with these sorts of company tax obstacles in the
Internal Market. Some possible elements of such an exercise are considered in more
detail below during the discussion of other targeted remedial measures.
 5(0(',$/0($685(6,17+($5($2)',9,'(1'7$;$7,21
 7KHFODVVLFDOV\VWHPYVWKHLPSXWDWLRQV\VWHP
The analysis in Part III of the obstacles in the area of dividend taxation demonstrated
that differences in the tax treatment of resident and non-resident shareholders as well as
foreign and domestic investment need to be removed, as such differences entail an
incentive towards domestic investment.
The classical system avoids this difference in treatment but leads - for both domestic
and foreign shareholders - to economic double taxation of the company profit at
company and shareholder level. There are, however, several possible ways to at least
significantly mitigate the effects of this double taxation, e.g. the application of a reduced
rate on dividend income or partial taxation of dividend income only. In any event, this
form of double taxation is not a cross-border tax problem.
The imputation system eliminates, via an appropriate tax credit, the double taxation
problem but usually only for resident shareholders. Most commentators maintain that
this difference in treatment infringes the free right of establishment and the free
movement of capital. Regardless of the future development of the jurisprudence in this
respect, the best solution for the Internal Market would be, if imputation systems are
maintained, for Member States to extend imputation tax credits also to, on the one hand,
non-resident shareholders or, on the other hand, foreign income. Given that most
Member States do not apply imputation systems this could, however, not be done on a
strict reciprocity basis. Generally, imputation systems tend to become rather the
exception than the rule in the EU.
The choice between the imputation system, the pure classical system or shareholder
relief systems involves a number of additional technical and political considerations
(e.g. the inter-relations with the applicable tax rate, the treatment of "small"
shareholders and the precise design of the system). However, from the Internal Market
perspective under consideration in this study, it can be concluded that the current design
of imputation systems creates tax obstacles to cross-border economic activities which
only a fundamental change of the system can remedy.
In this context, the framework for discussion of the implications of relevant ECJ
jurisprudence outlined in section IV.A 2 above could play a particularly fruitful role in
tackling this problem of the bias in favour of domestic investment of certain systems of
company taxation, notably imputation systems. The case law of the Court has particular
significance in this area. Recent rulings, in particular 9HUNRRLMHQ, suggest that tax
                                                
151  Title XVII, Art. 29 of the 6th VAT directive.327
systems which provide a disincentive to cross-border activity or investment may be
contrary to the Treaty provisions on the fundamental freedoms. Such rulings raise
important issues for the design of Member States’ tax systems for which more guidance




On the basis of the analysis in Part III, the Parent-Subsidiary Directive’s double taxation
provisions do not need to be radically recast. Though the Directive could be improved,
the system for preventing double taxation of dividend payments between associated
companies in different Member States works relatively well and enjoys widespread
approval. Nevertheless, a number of other improvements would help to remedy the tax
obstacles identified in Part III and would assist cross-border business restructuring
operations. Given the importance of the underlying problems, it appears that measures
to improve the effectiveness of the Directive should be pursued as a matter of urgency.
The Commission remains convinced of the merits of its 1993 proposal for a Directive
encompassing all companies subject to corporation tax, whatever their legal form. It
would help greatly if the Council were to resume discussions for the adoption of this
proposal, which were interrupted in June 1997 to make way for the high-priority “tax
package”. Admittedly, a majority of Member States would currently rather see the list of
company forms covered by the Directive updated than have the Directive extended to all
companies subject to corporation tax. But even if this solution were adopted, there
would still be a pressing need to resume discussions of the issue. In its meeting of 26-
27  November  2000, the ECOFIN Council cited updating the list as a priority. The
agreement reached at the Nice European Council concerning the European Company
Statute also entails updating the list, if only to include the new European Company
(Societas Europeae).
7ULDQJXODUVLWXDWLRQV
The Directive could also define the law applicable to triangular relationships involving
permanent establishments. As in the proposal for a Directive on interest and royalty
payments, the Parent-Subsidiary Directive could, by applying the same principles,
govern situations in which the shares covered by the Directive are held by a permanent
establishment located in a Member State other than that in which the company has its
registered office. Such a solution would dispel the current uncertainties and overcome
divergent approaches across Member States.
7KHSDUWLFLSDWLRQWKUHVKROG
As indicated above, the Parent-Subsidiary Directive currently applies where companies
have a direct holding of 25% or more in the capital of the company located in another
Member State that is paying the dividends. Taking account solely of direct holdings may
adversely affect the internal organisation of groups and hamper restructuring operations.
Moreover, some Member States already apply much lower thresholds. There are two
options for improving the Directive’s working and resolving these problems.328
The first would be to broaden the definition of the holdings taken into account when
calculating the 25% threshold to include indirect holdings. This would solve the
problems affecting the organisation and reorganisation of groups, but national tax
administrations would then have to identify and calculate indirect holdings. The second
would be to continue taking account of direct holdings alone but to lower the 25%
threshold considerably. This would have the merit of not complicating the Directive’s
application by the national tax administrations while eliminating most of the difficulties
involved in the organisation of groups. In the interests of simplicity, the latter solution
seems preferable. It must be borne in mind that several Member States already apply the
Parent-Subsidiary Directive with lower thresholds of 5 or 10% of the subsidiary’s
capital, in order to mitigate the double taxation of dividends received.
0HWKRGVIRUHOLPLQDWLQJGRXEOHWD[DWLRQ
The existence of two methods of eliminating double taxation (exemptions and tax
credits) results in much complexity. Abolishing this optional system to leave just one
method of avoiding double taxation would simplify the Directive’s application within
the Community. Many commentators argue that the Internal Market philosophy pleads
for the exemption method, which is said to represent Capital Import Neutrality. If the
EU were really, from a tax point of view, one Internal Market the CEN-CIN discussion
as presented in Part II would become theoretically irrelevant, and turn into an internal
debate on the regional allocation of new investments. In this sense, one might argue that
the credit method creates an REVWDFOH that is against the spirit of the freedom of
establishment. The home state levies additional tax up to its own tax level, as a result of
which companies operating in the state by means of a permanent establishment pay
more tax than locally operating companies. From this standpoint, "capital import
neutrality" as reflected in the exemption method should become the general rule within
the Internal Market. Tax would then be levied at the rate of the permanent establishment
state and a level playing field created for non-resident companies and local companies
as far as taxation is concerned.
However, certain Member States almost always provide for the use of tax credits in their
bilateral double taxation treaties, whereas others almost always provide for exemption.
This will make it even harder to reach agreement on a common method. What is more,
the equations "CEN = credit method" and "CIN = exemption method" seem to be
oversimplified and do not correspond to the complex functioning of both methods,
which in any event could both be improved.
The Member States may opt to exempt management costs relating to holdings and
exclude these from taxable profits. Such management costs may be fixed as a flat rate,
but the fixed amount may not exceed 5% of the profits distributed by the subsidiary
(Article 4(2) of the Directive). The advantage of a flat-rate system is its simplicity.
However, companies should be allowed, provided they can provide justification, to use
the actual management costs relating to holdings rather than the fixed amount if the
former can shown to be lower than the fixed amount.
In the above-mentioned 1993 proposal, the Commission suggested that Article 4 of the
Parent-Subsidiary Directive be amended so that the tax credit accorded to the parent
company include the tax paid by sub-subsidiaries where they themselves pay dividends
covered by the Directive to the subsidiary company. The Member States gave a329
relatively favourable reception to these particular provisions of the 1993 proposal.
Renewed discussion of the proposal should also help settle this point.
 &ORVHUPRQLWRULQJRIWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKH'LUHFWLYH
The analysis in Part III suggests that the conformity of national implementing legislation
needs to be checked in more depth, especially provisions based on the Directive’s tax-
evasion/avoidance clause. This review would (mainly but not only) focus on countries
whose law deems the holding of shares in a Community company by non-Community
shareholders to be a presumption of tax evasion or avoidance.
As mentioned in section III 3.3.1 above, in its judgment in Case C-28/95 ($/HXU
%ORHPY,QVSHFWHXUGHU%HODVWLQJGLHQVW2QGHUQHPLQJHQ$PVWHUGDP), the Court of
Justice ruled that tax-evasion/avoidance has to be determined on a case-by-case basis.
Though this case-law concerns the Merger Directive, the Court’s analysis seems
applicable to the Parent-Subsidiary Directive.
Firstly, setting aside the Directive where companies paying or receiving dividends are
controlled by one or more non-Community companies, without allowing taxpayers to
present evidence to the contrary, does not, at first sight, seem consistent with the
Directive.
Furthermore, with regard to the creation of a presumption of tax evasion/avoidance, the
/HXU%ORHP judgment does allow Member States to consider certain operations to
constitute a presumption of evasion or avoidance as long as the taxpayer has the
opportunity to present evidence to the contrary. However, a blanket presumption of
evasion or avoidance seems excessive. Such a presumption would lead to a situation in
which any shareholding in a Community company by non-residents constituted a
presumption of evasion or avoidance. Accordingly, the mere fact of having non-
Community shareholders cannot be sufficient grounds for a presumption of tax evasion
or avoidance.




The lack of progress in adopting Community-wide legislation on company law is
regrettable. Work on the tenth proposal for a Council Directive on cross-border mergers
of public limited companies should resume so that Community law can at long last
permit company mergers and divisions throughout Europe. The agreement reached on
the European Company Statute should facilitate the resumption of work to make cross-
border mergers and divisions legally possible. Only the adoption of such legislation will
give full effect to the 1990 Merger Directive. The agreement on the European Company
Statute could also provide an opportunity to re-launch the planned discussions on
transfers of registered offices from one Member State to another.330
 5HPHGLDOPHDVXUHVFRQFHUQLQJWKH0HUJHU'LUHFWLYH
 'HVLUDEOHFKDQJHVWRWKH'LUHFWLYH
Part III of this study set out a number of shortcomings in the existing Merger Directive.
The Commission remains convinced of the merits of its 1993 proposal for a Directive
encompassing all companies liable for corporation tax, whatever their legal form.
Moreover, although it is not, in the Commission’s view, legally imperative that the
Directive be amended to cover the conversion of branches into subsidiaries the issue
could usefully be clarified in the course of a future amendment of the Merger Directive.
To avoid the risk of double taxation, it would make sense to amend the Merger
Directive so that, in the case of the disposal of shares received following a transfer of
assets, the taxable capital gain was calculated on the basis of the real value of the shares
received on the date of the transfer of assets. This would in particular prevent the
taxation of capital gains from effectively precluding such operations. There would be no
charge to tax on the disposal if the capital gains on securities received in exchange for a
transfer of assets could be calculated on the basis of their cost price on the date of the
transfer of assets rather than the book value of the assets transferred.
Likewise, in the case of exchanges of shares, the capital gains on the acquired
company’s shares received by the acquiring company should be calculated on the basis
of the real value of the acquired company’s shares on the date of the exchange.
The Directive could usefully be amended to oblige Member States - in the event of
mergers, divisions or transfers of assets - to transfer the transferring company’s unused
losses to the company receiving the assets. In this case, it would need to be considered
in more detail whether and to what extent Member States could, on the basis of
Article 11(1)(a) of the Directive, refuse, on a case-by-case basis, the ability to transfer
losses where the restructuring operation clearly is carried out in order to evade or avoid
tax. The Court's judgement of 17 July 1997 on /HXU%ORHP(Case C-28/95) provides
some arguments in this respect.
Clearly all the above amendments would have to be drafted to ensure that they do not
create any new tax avoidance possibilities (e.g. the potential for selling losses between
unassociated groups).
 &ORVHUPRQLWRULQJRIWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKH'LUHFWLYH
The Commission will examine the Member States’ transposition of the Merger
Directive in depth. Although in the context of this study it is not possible to produce an
exhaustive list of the national measures transposing the Merger Directive, two points are
worth raising here.
On the basis of the “anti-abuse” clause in Article 11(1)(a), some Member States make
the Directive’s application subject to, for example, an obligation to retain securities
received at the time of the transfer of assets or exchange of shares. These provisions
have to be carefully examined in the light of the Court’s ruling in /HXU%ORHP (C-
28/95). Admittedly, the rapid disposal of shares received following a transfer of assets
or an exchange of shares could in principle fall within the scope of Article 11 of the
Directive. This article may allow Member States to deem, on the basis of certain criteria,
specific operations as constituting a presumption of “abuse”. However, the /HXU%ORHP331
ruling requires that “abuse” be determined on the basis of a case-by-case examination. A
blanket refusal to apply the Directive to the disposal of shares received before a given
period has elapsed, without granting the taxpayer an opportunity to show that the
disposal is above board, would not appear to be consistent with the Directive. Nor do
particularly long embargoes of five to seven years on the disposal of shares appear to be
inherently compatible with the possibility of presuming tax evasion or avoidance when





Dutch legislation does not apply the Merger Directive’s provisions on exchanges of shares where the
acquiring company does not itself carry on business or where a natural person who is both the sole
shareholder and director of the company acquired becomes the sole shareholder and director of the
acquiring company. The Dutch authorities argued that this was intended to prevent abuses.
5HVSRQVHE\WKH&RXUW
Even in the above scenario, the operation in question still has to be treated as a merger by exchange of
shares. With regard to the arguments concerning the risk of abuse, Article 11 of Directive 90/434 is to be
interpreted as meaning that in determining whether the planned operation has as its principal objective or
as one of its principal objectives tax evasion or tax avoidance, the competent national authorities must
carry out a general examination of the operation in each particular case. Such an examination must be
open to judicial review. Under Article 11(1)(a) of the Directive, the Member States may stipulate that the
fact that the planned operation is not carried out for valid commercial reasons constitutes a presumption of
tax evasion or tax avoidance. It is for the Member States, observing the principle of proportionality, to
determine the internal procedures necessary for this purpose. However, the laying down of a general rule
automatically excluding certain categories of operations from the tax advantage, on the basis of criteria
such as those mentioned in the second answer under (a), whether or not there is actually tax evasion or tax
avoidance, would go further than is necessary for preventing such tax evasion or such tax avoidance and
would undermine the aim of the Directive.
‘Valid commercial reasons’, within the meaning of Article 11 of the Directive, must be interpreted as
involving more than the attainment of a purely fiscal advantage such as horizontal off-setting of losses.
In some Member States shareholders exchanging shares in the acquired company for
shares in the acquiring company are taxed before selling shares received in the acquiring
company, especially if shares in the acquired company are disposed of by the acquiring
company before shareholders dispose of shares in the acquiring company.
This approach does not seem to be compatible with Article 8 of the Merger Directive,
which does not, in principle, provide for any form of taxation before a shareholder sells




1. On a merger, division or exchange of shares, the allotment of securities representing the capital of the
receiving or acquiring company to a shareholder of the transferring or acquired company in exchange for
securities representing the capital of the latter company shall not, of itself, give rise to any taxation of the
income, profits or capital gains of that shareholder.
2. The application of paragraph 1 shall not prevent the Member States from taxing the gain arising out of
the subsequent transfer of securities received in the same way as the gain arising out of the transfer of




The cross-border restructuring operations that are not covered by the Directive are
mainly those which do not involve the creation of a permanent establishment in the
Member State in which the assets were located before the restructuring procedure. This
situation occurs essentially in two cases:
-  Mergers and divisions of companies that do not imply the creation of a permanent
establishment in the Member States of the transferring company, as for instance in
the case of mergers or divisions of holding companies.
-  Certain cross-border operations involving the transfer of goodwill against "cash"
between companies of the same group, notably in the case of concentrations
accompanied by the closure of sites in one or more Member States and the recovery
of the goodwill by a company in another Member State.
The present text of the Directive does not cover these situations as it is difficult to
guarantee the financial interest of the Member State of the transferring company (i.e. the
company which is absorbed or divided) when no taxable activity or asset is left in that
State after the operation.
It should, however, be possible to deal with this problem by deferring the taxation of the
capital gains under the conditions put by the directive and keep, at the same time, the
financial claim of the Member State in question. This would of course imply amending
the Directive in order to take into account the fact that all taxable activities or assets
literally disappear in the State that defers taxing the capital gains. Such a new,
innovative scheme could include specific declaration requirements. These could be
certified by the authorities of the Member State receiving the assets in question and
show that the assets bear the tax liability and have not been sold.
Thus, a transfer of assets implying the deferral of capital gains taxation would require
appropriate mechanisms of mutual assistance in the administration and the recovery of
the tax claim in order to make sure that the Member State of the originally transferring
company effectively collects the tax when the assets are sold or transferred. It is333
acknowledged that this idea could be perceived as "radical" and, in a sense, breaking a
"taboo". Further technical discussions with Member States will, however, help to refine
it and avoid misconceptions.
 ,PSOLFDWLRQV RI WKH UHRUJDQLVDWLRQ RI FRPSDQLHV IRU WKH &DSLWDO
'XW\'LUHFWLYH
In its judgment in Case 1/93 +DOOLEXUWRQ, the Court of Justice ruled that the freedom of
establishment precluded a Member State from restricting exemption from the tax on
transactions relating to immovable property, which is normally payable in connection
with a reorganisation within a group of companies, only to cases where the company
benefiting from this exemption acquires immovable property from a company
constituted under national law, thus denying the exemption where the transferor is a
company constituted under the law of another Member State.
However, where there is no such discrimination, and insofar as both cross-border and
domestic operations are taxed according to the same conditions, the collection of such
taxes is not contrary to Directive 69/335/EEC of 17  July  1969 (the Capital Duty
Directive).
The existence of capital duties and transfer taxes, which can amount to as much as 10%
of the immovable property’s value, is nevertheless a significant obstacle to corporate
reorganisation. It would therefore make sense, at least in the case of mergers, divisions
and transfers of assets covered by the Merger Directive, to automatically exempt from
all such duties and taxes transfers of immovable property from one company to another
in the course of a restructuring operation.
 5(0(',$/0($685(6&$7(5,1*)25&5266%25'(5/266&203(16$7,21
The tax problems that were identified in Part III in connection with the absence of
effective cross-border loss compensation represent an important obstacle to cross-border
activities in the Internal Market. According to the panel of experts assisting the
Commission services with the study these problems are a crucial (sometimes
prohibitive) impediment to cross-border business activities and directly run against the
basic principles of the Internal Market. From a business perspective, EU groups of
companies should generally be taxed on their consolidated EU-wide profits. This would
automatically include the offsetting of losses but at the same time tackle a number of tax
obstacles.
The following section considers more targeted solutions only to the specific loss-offset
problem and discusses whether these form sensible and promising ways forward. First it
presents the technical solutions put forward in the Commission proposal for a Directive
of 1991. It then considers the various fundamental issues that need to be decided for
devising (targeted) cross-border loss-offset schemes.334
 7KH&RPPLVVLRQSURSRVDOIRUD'LUHFWLYH
In 1991 the Commission put forward a proposal for a Directive concerning the
imputation of foreign losses152 that addresses many of the above-mentioned problems.
However, this proposal has been discussed only once by Member States in the
responsible Council working group. It is still on the table of the Council.
The Directive would apply to all enterprises which are resident in a Member State and
which are subject to corporation or (personal) income tax in another Member State.
Generally, Member States would be obliged to recognise and relieve the losses incurred
by permanent establishments and subsidiaries situated in another Member State. For the
definition of "enterprise" the proposal refers to the internal legislation of Member States.
Permanent establishments are generally defined as a fixed place of business through
which an enterprise of a Member State carries on all or part of its activities. For
"subsidiary", there are two requirements: minimum holding of 75% (an indication of
sufficient influence on the management of the subsidiary) and majority of voting rights.
If Member States extend the Directive to permanent establishments and subsidiaries
located outside the EU, the conditions should not be more favourable than within the
EU.
The proposal provides for two methods for loss-offset for permanent establishments: the
credit (or imputation) method and the method of deducting losses and reincorporating
subsequent profits (deduction/reintegration method). These methods, which were
explained in detail in Part III, are already now current practice for permanent
establishments in most Member States. For subsidiaries, the proposal allows, in
principle, only the latter method, but Member States can introduce other methods in
addition, e.g. the consolidation method. If there has been a change in the level of
ownership, a subsidiary’s losses and profits are computed in proportion to the lowest
holding of the tax period. The choice of method is generally binding and any provisions
for depreciation by the parent relating to the asset value of the subsidiary are not
deductible. The income of the permanent establishment or subsidiary is calculated
according to the rules of the Member State where it is located. Where the permanent
establishment or subsidiary is sold or transformed into a subsidiary or permanent
establishment respectively, or when the holding in the subsidiary falls below the limit,
loss recapture is possible. Member States may require the clawback of any loss relief
which they have given when profits equal to the losses are not made subsequently
within 5 years.
From today’s perspective and in view of the fundamental developments described in Part
I of this study, it might be appropriate to review some of the technicalities of the
proposal153. Given the experience with the Merger Directive, it would for instance be
                                                
152  Proposal for a Council Directive concerning arrangements for the taking into account by
enterprises of the losses of their permanent establishments and subsidiaries situated in other
Member States (COM (90) 595), see O.J. C 53 of 28 February 1991, p. 30.
153  See also UNICE position paper, 3URSRVDOIRUD&RXQFLO'LUHFWLYHFRQFHUQLQJDUUDQJHPHQWVIRU
WKHWDNLQJLQWRDFFRXQWE\HQWHUSULVHVRIWKHORVVHVRIWKHLUSHUPDQHQWHVWDEOLVKPHQWVDQG




desirable to bring the definition of "enterprise" in line with that of the Merger Directive
and to include specific safeguard measures (aimed at avoiding the possibility of non EU
resident subsidiaries offsetting losses against EU parent companies). As indicated
above, general anti-avoidance measures have not proven very successful either in the
Merger Directive or the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and may be subject to judicial
criticism on the basis of jurisprudence by the Court of Justice. Moreover, the issue of re-
incorporation of losses when the permanent establishment or subsidiary is sold, wound
up or, in the case of a permanent establishment, transformed into a subsidiary could also
be addressed more precisely.
Furthermore, the proposal does not indicate how the loss is to be calculated in the
situation where an enterprise has (i) both a permanent establishment and subsidiaries or
(ii) several subsidiaries in another Member State. Currently, this needs to be determined
according to Member States’ detailed rules on the elimination of double-taxation (i.e.
credit or exemption method). Finally, the proposal is silent on whether the loss
deduction can be claimed on an overall basis or per country. How are differing tax
periods between Member States dealt with? How is the exchange rate to be determined
while translating losses into the currency of the country where the enterprise is resident?
Finally, the order of set-off could be specified under which profits of the permanent
establishment are to be re-incorporated into the taxable income of the enterprise.
 )XQGDPHQWDOLVVXHVIRUFURVVERUGHUORVVFRPSHQVDWLRQVFKHPHV
The following section refers in places to the above-mentioned Commission proposal but
the issues under discussion are all of a general nature. Some of these issues are only
touched upon, and require further analysis.
 2ZQHUVKLSWKUHVKROGDQGLQGLUHFWRZQHUVKLS
As regards subsidiaries, it is necessary to determine which subsidiaries of a parent-
company could benefit from cross-border loss-compensation.
The threshold of 75% direct shareholding in subsidiaries fixed in the proposal for a
Directive is often considered too high, particularly given the explanatory memorandum
of the proposal identifies the majority of the voting rights as the decisive criterion. It has
thus been suggested fixing the threshold at 50% plus one share. Others consider the
threshold is too low, as the appropriate thresholds for groups of resident companies in
national legislation are mostly higher154. One might make the adoption of the draft
Directive easier by providing a higher threshold which could then be gradually lowered.
Thus, the revenue implications for Member States would be limited in the beginning.
Moreover, the proposal does not specify how the loss deduction, if any, is to be effected
in the case of indirect shareholdings (although the proposal only covers the immediate
parent company), i.e. the treatment of the losses in subsidiaries of subsidiaries. Industry
pleads for both direct and indirect shareholdings to be taken into account in computing
the qualifying ownership threshold, be it 75% or 51% or something else. In this context,
it is however most important to make sure that identical losses are not deducted twice.
                                                
154  DK 100%; L and NL 99%; F 95%; E, P, FIN, S 90%; UK, IRL, A 75%; D 51%.336
Generally, it appears that the imposition of relatively high thresholds and the refusal to
take indirect shareholdings into account are motivated by Member States’ concern about
revenue losses and abusive behaviour. Tax administrations sometimes claim that
indirect shareholdings are difficult to control and audit. They thus wish to build
safeguards into any proposal on cross-border loss-compensation, in particular to avoid
"double-dip" situations (i.e. for example the deduction of an identical loss in two
different jurisdictions). Therefore, from a pragmatic perspective the political
acceptability of any such proposal has to be balanced against a more economic-based
reasoning (seeking to determine effective control or voting right majority).
 5HFDSWXUHRIORVVHV
Another general problem relates to the recapture of losses which have been relieved
when the company becomes profitable. It is important to make a clear distinction
between cases where the permanent establishment or subsidiary starts to make profit and
cases where it does not. From a political point of view, it is fair to say that the Member
State of the subsidiary or permanent establishment should, provided that the business
becomes profitable, "finance" the loss. As regards subsidiaries, the technical method for
achieving this is, as indicated above and provided for in the proposal for the directive,
the deduction/reintegration method. The way this works is explained in Box 52 below.
In other cases, it seems legitimate to ask why there should be any recapturing in the
State where the head office is located. Clearly, the deduction of capital losses should be




Under the proposal for a Directive, the losses incurred in a certain period by a subsidiary of a company
are credited. In the subsequent years, the profits of the subsidiary are also included in the taxable
income of the parent company but the subsidiary can now carry over the loss that was previously
transferred to the parent-company (which now adds it back). Alternatively, in year 2 when the
subsidiary becomes profitable again no adjustments are made. In the first case, it is the country of the
subsidiary which ultimately bears the tax-reducing effect of the losses (Member State B), in the second
it is the country of the parent-company (Member State A).
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Moreover, the proposed Directive allows Member States to oblige companies to
reincorporate profits by the end of the fifth year following the year in which the loss
became deductible, if subsequent profits do not exceed these losses. This 5 year period
seems rather arbitrary, as the carry forward compensation of losses permitted by the
domestic tax laws differ very much among Member States155. A reference to the carry
forward period allowed internally might avoid discrimination between foreign and
domestic subsidiaries and/or permanent establishments. This reference to domestic
legislation could, where it exists, include the carry back compensation too. Such an
approach would, however, imply a lack of homogeneity. This would be regrettable in
the sense that good legal and economic reasons can be found in favour of unlimited
domestic loss carry forward. Anyhow, it seems that this feature is not decisive for cross-
border loss-compensation. It is important that fundamentally the (sufficient) carry over
                                                




of losses is possible. Generally, the recapture of losses is not a common feature of
Member States’ domestic tax systems.
 +RUL]RQWDOYVYHUWLFDORIIVHWWLQJRIORVVHV
Industry regrets the exclusion of the horizontal offset of losses (e.g. the losses of one
subsidiary are offset against the profits of another subsidiary), but it should perhaps also
be noted that not all Member States provide for horizontal offsetting of losses
domestically. It is nevertheless true that arrangements that only allow the up-stream
loss-compensation at the level of the parent imply the risk of "losing" losses when the
parent-company has not enough profits for full absorption.
One can therefore find strong arguments for including also the situation of profits in the
Member State of the permanent establishment and losses in the Member State of the
subsidiary. Up-stream vertical loss-compensation only is said to put smaller Member
States implicitly at a disadvantage, as larger Member States obviously offer more room
for the immediate compensation of losses in the home market of the subsidiary.
However, the revenue effects of horizontal cross-border loss-offset would hit Member
States with a relatively high number of subsidiaries in a particularly strong way.
Moreover, horizontal cross-border offsetting of losses creates new problems VXLJHQHULV.
If, for instance, a multinational enterprise having its head office in one Member State
and one subsidiary in seven others, suffers losses in three subsidiaries which cannot be
absorbed by the head office, the question arises as to which of the other four subsidiaries
shall then absorb the surplus loss, and how it should be recaptured. A general problem
of cross-border loss-compensation is particularly acute for horizontal loss-offset: the
targeted "creation" or "shifting" of losses may open undesirable possibilities of tax
avoidance (or even evasion). These questions also illustrate the inherent difficulties in
any solution in this area which falls short of full consolidation of profit and loss at EU
level.
 :KLFKUXOHVDSSO\LQFRPSXWLQJWKHORVVHV"
A general problem that was singled out above concerns the question as to which
country’s rules apply for determining the deductible loss.
While the proposal for a Directive indicates that the losses should be fixed on the basis
of the rules of the country in which they occur, many suggest applying the parent-
company country’s rules for calculating the quantum of loss deduction (or the income to
be reincorporated) of the foreign subsidiary or permanent establishment. This would
contribute to a more consistent approach and it would avoid Member States having to
accept that in certain situations the calculation of foreign losses was more generous than
that of domestic losses. Moreover, it should not be overlooked that computing the losses
under the rules of the country in which they occur would open tax planning
opportunities as multinational groups might try to ensure that expenses were always
incurred in a jurisdiction in which they were deductible.
Notwithstanding these objections of principle, the approach of applying the rules of the
home country of the parent-company or head office looks appealing from a more
practical standpoint. Moreover, it is noteworthy that in applying the credit method for
permanent establishment income generally Member States tend to re-calculate foreign
(losses and) profits according to their own rules and limit the credit given for foreign tax339
paid to the amount that would have been due while applying their tax rate to the profits
calculated under their laws. Hence, their wish to avoid calculating foreign losses in a
more favourable way than domestic losses is consistent with current practice.
 5HODWHGSUREOHPDUHDV
There are a variety of other problem areas to cross-border loss compensation, which
deserve a brief mention. First, the arrangements in double taxation treaties, particularly
in relation to permanent establishments. As explained above, the differences between
existing double taxation treaties can create problems, especially in triangular situations.
Possible remedial measures in this respect are considered in section IV. B 9 below.
Secondly, it needs to be examined whether partnerships can be treated in the same way
as companies in comparable situations of cross-border losses. Although in principle
highly desirable, the technical complexities do not allow for a clear-cut conclusion. For
instance, the proposal for a Directive explicitly includes "partnerships" in its scope
while this study provides some arguments to be cautious in this respect. Given the
current situation, it appears justifiable to concentrate first and foremost on losses of
subsidiaries and permanent establishments and consider partnership losses separately.
Finally, as mentioned above, the treatment of pre-acquisition or pre-merger losses needs
to be kept in mind. The idea of "freezing" the theoretical tax liability at the moment of
the merger and its deferral until the related items are sold or a de-merger operation takes
place seems to provide a promising way forward. This idea was further elaborated
above, in the section on possible remedial measures to tax problems relating to cross-
border restructuring operations.
 3RVVLEOHZD\VIRUZDUG
On the basis of the above analysis it is possible to consider the fundamental direction
that a targeted initiative in the area of cross-border loss-offset might take. First, it is
logical to re-assess the existing Commission proposal for a Directive. Second, ideas
based on different approaches that build on the current experience in (some) Member
States should be explored.
 5HDVVHVVPHQWDQGFRPSOHWLRQRIWKHSURSRVDORI
After ten years on the table of the Council, the current Commission proposal for a
directive would clearly need to be technically refurbished and up-dated.
However, one might have doubts about the ultimate feasibility of such technical
improvements. Many of the difficulties relating to the proposal for a directive of 1991
boil down to the different definitions and concept of "loss" in the various Member
States. Therefore, it might be argued that before introducing cross-border loss-
compensation some approximation or harmonisation is required in this area. What is
more, without such approximation or harmonisation the revenue consequences for
Member States, both due to the desired effect of cross-border loss relief and the
undesired effect of drastically increased opportunities for profit/loss-shifting and
appropriate tax planning, would be substantial.340
One possibility to address this problem would be to look at an earlier Commission
proposal for a Directive of 1984156 which proposed three years carry back and unlimited
carry forward of losses in the domestic laws of Member States. It might be appropriate
to revive this proposal, devise harmonised rules on the definition of losses and the
timing of compensation and, once adopted, to build on this base the second step of
cross-border loss-compensation as put forward in the 1991 proposal. However, the
Commission has withdrawn this proposal and argued that the domestic loss-
compensation arrangements fall under the institutional sphere of competence of Member
States (subsidiarity). It is also doubtful whether it is technically and politically possible
to approximate RQO\ the definition of losses at EU level. This is because the definition of
losses cannot be separated from all other components of the tax base.
Consequently, a more fundamental rethinking of key elements of the proposal may be
needed. It is in particular the arrangements for deciding on which country’s rules should
apply for determining the losses that creates problems. Applying the rules of the parent-
company or head office country would remove many of Member States’ concerns and
resolve a number of practical problems. Moreover, such an approach could contribute to
finding a pragmatic solution to the other problems mentioned above, such as
determining the participation threshold. Without common rules one could consider
applying differing home state rules.
Generally, Member States’ diverging approaches and definitions in this area should be
manageable for the companies involved as most multinational companies already work
with these and re-calculate profits and losses as required under tax and accounting rules.
Therefore, it is true that the compliance cost resulting from the co-existence of 15 tax
systems in the Internal Market would persist, but the advantages of cross-border loss-
offset seem to outweigh this disadvantage.
 0RUHJHQHUDO(8ORVVFRQVROLGDWLRQ
The problems relating to the (lack of) cross-border offset of losses boil down to the
basic question on whether or not a ’group’ of companies could and should be recognised
as such for taxation purposes at EU level. If the basic reply to this is yes, and the
Internal Market strongly presumes this reply, thought should be given to the technical
means of achieving this. Regardless of varying terms of art and different systems,
consolidation of profits and losses at the level of the parent-company is an essential
feature of all company tax regimes. Clearly, from a business perspective the ideal
solution to the problem of cross-border loss-offset (among other things) would be to
provide EU businesses with a common consolidated corporate tax base for their EU
activities.
As indicated above, two EU Member States operate cross-border consolidation schemes
which in practice focus on the tax treatment of losses. France offers a system of
consolidated world-wide corporate income taxation which is applied very restrictively
and subject to approval by the Minister of Finance. The rules of this regime are
generally considered to be very complex and in practice only a few big French groups
                                                
156  COM(84)404; proposal for a directive on the harmonisation of the laws of Member States relating
to tax arrangements for the carry-over of losses of undertakings, OJ C 253, 20.091984, p.5
[withdrawn 20.11.1996 (OJ C 2, 04.01.1997, p.6)]341
obtain the formal agreement to implement it. Denmark applies a comparable system
which appears to be less complex and more accessible. Business circles appear to
consider the Danish approach a promising way forward157.
The Danish system was originally intended to accommodate several concerns but after
numerous changes to the regime its advantages now mainly relate to cross-border loss-
offset. In a cross-border context, it effectively provides for loss-compensation of
subsidiary losses. It only applies Danish rules, i.e. the tax rules of the country of the
parent-company, for defining and calculating the losses, determining ownership
thresholds etc. This is a major difference to the Commission proposal for a Directive of
1991. That proposal, however, would also cover losses from permanent establishments
which the Danish joint taxation system does not158. On the other hand, the Danish
system, unlike the Commission proposal, gives the country of the parent-company the
possibility to tax the profits of the subsidiary.
The Danish ’joint taxation’ system is described in the following box.
                                                
157  See: Luther, S., 8QWHUQHKPHQVEHVWHXHUXQJLP%LQQHQPDUNW%HKLQGHUXQJYRQ
JUHQ]EHUVFKUHLWHQGHQ$NWLYLWlWWHQHXURSlLVFKHU8QWHUQHKPHQ, contribution for the CFE Forum
2000, Brussels
158 This does not mean that there is no offset of losses in permanent establishments at all. Such offset





A Danish parent company may apply for joint taxation with its wholly owned Danish and foreign
subsidiaries. Under the scheme, the net total of each company’s taxable profits, computed in accordance
with Danish tax rules, constitutes the Danish parent company’s taxable profit. The most important
conditions for obtaining permission for joint taxation are as follows:
-  Danish subsidiaries must be wholly owned by the parent company directly or together with other
subsidiaries.
-  The parent company must directly or together with other subsidiaries own 100% of the shares in a
foreign subsidiary or the maximum percentage allowed under the legislation of the foreign country.
-  All companies included under joint taxation must have the same financial year.
-  The shares in subsidiaries included under joint taxation must have been owned for the entire financial
year. Newly incorporated companies may be included under joint taxation from the date of
incorporation.
-  Application for joint taxation with a foreign subsidiary will, however, be disallowed if more than 50%
of the share capital in the foreign subsidiary has been acquired from a related company. Similar rules
apply to subsidiaries which have been foreign but are now considered resident in Denmark, because
the effective management has been moved to Denmark. However joint taxation will be allowed if the
Danish parent company directly or indirectly has owned more than 50% of the share capital of the
foreign subsidiary in the whole period during which the company has been related.
-  All subsidiaries in a group do not have to be included under joint taxation. It is also possible to
exclude from joint taxation in any given year a subsidiary which has previously been jointly taxed.
Subsequent re-inclusion of the subsidiary is normally not possible.
The net total of each company’s taxable profits, computed in accordance with Danish tax rules, constitutes
the tax base of the companies included in the joint taxation scheme. The tax is charged to the Danish
parent company.. Foreign taxes paid by subsidiaries included under joint taxation can be set off against
Danish taxes using the credit method. This applies irrespective of possible exemption provisions in a
double tax treaty. Jointly taxed companies are jointly and severally liable to taxes relating to the years in
which they have been jointly taxed. The main benefits of joint taxation are that tax losses in Danish
companies and foreign subsidiaries can be set off against profits of other profitable Danish companies.
In order to ensure that the use of tax losses arising from foreign jointly taxed subsidiaries only has effect
as a deferred tax, complex rules on claw back of tax losses exist. Generally withdrawal of foreign
subsidiaries from Danish joint taxation will result in full claw back of deductions for tax losses
corresponding to the total tax losses which have been set off against positive taxable income in other
companies included under the joint taxation and which do not correspond to profit in later income years,
unless:
-  the joint taxation ceases due to a sale of shares to a non related company;
-  the joint taxation ceases due to bankruptcy or liquidation without transfer of the assets to related
companies.
In these cases the claw back is limited to the capital gain on a fictitious sale of the assets at market value
increased by the tax-exempt dividends and tax-exempted capital gains on the sale of shares in the
subsidiary during the past five years. If the Danish parent subsequently receives tax-exempt dividends or
capital gains, claw back will be effected until the total tax losses have been recaptured. Full claw back of
tax losses will also apply if the activities of the foreign subsidiary (or part of it) are sold to related
companies, if the Danish parent company becomes a resident in another country, or if it regains control
within 5 years. Claw back of tax losses will be eliminated in case of a merger of two jointly taxed
subsidiaries or a merger of the Danish parent company and another Danish company provided certain
conditions are met. Finally, there is a rule which, in the case where a foreign subsidiary can be included in
a foreign domestic group taxation scheme, prevents the double use of a loss.
One could devise an EU scheme pursuing the Danish approach on the (profits and)
losses of subsidiaries and complete that by appropriate rules on permanent
establishment losses. Here, as demonstrated above, loss-compensation is already343
immediate when the credit method is used. However the 100% participation
requirement forms an important restriction to this possibility.
As also indicated above, there may be a specific problem concerning the other side of
the coin, the profits of the permanent establishment. When the foreign tax credit
available in relation to these profits cannot be tax-effective in a given period as the
headquarter company is in a loss situation (and does not pay tax) or when its tax liability
is smaller than the credit, the tax credit would be "lost". This problem could be
overcome when foreign tax credits are generally made available for carry forward. This
solution would be consistent with the possibility of carrying forward losses in
permanent establishments and ensure that similar domestic and international situations
are treated similarly. For many Member States the effects of such an approach would be
less dramatic than one might expect at first sight. Many Member States already apply
the credit method to permanent establishments. If they do not have it already, they
would have to introduce the carry forward of tax credits.
Granting the tax credit also to subsidiaries, implicit in the Danish system, is much less
revolutionary than one might think at first glance. The "revenue sharing" between
Member States on that basis would be "fair" in the sense that no Member State would
have to give up its right to levy tax locally. Generally, this idea does not provide for
general horizontal offset of losses. This should comfort the general fear of revenue
losses due to manipulation. Clearly, "low-tax countries" would not feel drastic revenue
effects. It should be observed that, generally, enhanced possibilities for cross-border
loss-offset should go hand in hand with more intense co-operation of national tax
administrations in order to prevent abuse.
Under this approach, which clearly needs to be further elaborated, EU companies would
effectively be permitted to establish a complete up stream vertical offset of losses cross-
border and thus resolve at least the basic "losses" problem. It would fall short of
addressing other group-related tax problems. There might even be some additional
compliance cost involved: the subsidiary could effectively have to run two sets of
accounts (according to the requirements of the two Member States involved). Moreover,
many technical details would have to be sorted out.
Regardless of the precise technicalities of the solution ("traditional" loss-transfer under
the Commission proposal vs. "innovative" joint taxation of losses and profits) the basic
issue should be followed up since it concerns one of the most important company tax
obstacles in the Internal Market.
Finally, it is noteworthy that the United States have chosen another radically different
approach to deal with the problems created by the differing rules on loss-compensation
for subsidiaries and permanent establishments. This - much-disputed - approach of
granting the enterprises concerned a simple option is described in the following box. In
the panel consulting the Commission services on this part of the study these
arrangements met with wide support. Some members of the panel suggested that this
procedure could be a practical answer to requests by business in the EU for cross-border
loss-compensation. The fact that companies have the incentive to run a loss-making
foreign start-up for, say, the first 3-5 years as permanent establishment and as subsidiary
in the subsequent profit-generating phase is very illustrative in this respect. Such
situations could indeed be overcome by a procedure under which the taxpayer would
have the possibility to elect for five years that the subsidiary is treated for taxation344
purposes as if it was permanent establishment. This less ambitious solution could help
to eliminate many of the problems if Member States are not prepared to adopt the




According to a regulation that entered into force beginning of 1997, US partnerships and limited liability
companies can elect for qualification for tax purposes either as a corporation or partnership. In principle,
this election is also open to foreign companies, but a number of foreign companies are listed for
obligatory qualification as corporations. For instance, a German $NWLHQJHVHOOVFKDIW is always necessarily
qualified as a corporation according to US law (as it forms part of the list) whereas a *HVHOOVFKDIWPLW
EHVFKUlQNWHU+DIWXQJi.e. a corporation subject to German corporate income tax can elect for the status
of a partnership and thus be treated as a branch of a US-parent for US taxation purposes. The basic idea of
the election is to avoid the multiple classification problems of ’partnerships’ and/or ’corporations’ in
various jurisdictions. However, it effectively enables US parent companies by a simple tick in an
appropriate box on the tax return to make sure that foreign losses are taken into account in their profit
determination. The fairly complex standard practice of "check-the-box" can thus eventually result in an
effective global consolidation for US companies. It may be noted that this "generous" feature is embedded
in an environment which is generally considered as extremely anti-abuse-conscious.
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In Part III, it was established that the tax problems relating to transfer pricing in the
Internal Market mainly relate to (i) high compliance cost and (ii) the risk of double
taxation. Given the significant complexity of the problems the various possible targeted
solutions should be considered in some detail and because of the importance of the issue
this section attempts to explore DOO possibilities, regardless of their relative prospect of
success.
This section starts by considering the intense activities of the OECD in this area which
form a framework for the search for solutions at EU level. It then considers various
possibilities to remove first, the obstacles giving rise to compliance costs and second,
those giving rise to double taxation. The latter also discusses mechanisms for settling
transfer price disputes between Member States.
At various points, this section refers to the transfer pricing surveys of business
organisations carried out by Ernst & Young in 1997 and 1999, and a questionnaire on
transfer pricing produced and sent to companies by the Commission Services in 2000.
See Part III for further details of these.345
 7KH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ WKH 2(&' DQG SRVVLEOH (8 DFWLYLWLHV RQ
WUDQVIHUSULFLQJWD[SUREOHPV
7KHZRUNRIWKH2(&'
The OECD agreed a comprehensive set of new transfer pricing guidelines in 1995159.
These represent a compromise reached by all OECD member countries and serve as a
common basis for governments, tax administrations and multinational enterprises. They
are also applied in a number of non-OECD countries.
Their high level of acceptance means that the Guidelines are a major tool for avoiding
both double taxation and unintentional ‘non-taxation’. They thus contribute to the
promotion of international trade and investment in a global context but also of course
within the Internal Market. It is therefore important that any targeted solutions take into
account the Guidelines and do not apply divergent solutions without carefully
considering the implications this could have for Member States’ relations with third




The Guidelines include the following main chapters:
·  Chapter I:  The Arm’s Length Principle
·  Chapter II:  Descriptions of the Traditional Transactions Methods
·  Chapter III:  Other Methods
·  Chapter IV:  Administrative approaches to avoiding and resolving transfer pricing disputes
·  Chapter  V: Documentation
·  Chapter VI:  Special Considerations for Intangible Property
·  Chapter VII: Special Considerations for Intra-Group Services
·  Chapter IX:  Cost Contribution Agreements
·  Appendix 1: Guidelines for Monitoring Procedures on the OECD Transfer pricing Guidelines and 
the Involvement of the Business Community
·  Appendix 2: Examples to Illustrate the Transfer Pricing Guidelines
·  Appendix 3: Guidelines for Advance Price Agreements (APA)
The Guidelines are not static, but are constantly being updated, amended and
supplemented. Current work focuses on the following areas:
                                                
159  The OECD Council approved for publication on 13 July 1995 new OECD transfer pricing
guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations. The Guidelines are a revision
and compilation of previous reports by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs (CFA) and replaces
the previous report by CFA addressing the transfer pricing issue. These are “Transfer Pricing and
Multinational Enterprises” (from 1979), “Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises – Three
Taxation Issues” (from 1984) and  “Thin Capitalisation” (1987).346
First, providing guidance on how to apply the general principles of the Guidelines to
complex situations, such as permanent establishments, financial services, and global
trading and thin capitalisation. This is expected to lead to the introduction of new
chapters.
Second, monitoring the practical implementation of the Guidelines and amending and
updating the existing guidance given in the light of this monitoring. The business
community, via the Business and Industry Advisory Committee of the OECD (BIAC), is
associated with this activity. The monitoring process is set out in Appendix 2 of the
Guidelines. Appendix 2 provides that the monitoring process is carried out through four
related projects:
·  Peer reviews of Member Countries; the purpose is to gain detailed information on
legislation, practices and experiences of Member Countries,
·  Identification and analysis of difficult case paradigms; the purpose is to identify
difficult fact patterns and problems which may be illustrated by practical examples
and which present obstacles to a consistent application of the transfer pricing
methods, along with monitoring of areas where the Guidelines offer no or
inadequate guidance,
·  Review of changes in legislation, regulations and administrative practices in
Member Countries; Member Countries also report on their own updates of
legislation and practice,
·  Development of further practical examples to illustrate the application of the arm’s
length principle.
The extent to which the existing guidance on transfer pricing can be applied to
electronic commerce is also being examined.
Third, the improvement of administrative procedures. The various methods of dispute
resolution, i.e. the mutual agreement procedure and arbitration are currently being
examined.
Fourth, via multilateral seminars the OECD encourages countries outside the OECD to
associate themselves with, and apply the Guidelines.
3RVVLEOH(8LQLWLDWLYHV
Any targeted solution should thus build on the fundamental principle underlying the
Guidelines, i.e. that multinational enterprises must conduct their business on arm length
terms, and be willing and able to demonstrate to the tax authorities that this is the case.
However, this does not imply that there is no room at all for Member States to agree,
within these principles, upon more targeted solutions to provide for the smooth
functioning of the Internal Market.
As an underlying principle Member States should of course always act in accordance
with the Guidelines. However, these are not always complete in every detail and
sometimes leave room for further interpretation and/or guidance. This is for instance the
case with respect to documentation requirements. This is not surprising given that they
represent a policy compromise between all the OECD Member Countries. It should be347
possible for the 15 EU Member States to develop this compromise further in certain
areas and thereby reduce compliance cost by providing clearer more definite guidance
for EU tax administrations and businesses. Furthermore, in some cases the Guidelines
lay down recommendations, which it is then up to each Member Country to follow. This
is for instance the case with respect to the application of certain aspects of dispute
settlement mechanisms, the use of simultaneous audits, Advance Pricing Agreements
and ’safe harbours’.
It follows from the foregoing that it will probably not be appropriate to suggest a strict
EU approach to identify and eliminate all (potential) differences among Member States
in the application of the OECD transfer pricing guidelines. The resource and timing
implications would be substantial, and duplication or interference with OECD work
should be avoided. It is equally important not to jeopardise compromises that have been
reached at OECD level. However, in certain areas there is room for an EU approach,
and moreover co-ordinated action at EU level appears to be necessary.
Where businesses are reasonably compliant with their obligations to co-operate with the
relevant tax administration, they should not suffer disproportionately from high
compliance costs. Under the ’Single Market philosophy’ internationally operating
businesses should not systematically suffer disproportionately higher compliance costs
than domestically operating ones and instances of double taxation need to be tackled.
This applies to the transfer pricing area just as it does to other aspects of company
taxation.
 5HGXFLQJWKHFRPSOLDQFHFRVWUHODWLQJWRWUDQVIHUSULFLQJWD[DWLRQ
As Part III showed, compliance costs relating to transfer pricing mainly result from the
obligation to put together appropriate documentation and find comparables. These
issues are considered further below. Given that most Member States are still in the
"learning process" as regards the implementation of transfer pricing guidelines and
documentation requirements and in view of the complexity of the issue, increased co-
operation between them appears to be a promising way forward for addressing this
issue. Finally, a specific section is devoted to the possibilities for tax administrations to
extend their co-operation in this area.
 'RFXPHQWDWLRQUHTXLUHPHQWV
The 1999 Ernst & Young transfer pricing survey clearly illustrates that multinational
enterprises in principle favour integrated global documentation. In general 68% of
multinational enterprises placed medium-high priority on a global approach. The main
reason given for this was that an integrated approach provides consistent documentation
(51%). Other reasons given included the possibilities of identifying opportunities of tax
planning (31%) and cost savings (30%). The survey, however, also showed that
multinational enterprises in practice only rarely (19%) apply a global approach. One of
the main reasons for multinational enterprises not taking a global approach is probably
the different documentation requirements (including questions of language). The
existence of a common EU documentation guidance would probably serve as a major
incentive for business to prepare EU and, as necessary, global documentation.
Moreover, such guidance on common EU documentation rules would help to find an
agreement on documentation requirements in the international context, not the least at
OECD level.348
Another reason for seeking a common EU approach on documentation requirements is
the important concept of the prudent business manager in the documentation chapter of
the OECD Guidelines (5.4). This concept states that the process of considering transfer
prices should be determined in accordance with the same prudent business management
principles that would govern the process of evaluating a business decision of the same
complexity and importance. This implies that tax administrations cannot expect
taxpayers to devote more resources to setting transfer prices at arm’s length than they
would for other aspects of their business, which of course affects the level of
documentation that tax administrations can reasonably expect. The practical application
of the prudent business manager is difficult, but this makes it all the more important that
Member States adopt the same approach.
The time for a common approach also seems to be appropriate. Whereas a number of
Member States have recently introduced formal documentation requirements, the
majority of Member States have not, but are likely to do so in the near future.
Furthermore, some of the Member States that have introduced documentation
requirements have not yet issued detailed guidelines on the actual application of these
requirements.
Often multinational enterprises are active in both the EU and other (OECD) countries,
and it is therefore important that such documentation requirements do not interfere with
the OECD transfer pricing guidelines. However, it is difficult to see how such a problem
could occur. Apart from providing guidance to taxpayers on documentation, the most
important objective in the documentation chapter of the Guidelines is to keep the right
balance between the right of tax authorities to obtain from the taxpayer as much
information as possible to ascertain whether the price is at arm’s length, and the
compliance cost to the taxpayer in providing the information. In general, EU Member
States apply less robust documentation requirements rules than other OECD countries. It
is worth noting that the OECD have not indicated any intention of revising the chapter
on documentation.
It is evident that such an initiative has important resource and timing implications. The
resources required by Member States will probably be material and the process is likely
to be somewhat lengthy. The relationship with the (general) OECD work on transfer
pricing would also need to be carefully planned. None of these difficulties are, however,
of a fundamental nature. The way forward should therefore be explored more concretely
in an appropriate forum of Member States at EU level. Such a forum could in fact
usefully address all EU transfer pricing problems.
 &RPSDUDEOHV
One of the main difficulties in fulfilling the documentation requirements for transfer
pricing is the determination of a comparable transaction (or company) at arm’s length.
This problem of finding arm's length comparables for valuing intra group transactions is
not straightforward to solve. The trend towards more intra group transactions and fewer
independent transactions, more complex group structures and the increased use of
intangibles etc. has the effect of reducing the number of easily applicable clear
comparables available to both business and tax administrations. Various ways have been
suggested for tackling this question at EU level.349
One could consider whether it would be helpful if the Commission (or another EU
body) were to initiate the establishment of an EU database. As mentioned above, a
number of commercial databases including some at the Pan-European level are
available. None of these databases is, however, developed specifically for transfer
pricing purposes, and the financial information tends to be too aggregated. Furthermore,
information is often not consistent, as accounting principles and financial statement
requirements vary between Member States and even within Member States (in many
Member States business can choose between different principles).
An EU transfer pricing database could be founded on existing information, i.e. without
changes in financial information requirements. It could improve the existing databases
by including more companies, more detailed descriptions of company activities and
more specific market information etc. Another benefit would be that business and tax
authorities to a greater extent would be using the same information source. One could
also consider establishing a transfer pricing Forum where tax authorities and business
could make database searches. If there were a possibility of making joint searches this
would enhance co-operation and understanding between different tax administrations,
and between tax administrations and business.
Apart from finding the resources required to establish and maintain such a database,
there are however some potential downsides. One is that database comparables based on
the existing level of information tend to give “only” profit comparables (mainly
Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM) and Comparable Profit Method (CPM)).
The use of profit comparables is controversial among tax administrations (especially
within the EU), and often gives rise to disputes on the correct transfer price or range of
prices. On the other hand it could be argued that a “bad comparable” is better than “no
comparable”, and that in practice most EU tax authorities will accept a well documented
and justified transfer price even if it is based on a profit comparable. Another problem
could be the tendency to exacerbate the present situation where some EU tax
administrations insist on the taxpayer providing a comparable based on data from an
independent party even where a prudent business manager would not have resorted to
searching for such an external comparable.
It seems uncertain whether the potential advantages of this sort of initiative would
exceed the disadvantages, in particular when the resource requirement is taken into
account, if the present level of available (financial) information is not improved.
Therefore, any potential initiative towards a new EU transfer pricing database should
probably be linked to an improvement in the level of (financial) information compared
to that available in existing commercial databases. This would of course require
harmonised and more detailed accounting principles and financial reporting
requirements.
In conclusion, it seems sensible to explore the idea of an EU database for comparables
first in an appropriate working group which could then, if desired by the participants, be
developed into a common search forum. In comparison, however, other remedial
measures might be more important for the removal of transfer pricing obstacles.350
 :RUNRQWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRIWKHYDULRXVWUDQVIHUSULFLQJPHWKRGV
Currently, not all transfer pricing methods are accepted by all Member States. It appears
that agreement on the detailed use of profit methods would constitute a big step forward.
Member States do not generally accept the application of profit methods (Transactional
Net Margin Method (TNMM), Comparable Profit Method (CPM) and Profit Split
Method (PSM)) for determining transfer prices at a detailed level. Indeed, it seems fair
to say that currently most Member States have gained only little experience with these
methods. A forum for exchanging best practice at EU level could help to improve this
situation. It should be noted that the OECD is in the process of working on how (and
when) its Members should apply profit methods. This process will lead to a more
uniform application of the methods.
Some commentators have floated the idea of prescribing more specifically which precise
method should be applied to which transaction and thus develop a certain (binding)
typology. This suggestion is not undisputed and there is also a concern relating to the
risk of harmful tax competition. On the one hand, there would no doubt be a gain in
simplicity and certainty of application but on the other hand there would be a risk of
creating too strict rules for similar cases which are very different in their details. Again,
the use of the various methods for identifying comparables could be usefully considered
by Member States.
Finally, the trend towards truly pan-European business structures implies the
concentration of some functions, for instance service functions such as marketing,
headquarter services and R&D. Very often these service costs – which can be substantial
- must be allocated to the various companies in a group. The OECD transfer pricing
guidelines include extensive guidance on services and cost contribution agreements.
However, due to the importance of the subject a uniform application of the guidelines
would nevertheless be desirable and could be usefully discussed by Member States.
 &RRSHUDWLRQEHWZHHQWD[DGPLQLVWUDWLRQV
Surprisingly, even business representatives sometimes argue in favour of more co-
operation (including in tax audits) between Member States' tax administrations on
transfer pricing. This is because such co-operation would have positive effects for both
tax administrations and taxpayers.
The OECD transfer pricing Guidelines include a comprehensive section on the use of
simultaneous audits (Chapter IV, D). The Guidelines recommend a greater use of
simultaneous audits, as these provide substantial benefits for both tax administrations
and taxpayers. The OECD has also agreed upon a Model Agreement on simultaneous
audits containing guidelines on the legal and practical aspects thereof. On 23 July 1992
the OECD Council made a recommendation to Member Countries to use this Model
Agreement.
The main advantages of a simultaneous audit are as follows:
·  It facilitates better tax audits.
·  It helps tax administrations to acquire a better understanding and insight into the
overall activities of a multinational enterprise.351
·  It generally tends to foster mutual understanding and trust between tax
administrations.
·  It allows for the identification of potential transfer pricing disputes at an early stage
and thereby minimises the use of litigation.
·  As a simultaneous audit is not a one-sided but a multilateral approach, it improves
opportunities of avoiding double taxation.
·  Business also benefits from savings of time and resources, for instance because tax
administration enquiries can be co-ordinated and duplicate requests avoided.
Despite all these advantages, as sketched out above, the Commission services transfer
pricing questionnaire indicates that Member States do not participate in many
simultaneous audits. A more comprehensive use of simultaneous audits within the EU
should therefore be considered. A possible way forward in this area would be to build
on the very positive experience with the FISCALIS programme which is designed to
foster simultaneous audits and common training in the area of indirect taxation. The
Commission services have already raised this possibility in the appropriate working
group with Member States and will follow it up in future. However, at present, some
Member States have legal impediments for participating in joint audits.
Exchange of information between tax administrations is another method of obtaining
information from sources other than the taxpayer, thus reducing compliance cost for
business. The extended exchange of information between tax administrations should
therefore be encouraged. This would also correspond to a current general trend
following the OECD work on international taxation. It is noteworthy that the Council
working group on the Code of Conduct for business taxation has recently created a sub-
group in order to explore the possibilities of transfer pricing information exchange.
 $YRLGLQJDQGUHPRYLQJGRXEOHWD[DWLRQRQWUDQVIHUSULFHV
In the Internal Market double taxation (as well as unintentional non-taxation) should not
occur. Even temporary double taxation is, in principle, not compatible with the Internal
Market. Moreover, temporary double-taxation often has non-negligible economic effects
on the taxpayer (e.g. cash-flow effects, lost interest etc.). At the very least, when double
taxation occurs in transfer pricing cases, there should be mechanisms for its quick and
effective removal.
It is therefore, along with all the other recommended initiatives in the transfer pricing
area, most important to ensure that appropriate dispute settlement mechanisms are
available. The EU Arbitration Convention constitutes a major improvement compared to
the traditional Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP) because it includes an arbitration
phase for cases where competent authorities cannot agree upon a solution. However,
Part III of this study identified some shortcomings in the Convention. If the overall
objective of making the Convention the primary dispute settlement mechanism is to be
met these shortcomings must be eliminated.
The following section thus considers the two aspects, (i) preventing double taxation
right from the start and (ii) if it still happens, removing it as quickly as possible, by352
focussing first on the existing EU instrument of the Convention. The relatively new
instrument of Advance Pricing Agreements is also considered.
 ,QWURGXFLQJ PHFKDQLVPV WR SUHYHQW GRXEOH WD[DWLRQ LQWR WKH
$UELWUDWLRQ&RQYHQWLRQ
3ULRUDSSURYDORUFRQVXOWDWLRQ
The Arbitration Convention (like bilateral double tax treaties) does not oblige the tax
authorities of a Member State to agree in advance an appropriate transfer price with the
tax authorities of the affiliated company before an income adjustment is made160. Such
an agreement would however often be needed to prevent the creation of double taxation.
Industry considers transfer pricing disputes to be disputes between (two) tax
administrations where all too frequently the multinational enterprise is ‘taken hostage’.
They therefore consider it appropriate to include in the Convention mechanisms
whereby a tax administration cannot make a primary adjustment until it has agreed the
correct transfer price with the other tax administration. This constitutes a 'perfect
solution' from a business perspective.
Such a procedure (where a tax authority cannot make a primary adjustment until it has
agreed with the other tax administration on the correct transfer price) would solve most
of the above mentioned business concerns; i.e. the double taxation itself, the costs of
temporarily having to finance the same tax burden twice, business costs of seeking
double tax relief etc. It would also pressure Member States to make only well founded
adjustments.
Tax administrations might argue that such a rule seems to go beyond the scope of the
Convention and that such a procedure would make it very difficult to make primary
adjustments as the other Member State would have no incentive to accept the
adjustment. This would increase the administrative burden of the tax administrations,
lead to more aggressive tax planning, and require substantial extension of the periods
where tax returns are open etc. These arguments have to be taken seriously. However,
they fail to explain why the creation of double taxation should be accepted within the
Internal Market. The basic idea of 'prior approval' should therefore be considered in
more detail.
Another, more pragmatic solution could be a consultation procedure where the tax
authorities of the other Member State had to be consulted in advance of the adjustment.
Whereas a consultation procedure would give no guarantee of solving the double
taxation problem in advance it would still have advantages compared to the present
situation. These include solving some cases in advance, the possibility of discussing the
case at an early stage (thereby avoiding fixed negotiation positions), more co-operation
between tax administrations etc. There is no reason to believe that such a consultation
procedure would lead to additional workload for tax administrations. Some cases would
be solved in advance and for the remaining cases it would just be a question of moving
some of the workload of a case from after the adjustment to before the adjustment.
Therefore, on the contrary, such an approach is likely to reduce the overall workload for
                                                
160  Article 5 (1) of the Arbitration Convention only obliges the tax administration to inform the
company in due time, so that it can inform the affiliated company which can then inform the tax
administration of the other State.353
tax administrations. All in all, however, a ’consultation procedure’, albeit having some
practical advantages, fails to tackle the basic problem of double taxation.
Finally, another alternative could be to introduce an agreement or consultation
procedure for certain types of transactions, adjustments or taxpayers, which are
considered to be of particular importance. This could include for instance cases where
an adjustment is based on a profit method, cases involving e-business, cases where the
adjustments exceeds a certain threshold or cases involving small and medium-sized
enterprises. At the very least, a voluntary model could be developed whereby interested
Member States could commit themselves to an agreement or consultation procedure.
6XVSHQVLRQRISD\PHQWV
As mentioned in Part III, the lack of a rule in the Arbitration Convention suspending the
collection of tax which is due is an important obstacle. If a fully-fledged approval
procedure cannot be achieved, the simplest way to avoid this problem would be to
include a provision in the Convention whereby tax collection was suspended when the
taxpayer requests arbitration under the Convention. Subject to any necessary safeguards
such a modest step would constitute a significant improvement to the Convention.
Alternatively the Convention could be amended so that suspension of tax collection was
possible to the same extent as when an adjustment is appealed against to national courts.
However, this would be less effective and would also cause technical problems when
Member States’ rules of suspension require a case by case determination.
A problem closely linked to the issue of collection of tax liabilities is that of interest
charges - or similar supplementary payments - added to those liabilities. Again, without
a fully-fledged approval procedure, setting standard rules could help to mitigate the
problem, for instance by disallowing higher interest charges on underpayments than
overpayments or by obliging both the primary and the corresponding adjustment to take
place in the same income year (e.g. the year when the mutual agreement is completed).
If the Convention can be made to work more effectively, i.e. if double taxation is
effectively abolished within a short period of time, the importance of this problem
diminishes. It still however constitutes an important equity issue and in cases involving
significant amounts the interest payment might constitute an important loss of cash-
flow.
 ,PSURYLQJ WKH GLVSXWH VHWWOHPHQW SURFHGXUHV RI WKH $UELWUDWLRQ
&RQYHQWLRQ
For the reasons given in Part III, thought should be given to the deletion of Article 8 of
the EU Arbitration Convention. Deletion of the clause will by definition remove an
incentive for business to comply with transfer pricing rules including documentation
requirements. However, an alternative incentive could be created through the
introduction of an appropriate penalty regime by the Member States. Another solution
would be a single definition in the Convention of what constitutes a serious penalty.
Again, a working group at EU level could play a useful role in developing such a
definition.
Member States define the starting point of the two year period of the first phase
differently. It should therefore be clarified when the two year period commences. This
would in principle not require an amendment to the Convention. However, if it is being354
amended for other reasons such a clarification could of course be inserted directly in the
Convention.
Moreover, it should be made clear that thin capitalisation rules are covered. This, again,
would in principle not require an amendment to the Convention. There are a number of
different ways of addressing the problem, along with the other terms not defined in the
Convention (e.g. ’enterprise’, ’permanent establishment’ and the question of association).
One approach would be to refer interpretation problems to the Court of Justice or the
European Commission. A disadvantage here would be that the duration of the dispute
would be prolonged, as the interpretation problem would have to be solved in advance
of the arm’s length issue. Another way forward would be to deal with the interpretation
problem and the arm’s length issue in parallel. This would imply that the competence of
the advisory panel under the Convention should be extended.
A more pragmatic approach could be simply to try to identify some of the main problem
areas, and then to solve them within the Convention. For instance, in cases where there
is no double taxation agreement in place between the Member States concerned, one
could make reference to the OECD model tax convention. As regards the question of
when companies are associated, a possible solution could be to determine this in
accordance with the rules and practices of the Member States making the primary
adjustment. Some Member States would probably argue that this would lead to an
unbalanced solution, but as the number of adjustments are modest this does not seem to
be a real concern. Another solution could be to try developing a common definition of
when companies are associated.
Some of these problems are maybe more theoretical than of immediate practical
importance. However, experience will show if this will remain the case and a working
group at EU level could contribute to finding appropriate solutions that would benefit
both businesses and Member States.
The arbitration phase should be explained in more detail and more guidance provided
for its functioning. Moreover, the Convention misses an opportunity to create a common
transfer pricing jurisprudence. This could be solved by including rules providing for the
mandatory publication of decisions from the advisory panel (and perhaps from mutual
agreements between competent authorities), thus building up a common knowledge base
in this area.
Obviously, there are some confidentiality concerns which need to be addressed but there
do not seem to be fundamental barriers to finding a solution to them. Furthermore, in
most Member States court rulings are generally available to the public.
The Convention does not include provisions to deal with the denial or the undue
postponement by Member States of business access to the Convention procedures. To
avoid such practises in the future, a promising way forward would be to give business
the possibility of referring the case to the Court of Justice or to the EU Commission.
Basic legal considerations strongly plead for giving the parties concerned appropriate
means of redress and remedies.
More generally, it is very important to make sure that the provisions of the Convention
are made subject to interpretation by the Court. A revised Convention should therefore
be agreed as a Directive. This would also resolve the current ratification problems in a355
more consistent manner than can the insertion of a conditional clause of automatic
prolongation in the Convention.
 $GYDQFH3ULFLQJ$JUHHPHQWV
Generally, Advance Pricing Agreements (APAs) are a means for the taxpayer to request a
’binding transfer pricing ruling’ from the tax administration(s) on the treatment of a future
transaction involving the setting of transfer prices. The disadvantage is that they can
usually only be obtained via a lengthy and costly procedure which makes them generally
interesting only for very important cases. More precisely, in the OECD transfer pricing
guidelines161 APAs are defined as: DQ DUUDQJHPHQW WKDW GHWHUPLQHV LQ DGYDQFH RI
FRQWUROOHG WUDQVDFWLRQV DQ DSSURSULDWH VHW RI FULWHULD HJ PHWKRG FRPSDUDEOHV DQG
DSSURSULDWH DGMXVWPHQWV WKHUHWR FULWLFDO DVVXPSWLRQV DV WR IXWXUH HYHQWV IRU WKH
GHWHUPLQDWLRQRIWKHWUDQVIHUSULFLQJIRUWKRVHWUDQVDFWLRQVRYHUDIL[HGSHULRGRIWLPH".
Depending on the number of Member States granting a specific APA, those can be
unilateral, bilateral or multilateral. As unilateral APAs do not necessarily prevent double
taxation, owing to their domestic scope, the OECD encourages bilateral or multilateral
APAs.
Only a few Member States have established formal APA programmes162. However, in
most other Member States APAs to some extent can be obtained via other general
procedures such as rulings and/or under the scope of the mutual agreement procedure of
a double taxation treaty. The majority of bilateral or multilateral APAs concluded by EU
multinational enterprises (and tax administrations) involve a non-Member State, often
the USA. It is worth noting that the OECD transfer pricing guidelines have recently been
supplemented with an annex that establishes some common guidelines for operating
APAs under Mutual Agreement Procedures in Tax Treaties.
The 1999 Ernst & Young transfer pricing survey indicates that there is an increasing
business interest in APAs, as 45 % of multinational enterprises would consider using one
in the future (in the 1997 survey the percentage was 36). Among those multinational
enterprises wishing to conclude an APA, those from Italy (64%), Denmark (62%) and the
Netherlands (56%) are the most likely to use an APA in the future (in 1997, US and
Canada showed the highest values). The survey also states that 12% of respondents
reported having used an APA (14% in the 1997 survey).
It is generally assumed, that the practical application of APA programmes (or similar
instruments) is often more difficult than it might seem from the legislation at first sight.
From the point of view of the taxpayer the main concern is likely to be the complex
procedures, significant cost and time required. For instance, tax authorities will
generally require that the multinational enterprises prepare the same (or even higher)
levels of documentation as would be required in “normal” circumstances. The
confidentiality of the information supplied in the APA might also, by some multinational
enterprises, be seen as a disadvantage. Seen from the tax administration side, the costs
                                                
161  OECD (1995a): Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax
Administrations, at IV-41.
162  See also Gangemi, B., $GYDQFH3ULFLQJ$JUHHPHQWVLQ(XURSH, in: Europees Belastingsrecht –
Droit fiscal européen, liber Amicorum in honour of Jean-Pierre Lagae (pp.459-476), Ced. Samson,
1998, which also provides for a detailed description of the US rules, and Fédération des experts
comptables européens, 6XUYH\RQ$GYDQFH7D[5XOLQJV, Brussels 2000356
and resources required will be the main concern, and for some tax administrations there
is also the problem of a lack of experience in dealing with APAs. As a result, APAs are
primarily used by large multinational enterprises in cases involving complex issues (e.g.
intangibles, cost-sharing etc.) and/or transactions involving significant amounts, and
furthermore a non-Member State is often involved.
However, the Ernst & Young survey indicates that business is less concerned with costs,
length of procedures etc. than is generally assumed. Of the 39% confirming that they
would not consider using an APA in the future, 48% believed the process unnecessary,
38% declined to give a reason, and 25% responded that the process was either too time-
consuming or costly, or too complicated. Only 1% cited too much disclosure! It should of
course be noted that the survey does not reveal to what extent costs, length of procedures
etc. were also a concern for those multinational enterprises that indicated that in future
they would consider entering into an APA; but on balance one should probably not
overestimate the problem.
Even if the procedures for entering into bilateral or multilateral APAs – including APAs
concluded after Appendix 3 to the OECD Guidelines was issued – might be complicated,
costly and time consuming for business (and tax administrations), it seems difficult to
avoid this. Thought could therefore also be given to developing simplified administrative
procedures in the form of a "mini-APA" available for small and medium-sized enterprises
on GHPLQLPLV grounds. Moreover, if tax administrations are to feel confident in agreeing
on the transfer pricing method etc. in advance, it is not unreasonable that the process
should include certain safeguards and that taxpayers should be asked to provide
sufficiently detailed information to enable administrations to form a judgement.
Against this background, Member States clearly should be encouraged to provide the
possibility for businesses to obtain under reasonable conditions an APA in important
transfer pricing cases. Member States could benefit from an exchange of best practice in
this area, especially as the cases and conditions for issuing APAs in the EU seem to be
fairly similar (e.g. prominence of third-country cases), which is not necessarily the case
for all OECD member countries. On the basis of the analysis so far, it is however too
early to give a judgement on the usefulness of EU guidelines on multilateral APAs.
 &RQFOXVLRQ
This section has considered a variety of measures that could help to tackle compliance
cost and double taxation problems in the area of transfer pricing. The Internal Market
clearly requires stricter standards here than would otherwise be the case.
The practical application of the Arbitration Convention could certainly be improved and
its provisions made subject to interpretation by the Court of Justice. Moreover, Member
States could be encouraged to introduce or expand bilateral or multilateral Advance
Pricing Agreement programmes; such instruments, although costly, are an effective
means of dealing with the uncertainty relating to transfer pricing. More ambitiously, and
subject to safeguards to prevent aggressive tax planning, a framework for prior
agreement or consultation before tax administrations enforce transfer pricing
adjustments could be established.
More generally, compliance costs and uncertainty could be reduced by better co-
ordination between Member States as regards documentation requirements and the
application of the various methods, for example by developing best practices. Such co-357
ordination could take place in the context of an EU working group and should build
upon and complement the OECD activities in this field. Co-ordination in this area has
already begun to some extent in the framework of the Code of Conduct group. It would
be possible to develop that process further in order also to address the concerns of
business. The establishment by the Commission of a Joint Forum on transfer pricing
comprising representatives of tax authorities and business might allow the currently
conflicting perspectives of the two sides to be reconciled. While on the one hand tax
administrations view transfer pricing as a common vehicle for tax avoidance or evasion
by companies and as a source of harmful tax competition between Member States,
business on the other hand considers that tax authorities are imposing disproportionate
compliance costs. This study finds that both sides have legitimate concerns to which it is
necessary to seek a balanced solution through dialogue at EU level. A more uniform




Three main approaches have been identified by commentators and by the Panel assisting
the Commission services with this Part of the study to resolve the problems of double
taxation in the Internal Market and incompatibilities with EC law that are not currently
being adequately addressed by bilateral tax treaties. These are:
-  the conclusion of a multilateral tax treaty between all EU Member States;
-  the development of an EU Model Treaty, based on the OECD Model but taking
account of the requirements of the EC Treaty, which could be used by Member
States in their future tax treaty negotiations with each other and with third countries;
-  within the OECD framework, work on specific EU concepts (such as the definition
of "residence" and "non-discrimination") culminating in a recommendation to
Member States or an agreement by Member States to reflect these concepts in their
relations with each other and with third countries.
  All these approaches basically boil down to various degrees of co-ordination of Member
States’ double taxation treaty policies within a Community framework. It is important to
emphasise that any such co-ordination exercise would be designed in harmony with the
work of the OECD in this area. Clearly, the OECD model convention and the OECD
work on double taxation treaties in general form the framework for possible – more
specific – EU work in this area.
  Irrespective of which approach is adopted, there is a need to ensure either that the
obligations arising from the Treaty, from the existing tax Directives and the Arbitration
Convention, and from their interaction with Member States' domestic and international
tax arrangements are clarified so as to remove the current situation of legal uncertainty.
The various approaches are considered in detail below.
  Incidentally, it is important to note that the Court of Justice will, in interpreting the
interaction of Community Law provisions with bilateral tax arrangements and national
provisions, seek inspiration from international law, guidelines and commentaries,358
including the OECD Model Convention and Commentary. In such a highly technical
and complex area a Community framework could help to ensure consistency and
coherence in Court decisions and this would only be to the benefit of both tax
authorities and taxpayers.
  The Ruding Committee already considered that "there is a need for the co-ordination of
Member States’ policy at the Community level with a view to approximating their tax
treaty provisions in areas covered by Community law (as in the cases of withholding
taxes on dividends, interest and royalties, for example) and to avoid conflicts with treaty
provisions". It recommended action by the Commission in concert with Member States
aimed at defining a common attitude with regard to policy on double taxation
agreements with respect to each other and also with respect to third countries. The
members of the panel assisting the Commission services agreed with the Ruding
Committee recommendations. Many of them strongly expressed the view that bilateral
tax treaties no longer adequately address the increasingly complex multilateral structures
of enterprises and that a multilateral convention is now required between EU Member
States.
There also appears to be a measure of support among Member States for more co-
operation at Community level in the tax treaty area. The High Level Group of personal
representatives of EU Finance Ministers, which has met a number of times following the
discussions at the informal ECOFIN Council at Verona in April 1996 on a new global
approach to tax policy, identified policy areas where sharing information at a
Community level could be helpful. One suggestion was for consideration of the role,
functioning and possible co-ordination of double taxation treaties.
 3RVVLEOHLQVWUXPHQWV
 0XOWLODWHUDO&RQYHQWLRQ163
The idea of a multilateral tax treaty between EU Member States has been in existence
for some time. The EC first produced a draft for such a treaty dealing with taxes on
income and capital over thirty years ago and it was discussed with the then six Member
States in a Commission working group164. The discussions did not lead to any
agreement on a text.
Since then there has been a significant growth in the number of tax treaties as well as of
Member States. With this growth which coincides with the growth in cross-border
activities of enterprises it has become clear that the bilateral character of tax treaties
does not always cater for the complex multinational character of economic relations or
the requirements of the Internal Market. It is clearly the case, for example, as mentioned
in Part III, that bilateral tax treaties do not adequately address triangular problems.
Furthermore, with the increase in the number of bilateral tax treaties, tax law becomes
increasingly complicated and, although many bilateral tax treaties are quite old, the
                                                
163 Reference is made to the ground-breaking publication 0XOWLODWHUDO7D[7UHDWLHV1HZ
'HYHORSPHQWVLQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO7D[/DZ, edited by M. Lang, published by Linde Verlag Wien. See
also: Confédération fiscale européenne 2SLQLRQ6WDWHPHQW - 0XOWLODWHUDOWD[WUHDW\, Bonn 1998
164  The text of this draft convention  was published in Regul (ed), Steuern und Zölle im Gemeinsamen
Markt (15
th Amendment 1969) V B/2.359
process of revision is time-consuming because of the number involved. There is also the
fact that the effect of Court decisions concerning one bilateral tax treaty on other similar
but not identical tax treaties is not always certain.
It is for this reason that many commentators have suggested that a multilateral tax
convention is now needed within the European Union. There is already a multilateral
convention between three Member States of the EU - the Multilateral Nordic
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with respect to Taxes on Income and
Capital was signed in 1983 between Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Iceland and Norway.
The experience with this convention appears to be generally positive. A multilateral
convention can address problems which a bilateral tax treaty is incapable of addressing
and it creates greater legal certainty and reduces complexity. This ought to be especially
true in an Internal Market such as the EU. Some commentators even go as far as arguing
that an EU taxpayer must get the benefit of the most favourable tax treaty concluded by
the Member State where he is resident or from which he derives income.
The Ruding Report, states in its annex 6 that it "is absolutely unacceptable in the
Internal Market that bilateral tax treaties between Member States give preferential tax
treatment to enterprises in one or several Member States and not to enterprises resident
in the remaining Member States". It is also argued that the fact that a Member State may
apply a different rate of withholding tax to interest paid to an enterprise resident in a
second Member State compared to an enterprise resident in a third, because of different
bilateral tax arrangements with the second Member State and the third, is in conflict
with the provisions against discrimination of the Treaty of Rome. A similar argument
could be made concerning special incentives such as the extension of an imputation
credit or tax sparing to taxpayers resident in some Member States but not to others.165 If
the fundamental freedoms of the EC Treaty are reflected in bilateral tax treaties between
EU Member States, there is an implicit move in the direction of the multilateralisation
of those tax treaties.
But there are also some arguments against the conclusion of a multilateral double
taxation convention. The Nordic Convention is almost constantly being amended by
protocols. Moreover, many argue that bilateral treaties are more appropriate to reflect
special relations between Member States and reflect individual States’ interests.
Moreover, the previous attempt to agree a multilateral double taxation convention
within the EU resulted in failure. There are a significant number of differences in
Member States’ corporate tax systems. If it is already a frequent difficulty to resolve the
problems of the interaction of such different systems in a bilateral context, how much
harder would it be to do so on a multilateral basis? Then, divergences of economic
relations between Member States create specific requirements which may be more easily
met in a bilateral treaty than under a multilateral approach. Imbalances between capital
importing countries (with high outgoing dividends) and capital exporting countries
(with fairly low outgoing dividends) often mean, for example, that the capital importing
country wish to retain a withholding tax on dividends whereas the capital exporting
countries may not.
                                                
165  However, some commentators also maintain that different tax treatment under different tax treaties
may not, in the end, be discriminatory. If, for example, a higher rate of withholding tax under one
treaty is offset by corresponding tax relief in the other, the treatment is only different and not
discriminatory.360
It is not clear that such a multilateral convention could be put into place without
including a number of protocols and appendices to deal with the specific situations of
different countries and specific bilateral economic relations. This could mean no
reduction in technical complexity compared to the current situation of 94 bilateral tax
treaties. Furthermore, in view of the experience of trying to secure agreement on
Directives, it is not certain that a multilateral convention could be put in place quickly
enough to meet the needs of the Internal Market or, whether once implemented, it could
be updated and modified as quickly as necessary.
 (&0RGHO7UHDW\
An alternative approach would be for Member States to agree to an EC Model Treaty
for use in their tax treaty negotiations with each other and with third countries. This long
term approach would have the advantage that it would leave Member States free to
continue to reflect strictly bilateral concerns in bilateral tax treaties. It could also, unlike
a multilateral convention but like the OECD model, be adopted in a non-legally binding
form.
In any event, it is important to note that this approach would not aim to replace the
OECD model treaty within the OECD or "compete" with it but rather to provide clearer
solutions where the OECD model currently provides options.
 :RUNRQVSHFLILF(8FRQFHSWV
This approach would be limited to fields that are of major interest to the Community
e.g. where case law has clearly interpreted Treaty provisions. Under this approach
guidance could, for example, be provided on residence and non-discrimination and
Member States would then be free to reflect such guidelines either in their tax treaties or
in their domestic laws. This approach would go some way towards, but might not
completely address the problem of complexity of tax treaty rules compared to national





Article 293 of the EC Treaty implies that bilateral tax treaties between Member States should cover taxes
in addition to those on income and capital, particularly taxes on capital, estates and inheritances, in
addition to state and local taxes.
$UWLFOH%XVLQHVV3URILWV
In line with the principle that permanent establishments be treated in the same way as resident companies,
the determination of the income of permanent establishments should be carried out in the same way as for
subsidiary companies. Rules restricting the deduction of general expenses and losses to those GLUHFWO\
related to the operations of the permanent establishment may be too strict. Apportionment may be one of
the only practical solutions. Profits before deduction of headquarters expenses may also constitute a
criterion to be considered. Taxation of part of the headquarters expenses in the country in which the
headquarters are located could also be considered.
$UWLFOH$VVRFLDWHGHQWHUSULVHV
Here the provisions of the Arbitration Convention should be reflected. It would be useful if it also
provided for common rules on Advance Pricing Agreements.
$UWLFOH'LYLGHQGV
Article 10 should reflect the Parents-Subsidiary Directive.
With regard to Articles 10, 11 and 12, different withholding tax rates in different treaties, between
Member States and between Member States and third countries are undesirable. Furthermore, extension of
imputation tax credits to some EU countries or third countries and not to other EU countries might be
discriminatory.
Articles 10, 11 and 12 should also provide rules that tax withheld has to be refunded in a reasonable
period of time.
$UWLFOHVDQG7D[DWLRQRILQWHUHVWDQGWD[DWLRQRIUR\DOWLHV
These should reflect the proposal for a Directive on Interest and Royalties
$UWLFOH1RQ'LVFULPLQDWLRQ
This article should reflect the fundamental non-discrimination principles of the Treaty. This may imply
-  equating nationality with residence,
-  treating permanent establishments in the same way as resident subsidiaries,
-  requiring provisions available to groups of companies within a Member State to be applicable where
one of the members of the group is resident in another EU Member-State.
Any statement that anti-abuse legislation is not prohibited under this Article would have to reflect the
restrictions on anti-abuse legislation to be inferred from the EC Treaty. Any other special rules added by
Member States in Article 23 and 24 to govern the taxation of income which has been taxed at a low-rate in
another country would have to aligned with the Treaty.
$UWLFOH0XWXDO$JUHHPHQW3URFHGXUH
This must be amended to reflect the provisions of the Arbitration Convention applicable to transfer
pricing disputes. It would also be advisable, in order to ensure the complete elimination of double
taxation, to provide for the Court of Justice to arbitrate in other double taxation disputes and cases not
covered by the tax treaty, such as triangular cases. This was proposed in the EC draft multilateral
convention and has been included in the Austria/Germany double taxation convention.
$UWLFOH([FKDQJHRI,QIRUPDWLRQ
Here reference should be made to the Mutual Assistance Directive which takes precedence over this
Article.362
 7D[WUHDWLHVZLWKWKLUGFRXQWULHV
The issue of tax treaties between individual Member States and third countries is a
separate one. Annex 6 to the Ruding Report suggests that "under the rules of fair
competition, the same or at least similar principles should apply in the tax treaties
between individual Member States and third countries, especially those treaties
concluded with the most important trading and investment partners of the Community
such as the United States, Japan and the other OECD Member States". The Panel
assisting the Commission services with this part of the study agreed that more co-
ordination is required in this area. This is a far-reaching ambition. But it is certainly true
that anti-abuse clauses in tax treaties concluded by Member States with third countries
should not discriminate against taxpayers in other Member States. The treaty-shopping
("Limitation of Benefits") clauses concluded by many EU countries with the United
States should be examined in this connection.
 &RQFOXVLRQ
This study identifies a number of obstacles of discriminatory treatment and double
taxation which the current network of double taxation treaties has not addressed and this
section has considered possible remedial measures for these. It goes without saying that
it is essential that the few remaining gaps in the existing network of double taxation
treaties covering taxes on income and capital within the EU should be filled. Moreover,
the existing tax treaties of Member States could be improved in order to comply with
the principles of the Internal Market, in particular in relation to access to treaty benefits.
Better co-ordination of policy in relation to treaties with third countries is also
necessary. In addition, the study identifies the need for binding arbitration where
conflicts arise between treaty partners in the interpretation and application of a treaty166,
leading to possible double taxation or non-taxation. The most complete solution to such
problems would be the conclusion under Article 293 of the Treaty of a multilateral tax
treaty between Member States, conferring interpretative jurisdiction on the Court of
Justice. Another possibility, leaving intact the existing bilateral system, would be to
elaborate an EU version of the OECD model convention and commentary (or of certain
articles thereof) which met the specific requirements of the Internal Market.
Irrespective of the way forward, it is clear that co-ordination within the EU in this area
is essential. The choice is to leave the Court to find the flaws in Member States’ treaties
or to try to come up with common rules of interpretation of the interaction between the
EC Treaty and bilateral tax treaties which can provide guidance for the Court and legal
certainty for companies. Such co-ordination could resolve problems of the cross-border
allocation of headquarter expenses and general overheads, which at present are very
often restricted in national tax law. It would also have the advantage of approaching the
problems of limitation of benefits clauses in treaty negotiations with third countries in a
more uniform way, thereby increasing the efficiency of the parent-subsidiary Directive.
Last but not least, such co-ordination would eliminate distortions in tax competition in
the relations between Member States and third countries, specifically with respect to the
                                                
166  See also the suggestion by: Raad, K. van, 6ROYLQJ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO'LYHUJHQFHLQ7D[7UHDW\
,QWHUSUHWDWLRQDQG$SSOLFDWLRQ, in: Report of Proceedings of the First  World Tax Conference:
Taxes Without Borders, p. 30:1 - 30:7., Canadian Tax Foundation, Toronto, 2000 (also published
in: Kirchof, Lehner, Raupach & Rodi (eds.), 6WDDWHQXQG6WHXHUQ, Festschrift für Klaus Vogel, pp.
1091 – 1103, Schmidt, Frankfurt, 2000)363
transfer of investment income from the European Community to third countries. Clearly,
however, no EU initiative in this area should interfere with OECD work, which should
continue to form the general framework for the elimination of double taxation.
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 3HQVLRQV
As explained in Part III Member States’ tax laws in many cases de facto prohibit cross-
border membership of occupational pension schemes. This may lead to considerable
extra costs for companies with establishments in different Member States. They are in
practice forced to establish separate pension schemes in each State where they have
employees, and they often have to compensate their employees where these, as a result
of moving cross-border, incur extra taxes and/or lose pension rights.
In order to deal with these problems the Commission, on 19 April 2001, issued a
Communication on "The elimination of tax obstacles to the cross-border provision of
occupational pensions"167.
One of the main conclusions of the Communication is that the Commission considers
that discriminatory tax treatment of pension schemes with pension institutions
established in other Member States is contrary to the Treaty and should be abolished.
The Commission will monitor the relevant national rules and take the necessary steps to
ensure compliance with the EC Treaty. As a result migrant workers should be able to
remain in their homes schemes and sedentary workers should be able to enter into
pension schemes with pension institutions established in other Member States, thus
enabling European business to centralise their pension provision.
 6WRFNRSWLRQV
As explained in Part III, the impact on companies of taxation rules relating to employee
stock options is twofold: 
-  ILUVW, there is the direct impact of the tax treatment of the companies’ costs for
employee stock option plans
-  VHFRQG, there is the indirect impact of the tax treatment of the stock options in the
hands of the employees.
As regards the second point, i.e. the tax treatment of stock options in the hands of the
employees, it is worth repeating that, especially in cross-border situations, this is far
from being a problem just for the employee. Companies wanting to move an employee
from a plant (or a company in the group) in Member State A to a plant (or another
company in the group) in Member State B, will as a rule be faced with demands for
compensation for any extra costs, including in the form of increased taxes, resulting
                                                
167  Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic
and Social Committee, The elimination of tax obstacles to the cross-border provision of
occupational pensions [COM(2001)214 final]364
from such a move. Furthermore, any tax treaty issue facing the employee will normally
result in compliance problems for the employer.
Ultimately the problems stem from the diversity of Member States’ taxation rules as
regards employee stock options. It is noteworthy that the rules in this field have
undergone a particularly rapid evolution over the last few years.
The development of the taxation rules quite naturally reflects the increase in use of
employee stock option plans and their economic importance. A majority of Member
States have by now (January 2001) introduced specific legislation. In many cases this
legislation, although relatively new, has already been amended or is about to be
amended. It seems probable that this evolution will continue. Unfortunately, so far, there
appears to have been no tendency towards convergence of Member States’ rules.
As mentioned, the key issues in cross-border situations are the deductibility of the costs
for employee stock option plans and the risk of double taxation of the stock options in
the hands of the employee. There is a clear link between these issues and the ability of
companies and employees to avail themselves of the fundamental freedoms enshrined in
the EC Treaty.
Therefore it seems essential that the matter be discussed at EU level. Discussions with
Member States could usefully sound out the possibilities of achieving a greater co-
ordination or approximation of Member States’ domestic rules and how adequately to
address the problems of double taxation or non-taxation,
-  ERWK as regards the deductibility of the costs incurred by employers for the setting up
of stock option plans (costs of the shares etc.) 
-  DQG as regards the taxation of the stock options in the hands of the employees.
In the latter respect, a particularly important problem to be discussed seems to be the
WLPLQJ: both the timing of taxation, i.e. the event triggering the taxation, and the period
during which, depending on the conditions linked to the stock options, the charge to
income tax arises.
If greater co-ordination could be achieved between Member States’ domestic legislation,
the risks for international double taxation and non-taxation would decrease
correspondingly. In the absence of complete co-ordination some risks would, however,
remain. A solution would then have to be found through double taxation treaties.
The double taxation problems relating to employee stock options could be dealt with
within the context of some of the solutions discussed in section 9 above on double
taxation treaties, namely the conclusion of a multilateral tax treaty between all EU
Member States and/or development of an EU Model Treaty. The aim of these solutions
is precisely to resolve the problems of double taxation in the Internal Market and
incompatibilities with EC law which are not currently being adequately addressed by
bilateral tax treaties. However, these problems are not limited to the EU but have a
wider international dimension. It is therefore desirable that they be discussed also at
OECD level. In fact, the issue has recently been raised within the OECD. The steering
group of Working Party No. 1 has formed a sub-group to examine the tax treaty issues
arising from employee stock option plans and formulate provisions for inclusion in the
Model Tax Convention and Commentary to address the problems identified. However,365
so far, no attempt has been made to assess the practical importance of any of these tax
treaty issues, or to suggest possible solutions.
Since all EU Member States and the Commission are represented in the OECD, a joint
action could prove productive in order to achieve progress. Any discussions at EU level,
along the lines suggested above, should therefore ideally also deal with the possibility of
co-ordinating Member States’ positions in the OECD, as the OECD work is taken
forward.
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HQWHUSULVHV
Generally, and notwithstanding the two exceptions referred to in Part III of this study,
the tax obstacles to cross-border economic activity are identical for small and medium-
sized enterprises and bigger companies. According to the panel assisting the
Commission services with this part of the study, the impact of many obstacles on small
and medium-sized enterprises is however stronger as they have, simply due to their
smaller size, less resources and tax expertise available. Thus, they should also benefit
relatively more from the realisation of remedial measures (e.g. those on cross-border
loss-compensation). Any measure that approximates or harmonises important elements
of the tax base, notably concerning depreciation rules and more uniform transfer pricing
rules, would reduce the complexities of cross-border tax treatment for small and
medium-sized enterprises and increase the necessary transparency. As a result, tax
competition would take place mostly via tax rates.
This suggests that there is, in principle, no need for major specific "SME" solutions to
the various obstacles at EU level. It must be made sure, however, that the general
remedial measures build on taxation techniques which are open to small and medium-
sized enterprises. This appears generally to be the case. The idea of far-reaching specific
"SME" solutions at EU level could also violate some basic principles of EU law. In this
context it should however be noted that among the comprehensive solutions which are
analysed in detail below the one of "Home State Taxation" would be particularly
beneficial from the perspective of small and medium-sized enterprises.
The analysis so far has not provided compelling arguments for harmonising the
domestic special tax arrangements for the taxation of small and medium-sized
enterprises or related special incentives. Equally, there appears not to be an advantage in
developing an EU tax definition of small and medium-sized enterprises (which in any
event would be a very difficult exercise). Tackling the tax obstacles in general will
benefit small and medium-sized enterprises relatively more than bigger companies and
also more than special targeted tax arrangements possibly could.
As regards the specific problems faced by SMEs that are outside the scope of this study,
reference is made to the Commission recommendations on tax problems concerning the366
transfer of small and medium-sized enterprises168 and to the Communication on the
general improvement of the tax environment of small and medium-sized enterprises169.
Most of the recommendations concern tax problems relating to the legal status of sole
proprietorships and partnerships, in particular on the succession of small and medium-
sized enterprises. The Ruding report also examined the possibility of allowing
businesses which are subject to personal income tax an option of taxation as if they were
incorporated. This would reduce the distortions resulting from differing rates of
corporate tax and income tax and open broader possibilities for the transfer of losses
cross-border. It is clear, however, that such an approach raises a number of questions as
to its practical feasibility and application.
Given that compliance cost is one of the most important general cross-border tax
problems, and given that the importance of the problem is greater for SMEs than for
bigger companies, thought might be given to Community action in this area. In
particular, a simplified and uniform tax return and simplified bookkeeping rules for
small and medium-sized enterprises which they could file throughout the EU would
constitute an enormous help for the businesses concerned. Moreover, consideration
could be given to the standardisation of formal and procedural requirements (similar
filing dates, similar penalty regimes and a similar basis for charging interest on late
payment etc.). Such an initiative should be acceptable to Member States as most
Member States already apply specific tax arrangements for small and medium-sized
enterprises which are designed to mitigate the administrative burden and reduce their
compliance costs. Moreover, it would be possible then to build on the Commission
Communication on the improvement of the tax environment of small and medium-sized
enterprises, in particular the ideas for moderating the administrative complexity relating
to permanent establishments of small and medium-sized enterprises (e.g. building sites).
Thus, all remedial measures that are being considered should be checked against their
particular impact on small and medium-sized enterprises. Depending on the type of
measure the above-mentioned simplification or standardisation initiatives should be
supported, as appropriate either at national level or, as for instance currently in the area
of VAT, explicitly at EU level.
As regards the issue of loss-compensation and in particular start-up losses, there are
various possibilities to address this problem. Some of the domestic solutions found in
Member States are already considered in the Commission Communication on the
taxation of small and medium-sized enterprises of May 1994 (e.g. build up of reserves
to meet future losses). Currently, none of them seems suitable for general application at
EU level. A further idea would be to exempt profits from tax for a limited starting
period, for instance in the first two to five years. The deferred tax could then be spread
over subsequent years. This tax deferment would of course need to be limited, e.g. to
companies whose turnover abroad is below a certain threshold. One could also consider
the specific approach taken in many double taxation treaties which provides for
                                                
168  Commission Recommendation of 25 May 1994 concerning the taxation of small and medium-sized
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Commission recommendation of 7 December 1994 on the transfer of small and medium-sized
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169  Commission Communication to the Council and to Parliament on the improvement of the tax
environment of small and medium-sized enterprises, COM(94)206, OJ C187, p.5-10.367
generous transitional period under which building and assembling companies can
operate abroad without creating a permanent establishment. Such rules could be
extended generally to small and medium-sized enterprises which would then have more
opportunities to familiarise themselves with the tax situation in the foreign country.
There is, however, a certain risk that the benefits of such rules could be outweighed by
corresponding – presumably complicated – anti-abuse rules.
The medium-term objective is to remove tax anomalies specific to cross-border
economic activity so that such activity can be undertaken in the Internal Market in the
same way as in national markets. Small and medium-sized enterprises in particular are
reluctant to embark upon new business. Given the choice, they would want to start on
the basis of the legislation and tax system of their home country and then find their way
gradually around the arrangements in the other country (learning by doing). Some
representatives in the Panel assisting the Commission services with this part of the study
pleaded strongly for finding a EU-wide arrangement of this sort. In an initial phase,
companies would thus have to fulfil their tax obligations, solely vis-à-vis the tax
authorities of the Member State in which they have their head office, even if they
operate in another Member State. Accounting, declaration and payment obligations
would continue to apply solely in the home State.170 One could attempt to develop this
solution by gradually approximating core elements of the company tax base and the
relevant administrative procedures.
Such an approach would, however, require a tax definition of "small and medium-sized
enterprises" for this purpose and need to be accompanied by strict tax controls and
appropriate anti-abuse measures. This "targeted" solution could also form part of a
broader, comprehensive approach available for all companies, regardless of their size.
 5HPHGLDOPHDVXUHVLQWKHDUHDRIYDOXHDGGHGWD[
Generally, most of the VAT problems for businesses in general and small and medium-
sized enterprises in particular described in Part III would be resolved by an origin-based
VAT system. This would reduce complexity (only one jurisdiction) and increase
administrative simplicity (cutting costs for business). However, it must be recognised
that the current climate (notably the refusal of Member States to accept any further
approximation of tax rates and any reduction in the numerous special arrangements,
options, derogations, etc. which exist, and the difficulty of establishing a mechanism for
the redistribution of receipts that will be perceived to be entirely reliable), mean that it is
unlikely that any significant progress towards a definitive origin-based system will be
made in the immediate future.
The Commission does not in any way intend to question the idea of an origin based
definitive system as a long term Community goal. However, it is now committed to a
new strategy to improve the operation of the existing VAT System within the context of
the Internal Market. This concentrates on four main objectives, namely, the
simplification and modernisation of existing rules, a more uniform application of
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existing provisions and the re-enforcement of administrative co-operation.171 The first
two objectives are of particular importance for the problems addressed in this study.
Against this background, simplification and modernisation of existing rules should be
given priority. First, to allow small and medium-sized enterprises to better benefit from
the Internal Market it would be necessary to reduce the complexity of VAT rules, in
particular those determining the place of taxation172, reducing the need for small and
medium-sized enterprises to invest in tax advice. In addition, all available instruments to
ascertain more harmonisation of administrative practises should be strengthened
(administrative agreements, common decision on procedures and application of the
law).
Second, priority should be given to the reform of compliance rules:
-  The adoption of directive 2000/65/CE of 17/10/2000 means the obligation to
appoint a fiscal representative, still applicable in some Member States, will be
definitively abolished by 1 January 2002. This is the first significant simplification
adopted by the Council as an outcome of the new VAT Strategy presented by the
Commission;
-  The draft proposal to abolish of the 8th Directive procedure173 should be adopted by
the Council. The difficulty of obtaining refunds of tax from other Member States has
been identified as one of the main sources of problems for small and medium-sized
enterprises that operate in other Member States.
-  Further harmonisation of invoicing requirements could reduce costs for small and
medium-sized enterprises as software already available could be used without the
need to establish different procedures in other Member States. The Commission has
adopted, on 17 November 2000, the proposal for a directive amending Directive
77/388/EEC with a view to simplifying, modernising and harmonising the
conditions laid down for invoicing in respect of value added tax174. Its quick
adoption by the Council would mean a real improvement in the situation of small
and medium-sized enterprises.
-  For deliveries in which the suppliers takes charge of assembly and installation, small
and medium-sized enterprises have been caused needless difficulty by the
coexistence of rules for intra-Community delivery/acquisition and the rules for
taxation in the Member State of destination in the case of deliveries of goods by the
supplier on the customer’s premises. These arrangements should be revised.
-  As regards distance selling, small and medium-sized enterprises often fail to
spontaneously fulfil their declaration and payment obligations in the Member State
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where the tax is due. In these circumstances, provision should be made for taxation
thresholds to be revised to ensure that the system only applies if there is a genuinely
significant activity in the Member State of destination.
These are only a few of the various current Commission initiatives to tackle the VAT
obstacles to the Internal Market. They are presented, again, here as they are closely






The previous section of this Part of the report has analysed a series of targeted solutions
to the existing company tax obstacles in the Internal Market. These are considered very
valuable by business representatives175. However, at the same time, there is an ongoing
debate concerning comprehensive approaches to EU company taxation, in particular
with reference to the problems mentioned above relating to the existence of fifteen
separate tax systems in the Internal Market. This section seeks to enhance that debate by
discussing a number of the possibilities within the specific context of the obstacles
identified in Part III. Although the impact of these obstacles is for the most part not
covered by the quantitative analysis in Part II the results of the modelling can
nevertheless contribute to the debate.
While generally academic proposals for an EU corporate tax system have been made for
some time176, in recent years there has been growing interest in such specific
comprehensive approaches both from industry and from the academic world. Many of
the main interested parties have assisted the Commission Services through their
participation in the two Panels of experts. Various ‘think tanks’ involved in EU tax
policies have been debating and researching the issues including the Centre for
European Policies (CEPS)177, and the Institute for Fiscal Studies178. UK-based
researchers such as Messrs Devereux and Troup have been actively involved and the
‘Stockholm Group’ including Professors Lodin and Gammie have produced a number of
papers developing an approach known as ‘Home State Taxation’179. UNICE, amongst
others has floated the concept of a ‘Common Base’ for taxation across the EU and
Professor Plasschaert has outlined a possible ‘European Union Corporate Income Tax’.
The following sections draw heavily on their and others’ valuable contributions to the
debate, without seeking to represent their individual views.
As an alternative to a series of targeted solutions the possibility of adopting a
comprehensive solution is examined. What a comprehensive approach must do is
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explained. Some options which have been proposed are briefly described with a basic
definition and the distinguishing features of the different methods highlighted. The
options are then evaluated, principally in the context of the existing obstacles,
highlighting any potential problems and technical issues which may arise. Transitional
issues concerning implementation are considered, and possible revenue allocation
methods are reviewed. Finally the economic effects, including reference to the
quantitative analysis simulations and the overall economic efficiency of the EU are
considered.
Much of the debate to date has concentrated on the potential advantages of adopting one
or other of the comprehensive approaches. This report builds on the debate and centres
more on how the approaches tackle the specific obstacles identified by the expert Panels
and on some of the more detailed technical issues concerning particular hypothetical
situations. The main aim being to start the evaluation process rather than to merely
describe the approaches in detail. It also considers in depth the possible ways of
introducing such a system and the possible methods of apportionment or allocation of
the tax base or the actual tax. However, in attempting to identify as many as possible of
the issues which would have to be resolved, or decided upon, in order to implement an
approach it is important not to lose sight of the fundamental advantages of a
comprehensive approach over the existing fragmented situation with its 15 entirely
separate systems.
 :KDWDFRPSUHKHQVLYHDSSURDFKPXVWGR
In Part III of this report a number of specific tax obstacles to cross border activity are
identified, and in the opening sections of Part IV these are addressed obstacle by
obstacle in a series of possible targeted actions. A comprehensive approach differs in
that it seeks to address the various obstacles at a stroke by providing a true Internal
Market solution. However, it should be emphasised that it is only a change in the
method by which the tax base is determined that is discussed here. The responsibility for
setting the rate of tax would remain a matter for individual Member States to decide.
When considering a more comprehensive approach it makes sense to initially consider
the basic nature of the key underlying obstacles.
These can be summarised as follows –
·  The existence of 15 different individual sets of rules, regulations and legislation, and
the issues arising from there being 15 separate jurisdictions
·  The allocation of profits (and losses) between them on the basis of individual
transactions (transfer pricing),
·  The lack of a satisfactory treatment of cross border losses,
·  The tax costs involved in group restructuring.
It follows that, from a business perspective in order to be comprehensive, a complete
approach should ideally incorporate –
·  One set of rules, regulations and legislation372
·  Provide a simpler mechanism for the allocation of profits and losses, (which also
covers cross border losses and reorganisations).
The existence of the 15 systems is the source of the majority of the obstacles. In order to
carry out activities across the Internal Market business has to compute its results on 15
different tax bases in accordance with 15 sets of legislation. All the comprehensive
approaches have the potential to reduce this to one single base thus reducing compliance
costs for European business. Even if such a comprehensive approach were adopted by
only some Member States, which is now a real possibility under enhanced co-operation,
there would be a proportionate saving in costs and a corresponding increase in
efficiency. This could be particularly significant for small and medium-sized enterprises,
and the new European Company Statute could provide a suitable vehicle for any trial.
In addition to the reduction in compliance costs, an enterprise with a single base would
no longer have to involve itself, and the tax administrations across the Internal Market,
in the complex, time-consuming and expensive process of agreeing transfer prices for
goods and services transferred from one part of the Internal Market to another. There is
no productive value to be obtained from this activity and business would clearly benefit
enormously from its cessation. Tax administrations would also benefit and would be
able to direct their resources towards true cross border issues concerning transactions
with countries outside the EU. Even if Member States could, through increased co-
operation, ensure that transfer pricing rules were applied in an identical manner across
the EU and instances of double taxation did not arise, there would still be costs and
inefficiencies present which would simply disappear for businesses operating with a
single tax base.
Furthermore Member States recognise that a business should be able to offset its profits
and losses, but with 15 separate systems this has proved difficult to achieve beyond the
borders of each individual Member State. A single tax base established under a
comprehensive system makes this much simpler to achieve using an allocation system
and the difficulties over the detailed computational issues disappear when only a single
set of rules is applied by a business. Although this will initially reduce Member States’
tax revenue as they recognise unrelieved losses denial of this relief would not be in
keeping with the concept of a Single Market.
Just as a comprehensive approach makes cross border loss relief easier to achieve it also
makes group reorganisations or restructuring more straightforward. As with transfer
pricing the costs flow from the fact that, although these activities take place within the
Internal Market, they often involve complex interactions between different tax systems.
There is no intrinsic value in making such activities costly and where businesses are
deterred from organising their business in the most efficient way because of these costs
the EU as a whole suffers. By providing a single tax base the comprehensive approaches
ensure that restructuring can be carried out in a much simpler manner in accordance
with a single set of rules.
Overall it is clear that the Internal Market would benefit greatly from a common or
harmonised base which permits effective cross border consolidation of losses. This
could take a number of different forms.373
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It is possible to design many different theoretical approaches to company taxation and
this section does not seek to cover all the possibilities. The individual approaches
analysed are those which were proposed and discussed in detail in the expert panel
assisting the Commission with this part of the study. For completeness the general
concept of a compulsory harmonised tax base is also mentioned. The approaches
discussed are therefore as follows –
·  Home State Taxation
·  Common (Consolidated) Base
·  European Union Company Income Tax
·  A Single Compulsory ‘Harmonised Tax Base’
The approaches are designed such that Member States would set the rate of tax180 to
apply to their share of the tax base allocated to them under an allocation mechanism. All
of the approaches require such an allocation system to share the tax base and this is
discussed separately from the individual approaches. All of the approaches would also
require a clear definition of the group to operate any consolidation of profits and losses.
This would ensure that an element of tax competition between Member States would be
retained. However, in order to avoid any negative effects of tax competition Member
States might wish to agree on a minimum rate, or agree to remain within a specified
band around an EU average as a revenue protecting measure.
 +RPH6WDWH7D[DWLRQ
Home State Taxation181 involves all, or a group of Member States agreeing to accept
that certain enterprises with operations in a number of Member States should compute
their taxable base according to the tax code of a single Member State – the Home State,
instead of according to all the different tax codes of the respective Member States where
they have operations. Only the method of calculating the base would change, each
Member State would continue to set the tax rate to apply to its share of the group’s
profits. Corporate enterprises headquartered and operating from a Member State (MS A)
would therefore have the option to adopt the domestic tax code of this Member State
(MS A) for all their activities in participating Member States (MS B, MS C, etc),
whether carried out by subsidiaries or permanent establishments.
For companies operating in several Member States this would represent a significant
simplification compared to the current situation. Home State Taxation aims to ensure
that enterprises benefit from being subject to only a single tax system, only compute a
single tax base. The group deals with only one tax code and one Member State
administration for computing the taxable base. Member State administrations accept,
                                                
180 European Union Company Income Tax was originally conceived as a compulsory scheme for large
multinationals with a single EU rate but it could also be adapted to in such a way that Member
States would set the rate of tax to apply to their share of an allocated base.
181 Lodin, S.O. and Gammie, M. +RPH6WDWH7D[DWLRQ (IBFD Publications, Amsterdam, 2001) –
which contains a full description of Home State Taxation.374
under a form of mutual recognition, the validity of other Member State tax codes for the
purposes of this initial calculation. The definition of an enterprise’s home state would
require careful thought as although in the majority of cases it would be clear there would
undoubtedly be a number of individual cases where depending on the definition adopted
more than one possibility might exist. The definition of the group would also have to be
agreed, for example it could be limited to 100% subsidiaries.
Under Home State Taxation cross border loss compensation would be obtained by
applying the existing local rules of the Home State – the foreign subsidiaries would be
treated as though they were domestic subsidiaries. The group would therefore obtain full
loss compensation and eliminate difficulties arising from transfer pricing between the
participating Member States. Currently the methods for granting this relief (for example
German style 2UJDQVFKDIW consolidation or UK group relief) differ and the conditions
for eligibility (for example a 90% or a 75% ownership threshold) also differ. Unless
participating Member States’ methods were more closely aligned prior to the
introduction of Home State Taxation this could maintain the present situation where
different groups are subject to different conditions for loss relief depending on their
home state. Once the net profit for the group were computed it would then be allocated
to individual Member States in accordance with the agreed formula, and in this sense
the formula plays a crucial role. All groups in the Home State area would have their net
profit shared in accordance with the same formula, but the method for ‘netting off’ of
profits and losses could vary, depending on the precise rules of the Home State. In a
similar context the concept of Home State Taxation involves the possibility of
competing enterprises located in a Member State computing their tax base in accordance
with different tax codes.
%R[
6LPSOHH[DPSOHRQWKHIXQFWLRQLQJRI+RPH6WDWH7D[DWLRQ
Company Z, headquartered in MS A, with a 100% subsidiary Y in MS B, computes the taxable base of
both Z and Y DFFRUGLQJWRWKHWD[FRGHRI06$. Both Z and Y’s tax computations are submitted to MS
A’s administration for agreement of the taxable base. When the tax calculations are agreed and the tax
base is apportioned between the two Member States, Z pays tax at MS A’s rate to MS A but Y pays tax to
MS B at MS B’s rate.
When one entity within a group supplies another in a different Member State with goods
or services then an allocation of profits between the two Member States is necessary.
The same calculations as in the above example are made and the intra group transactions
are treated as though both entities were in MS A. In Member States where consolidation
is permitted, the current transfer pricing question relating to the transaction between MS
A and MS B effectively disappears. However, the combined taxable base of Z and Y has
to be allocated between MS A and MS B, according to the terms of an agreed formula.
Possible methods of allocation are discussed separately as this issue is common to more
than one comprehensive approach.
It is probable that only Member States with broadly similar (not necessarily identical)
taxable bases would wish to participate in the system and therefore initially there would
probably be a ‘core group’ of participant Member States. The possibility of achieving
such a grouping as a form of ‘enhanced co-operation’ would depend on progress in this
area of institutional development following the ratification of the Nice Treaty. As an375
alternative a separate multilateral convention between the participants could be
envisaged, as is proposed in some of the relevant literature. This might be quicker to
organise but would not benefit from the established Community implementation and
enforcement procedures and practices, nor from authoritative interpretation by the
European Court of Justice.
 &RPPRQ&RQVROLGDWHG7D[%DVH
A Common (Consolidated) Tax Base system182 shares some of the characteristics of
Home State Taxation. However, instead of extending the application of each of the
existing national tax codes across the EU it suggests an optional additional new code
should be adopted across the EU. It involves all Member States, or possibly initially
only a group, agreeing on a set of common rules for establishing the taxable base of
certain enterprises with operations in a number of Member States (or even in a single
Member State). Corporate enterprises headquartered in any of the participating Member
States would have the option to adopt this common European tax base for all their
activities in participating Member States, whether carried out by subsidiaries or
permanent establishments. The agreed set of common European rules could take as a
starting point  agreed European Accounting Standards.
The new European tax rules would be administered by the Member State where the
enterprise was headquartered for all its activities and each group of companies would
have only one tax base to calculate, and one administration to deal with. The rate of tax
(as in Home State Taxation) would be set by the individual Member States. Each
Member State administration would deal directly with the tax affairs of only those
groups which were headquartered in their respective State, but cover all its activities
across the EU. Identifying the appropriate headquarter state would be relatively
straightforward as the choice would determine only which Member State administered
the common code rather than, as would be the case under Home State Taxation which
tax code should be applied to the group’s activities. However, if this also determined the
legal system under which any disputes would be resolved it might become a more
important issue.
                                                
182  “Home State Taxation and Common Base Taxation” – unpublished paper submitted by the
representatives of UNICE & ERT to Panel II. See also various preceding position papers by





Company Z, headquartered in MS A, with a 100% subsidiary Y in MS B, computes the taxable base of
both Z and Y according to the QHZFRPPRQFRQVROLGDWHGWD[FRGH. Both Z and Y’s tax computations are
submitted to MS A’s administration for agreement of the taxable base. When the tax calculations are
agreed and the tax base is apportioned between the two Member States Z pays tax at MS A’s rate to MS A
but Y pays tax to MS B at MS B’s rate.
Just as in Home State Taxation individual enterprises or groups operating in several
Member States would gain from a significant simplification compared to the current
situation. Most importantly because it is a single common base rather than a series of
separate bases difficulties stemming from transfer pricing within the EU would be
eliminated and enterprises would automatically benefit from consolidation. All
enterprises in the EU who chose to participate would be taxed on the same base
wherever they operated and accordingly differences in tax treatment would not be
dependent on headquarter location, which could be the case under Home State Taxation.
The Common (Consolidated) Base would require allocation to the individual Member
States for them to exercise their taxing rights and this would require allocation
according to the terms of an agreed formula in the same way as for Home State
Taxation. Proponents of a Common (Consolidated) Base emphasise in particular that the
optional element, combined with the retention by the Member States of the right to set
the tax rate would ensure that there was an opportunity for an appropriate element of
transparent tax competition between Member States. In contrast to Home State Taxation
the method of arriving at the ‘consolidated’ group result, the ‘netting off’ of profits and
losses, would be the same for all enterprises and would not depend on the rules in the
‘home’ or headquarter state. This ‘common’ approach to loss relief would then be
followed by the allocation according to the agreed formula, ie both stages of the process
are identical for all enterprises within the Common (Consolidated) Base, whereas under
Home State Taxation the calculations for the first stage could vary.
All Member States who wished to adopt the new tax code would be able to, without
amending their existing code. Over time one might expect individual ‘domestic’ codes
to evolve towards the common code to further simplify domestic administration but
there would be no need for this to be the case if enterprises had the choice to adopt the
new code. As a new tax code introduced at the EU level a new multilateral Double Tax
Treaty network would seem to be required eventually in order to reap all the benefits
and this is explained in further detail later. Introduction of the new code might be
possible under the ‘enhanced co-operation’ procedure if Council did not unanimously
support its introduction but the use of a multilateral convention independent of the
Community institutions is more difficult to envisage.377
 (XURSHDQ8QLRQ&RPSDQ\,QFRPH7D[
An additional variation on the ‘common base’ theme has also been suggested. The
European Union Company Income Tax183 would also require the drafting of a new,
single corporate tax code to apply across the EU. In its purest form it would be
administered by a new single authority, with a single EU tax rate and the revenues
would be used to fund the EU institutions and activities with any excess allocated
between Member States according to an agreed formula. However, it could also be
administered by individual Member States in much the same way as Value Added Tax,
and each Member State could apply its own tax rate to its allocated share of the tax base.
From a tax technical perspective the European Union Company Income Tax is no
different from a national one, it is simply applied at an EU level rather than a national
level. From a political perspective it represents a fundamental change in that Member
States are required to relinquish an element of their fiscal sovereignty and establish a
federal EU Tax. It could be argued that several Member States do in effect take a similar
approach in their own internal tax systems - for example the United Kingdom has a UK
corporate tax system and UK Double Tax Agreements rather than an English system
with English Double Tax Agreements, plus a Welsh system with Welsh Double Tax
Agreements etc, and Belgium has a Belgian tax system rather than a Flemish system, a
Wallonian system etc. However, the introduction of a European Union Company
Income Tax would certainly represent a major step towards the creation of a ‘federal
Europe’, although whether it could be considered a development on the same scale as
monetary union is debatable.
 $6LQJOH&RPSXOVRU\µ+DUPRQLVHG7D[%DVH¶
The most ‘traditional’ response would be to propose a compulsory harmonised tax base
in the EU. This would require a single corporate tax code to be applied across the EU, to
all enterprises, by all Member States replacing the existing fifteen domestic tax codes.
Past Commission proposals184 have to a certain extent suggested moves towards
harmonisation of bases. However, a Single Compulsory ‘Harmonised Tax Base’ would
represent a development well beyond these individual proposals and Home State
Taxation, Common (Consolidated) Base Taxation or the European Union Company
Income Tax as described above. It would require compulsion, applying to all enterprises
regardless of size or cross border activity. The existing tax codes would cease to exist
and Member State administrations would all operate the harmonised code without the
need for a new centralised administration. In this way the obstacles in the first category
above, the very existence of 15 separate systems, would disappear, although as is the
case for VAT some differences in application might remain.
                                                
183 See: Plasschaert, Sylvain, "An EU Tax on Consolidated Profits of Multinational Enterprises",
European Taxation (IBFD), January 1997. There, a single tax is suggested, legislated for by the
EU, whose proceeds would fully or partly accrue to the EU itself. That tax would apply to all
(larger) companies with a high degree of multinational involvement within the EU.
184 See Part I para 2.1 for further details including reference to COM(84)404 & OJ C253 20/9/84 p5,
withdrawn 1996 re proposed Directive on definition of losses, and COM(90)595 & OJ C53
28/2/91 p30, re proposed Directive on cross border loss relief.378
A Harmonised Tax Base would by necessity include consolidation. The consolidated tax
base of each EU enterprise would therefore have to be allocated between Member States
according to the terms of an agreed mechanism. The possible types of mechanism and
formula are separately reviewed in more detail below as they are also relevant to other
possible comprehensive approaches. However, without going into details at this stage it
is reasonable to assume that if a harmonised tax base could be agreed upon then such a
formula could be constructed to resolve the points relating to profits and losses.
In this way the key obstacles would be addressed and many of the questions which are
discussed in relation to other approaches later in this paper, such as the pros and cons of
an optional system, a system for a specific sector, a specific size of enterprise, a limited
group of Member States etc would simply be avoided.
Even such a harmonisation would not necessarily solve or remove all the obstacles, for
example those where the interaction with personal taxation is a factor such as the
taxation of partnerships. However it would self evidently resolve those which arise from
the current differences in the methods of computing the tax base of an enterprise across
the EU and from determining which particular Member State should subject them to
corporate tax. It would not necessarily resolve the similar obstacles which may exist for
an enterprise wishing to invest outside the EU but within the Internal Market the
potential distortions and inefficiencies would be reduced.




The basic descriptions of each of the above suggest that each approach would solve
industry’s basic concerns in that an enterprise operating in more than one EU Member
State185 could choose to have to follow only one set of rules, regulations and legislation.
Coupled with an appropriate method of allocation the problems related to transfer
pricing and consequent economic double taxation would essentially cease to exist and
cross border consolidation of taxable profits and losses would be freely available, in
contrast to the current complex and incomplete network of possible reliefs.
In this context the business representatives in the panel assisting the Commission
services with the studyemphasised that the creation of a single set of rules, i.e. a single
tax base was of paramount importance. The route to achieving this was of less
importance providing that participation were optional, which when coupled with the
retention of individual Member States’ control over rate setting, should ensure that an
element of tax competition could thrive.
As discussed in more detail below Home State Taxation is based on mutual recognition.
It does not seek to introduce a new tax code but to make use of the existing ones. It is
                                                
185 The analysis is directed primarily towards an EU group of companies active in more than one EU
Member State. However, parent companies from third countries, such as a US parent company
with activities in several EU Member States would also be able to benefit by establishing an EU
subgroup with an EU ‘parent’.379
essentially a pragmatic response to the question of how to introduce a common ‘EU’
approach to the taxation of an EU enterprise, without actually creating a new ‘EU’ tax
code. By avoiding the difficulty of creating a completely new code, it represents a
workable solution which could be introduced relatively quickly, and to a certain extent it
side-steps questions concerning national sovereignty over taxation. It is not suggested as
the ‘perfect’ solution, but more a practical ‘half–way’ house, balancing the needs and
concerns of business and governments permitting those Member States who already
have reasonably similar tax systems to provide a joint solution for business.
An approach based on a Common (Consolidated) Base goes further in that a new tax
code has to be drafted and agreed. In this way participating Member States could retain
their own domestic tax system intact for domestic activities and contribute to the design
of an improved harmonised approach for cross border activities. Participating
enterprises active in more than one Member State would all be treated equally, and the
precise mechanics of for example loss consolidation will only have to be implemented
in one common tax code. This is in contrast to Home State Taxation where loss
consolidation is dependent on individual Member States’ existing systems unless the
agreement to implement Home State Taxation includes specific loss provisions. A
European Union Company Income Tax would be similar but the added possibility of
administering it centrally, or of introducing at the a same time a single European tax rate
places it politically in a different sphere.
The optional or partial nature of the above approaches involves a number of issues
concerning the different ways of restricting or broadening access to the comprehensive
approach and a Single Compulsory Harmonised Tax Base neatly avoids these in that it
would be applicable to all enterprises in all Member States. However, there can be little
doubt that such a common comprehensive approach does not correspond to the current
level of institutional development within the EU. In fact individual Member States
would be required to give up their freedom of setting company tax rules and would
merely retain the right to set tax rates. Accordingly this ‘approach’ is not discussed in
substantial detail, although in analysing the potential difficulties associated with the
other approaches the practical advantages of such an approach are highlighted.
Fundamental benefits could flow from any of the comprehensive approaches, and the
solving of the more technical details concerning implementation could be considered to
be the necessary costs of achieving them. A new system, for example Common
(Consolidated) Base, would be preferable to the extent that it can be designed to address
any particular areas of difficulty. However, implementation of Home State Taxation is
potentially a quicker process since it relies on existing systems and therefore the
fundamental benefits would be available much earlier.380
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* For interest, royalties and income from permanent establishments outside EU the subsidiary receiving
the income will generally give a credit for any tax deducted/paid at source under its double taxation
agreement. However if the relevant income is apportioned via the formula across a number of Member
States the recipient subsidiary could have the tax credit but not the relevant income.
Conceptually a comprehensive approach may be based either on the premise of mutual
recognition (Home State Taxation) or on harmonisation (Common (Consolidated) Base,
European Union Company Income Tax or a Single Compulsory Harmonised Tax Base).
In theory mutual recognition is easier to achieve and may be a preparatory step towards
eventual harmonisation. It involves Member States being prepared to recognise the tax
systems of other states and accord them equal status to their own. It introduces the
possibility of a step by step approach with individual Member States moving towards a
position of possible mutual recognition. In contrast harmonisation involves Member
States moving towards a single common system rather than a series of individual
systems.
In order to do this there must be a certain amount of similarity186 between or
approximation of the tax codes in terms of the results obtained but the method of
achieving these results need not necessarily be the same. For example there are a
number of possible methods for calculating tax deductible depreciation but providing
                                                
186 It should be stressed that the literature on Home State Taxation assumes, certainly initially, that it
would only be introduced by those Member States whose tax systems are already relatively similar
and would require minimal amendment.382
the end result, the amount, and to a certain extent the timing of, the deductions is
comparable then there is no need for exactly the same method to be applied.
 ([LVWLQJOHYHORIFRPSDUDELOLW\
More definite conclusions may be drawn from the qualitative analysis comparing some
of the other categories of tax rules in Part II It is possible to identify aspects of the tax
codes which are particularly different and which would have to be amended in some
way before mutual recognition could progress beyond any initial grouping of
participating Member States.
Individual parts of different tax codes may be reasonably similar when they share the
same aims, for example tax depreciation of plant and machinery generally has as its goal
the granting of deductions to take into account the decline in value of an asset over time
through wear and tear and/or obsolescence. However even here complications arise
when particular provisions are introduced as incentives. In some cases certain assets are
treated quite differently. Goodwill is depreciable in some Member States, but not in
others and a precise solution in these cases is more difficult. Similarly whereas it is
conceptually consistent that if a Member State taxes capital gains on share sales it
should recognise capital losses it is more difficult to reconcile this approach with that of
another Member State which might ignore both gains and losses. The implications of
theses differences are discussed further below.
 'LVWLQJXLVKLQJEHWZHHQPXWXDOUHFRJQLWLRQDQGKDUPRQLVDWLRQ
Mutual recognition would be of the overall tax code rather than each and every
individual aspect and therefore it would not be necessary to agree on each and every
aspect of the tax code. In contrast harmonisation would inevitably involve agreement at
a far more detailed level. Proponents of a mutual recognition system emphasise this
ability to take a more ‘macro’ based view of Member State tax codes when assessing
whether or not they are sufficiently approximated as a distinct advantage. There are
clearly also disadvantages in a system which potentially results in two similar competing
enterprises computing their taxable profits according to different methods. The changes
in legislation which would be required are limited to those required to make a Member
State’s code acceptable to other Member States, and of course the enabling legislation to
permit the use of other Member State’s codes to compute the tax base. In overall terms
the amount of legislation and regulation to be changed should represent only a small
proportion of a Member State’s total tax legislation. If material changes were required in
a particular Member State it might raise doubts over the appropriateness of that Member
State adopting a mutual recognition approach and it is generally accepted that any initial
introduction of Home State Taxation would be confined to a group of Member States.
 0XWXDO5HFRJQLWLRQDVSUHSDUDWLRQIRU+DUPRQLVDWLRQ"
Mutual recognition is also sometimes seen as a preparatory step towards eventual
harmonisation in the sense that legislative change designed to make tax codes more
comparable, ie capable of mutual recognition, must necessarily bring them closer
together and possibly facilitate eventual harmonisation. However, it could equally turn
into a ‘brake’ on future developments towards harmonisation as it, to some extent at
least, ‘fixes’ the tax codes of participating Member States. Any agreement for mutually
recognising tax codes would have to define very carefully the codes themselves and this
would inevitably place constraints on participating Member State’s abilities to amend383
and improve their own tax legislation without seeking the ‘approval’ in some way of
other ‘participants’.
Hence an approach designed to be adopted relatively simply, without detailed
harmonisation, with a minimum pooling of sovereignty might induce an unwillingness
to contemplate further change as this would necessarily involve reopening the
discussions on mutual recognition. Given the potential amount of legislative change
required to establish the mutual recognition, if major benefits followed there could be
pressure to simply ‘bank’ these and make no further changes towards harmonisation
which might not bring further significant benefits. Conversely, if major benefits were
not forthcoming there might be a greater reluctance to introduce the further changes
required to harmonise given a disappointing outcome from the earlier ‘mutual
recognition reforms’.
Harmonisation takes the process a step further in that it involves a much greater degree
of alignment of currently disparate tax codes. At its logical conclusion it involves each
Member State effectively having the same tax code. A tax code is made up of a number
of major structural elements (and many minor ones) all of which need to be harmonised,
all of which pose different questions. To what extent harmonisation can be staged or
planned out in a series of predetermined steps to assist the process is considered in more
detail later.
Harmonisation provides an opportunity to design a new tax system rather than settling
for the expedient of mutual recognition. Mutual recognition represents a form of tax co-
ordination in that it leaves national tax codes intact and requires only their
approximation in order to successfully define the relationships between the different
codes. In contrast harmonisation potentially replaces the national tax codes and
depending on the extent to which rates are also harmonised, or at least restricted by a
lower limit, could have a profound influence on tax competition.
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Conceptually an approach based on harmonisation should resolve more obstacles more
thoroughly than one based on mutual recognition. This is particularly the case for
obstacles which arise in part from the existence of different approaches across the EU as
harmonisation implies a common or single tax systemUnder mutual recognition more
variations and hence potential obstacles can be tolerated. Member States might be
prepared to recognise the overall tax code of another Member State even if there were
specific incompatibilities with its own code on the basis of a degree of ‘give and take’.
The acceptable level of toleration is greater for the administration than the enterprise
because it can balance the tax effect of any differences across all the enterprises which it
taxes, perhaps taking a view over a number of years. In contrast an individual enterprise
has only its own individual position to consider and may be materially affected by one
particular aspect of a tax code.
The possible specific remedies to each of the obstacles as discussed above, to a certain
extent illustrate some of the detailed provisions which would have to be included in any
comprehensive approach based on a new tax code. By definition under mutual
recognition (ie Home State Taxation) changes would be more limited. In the event of
implementation by a group of Member States the obstacles would only be removed in384
those Member States who chose to participate. Under harmonisation the aim would be
for the effect of the individual actions to be incorporated within the harmonised tax code
which in theory all Member States could adopt as an option without amending their
existing codes.
 &RPSOLDQFH&RVWV
When assessing to what extent compliance costs are reduced by the comprehensive
approaches it is important to distinguish between the initial set up, or implementation
costs and the ongoing costs. For the most part this section deals only with ongoing costs,
the initial costs could be expected to be ‘amortised’ quite quickly as the benefits
emerged.
Home State Taxation offers the taxpayer the opportunity to deal with only one tax code,
and essentially only one tax administration. This potentially reduces the costs to the
extent that it is no longer necessary to be expert in all the individual tax systems.
However, depending on the structure of the company and the resolution of the Double
Tax Treaty question outlined below a requirement to maintain relations with the non-
home state authorities, and therefore the expertise, may remain for local subsidiaries
subject to their parents’ Home State tax code. In fact, if a considerable amount of
additional accounting analysis (between activities within and outside the Home State
network) is required costs may increase but should still be lower than at present.
Individual administrations may find that their workloads increase if they have a large
number of ‘Home State’ enterprises but across the EU this should balance out. Savings
should arise in that transfer pricing enquiries between participating states would cease to
exist but the allocation process, could require significant resources. If a ‘micro’ rather
than ‘macro’ approach were adopted this could also be the case for enterprises. To
conclude, Home State Taxation is likely to lead to a significant reduction in compliance
costs, in particular for enterprises, but a smaller reduction perhaps in the costs for tax
administrations. In order to benefit fully administrations would have to be prepared to
accept that auditing of tax returns of previously local subsidiaries would have to be left
primarily to the ‘Home’ State administrations (in co-operation with the local tax
administration) otherwise each administration would have to become familiar with all
the tax codes of the participating ‘home’ States. The precise reduction in costs for
administrations is difficult to quantify at present.
Approaches based on a harmonised187 common or single tax system offer individual
enterprises similar benefits in terms of reducing the number of different tax codes which
they must apply but, where the current tax codes are also maintained in parallel the
administrations effectively have to operate an additional tax system. Cross border
transactions within the EU would cease to give rise to specific costs but again precise
figures are difficult to quantify at present. As with Home State Taxation to a certain
extent the design and operation of the allocation process would determine the level of
savings achieved.
                                                
187  When evaluating the comprehensive approaches the Common (Consolidated) Base, European
Union Company Income Tax and Single Compulsory Harmonised Base are collectively referred to
as ‘approaches based on harmonisation'. This is to avoid listing all three each time to distinguish
them from an approach based on mutual recognition. However, when they are considered
individually the level of co-ordination required for each approach is clearly different.385
Home State Taxation would rely on the respective existing legal frameworks,
interpretations and judicial procedures of participating ‘Home’ States. Again, cf auditing
above, administrations would have to accept that any litigation would have to be left to
the respective ‘Home’ State. For a new common base all these would appear to have to
be established at an EU level. The alternative of relying on the existing national
frameworks, applying for example the system of the state where the group was
headquartered could risk an uneven application of the new common base. Clearly this
could involve both administrations and enterprises in additional costs in the short term.
 *URXS7D[DWLRQ
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Under Home State Taxation enterprises would be subject to the applicable existing
domestic rules within the Home State which in most cases are more straightforward than
those applicable to cross border activities. However, as mentioned above, treatment
varies across the EU and unless these variations were specifically eliminated when
Home State Taxation was implemented these would remain as potential ‘irritants’.
Member States without some form of consolidation or group relief would have to
specifically address this. Other more detailed provisions, for example minimum
shareholding periods or thresholds to benefit from a merger relief could in theory remain
and therefore Home State Taxation would not as such necessarily remove all these
obstacles. Enterprises whose Home State was one where a particular provision was
disadvantageous would simply be subject to the disadvantage on all of its activities
rather than just on those in the Home State.
Approaches based on harmonisation should resolve these obstacles in the sense that they
are based on an improved tax code applicable across the EU. Many of the measures
which are perceived as obstacles are conceived in order to protect or maintain taxing
rights by the respective Member States and therefore the pooling of the taxable bases
should remove the need for them.
Legislation dealing with reorganisations is particularly complex as Member States
currently need to ensure that they are not placed in the position whereby they grant
material relief or deductions against their domestic tax but subsequently do not share in
the benefits realised by, for example, investment in particular assets. However, under a
harmonised approach these concerns should, in principle, disappear because both relief
and taxation are effectively at the EU level via the allocation process. One difficulty
which remains is how to deal with the transitional phase when enterprises move from
the current system to a harmonised one. The pragmatic approach, under both Home
State Taxation and Common (Consoldiated) Base would be to freeze the historic
position and to apply strict conditions for any ‘opting out’ of the approach.
Reorganisations under Home State Taxation which involve an entity from a state outside
the Home State area; or even an entity within the Home State area, but with a different
‘Home’ State could create complications:386
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Company Z, headquartered in MS A, sells shares in Subsidiary Y to Company X. Subsidiary Y located in
MS B has ‘frozen’ pre Home State Taxation (MS B) losses, and assets partly depreciated under MS A
(Home State) rules. The purchaser - Company X - is located in either MS C outside the Home State area
or in MS D which is part of the Home State areaIf the purchaser is not in a Home State area, which tax
rules apply to its new subsidiary – those of the subsidiary’s original state (MS B) to whom it actually pays
tax or those of its old Home State (MS A)? If the purchaser Company X had been headquartered in MS A
there would have been no change of tax base for the subsidiary.
The example highlights the problematic aspects of changing the method by which a
subsidiary prepares its tax calculations. For operations within a Home State area the
principle of mutual recognition should enable the states to agree upon a solution, but if
the purchaser is from outside the Home State area the prospects for a simple solution are
not so promising as there is no Home State mutual recognition agreement to underpin
and discussions.. Since one of the main aims is to remove, or at least reduce the
influence of tax on business decisions the introduction of new complexities is
unfortunate and needs to be balanced against the perceived benefits. Mergers and share
sales and purchases currently have to take tax into consideration, but the possibility of
such a transaction altering the tax base by the current equivalent of changing the
residence of an enterprise could be considered as a move away from achieving tax
neutrality.
In contrast under a harmonised approach such group re-constructions, or sales of
subsidiaries are more straightforward. For those within the new system the common
rules apply, for those involving subsidiaries or purchasers outside the harmonised
system the method by which the subsidiary’s tax is computed remains the same – it
continues to use the common base rules regardless of the fact that it now has a new
parent company. The Member State responsible for the tax return administration may
change (under Common (Consolidated) Base it is assumed that the headquarter Member
State is responsible for the tax administration of the whole group) but the tax rules
relating to computing the tax base remain the same.
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Currently, under the existing system, with its 15 independent sets of tax legislation
unless Member States were to follow the ‘deduction/reintegration’ method as explained
aboveindividual Member States might feel they were giving relief for a subsidiary’s
losses whose subsequent profits they would not be able to tax. The existence of different
rates across the EU further complicates the issue at present as losses in a ‘low’ tax
subsidiary might relieve profits in a ‘high’ tax one; but the subsidiary’s subsequent
profits would be subject to the ‘low’ tax.
Under a comprehensive approach, where the consolidation of losses and profits across
existing borders is assumed, this ‘complication’ no longer exists as it would be the
allocation process which determined which Member State can tax which profits. The
source of the profits would be determined not by separate accounting followed by some387
form of consolidation but by the formula itself. It would be this formula or formulae that
would share the overall, consolidated results of the enterprise between Member States.
Accordingly it is theoretically simpler to resolve the obstacle created by the lack of cross
border loss compensation with a comprehensive solution than with a specific targeted
measure. This is because the precise method of achieving the initial consolidation, or
combination of subsidiary results, does not determine which Member State effectively
bears the tax-reducing effect of a subsidiary’s loss.
As mentioned above this is assumed to be a prerequisite for participation in Home State
Taxation and therefore the obstacle is assumed to be resolved. However, given the range
of methods currently in use across the EU there are a number of detailed issues which
could be usefully addressed when any agreement to adopt Home State Taxation was
established. The sectionon losses explains the issues in more detail – obviously the
fewer differences between the methods of permitting consolidation the more coherent
the overall approach is.
In Member States where there is currently no domestic consolidation if this were not
introduced then the current position of some enterprises could actually be worsened. For
example an enterprise headquartered in a Member State without consolidation but with
two subsidiaries within a Member State where consolidation is permitted could find
themselves no longer able to offset the profits and losses of its two subsidiaries because
the whole group now computed its tax base under the rules of the headquarter or ‘home’
state. As consolidation reduces the incentive to ‘shift’ profits via transfer pricing it
follows that without consolidation many of the difficulties associated with transfer
pricing would remain.
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Under Home State Taxation all intra group dividends would be treated as domestic but
the existing problems concerning some cross border dividends from the parent in a state
which operates an imputation system to a shareholder in another state could remain
unless the agreement to participate in Home State Taxation addressed the issue. Under a
harmonised approach the same situation would exist, unless the harmonisation of the tax
base extended to dividends. This existing problem may of course be settled by the
European Court of Justice, but if not it would remain unless specifically addressed in the
agreement to establish Home State Taxation or a harmonised approach.
A further complication for the administration of companies would exist for those
subsidiaries subject to their parent’s Home State taxation code who also have minority
shareholders, either in the same state or different ones. The subsidiary would have to
account under its domestic legislation for dividends payable to domestic, and
presumably foreign and Home State minority shareholders188, and under its Home State
legislation for the majority parent. A similar situation could arise under a harmonised
approach if harmonisation did not extend to the treatment of dividends.
.
                                                
188  The ‘imputation’ problem arises because the minority shareholder in the subsidiary would continue
to expect his dividend to be paid under the subsidiary’s ‘local’ rules – not under the rules of its
parent’s Home State, and the subsidiary therefore has to comply with two sets of legislation each
time a dividend is paid.388
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Transfer pricing issues arising from separate accounting should be eliminated or
practically disappear for transactions between connected parties participating in any of
the comprehensive approaches where tax consolidation is available since they assume
the use of a formula for apportioning income between Member States. The current
complexities of interpretation and application of the OECD Guidelines on Transfer
Pricing as explained above would therefore cease to exist for activities within the EU.
However for transactions with third countries they would remain and Member States,
and therefore EU enterprises would continue to apply the Guidelines for any
transactions with enterprises outside the EU. Given the increased level of co-operation
between Member States required for implementation of any comprehensive approach it
would be reasonable to assume that this would improve the establishment of common
interpretations and application.
Whatever method for allocating the taxable base (or the revenue from a European
Company Tax) is used, this would require some form of co-operation at either the
Member State level (where macro level data provides the allocation keys) or the
enterprise and allocation authority level (where micro level data provides the allocation
keys).
The design of the allocation system would aim at simplicity, to avoid the problems
associated with the growing data demands of transfer pricing, but it could still
potentially involve an enterprise in dealings with a number of administrations. Under
Home State Taxation the natural ‘lead’ authority in verifying the formulae data and their
application would be the Home State, with possible support from the other Member
States. Under harmonising approaches, the same would apply - the natural ‘lead’
authority would be the ‘headquarter’ state who dealt with the administration of the new
tax rules for computing the base. However, given the importance of the actual allocation
Member States could be expected to take a close interest in its application and any
potentially different interpretations. Some form of mechanism might be required to
ensure this did not become as arduous as the existing system and the current Arbitration
Convention suitably adapted might provide a framework.
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The obstacles identified relating to labour costs can be divided into two distinct types,
those which relate directly to the company or employer, and those which relate directly
to the employee and only indirectly create problems for cross border activities by
companies.
Those relating directly to the company such as the deductibility of pension contributions
would in principle be resolved by Home State Taxation since only one set of rules
would be applicable across the group, and only one pension scheme or fund would be
required. However, in an existing group of companies operating across the EU this
could require the current pension schemes or funds to be changed into the type or types
currently recognised by the Home State unless mutual recognition was extended to
recognition of the different forms of pension funds and schemes.
Those obstacles relating directly to the employee, arising from personal tax legislation
within different Member States would remain if Home State Taxation were adopted as it
does not extend to personal taxation. If funds or schemes were introduced or amended to389
satisfy the conditions imposed by the Home State, additional difficulties for the
employees might be introduced since funds and schemes tend to be designed in
accordance with local, domestic legislation. A similar situation would arise vis-a-vis
other employee benefits such as stock options etc.
Under a harmonised approach one would hope that a satisfactory solution for companies
could be reached but again because the obstacles arise in part because of personal
taxation, and harmonisation of personal taxation is not included in the comprehensive
options, these obstacles would not be resolved.
In conclusion although both Home State Taxation and a harmonising approach could
potentially resolve a part of the obstacles, they might create new complexities and
additional specific targeted actions would be required because of the personal tax issues.
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The possible targeted methods for resolving the obstacles concerned three areas – a
multilateral treaty, an EU Model Treaty, and EU recommendations or ‘guidelines’, all of
which imply a better co-ordination between Member States. Amongst Member States
adopting a comprehensive approach many difficulties should be resolved to the extent
that the relevant articles of the Double Tax Agreements would no longer need to be
applied. Resolution of the obstacles relating to activities beyond the Member States
depends to great extent on whether the existing Agreements are amended. However, as
all the approaches require close co-operation the general situation could be expected to
improve.
To a certain extent Home State Taxation could be introduced without amending or
extending existing Agreements between participating Member States. However, when
the activities of enterprises move outside the Home State network the situation becomes
more complex and this is explained in some depth below (‘Potential new issues and
related technical issues’). Other legal uncertainties, particularly those concerning their
interaction with the EU Treaty would remain, and could be increased. However, even
without formally amending any Double Tax Agreements the agreement establishing a
Home Taxation ‘group’ could include common rules of interpretation which would go
some way to improve the current situation as regards Double Tax Agreements between
the relevant Member States and at the same time the vexed issue of interaction with the
EU Treaty could be addressed.
An approach based on harmonisation would raise similar issues. However, given the
level of agreement and the amount of work which would be required to establish a new
tax code, to restrict its application to EU income, (which has been suggested in relation
to Home State Taxation) would be unfortunate. Amendments to existing Double Tax
Agreements or more likely a new multilateral treaty, an EU model treaty or work on
specific EU concepts could be expected – along the lines set out in earlier sections of the
study. Simply agreeing on common rules of interpretation would probably not be
sufficient for a harmonised approach to be implemented effectively.
In conclusion, Home State Taxation on its own might ease the current situation, but
realistically the current obstacles would still have to specifically addressed. An approach
based on harmonisation would seem to require more specific action and therefore the
concept of harmonisation could be said to offer solutions or remedies to the existing
obstacles. However, this distinction is founded on the assumption that the targeted390
solutions identified above would form part of any such harmonisation. The task of
negotiating new Double Tax Agreements should not be underestimated, particularly
when the current existing domestic tax systems remain in place in which case any new
Agreement, bilateral or multilateral, would have to cater for enterprises continuing to
operate under the existing approach, and those opting for the new approach.
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The measures envisaged in the comprehensive approaches are not directed from a
technical angle towards small and medium-sized enterprises rather than larger ones but
they each have features which make them more or less attractive to this size of
enterprise.
For a comprehensive approach to be advantageous clearly an enterprise must be active
in more than one EU Member State. To the extent that it is easier to imagine a group of
Member States adopting Home State Taxation than a group adopting a harmonised
approach, Home State Taxation is likely to be more useful to a small or medium-sized
enterprise since the likelihood of the core group encompassing all its international
activities is greater. However, even where an enterprise had activities outside the Home
State grouping, and therefore still had more than one tax code to apply, the members of
the expert panel assisting the Commission with this part of the study felt that any
reduction in the number of different tax codes applicable was a step in the right
direction and beneficial. As explained above, Home State Taxation becomes more
complex when enterprises trade outside the Home State territories and again the small or
medium-sized enterprise is more likely to be able to avoid this complexity.
The basic premise of applying only one tax code, namely the tax code the company is
already used to, is also likely to be particularly attractive to the smaller company with
limited resources. The initial and ongoing compliance costs associated with an activity
in a different state, starting with simply understanding a new tax system, are likely to be
proportionately much greater than for those of a large multinational enterprise.
The attraction of the simplicity of Home State Taxation contrasts with the possible
difficulties associated with a harmonised approach, the establishment of a common
consolidated base for example, which would involve the smaller enterprise in effectively
abandoning its only secure knowledge base – the existing tax code – and adopting a new
code without any of the established interpretations and precedents. The example of the
European Union Corporate Income Tax accentuates this problem even more and it is
more generally perceived as being designed primarily with the larger multinational
enterprises in mind.
As explained in Part III (on obstacles), in general small and medium-sized enterprises
do not face different obstacles to larger enterprises. They suffer more from them because
they have less resources, and fewer opportunities, to avoid or overcome them. The
comprehensive approaches seek to provide an overall response and therefore where they
are particularly attractive to small and medium-sized enterprises this is by accident
rather than design. As a final comment one could add that all the approaches involve
participating Member States in a degree of change and hence initial uncertainty as
regards the profits they may tax. Therefore such approaches might be more appropriate
for smaller enterprises on the basis that the revenue risks to the Member State are less. It391
then follows that mutual recognition, via Home State Taxation, seems more suited to the
smaller enterprise because it involves less change in the existing domestic tax codes.
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To the extent that the issues concerning partnerships arise from differences in their
definitions and hence their tax treatment in different Member States the comprehensive
approaches do not address all the problems identified in Part III associated with
partnerships, as they do not extend to personal taxation. If a common corporate tax
treatment were agreed as a result of a specific measure then the harmonising approaches
could be applied but for Home State Taxation purposes the issue of residence would
also have to be addressed to assist in identifying the Home State.
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In principle the comprehensive approaches do not extend to VAT. However, if Home
State Taxation were to be introduced there might be pressure to extend the mutual
recognition to include some aspects of VAT administration which currently create
difficulties, especially those relating to small and medium-sized enterprises. Similarly if
a harmonisation approach were to be introduced it would be logical to consider
improvements to VAT at the same time but the comprehensive approaches do not
address VAT explicitly and therefore additional specific targeted actions or
comprehensive VAT approaches would be required to provide remedies to the identified
obstacles.
In this context it should be noted that, as indicated above, the Commission is currently
concentrating its efforts in the VAT field to a new strategy to improve the operation of
the VAT System within the context of the Internal Market. This strategy contributes via
numerous targeted initiatives to the solution of the problems that are identified in this
study. The Commission remains nevertheless convinced that only a comprehensive
solution of a "definitive" or common VAT system will provide an adequate VAT system
for the Internal Market. There is no point in rehearsing the various possibilities and
proposals in this respect here but it is important to note that the current cross-border




The report goes beyond a straightforward description of the approaches in attempting to
evaluate them and therefore potential new issues in relation to the obstacles should also
be mentioned. As stated above if the application of either Home State Taxation or a
Common (Consolidated) Base were restricted to
·  entities and corporate forms currently located in the Home State area189 or the EU in
the case of a Common (Consolidated) Base190 , and to
                                                
189 Income from a ‘non – HST’ permanent establishment of an HST subsidiary would therefore be
excluded from taxation under the HST tax code, and taxed separately392
·  income generated within the Home State area or EU
it should be possible, at least in the short term, to rely on the existing Double Tax
Treaties and to avoid potential complications over the taxation of foreign source
income. Without this restriction a number of difficulties arise – they are explained in
relation to Home State Taxation but, broadly speaking, the issues are similar for a
Common (Consolidated) Base.
                                                                                                                                              
190 Income from a non EU permanent establishment of an EU subsidiary would therefore logically also
be excluded from taxation under the Common Base tax code, and taxed separately393
%R[
([DPSOHFRQFHUQLQJWKHDSSOLFDELOLW\RIQDWLRQDOGRXEOHWD[DWLRQWUHDWLHV
Subsidiary Y, based in MS B but whose tax base is computed in accordance with the tax code of the
group’s Home State MS A, trades with another group company – Subsidiary X, which is a USA company.
Although the tax code of MS A applies to transactions with other ‘Home State’ group entities any transfer
pricing discussions concerning transactions between Subsidiaries Y and X would have to be between the
administrations of the states where they are resident - USA and Member State B, not Member State A.
Subsidiary Y remains a resident tax payer of Member State B and has no rights under Member State A’s
Double Tax Agreements. It is only the method of calculating the tax base which has changed. The relevant
Double Tax Agreement is USA/Member State B. In the event of a transfer pricing enquiry any
adjustments agreed between the administrations (USA and Member State B), logically should not form
part of the group’s overall tax base computations in accordance with the Home State’s, ie Member State
A’s, tax code: They should remain with Subsidiary Y in MS B, as otherwise every participating MS would
have to accept the outcome negotiated under the DTA entered into by MS B. In the same way tax credits
or withholding taxes paid or suffered would remain ‘entity specific’ and not form part of the overall
computation and allocation of the Home State Taxation base.
A similar complication arises when a group has entities in Member States with different
approaches to the taxation of dividends.394
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Subsidiary Y from the above example, based in MS B but whose tax base is computed in accordance with
the tax code of the group’s Home State (MS A), pays a dividend to parent company Z in MS A. MS A
adopts the credit rule, MS B the exemption system. Subsidiary Y’s dividend may bring with it tax credits
for tax paid in MS B, and potentially for tax paid in 3
rd countries if Subsidiary Y has 3
rd country
subsidiaries.
The question here is how to deal with the potential tax credit, in particular whether or not it should form
part of the overall consolidated Home State Taxation base and therefore be distributed across the group in
accordance with the allocation system for the tax base.
These issues, and a number of other similar ones, have been identified in the literature
describing Home State Taxation as areas requiring further research and they illustrate
that although a very simple concept, Home State Taxation raises complex issues which
would have to be resolved prior to any application. The corporate structure of many
multinational enterprises can be very complex and at least seven structures can be
identified which would require additional analysis.
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-  Home State/Non EU subsidiary/EU Branch
-  Home State/EU subsidiary/Non EU Branch
-  Home State/EU subsidiary/EU Branch
-  Home State/EU subsidiary/EU sub-subsidiary
-  Home State/EU subsidiary/Non EU sub-subsidiary
-  Home State/EU subsidiary/Non EU sub-subsidiary/EU Branch
-  Home State/EU subsidiary/Non EU sub-subsidiary/EU sub-subsidiary
A solution to some of these complexities may be for participating companies and their
branches to report their activities under two separate categories. Those which are within
and between the Home State/common base network, and those which are outside – be
they non EU states or EU states who do not participate in Home State
Taxation/Common (Consoldiated) Base.
Under Home State Taxation some such analysis by  subsidiaries seems inevitable, for
example if a subsidiary has a minority shareholder then these dividends should continue
to be subject to the local tax code where the subsidiary is based.  Those paid to the
parent should be subject to the Home State tax code. Transfer pricing adjustments with
non Home State Taxation countries (as described above) would also remain at the  level395
of the local subsidiary. Similarly,   dividend tax credits or foreign tax credits  received
by or accruing to the subsidiary may also have to remain at this ‘local’ level.
However, additional analysis may reveal new problems and there is a risk that whereas
Home State Taxation may appear to simplify a group’s tax affairs, within some of its
subsidiaries it may impose a new type of complexity – that of identifying activities and
transactions which must remain at the ‘local’ level and not become part of the overall
Home State computed tax base which is to be allocated across participating Member
State enterprises. The final tax liability of a subsidiary would then be made up of two
parts, one relating to the profits allocated to it from the Home State ‘pot’, the other
relating to profits which had remained outside this Home State ‘pot’ and been subject to
local rules, principally because of the local State’s Double Tax Agreements. The same
could apply under a Common (Consolidated) Base. Proponents of both approaches are
convinced that the other benefits from adopting a comprehensive approach would far
outweigh these additional administrative tasks and would be a ‘price worth paying’.396
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In its study on the Compatibility of the Home State Taxation System with Double Taxation Agreements
included in Lodin, S. & Gammie, M. +RPH6WDWH7D[DWLRQ (IBFD Publications, Amsterdam, 2001) the
IBFD examined the compatibility of Home State Taxation (HST) with Double Taxation Agreements
(DTA) based on the OECD Model with particular reference to some of the above structures. Preliminary
conclusions confirm that if non EU income were initially excluded there should be no fundamental
problems. If it were included a number of technical amendments to DTAs would be required, the main
problem identified being the receipt of 3
rd country dividends by a subsidiary in a ‘credit’ state, whose
Home State were an ‘exemption’ state creating the situation of the subsidiary’s state having to give a tax
credit under the DTA when the relevant income may be exempt. The assessment identified two key
principles -
·  It is assumed that participating Member States will agree not to apply their DTAs amongst themselves
as the allocation formula effectively allocates taxing rights.
·  Some issues remain concerning DTAs with states not participating in the HST system. As access to
DTAs is based on the residence of the taxpayer it is assumed that individual members of a corporate
group taxed under HST will continue to rely on their ‘domestic’ DTAs, even though their taxable
base will be determined by their parent’s Home State tax legislation.
The review covered the following –
·  Article 2 Taxes Covered
In principle no problem – the nature of the tax levied does not change, simply the method of computing
the base.
·  Article 23A & B Elimination of Double Taxation: Exemption Method & Credit Method
Example – HST Parent with an HST subsidiary with a 3
rd country branch.
HST Parent operates exemption, ie the foreign income of the subsidiary would be exempt. The subsidiary
is in a credit system and the subsidiary/3
rd country DTA entitles the subsidiary to a credit for tax paid by
the branch. The subsidiary/3
rd country DTA still applies, regardless of any HST agreement. Only if the
foreign tax credit provisions of the subsidiary’s state are granted under its domestic law, and not under a
DTA with a 3
rd country would the subsidiary’s state be able to allow the treatment of the foreign income
to be determined under the exemption rules of the HST.
In principle this can only be solved either by amending the DTAs, or by restricting the operation of HST
rules to measuring income derived from within the HST area.
·  Article 5 Permanent Establishment & Article 7 Business Profits
Example – HST Parent with a 3
rd country subsidiary with an HST branch (PE).
The branch (PE) computes its base in accordance with the HST legislation, and the allocation formula.
Under the DTA (Art.5) the state with the HST Branch is entitled to tax those profits attributable
(calculated in accordance with Art.7) to the PE. But Article 7 basically requires the separate entity
approach to the calculation of the PE profits, and these are based on the allocation( ie apportionment)
under HST. Unless apportionment is customary the consent of the 3
rd country is required under the DTA
for the PE to compute its profits in this way. As a further complication the general aim of any
apportionment ought to produce figures as close as possible to those which would have been produced
under separate accounting [although a UK tax case (Sun Life v Pearson 1986) interpreted this not as a
close correspondence, but a degree of correspondence].
Consent would be required in most such cases, and HST states would have to convince 3
rd countries that
the apportionment formula could provide the necessary degree of correspondence – and 3
rd countries who
operate a tax credit system to eliminate double taxation would be mindful of the fact that if the formula
produced higher profits for the PE then they would have to grant a higher tax credit.397
·  Article 9 Associated Enterprises
(Transfer Pricing – provides for a corresponding adjustment where a transfer pricing adjustment has been
made)
Example - HST Parent with an HST subsidiary with a 3
rd country sub-subsidiary.
The 3
rd country authorities make an adjustment in the sub-subsidiary.
Under the DTA between the subsidiary’s state and the 3
rd country the subsidiary’s state may make a
corresponding adjustment and preferably after the allocation process. By analogy any primary adjustment
required would be made by the subsidiary’s state, not by the HST parent state.
·  Articles 10,11,12 Payment of Dividends, Interest, & Royalties.
Example - HST Parent with an HST subsidiary with a 3
rd country sub-subsidiary.
(i) Payments from the 3
rd country sub-subsidiary to the subsidiary may be subject to withholding tax, and
taxed in the subsidiary (subject to double tax relief already discussed above). However, the subsidiary’s
tax base is determined in accordance with the HST rules and apportionment and may not necessarily
include all these amounts (or at all if they are exempt) - for which a tax credit may also be expected. This
could be particularly relevant for a state with substantial foreign income flows which gives tax credits
under its DTAs but where a number of the resident enterprises have parents in potential Home States who
operate the exemption system. Excluding such 3
rd country dividends from the HST system has obvious
record keeping implications for the subsidiaries.
(ii) Payments to the 3
rd country sub-subsidiary from the subsidiary may again be subject to withholding
tax, under the subsidiary’s state’s legislation and DTA – not the HST state.
·  Article 24 Non Discrimination
Example – 3
rd country parent with a PE in a state which operates HST.
Tax on the PE ‘shall not be less favourably levied.. than ..[that]levied on enterprises of that other state
carrying on the same activities’, but there may be within the state enterprises who are taxed (more
favourably) on an HST basis.
It might be possible to counter such a claim by arguing the HST comparison is invalid as it is not the
‘same activities’ but this clause of the DTA should really be specifically amended.
·  Potential changes – to make HST more effective
Information gathering powers
Where the HST authority might wish to audit a 3
rd country subsidiary, for example when it had a branch in
a HST state it would be preferable for the DTA to make reference to this possibility than always having to
rely on the existing DTA between the branch’s state and the 3
rd country, ie acknowledge the role of a
Home State authority.
·  Deemed residence
In the long run the most effective solution would be for DTAs between HST states and 3
rd countries to
permit residence and hence DTA applicability to be determined by membership of the HST group. All
members of an HST group, where ever their current residence is would be entitled to apply the DTAs of
the Home State with 3
rd countries rather than those of their current state of residence.398
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*HQHUDO In principle most obstacles (within HST group or EU) are resolved or materially
reduced.
Under harmonisation this is partly because in defining any new tax code one would
expect to specifically address the obstacles at the design stage.
&RPSOLDQFH In principle reduced. Enterprises only have to deal with one tax code, and transfer
&RVWV pricing is resolved between participants. But without new DTAs significant costs could
remain for some enterprises and the allocation formulae might create additional costs.
For administrations
operating two tax codes (not applicable for Home State Taxation) could increase
costs. Use of existing legal system for HST could be simpler than a new tax code.
*URXS7D[DWLRQ 
Groups, mergers & acquisitions
Under HST domestic treatment would apply which is generally more straightforward,
but might involve subsidiaries changing their tax base when a new parent company is
.  headquartered in a different state. Harmonising approaches could be expected to 
specifically address these obstacles by providing a simpler common method.
Cross Border Loss Compensation
. Requirement for participation in HST, but simple extension of the currently used 
different methods could be problematic. In general much simpler to achieve under a
comprehensive approach than at present, because it is the allocation process
that determines how losses are allocated and relieved.
Dividend Taxation
                             Possible continuing difficulties/ new complications with imputation systems and   
minority holdings. Harmonising approaches could resolve these if extended to cover
                             these issues specifically.
7UDQVIHU3ULFLQJ
  Problems resolved within the EU (or the HST ‘group’) as separate
accounting replaced by allocation of the tax base.
/DERXU&RVWVAll comprehensive approaches could potentially resolve some of the obstacles,
but where they arise from interaction with personal tax they would remain.
'RXEOH7D[DWLRQ
$JUHHPHQWV BothHST and a common base could probably function under existing DTAs
but some of the advantages would be lost as a result of the reduced scope.
Perhaps acceptable under HST or a common base as a ‘pragmatic’ response but
.  harmonisation really requires a new multilateral DTA– ie as part of the process the
individual obstacles identified would have to be addressed. Existing obstacles relating
to issues within either the HST ‘group’ or the whole EU if applicable, should disappear
or be more straightforward to resolve.
6PDOO	0HGLXP
(QWHUSULVHV None specifically addressed to SMEs who meet the same obstacles. HST could be
particularly appropriate for SMEs – retain existing code, simple, low risk for
administrations.399
3DUWQHUVKLSV Not specifically addressed. Under HST defining residence for the partnership would
remain difficult
In theory harmonising approaches could attempt to address issues if desired.
9$7 Not specifically addressed. If a comprehensive approach were implemented there
might be pressure to further harmonise VAT procedures etc in a similar manner.
3RWHQWLDO Certain Foreign Income – could create difficulties and therefore might have to be
1HZ,VVXHV omitted from the new treatment.
Although in some instances the analysis of how the existing obstacles could be resolved
is complex, the ‘prize’, namely the overall improvement of the current fragmented
situation and the potential benefits that arise, should not be forgotten. Further research is
required but it is clear that applying a comprehensive approach could potentially permit
many of the obstacles to be resolved at the same time. Indeed in Part II of the Study the
Qualitative Analysis reveals how for many of the structural elements which make up the
tax base there already exist ‘clusters’ of Member States with broadly similar provisions.
A harmonised approach would be an ambitious undertaking, requiring as it would the
agreement of effectively a new tax code and some form of wider debate is needed to add




All the approaches create potential transitional difficulties which could extend for many
years. Under Home State Taxation aspects of the enterprise’s historic tax position could
be maintained outside the Home State calculation and only brought into account after
the allocation process. For example unrelieved losses brought forward by a subsidiary
could be retained and relieved not against the whole group’s current profits, but only
against the profits allocated to the subsidiary. This would take place after the
computation of the group’s taxable base under the Home State tax code and its
allocation in accordance with the agreed formula. However, if the subsidiary’s local tax
code categorised losses into trading and capital losses and similarly restricted their relief
then a problem could arise if the Home State tax code did not maintain this distinction.
This sort of issue would have to addressed in the initial agreement to participate in
Home State Taxation.
Maintaining this historic data is relatively straightforward when the existing tax code
co–exists alongside the comprehensive approach but if the new approach, for example a
compulsory harmonised system, replaces the existing code it becomes more difficult as
the historic data has to be translated in some way into the new system.
 &RPSHWLWRUVVXEMHFWWRGLIIHUHQWWD[WUHDWPHQW
Any form of parallelism implies differences between tax systems which raises a
competition issue. Home State Taxation inevitably creates the situation where two rival
enterprises located in the same Member State but belonging to parent companies in400
different Member States may be taxed on different bases, and would therefore be
contrary to the principle of capital import neutrality.
%R[
([DPSOHIRUSRWHQWLDOGLIIHUHQFHV
Two retail outlets – Z and Y - in Member State A compete. Currently although they may have parent
companies in different Member States they are both taxed initially under MS A’s tax code. Under Home
State Taxation Z’s tax base may be computed in accordance with its parent’s (MS B) Home State’s tax
code, whereas Y with a local MS A parent does not have this possibility. They will both eventually pay
tax to MS A but because the bases have been computed differently the effective rate may be different. A
third competitor – X – may have yet another Home State, say MS C.
In the above example three identical local business activities compute their tax base
according to three separate tax codes and may therefore be subject to different effective
tax rates. Whereas one could argue that mutual recognition presupposes a level of
comparability such that any differences would be immaterial this begs the question - if
there is so little difference between tax codes why not adopt a fully harmonised
approach?
Under a harmonised approach identical local business activities could be subject to two
separate tax codes. For example, under a Common (Consolidated) Base competitors
could be using either the common base or the local base. However if local companies
without any international activities are also permitted to opt for the common base then
this could be avoided.
Under Home State Taxation if the parent company were from a state outside the Home
State area, within or outside the EU, the subsidiary might complain that because it has
no option but to compute its tax base according to the local rules, whereas its
competitors had the choice to opt for Home State Taxation it is being discriminated
against. Under a harmonised approach, for example the Common (Consolidated) Base,
if such a subsidiary were permitted to adopt the common base this could be avoided.
 *HQHUDO'\QDPLFV
With the exception of a rapid introduction of a compulsory harmonised approach
comprehensive approaches raise the question of how the initial introduction is likely to
develop. Conceptually a new approach can be introduced by either a restricted number
of Member States, or for a restricted number of enterprises. The conditions defining the
participant enterprises can be defined in a number of different ways - size, sector, type
of entity etc. Combining the two factors results in an approach applying in some
Member States to some enterprises. How, and to what extent a ‘dynamic for
participation’ is created raises the question of how an incentive to participate can be




To what extent participation by a group of Member States rather than all the Member
States would be workable is an important issue. There are precedents at the EU level for
Member States to opt in or out of particular policies on a permanent or temporary basis.
The Schengen Area has gradually expanded as more Member States join, the Social
Chapter did not initially cover all Member States and the Euro has not been adopted by
all Member States. The recent Nice Treaty has further defined this concept of ‘enhanced
co-operation’ and the use of this may increase.
Any comprehensive scheme must therefore make allowance for the possibility that not
all Member States might wish to implement it at the same time. In theory a core group
of Member States could probably adopt any of the comprehensive approaches identified
but this would have implications both for the level of benefits flowing from the
approaches and potentially on the relations between participating and non participating
Member States.
Approaches based on mutual recognition seem to provide more scope for partial
implementation of this nature and the Qualitative Analysis in Part II provides some
pointers to which Member States might be more easily able to adopt this approach
where they already have similarities in their tax codes. A certain degree of similarity is
an absolute prerequisite for any sort of mutual recognition. Since the aim is essentially
to identify and recognise existing similarities, and not to define a new tax code it almost
seems to be designed for implementation by a group of Member States.
Clearly to qualify as ‘comprehensive’ a grouping would have to involve a number of
Member States but discussions in the panel of experts did confirm that notwithstanding
the fact that participation by all Member States would be preferable, a partial
implementation would be a step in the right direction. In the same way the creation of a
harmonised base by a limited number of Member States would be seen as progress.
([SDQGLQJWKHFRUHJURXS
Whether the formation of a Home State group would encourage other Member States to
aim for participation is less clear. Pressure might be expected to come from enterprises
headquartered outside one of the Home States either for its ‘own’ Member State to
participate, or for one of the Home States to accept it as being headquartered there. For
membership of a Home State group to be sufficiently attractive for an enterprise to seek
to change its ‘home state’ the advantage would have to be material. Whether such a
material advantage would represent a ‘distortion’ to competition is debatable but the
issue is not a new one as there is evidence of enterprises seeking to change their
residence under the current systems in order to benefit from more advantageous tax
treatment.
The incentive for Member States outside the grouping to subsequently negotiate ‘entry’
would depend on a combination of the evaluation of the benefits achieved by the
participating states which may not be evident for several years, and the pressure from
enterprises as demonstrated by their wish to relocate as outlined above. If the main
reason for not participating was originally related to structural differences it is likely that402
it would be the ‘incoming’ state who would have to adapt its code to make it acceptable
and it is difficult to see the formation of an initial grouping as establishing a rapid
momentum, unless the number of enterprises seeking to relocate was material.
Home State Taxation has been described by some authors as a step towards
harmonisation, helping to create the conditions for the establishment of a harmonised
base but this is not inevitable. If no predetermined timeframe for Member States to join
is established then such a ‘transitional’ phase might ‘de facto’ become the established
system.
The introduction of a harmonised approach such as a Common Consolidated Base or
even the European Union Company Income Tax by a group of Member States
essentially raises the same questions. Harmonisation by a group of Member States is
perhaps less likely because it requires a greater degree of technical preparation and
agreement than Home State Taxation and raises quasi constitutional questions
concerning the EU, unlike Home State taxation which could be considered a more
straightforward Member State issue. For instance Home State Taxation could be
established via a ‘Home State Convention’ agreed by the participating Member States,
whereas harmonisation requires Member States to agree upon a new, joint or common
tax system which one would expect to progress via the EU’s procedures, requiring
unanimity in Council (should all Member States participate).
 2SWLRQDORUFRPSXOVRU\IRU&RUSRUDWH7D[SD\HUV"
3DUWLDORUWRWDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQ"
The introduction of any comprehensive approach potentially involves transitional
arrangements whereby certain sectors or certain types of enterprises might be treated
differently. However, there is an additional issue of principle concerning whether or not
the option to participate should be a feature of an approach and who should exercise the
choice in what circumstances.The literature on the subject proposes that companies
should be free to opt into an approach, but, that with certain well defined exceptions,
this should be a ‘one off’ irreversible decision (or at least one which is binding for a
significant period of time), in order to ensure that it does not become a tool for tax
avoidance. In defining which enterprises would be eligible Member States would be
effectively exercising their choice over eligibility. Obviously for a choice to exist there
must be an alternative, in which case any element of choice presupposes that a parallel
approach has been adopted and the existing tax code remains intact whichadds
additional complexity. Such choice could raise potential problems concerning
discrimination between enterprises exercising their freedoms under the Treaty.
6HOHFWLRQE\6HFWRUDQGRU6L]H"
There are a number of possible ways in which participation could be partial. At the
enterprise level either sector or size could be a determining factor. Defining sectors for
the purposes of determining tax treatment is currently widely practised across the EU.
Examples include banks and insurance companies, oil and gas companies, and
manufacturing companies. Using size to determine tax treatment is similarly
widespread, for example, with special rates of tax and compliance requirements for
‘small and medium-sized enterprises’.403
The difficulty is what to do when an enterprise moves from one category to another.
When it is the sector that is the defining factor, movements are less common and a
change in tax treatment is more understandable as the very nature of a business changes.
Using size, whether measured by turnover, profits, employees or cross border trades is
likely to produce more movements from one category to another. As a general rule
existing tax differentiation on the basis of size tends to be for the purposes of providing
assistance or incentives for smaller enterprises and it is understandable that as an
enterprise grows it may have less need for different treatment. Whether a particular
comprehensive approach is to be considered as a form of temporary assistance or
incentive, or as a specific measure to remove an obstacle may then be important in
deciding whether or not size could be recommended as a factor.
Both sector and size are relatively objective measures, whereas for enterprises (or
Member States via the eligibility criteria) to be able to choose between tax systems
introduces a far greater degree of uncertainty. Within existing tax codes an element of
choice is already permitted, for example, in some Member States there is a choice of
depreciation methods, but these are relatively minor. Some members of the expert panel
assisting the Commission with this part of the study were very keen that enterprises
should be able to choose whether or not to participate and this highlights one of the
principle difficulties concerning choice. Neither enterprises nor Member States are
likely to support the idea that the other can choose a system to pay less tax, or choose a
system to collect more tax, simply by opting in or out of a tax system. This suggests a
comprehensive approach which is optional has to be capable of incorporating a motive
test, and/or be sufficiently transparent to permit comparisons. If enterprises are given the
choice of whether to opt ‘in’ or not, the right to subsequently choose a different option
would have to be carefully controlled. If, as has been suggested under Common
(Consolidated) Base, ‘special’ rates were applicable then this could be less of an issue.
The main advantage of extending an option to a defined sector or size of enterprise
would be that there would automatically be created a group of enterprises who could
provide a ‘pilot’ or test case. Enterprises operating under the European Company Statute
could clearly form such a group, as could small and medium-sized enterprises, or
companies quoted on certain stock exchanges. This latter group would of course
dovetail neatly with that proposal for accounting harmonisation and its application to
quoted companies.
In principle there is little justification for removing or resolving tax obstacles only for
certain types of companies. Thus ideally any comprehensive approach should be
extended to all companies. There are, however, practical arguments in favour of a
gradual approach, starting with some companies and thereafter extending to include
others.
For Member States, extending an approach initially confined to a specific sector will
depend to a great extent on the benefits obtained. The extent to which implementation
involved structural changes for a Member State might be a determining factor. The
initial introduction of Home State Taxation for, say, small and medium-sized enterprises
might require few changes but, if Double Tax Agreements were amended, then a wider
application might be considered worthwhile. Under a harmonised approach a new tax
code would have been defined and this could presumably be extended to beyond any
initial restricted introduction.404
Common to both a mutual recognition and a harmonisation approach would be the
introduction of the allocation system and the extent to which this was successfully
established could increase pressure to extend an approach to more sectors (and sizes of
enterprise). If the allocation was proving simple to operate and, at the same time, non-
qualifying sectors were increasingly involved in transfer pricing disputes or any of the
other obstacles addressed by the approach, then Member States would have an incentive
to extend the approach.
From the enterprise point of view, the introduction of a comprehensive approach for
certain sectors is perhaps less likely to create this dynamic or momentum for a more
widespread introduction. Two factors potentially create pressure, one the reduction in
absolute costs for the enterprise (either administrative costs or actual lower taxes), the
other that of competitive pressure where a competitor has ‘access’ to a more
advantageous tax regime.
Where different sectors are concerned the latter pressure would not exist and the driving
force would be solely related to cost savings. An exception to this might be the position
of enterprises operating in more than one sector, where there would clearly be pressure
to extend the definition of a qualifying sector if the approach were considered to be
advantageous – the ‘qualifying’ manufacturer who also had ‘non-qualifying’ activities
might seek an extension for example. In this way a more general extension might be
envisaged as the competition element in the non-qualifying activity sector might be
reintroduced.
In the longer term, if size were a determinant, the question of what to do when an
enterprise grew above the threshold might result in an extension of the category.
Removing the right to a comprehensive approach because an enterprise has grown might
be seen as unreasonably punishing success. Over time, as more enterprises exceeded the
definition but retained the benefits, then a competition concern might arise with existing
large enterprises in the relevant sector if the extension was not made general.
 6SHHGRIPRPHQWXP
Whereas a number of factors can be identified that might give rise to pressure to extend
approaches to more Member States and/or more enterprises, the majority are relatively
long-term and unpredictable. Without a predetermined timetable or statement of intent
such change is likely to be very slow indeed, with one possible exception. The restricted
introduction of an approach as a pilot or test case with a formal evaluation process to
follow might provide an incentive. Ring fencing such a pilot could be based on any of
the above factors although the simplest might in fact be to use the new European
Company Statute as the determining factor as there would be no problems of definition.
Another alternative might be to restrict a pilot to certain small and medium-sized
enterprises on the grounds that the risks to Member State tax revenues were lower and
more manageable.
 8QFHUWDLQW\DERXWWD[\LHOG
A more general difficulty would be the degree of uncertainty for Member States
concerning their tax yield from any new approach. This is the case for any major tax
reform but the scale of the uncertainty could be much greater. With the exception of a
compulsory introduction of harmonisation the concept of a staged introduction is a
possibility, and this would reduce the level of uncertainty and provide a useful ‘test’405
case. If an approach were made optional, as is the strong preference of the expert panel
assisting the Commission, a self selected sample would be immediately available. In this
respect introducing Home State Taxation for small and medium-sized enterprises could
be particularly appropriate, and if these only had activities within the Home State area a
number of the difficulties outlined above would be avoided.
However, the revenue implications should not be underestimated. In theory, the amount
by which total EU tax revenue would change should be limited to the current amount of
double taxation, but the timing of its collection would necessarily alter if enterprises
active in more than one Member State were able to offset cross border losses rather
than, as is currently the case, wait until profits are available within the current respective
tax jurisdictions. In addition there would probably be some redistribution of the tax base
of enterprises between the Member States as a new allocation system, in place of
separate accounting, is unlikely to produce exactly the same results.
In addition to these potential changes in the overall tax base, under a harmonised
approach unless Member States all applied the same tax rate they would also be subject
to competitive pressures as differences in the effective tax rate would become much
more transparent. Under Home State Taxation the identity of an enterprise’s home state
could become a key issue but it should be possible to define objective criteria for
establishing the appropriate State, particularly as the approach is based on existing
legislation rather than new unproven legislation.
 $FFRXQWLQJ
In preparing for an approach based on mutual recognition the required degree of
comparability is difficult to define precisely. The initial difficulty concerns the current
lack of harmonisation of accounting standards, an issue which is covered above in the
section on Company Taxation and Financial Accounts. There is considerably more
pressure to successfully implement a common approach to accounting than taxation and
there are a number of formal proposals under consideration. However, the different legal
traditions within the EU, concerning the degree of independence of financial accounts
from taxation accounts, will continue to be a stumbling block to complete
harmonisation. On the accounting front the driving pressure is the proposed adoption of
International Accounting Standards which tend to reflect more the investor interest than
the tax administration interest. The discussions concerning the possible move towards
fair value accounting accentuate this trend. In Member States where the degree of
independence is high such developments have potentially less impact than where the tax
accounts are more dependent on the financial accounts.
In preparing for any comprehensive approach the accounting issues discussed above are
particularly relevant. Mutual recognition of a tax code does not in itself demand
accounting harmonisation. However, because in some Member States the tax treatment
is dependent on the accounting treatment, the accounting issue becomes important.
Unless mutual recognition of tax codes was extended to include a mutual understanding
of other states’ approach to the relationship between tax and financial accounting, or
accounting harmonisation was simultaneously developed, some subsidiaries might have
to change their accounting policies to retain a particular tax treatment. Harmonisation,
as a comprehensive approach, on the basis of a new tax code could avoid such406
problems, but again the relationship between tax and financial accounting would have to
be specifically addressed.
The current practice of permitting the use of different accounting policies in the
consolidated group accounts, prepared essentially for investors, from those used in the
individual taxable entity accounts is an understandable, and pragmatic, response to the
existence of the two legal traditions but hardly contributes to business simplicity or
efficiency. The benefits stemming from current developments in accounting
harmonisation may then be relatively limited from a tax perspective. Conversely,
progress on the tax front might ease the harmonisation of accounting standards in that
some of the obstacles to this could be said to exist because of the conflicting demands of
individual Member State tax administrations.
The Qualitative Analysis presented in Part II of this study illustrates to a certain extent
the degree of comparability between the accounting base and the tax base in each
individual Member State. However, because of the lack of comparability of the
accounting systems, it is difficult to read too much into a comparison between the
individual Member States precisely because the accounts themselves may not
necessarily be comparable. It may be tempting to conclude that, if accounting standards
were harmonised, then this would be a major step forward towards permitting mutual
recognition but this is not necessarily correct. There is no guarantee that harmonising
accounting standards would inevitably lead to changes in the taxable bases because of
the differing degrees of tax and financial accounting ‘dependence’. The same applies to
an approach based on harmonisation, but here, with the greater degree of legislative
change required, it is perhaps easier to assume that the accounting difficulties could be
resolved simultaneously.
 7KH(XURSHDQ&RPSDQ\6WDWXWH
As it currently stands the above-explained regulation on the European Company Statute
does not include any specific provisions for taxation. The arrangements for the taxation
of the profits, or losses, of a European Company will be governed by the national tax
law of the Member State, and by existing international conventions subject to the
application of existing Community law. For instance a European Company registered in
France will be governed by French tax law, according to French Double Tax
Agreements, and if registered in Germany by German tax law, according to German
Double Tax Agreements etc. Logically existing Directives such as the ‘Parent
Subsidiary’ Directive and the ‘Merger’ Directive will require a simple amendment to
ensure that European Companies have the same rights as domestic companies are
granted under the directives. A European Company will therefore face the same tax
obstacles as any other local incorporated company.
However, now that the ‘company law’ situation for enterprises wishing to make use of
the Internal Market has been so dramatically simplified, there will be additional pressure
to ‘find’ a tax solution. Although the benefits may be sufficient in themselves for a new
company to incorporate as a European Company, the situation for existing groups may
not be so attractive. In return for a legal framework which is applicable across the EU
the established enterprise may incur significant tax liabilities when transferring activities
into the new entity from existing subsidiaries across the EU; and may ‘freeze’ losses in
these existing subsidiaries. An enterprise might as a result of the reorganisation be able
to benefit from more effective cross border loss relief than hitherto. This could be the407
case if the new European Company traded via permanent establishments across the EU,
instead of subsidiaries at present, and therefore the generally more advantageous rules
for treating the losses of permanent establishments, in contrast to those of subsidiaries
might be available. However, it would still be subject to the same tax legislation, and
suffer from the same tax obstacles, as a local registered company.
The European Company could therefore be described as a ‘European’ corporate form
looking for a European taxation approach – hence the particular attraction of a
comprehensive approach. Adopting Home State Taxation would be possible in the same
way as for an ‘ordinary’ company. A harmonised approach, such as Common
(Consolidated) Base could also be utilised. The rules governing who may establish a
European Company under what conditions are relatively well developed and restricting
a comprehensive approach to this category of company would be straightforward and
justifiable. For an existing enterprise the transitional complexities would remain unless
the approach specifically allowed for the transition, providing new businesses with a
‘European’ system of taxation from day one could be particularly attractive.
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DSSRUWLRQPHQW
As explained in the section ‘What must a Comprehensive Approach do?’ the
mechanism for allocating the profits and losses is an integral part of any comprehensive
approach and it is therefore considered quite separately from the individual concrete
options for a comprehensive approach.
It practically goes without saying that unless corporate taxes are computed and utilised
by a single authority in the Internal Market there has to be some form of apportionment
or allocation between the individual Member States. The current approach in the EU is
that of ‘separate accounting’. Activities within each Member State are accounted for
separately, and where enterprises operate across borders the arms length pricing concept
is applied to each transaction. Each Member State then individually assesses and
collects the tax due from each taxable entity in accordance with its own national tax
code and territorial principles. Indeed this analysis can be taken a stage further by ring
fencing specific activities in order to stratify the tax base in even more detail, as was
done in the UK when the field based Petroleum Revenue Tax was introduced.
Theoretically, separate accounting is the most accurate solution in that it follows a
‘bottom up’ approach, with each transaction being individually recorded in the accounts
of its respective jurisdiction so that the correct source of any profit can be identified.
The implication is that the EU represents a series of individual national markets rather
than one single European market. However, as markets and business models develop it
is questionable whether it remains the most appropriate and cost efficient method.
It is also an increasingly difficult approach to follow as the number of intra group
transactions grows.Often it comprises not only goods, for which third party equivalents
are relatively readily available, but also includes services or rights to exploit group
generated intangible assets such as patents, which may have no readily available third
party equivalent. This raises the more fundamental question as to whether within a
group it is possible to determine where the true profits are generated. When enterprises408
maintain the full range of activities within one tax jurisdiction, for example, a research
activity to develop a product, a manufacturing activity, and a marketing activity, there is
no need in many cases, for tax purposes, to allocate the profit between the activities.
Enterprises develop, for management purposes, methods of apportioning the profits and
record these in their management accounts.
Should an activity be transferred to another tax jurisdiction then although, within the
enterprise, the same apportionment may continue, for tax purposes the ‘arms length
principle’ would be applied. The developing nature of business activities results in this
happening more and more frequently and, as the methods for determining the
appropriate transfer price multiply and become more complex, it is tempting to question
the relevance of such an approach within a Single Market.
It is therefore not surprising that one of the major obstacles identified concerns transfer
pricing, which is an inherent feature of separately accounting for each transaction. All
the comprehensive approaches examined involve to a greater or lesser extent the
effective amalgamation of currently separate tax bases.They therefore require some
method of allocation or apportionment to individual Member States. So when
considering the different approaches one must also consider the possible allocation
methods. In theory one could probably apply separate accounting as an allocation
method under approaches such as Home State Taxation, European Corporate Income
Tax, or Common or Harmonised Base. But since this would in effect negate many of the
perceived advantages, it would be rather self defeating and is therefore not reviewed in
any depth here.
Transactions with non EU Member States, or any Member States not adopting a
comprehensive approach, would continue to be dealt with within the current
international framework. In most cases this would involve following the OECD separate
accounting approach, but the coexistence of two different methods for those enterprises
operating within and outside the EU would be quite possible.
Methods of allocation may be applied either to the tax base or to the actual tax.
Although there are significantly different political implications in the two approaches, in
technical terms the two are similar. All methods seek simply to allocate an EU figure
across a number of individual Member States. Allocation can be based either on
‘micro’, individual enterprise data, ‘macro’ Member State data, or a combination of the
two.409
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The best known method (other than separate accounting) is known as Formula
Apportionment191. Indeed it has sometimes been described as a potential comprehensive
approach to company taxation in its own right192. However, while in theory it could
work in isolation if individual tax bases were reasonably similar, in practice it requires
some form of overall base to act upon or apportion. It is therefore considered here as a
tool for the process of allocation rather than a tool for both measuring and allocating the




Federal State, with 50 states and the District of Columbia
Classical system, levied on consolidated group income (80% ownership test)
Federal Tax Rat: 33% (<$10m income), 34% (>$10m income)
State Tax Rate: determined by each state, ranges from 0% to 12%, average of 7%, deductible for Federal
Tax, therefore effective State Tax Rate ranges from 0% to 8%, average of 4%.
Federal plus State Rate: 33% to 42%
Proportion of total tax (Federal plus State tax) which is State Tax which is based on apportionment of
profits by formula: from 0% to 19%.
States have the right to define the base, the formula, and the rate.
Rules for computing the state tax base differ from state to state but in general the starting point is the
Federal Tax Base which, subject to any specific adjustments, is allocated by formula apportionment. This
apportions total income according to the share of total business activity in each state. Each State can set its
own formula. The vast majority use three factors, property, payroll and sales, but not all states weight each
factor equally. The definition of the factors may vary between different sectors. Most common is the
‘Massachusetts Formula’ with equal weighting of all three, but increasingly sales are double weighted
giving 25%,25%,50%; rather than 33%,33%,33%.
%R[
&DQDGD8VHRI)RUPXOD$SSRUWLRQPHQW
Federal State, with 10 provinces and 3 territories
Modified imputation system, levied on individual corporations.
Federal Tax Rate: 38%, reduced to 28% on domestic income. With 4% surcharge the effective Federal
Rate is 29.12%
                                                
191  For a discussion of US formula apportionment and its suitability for the EU see: McLure, Ch. E.,
Jr. and Weiner, J. M., 'HFLGLQJ:KHWKHUWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ6KRXOG$GRSW)RUPXOD
$SSRUWLRQPHQWRI&RPSDQ\,QFRPH, in: Taxing Capital Income in the European Union. Issues and
Options for Reform," (pp. 243-92) ed. Sijbren Cnossen, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000and
Weiner, J. M., 8VLQJWKH([SHULHQFHLQWKH866WDWHVWR(YDOXDWH,VVXHVLQ,PSOHPHQWLQJ
)RUPXOD$SSRUWLRQPHQWDWWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO/HYHO, OTA paper 83, United States Department of
the Treasury, Washington D.C., April 1999
192  For a more detailed discussion see: Bravenec, Lorence L, &RUSRUDWH,QFRPH7D[LQWKH
VW
&HQWXU\, European Taxation, October 2000410
Provincial Tax Rate: determined by each state, ranges from 14% to 17%, average of 16%, for
manufacturing and process income this is reduced to a range from 0% to 10%, average of 6%. It is not
deductible for Federal Tax.
Administration of Provincial Tax by Federal government, except in 3 provinces who self administer.
Federal plus Provincial Rate: 43.12% to 46.12% (manufacturing & process 29.12% to 39.12%)
Proportion of total tax (Federal plus Provincial) which is Provincial Tax which is based on apportionment
of profits by formula – from 32% to 37% (0% to 26% for manufacturing & processing).
Provinces for whom the Federal government provides the administration have no right to either define the
base or the formula, only the rate.
Rules for computing the province tax base are harmonised – it equals the Federal Tax Base. It is allocated
by formula apportionment, which apportions total income according to the share of total business activity
in each state. Each Province uses the same formula, based on two factors, payroll and sales.
In both the USA and Canada Formula Apportionment is used by individual states to
identify and subject to tax ‘their share’ of the national profits of enterprises which
operate in a number of different states. It seeks to apportion income according to the
share of business activity carried out in each state. This share is calculated according to
a formula, or series of formulae, typically based on a combination of the ratios of local
to total sales, payroll and assets, (in Canada the asset based key is omitted). This is in
direct contrast to the transaction based arms length transfer pricing concepts which
seeks to determine the geographical, and hence jurisdictional source of income.
The income which is subject to this allocation process is generally based on the Federal
Tax Base, which is itself derived directly from enterprises’ financial records.
Historically, formula apportionment was introduced because there was no tradition of
separately accounting for a business’s activities at the individual state level. When
enterprises began trading in more than one state the question of how to identify that part
of the profits which should be subject to taxation in a particular state arose. The
emergence of formula apportionment as the most widely used method is thus the result
of pragmatism rather than overt theoretical justification.
&RQWUDVWWR(8VLWXDWLRQ
The position in the EU is rather different as there is no current equivalent of the Federal
Tax Base and any comprehensive approach has to justify two quite distinct stages, firstly
the creation of the consolidated, or common EU base and secondly the allocation of it to
the individual Member States. In the US the choice of method is simply a question of
selecting the best method to solve an existing problem, namely how to allocate profits.
Therefore although the USA offers an example of a jurisdiction which successfully
utilises formula apportionment, it does not necessarily provide the best model for the
precise form of formula.
&RPSOLFDWLRQV
The situation in the USA is further complicated by the existence of the added refinement
in some states of unitary combination. The Federal Tax Base, which is the most widely
used starting point for apportionment, represents a consolidation on the basis of
ownership. Unitary combination seeks to widen this base to combine the integrated
operations of associated entities, to include activities which have common functions and
at the same time exclude activities which, although they satisfy an ownership test, may
not necessarily form part of a logical business unit or activity. This approach recognises411
that different activities may be best allocated on the basis of different allocation keys.
Just as the introduction of genuine full cross border consolidation would remove the
incentive to shift profits from one jurisdiction to another to take account of rate
differentials, the use of unitary combination combats profit shifting from one unit to
another based on ownership manipulation.
For example the financing activities of a manufacturing group may be excluded from the
manufacturing unit and these profits allocated under different keys more appropriate to
finance activities. In the same way a manufacturing activity which falls outside the
Federal Tax definition of consolidation for the same group may be brought into the unit
for allocation purposes
Another potential difficulty arising from the USA implementation of formula
apportionment is the lack of consistency in the formulae themselves. Each state is free
to decide its own allocation keys, and although there are groups of states who apply the
same keys, there is no standardisation. Furthermore although the nominal starting point
for the allocation is the Federal Tax Base, some states do require adjustments before
allocation.
Thus, what in theory is a simple allocation begins to look rather complex. The profits to
be allocated may differ as a result of adjustments to the Federal Tax Base, the formulae
by which they are allocated may differ from state to state, problems arise on the
treatment of intra group dividends and intangible assets remain difficult to value for the
purposes of inclusion in the formulae. Enterprises with a range of different business
activities, such as conglomerates, may under unitary combination find themselves
allocating their profits under a multiplicity of different keys. Indeed it would seem that
for the EU to adopt Formula Apportionment and/or Unitary Combination it would
require a substantial conformity of definitions of tax bases, apportionment formulae,
measures of apportionment factors, and unitary businesses.
'HVSLWHFRPSOLFDWLRQVLQSUDFWLFHLWZRUNV
Despite all this, Formula Apportionment should not be dismissed. Under the
comprehensive approaches described above the difficulties relating to tax bases should
be resolved since they are designed to arrive at just such a base. The USA experience
has evolved ‘piecemeal’ over many years with no single decision by common consent of
all the states to adopt this particular method of allocation. It seems reasonable to assume
that if Member States were to decide to adopt one of these comprehensive approaches
that they would at the same time seek to agree the appropriate formulae, factors and
definitions as part and parcel of the overall policy.
The comparative low level of USA tax rates permits a greater tolerance of these
apparent inconsistencies in the application of formula apportionment than would be the
case in the EU. Formula apportionment is used to derive the taxable base for local state
taxes, levied at rates which range from zero to 12% and which are in any case deductible
when computing gross income for Federal tax purposes.With a potential range in rates
across the EU of 13% to 40%+ there would be a far greater need, and hence will to
ensure consistency.
The situation in Canada is much simpler. All the provinces use a common definition of
the tax base, common allocation factors, and a common definition of the taxable entity.
The tax base is the same as the federal tax base, profits are allocated based on payroll412
and sales193, and in line with the federal tax base there is no unitary combination, nor
consolidation of legal entities. In return for the restrictions of this approach the federal
government administers and collects the tax on behalf of the provinces194. There is also
an ambitious system of fiscal equalisation and, instead of having the right to grant
specific tax deductions, Provinces have the right to provide specific tax credits to reduce
the liability to provincial tax. Compliance costs are kept to a minimum by this
centralisation and standardisation and protracted litigation is rarer than in the USA.
There are some drawbacks to this approach – for example the lack of consolidation can
lead to related companies attempting to allocate their tax base to group companies in
low tax provinces. However, Canada provides an interesting contrast to the USA and, if
a new system were being established, this more straightforward approach with its
greater commonality could be adapted by for example introducing consolidation.
In conclusion, the USA and Canadian examples illustrate that formula apportionment
can work, (and can, in the international context co-exist with separate accounting) and
provide a valuable source of experience and precedent for Member States should they
choose to pursue this route195. However, there is clearly a risk that the administration of
the allocation process could become almost as difficult and complex as the current
separate accounting approachunless the formulae, factors and definitions are agreed and
applied by all participating states in advance. The emphasis would have to be on
simplicity and there would have to be a recognition that the distribution of profits would
not necessarily be the same as under separate accounting.
Although it has been argued that the precise factors in the formula are of less importance
than the fact that they should be standardised across those administrations applying
them, the choice of factors remains important. Any formula which includes profits
reintroduces a potential problem related to transfer pricing, and it remains to be seen
how electronic commerce, and in particular the definition of the place of sale, will
impact on the sales element in existing formulae. Any formula will inevitably retain
some location incentives but it should be possible to minimise these. The degree to
which they distort location decisions will ultimately depend on the combination of both
the base allocation method and the rate.
                                                
193  Interestingly when the current system was formalised in 1946 the use of a third factor was rejected
on the grounds that Canada had no desire to get into the complications and controversies of adding
capital as a third factor
194  Three Provinces have elected to self administer but they tend to use the same base, factors and
entity definition.
195  Closer to home in Germany Trade Tax is allocated between municipalities on the basis of a




Company X has two factories: one in country A with payroll of 3 m. ¼DQGRQHLQFRXQWU\%ZLWKSD\UROORI
m. ¼,WVVDOHVLQ$DPRXQWWRP¼LQ%WRP¼,WVSULQFLSDOVHDWLVLQ$7KHWD[DEOHLQFRPHLQ$LV
700.000 ¼DQGLQ%¼7KHWD[UDWHLQ$LVLQ%8QGHUVHSDUDWHDFFRXQWLQJWKHWD[
liability of X is assessed as follows:
TA = 0,35 x 700.000 ¼ ¼
TB = 0,15 x 300.000 ¼ ¼
total tax liability for X = 290.000 ¼ZKLFKFRUUHVSRQGVWRDQDYHUDJHWD[UDWHRI
Scenario 1 "formula apportionment"
Generally, following the basic example of the USA and Canada, the tax liability T for A and B can be
determined by the following formula
Ki      Li           Si
Ti = ti,,> i
K i
L i
S -------    ]
K       L           S
with:
i =  state
Ti  = Tax Liability in state i
ti  = statutory tax rate in state i
IIi = tax base
Ki = Capital (property) in state i K = total capital
Li =  Labor (payroll) in state i L = total labor
Si  =  Sales (gross receipts) in state i  S = total sales
i
K =  weight on capital in state i
i





S =  weight on sales in state i
In the example, property is not used for the formula.
$SSOLFDWLRQRIWZRIDFWRUIRUPXODZLWKHTXDOZHLJKWV
TA = 0,35 x 1.000.000 ¼[>[[@ ¼
TB = 0,15 x 1.000.000 ¼[>[[@ ¼
total tax liability for X = 285.000 ¼ZKLFKFRUUHVSRQGVWRDQDYHUDJHWD[UDWHRI
$SSOLFDWLRQRIWZRIDFWRUIRUPXODZLWKZHLJKWLQJODERUVDOHV
TA = 0,35 x 1.000.000 ¼[>[[@ ¼
TB = 0,15 x 1.000.000 ¼[>[[@ ¼
total tax liability for X = 290.100 ¼ZKLFKFRUUHVSRQGVWRDQDYHUDJHWD[UDWHRI
$SSOLFDWLRQRIDVDOHVIDFWRUIRUPXOD
TA = 0,35 x 1.000.000 ¼[ ¼
TB = 0,15 x 1.000.000 ¼[ ¼
total tax liability for X = 247.500 ¼ZKLFKFRUUHVSRQGVWRDQDYHUDJHWD[UDWHRI
Scenario 2 "Formula apportionment"
X decides to relocate its manufacturing activities completely to B because of the lower tax rate.
$SSOLFDWLRQRIWZRIDFWRUIRUPXODZLWKHTXDOZHLJKWV
TA = 0,35 x 1.000.000 ¼[>[[@ ¼
TB = 0,15 x 1.000.000 ¼[>[[@ ¼
total tax liability for X = 225.000 ¼ZKLFKFRUUHVSRQGVWRDQDYHUDJHWD[UDWHRI
$SSOLFDWLRQRIWZRIDFWRUIRUPXODZLWKZHLJKWLQJODERUVDOHV
TA = 0,35 x 1.000.000 ¼[>[[@ ¼
TB = 0,15 x 1.000.000 ¼[>[[@ ¼
total tax liability for X = 250.500 ¼ZKLFKFRUUHVSRQGVWRDQDYHUDJHWD[UDWHRI
$SSOLFDWLRQRIDVDOHVIDFWRUIRUPXOD
TA = 0,35 x 1.000.000 ¼[ ¼
TB = 0,15 x 1.000.000 ¼[ ¼
total tax liability for X = 247.500 ¼ZKLFKFRUUHVSRQGVWRDQDYHUDJHWD[UDWHRI
This ‘pro-forma’ example illustrates a number of general features of formula
apportionment, with particular reference to the USA. The choice of formula clearly
influences the distribution of tax base between different tax states. If all states use the
same formula then there is no double or ‘non-‘ taxation, but if different formulae are
used both situations can occur. With common formulae tax competition still exists, but414
only at the level of the rate. With different formulae competition can exist on a number
of levels, as the formulae themselves can be used to attract certain types of business etc.
Labour and capital are relatively easy to ascertain and difficult to manipulate. Sales
figures could in theory be manipulated, perhaps through complex intra group
transactions but, compared to profit shifting in the conventional sense, the amounts
involved would have to be significant. It would therefore be much more easily
identified, for example by using simple analytical auditing techniques rather than
individual transactional testing.
 $OORFDWLRQRQWKH0LFUR/HYHO±µYDOXHDGGHG¶
An alternative to formula apportionment as outlined above would be to base the
allocation on the respective ‘value added’ within each Member State. Although similar
to a profit based approach this has the advantage of additionally including labour costs –
a large and relatively stable base, and excluding financial costs, which removes any
problems associated with thin capitalisation. It is not currently used as a base by any of
the countries who use apportionment formulae, but this is probably due to the simple
fact that without a ‘VAT’ system in place (as is the case for example in the USA) the
data would be difficult and expensive to collect. This is not the case in the EU where
value added is a familiar concept and ‘VAT’ data extensively recorded and collected.
Such an approach might create difficulties for those groups with permanent
establishments and branches outside the EU who do not routinely collect such data, but
this point of detail would only affect a minority of enterprises and would not arise if
these were excluded. Moreover, some sector-specific issues would occur, for instance in
the banking and insurance sector as financial services are usually exempt from VAT.
More importantly certain adjustments would be required to the existing VAT data. The
treatment of imports and exports196 would have to change (include exports, exclude
imports) and the concept of depreciation would have to be introduced in place of
immediate deductions for capital investments. An origin based system, rather than the
current transitional destination system would be required which might have implications
for VAT itself.
However, these alterations should not necessitate additional information requirements,
rather existing information is presented in a different manner. Given the size of the
value added base manipulation via transfer pricing would be more difficult and easier to
detect.
 $OORFDWLRQRQWKH0DFUR/HYHO
Other possible methods are more ‘macro’ based and generally break the link between
the individual enterprises and the allocation process. Instead of seeking enterprise
specific allocation keys the computed EU tax base would be allocated in proportion to
economic data at the level of the Member State. The national VAT base, adapted as
necessary, could be used or even the national Gross Domestic Product. Such indicators
have the advantage of being generally available on a reasonably standard basis but for
comprehensive approaches which retain the concept of individual Member State
                                                
196  Under the 6
th VAT Directive these are known as ‘Intra Community Acquisitions and Sales’415
corporate taxes, rather than a single EU tax, they create difficulties when tax rates vary
widely across the EU.
The enterprise would no longer have the compliance responsibility of providing the key
data and the allocation of its tax base across different Member States would be fixed by
reference to factors outside its control. Similarly individual Member States’ share of
enterprise’s tax bases, and hence ultimately tax revenues, would be partially determined
by the economic performance of other Member States. The link between the tax payer
and the taxing authority would be severed. Whereas this might be appropriate under an
approach requiring a significant degree of harmonisation between Member States it
seems out of keeping with an approach based on mutual recognition, where Member
States retain a higher degree of individual responsibility for their own tax codes. Indeed,
allocation at such a macro level might really only be appropriate if it were the tax itself
which was being allocated, in which case such a macro level allocation implies a
common rate of tax.
There are precedents for these types of ‘macro’ economic indicators being used to share
resources between Member States, for example part of the contributions to the
Community’s ‘own resources’ are computed in this way, but they tend to involve wider
issues than just taxation policy. Within the EU the percentage of total taxes raised by
Member States’ corporate tax systems varies quite considerably. This could create
additional difficulties because, in effect, the proportion of each Member State’s taxation
revenues dependent on other Member State’s economic performance would vary
accordingly.
 (&2120,& ())(&76 $1' 7+( 5(68/76 2) 7+( 48$17,7$7,9( $1$/<6,6
6,08/$7,216
The economic effects of introducing a comprehensive system are particularly difficult to
quantify. Even without the variables associated with the range of possible approaches
and the range of methods of introducing them, a precise quantification is beyond the
scope of the current analysis. However, one can usefully identify the areas where the
economic effects are likely to be felt and, in conjunction with the quantitative analysis in
Part II, suggest what the possible effects may be.
 %DVHFRVWV
In order to understand what the economic effects might be one must first understand the
current position. As regards the level of costs, although theoretically Member States
should be in a position to compute the costs of administering their current tax regimes,
the position is more complicated for business. The above section on compliance costs
explains the current situation as far as it can be established, and touches upon the vexed
question of whether or not tax compliance should be considered together with, or
separately from, the costs associated with tax planning.
In relation to both these measures one may also assume that the introduction of a
comprehensive approach, representing as it would a new system, would incur some
transitional ‘learning’ or ‘set up’ costs as administrations and enterprises re-organised
themselves. To what extent the costs of any subsequent corporate restructuring which416
took place as a response to the changes should be considered as compliance costs or
planning costs would again be subject to  debate.
Instinctively one would expect the costs to enterprises of dealing with a reduced number
of fiscal returns, and a reduced number of tax systems, to be lower than the costs of
potentially dealing with fifteen. Similarly, particularly if legitimate planning costs are
included, one would expect the proportional reduction in costs to be greater for small
and medium-sized enterprises than large multinational corporations, since part of the
compliance costs are more ‘fixed’ than variable, and for planning purposes the costs of
establishing a particular group structure are broadly similar regardless of the size of the
specific investment involved.
Although the level of existing costs for administrations should be more readily
available, predicting future costs is rather more difficult. To the extent that international
issues such as transfer pricing within the EU require resources, there should be some
savings although any additional auditing arising from Home State issues or the
allocation process would have to be taken into account in assessing any net benefit.
 5HGLVWULEXWLRQRIWD[UHYHQXHVEHWZHHQ0HPEHU6WDWHV
The current distribution of taxable profits of enterprises between Member States is the
result of the current business activity, as measured by separate accounting based on the
arms length principle. Under approaches such as Home State Taxation or a Common
(Consoldiated) Base, the base would be redistributed in accordance with a formula as
explained above. The translation from tax base to tax revenue would be the result of the
Member State’s chosen tax rate. Under European Company Income Tax this freedom to
set the rate could in theory be lost if a common rate were established, and it would be
the tax revenues rather than the tax base that were subject to allocation.
A distribution based on a formula would inevitably create differences, which, depending
on the proportion of total taxes raised by individual Member States from company
taxation, could have greater or lesser implications for the respective Member States. To
the extent that the allocation system produced a ‘fairer’ or more correct allocation than
the existing method, one could argue that the change was merely corrective. However,
regardless of the ‘correctness’ of any redistribution, Member States would still have to
deal with the change.
As mentioned above it has been suggested that, under Common (Consolidated) Base,
Member States experiencing large variations in the tax base as a result of the
introduction of a comprehensive approach could apply a different rate of tax to those
adopting a new approach (whilst maintaining its ‘normal rate’ for those enterprises not
using the new approach) for a transitional period. However, in the longer run once the
tax base has been harmonised (or is sufficiently similar to be part of a mutual
recognition approach) if a Member State is not satisfied more permanent measures
would have to be adopted. In the absence of tax rate harmonisation it would therefore be
via the rate that a Member State could seek to raise its tax revenues. Depending on an
individual Member State’s position, and the underlying reason for its low allocation, it
could either raise its tax rate in the hope that it could retain a ‘non mobile’ base or
decrease its rate to attract an increased mobile tax base. Such an approach would not be
so very different from the situation today, but it would clearly be more transparent, and
therefore provide a more open ‘non-harmful’ form of tax competition. Obviously the417
effect of any allocation system would have to be extensively modelled prior to its
introduction in order for each Member State to understand the full implications.
 4XDQWLWDWLYH $QDO\VLV 6LPXODWLRQV ± UHOHYDQFH IRU &RPSUHKHQVLYH
$SSURDFKHV
In Part II of this study effective rates of company taxation based on a series of
hypothetical investments and model firm behaviour are analysed in detail with particular
focus on overall economic efficiency, as measured by the dispersion of rates for
different investments in, to, and from the Member States.
Notwithstanding the limitations associated with drawing conclusions from hypothetical
models and applying them to specific examples beyond the scope of the models (which
are well documented in Part II) two particular aspects of the analysis are especially
relevant to a discussion of the comprehensive approaches.
·  The extension of the basic analysis to cover the effective average rate of tax
(EATR), beyond the traditional effective marginal rate of tax (EMTR) or cost of
capital;
·  The simulation of various structural changes to the underlying tax calculations, in
particular the simulations197 concerning a common base and an approximation of
Home State Taxation.
Using the EATR enables different levels of pre-tax profitability to be modelled, at levels
which are closer to those actually achieved by existing enterprises. Modelling some of
the structural changes inherent in the comprehensive approaches creates for the first
time some indicative quantitative data. The analysis is partial because no account is
taken of any benefits (or costs) accruing to administrations or enterprises from, for
example, reduced compliance costs. More significantly, it does not include loss
compensation or full consolidation, and it cannot model the benefits flowing from a
resolution of many of the obstacles arising from transfer pricing. Nevertheless it gives
an indication of possible impacts of comprehensive approaches.
Under the base case and the sensitivity tests at pre-tax profit levels of 20% and above,
the effective rate in most Member States is close to the statutory rate. On average for the
EU an enterprise with pre tax profitability of 20% could estimate its tax liability with
95% accuracy if it simply applied the statutory rate, rising to 98% accuracy at 40%.
Although this calculation is based on the domestic rather than cross border case there is
no reason to believe that extending the model would give radically different results. The
implication is that on average the statutory rate is a major determinant of the effective
rate.
The simulations, applied to cross border cases, confirm this. Although the primary aim
of the simulation concerning a common base (simulated by equalising the depreciation
rules) is to measure the dispersion of rates and thereby estimate deviations from capital
import and export neutrality it also illustrates that the EU average EATR remains very
                                                
197 The objective of the sensitivity tests and the simulations is explained in Part II of this study –
essentially they seek to establish the respective influences of different aspects of the tax code on
the observed dispersions.418
similar when the bases are aligned. This is in marked contrast to the simulation where
rates are equalised and where, not surprisingly, the EATR falls when a rate below the
current arithmetical mean is applied.
The simulation along the lines of Home State Taxation also illustrates the likely primacy
of rate, rather than base as a determinant of the EATR, in that the EU average EATR
remains similar to the base case. The most striking effect is found in the increased
dispersion of effective rates (assuming unchanged statutory rates) indicating a
movement further away from capital import and export neutrality due in part to the
effective removal of interest deductibility.198 However, in addition to the significant
factors mentioned above, which it has not been possible to include in the model, there is
a specific Home State Taxation feature which could not be modelled. Home State
Taxation is conceived as a pragmatic response to the existing problems related to cross
border trade, but a relatively high degree of similarity between tax systems is a
prerequisite for participation. The model is not designed to judge which Member States
are ‘ready’ for mutual recognition and accordingly all Member States have been
included.
If the hypothetical manufacturing investment example is representative there are a
number of implications for comprehensive approaches. On an EU level, their
introduction need not dramatically change the overall level of corporate taxation since
the EATR is primarily determined by the tax rate. If the rates remained unchanged in
each Member State, the implication is that the elements of the approaches relating to the
tax base would be relatively tax neutral. However, because of the limited nature of the
model as outlined above199, many of the benefits of comprehensive approaches are not
captured and are therefore not included in the quantitative analysis.
Neither is the impact of the allocation method measured in the quantitative analysis and
for individual Member States this is potentially material. Whereas common rules for,
say, depreciation would seem to have little impact (because for the most part they are
broadly similar already), redistributing the actual profits between Member States with
different rates would alter the level of overall taxation. The model effectively assumes
the distribution remains unchanged but, depending on the formulae chosen there are
likely to be some changes.
                                                
198 See Part II of this study for fuller explanation
199 As discussed in Part II a second model, the ‘Tax Analyzer’ was also used which followed the
‘model firm’ approach rather than the ‘model investment’ approach and which covered more
aspects of the tax base, for five Member States. By comparing the results of a simulation prepared
according to the normal tax rules for calculating the tax base of each Member State, and one
prepared where each Member State used the rules of the International Accounting Standards (IAS),
it was possible to identify the specific effect of each individual Member State’s tax rules. Where
the two results are similar it suggests that the two bases are similar; and furthermore it suggests
Member States who have similar results when comparing the two bases could implement either
Home State Taxation, or a Common Base close to IAS. The results suggest that the tax rules for
determining bases in Germany, Ireland, NL and UK are close to IAS, and they are therefore similar
to each other. However, the rules in France are rather different from IAS and therefore including
France in a Home State Group, or in a Common Base ‘group’ close to IAS would be problematic.
However, although Tax Analyzer includes more items from the tax base it only covers 5 Member
States, and like the IFS ‘model investment’ model it cannot take into account such features as
consolidation, transfer pricing simplification and formula apportionment etc so these simulations
cannot give definitive results concerning the comprehensive approaches.419
It follows that, in addition to the issues concerning general capital import and export
neutrality and economic efficiency (covered in Part II), the quantitative analysis suggests
that the main issues concerning comprehensive approaches are not related to mutual
recognition versus harmonisation, or the precise format of any new tax code introduced,
but the allocation method itself and the more general question of individual Member
State tax rates and tax rate differentials.
 &21&/86,216
At the beginning of this section the main objectives for a comprehensive approach were
identified as the provision to companies of one set of rules, regulations and legislation,
and a simpler mechanism for the allocation of profits and losses from the starting point
of a single or common harmonised base.
A compulsory Harmonised Tax Base would satisfy the first test and would represent
what each Member State has effectively introduced independently for domestic
purposes. An entity which operates within a single Member State faces as a general rule
a single tax system and, by analogy, a single tax system for the Internal Market is simply
an extension of the best practice implemented in each of the 15 Member States.
However, even within individual Member States, this sometimes gives rise to debates
concerning the needs of different regions and areas etc, and it is recognised that such an
approach does not correspond to the current level of institutional development within
the EU.
An approach based on mutual recognition such as Home State Taxation may be more
realistic and, if it appears that a large number of as yet unanswered questions have been
raised, this is partly due to the fact that more detail concerning this approach is
available. One could perhaps envisage, after further research, it eventually being
extended to a trial group of small and medium-sized enterprises within certain Member
States with similar tax legislation in an attempt to resolve some of their practical
problems and gain some experience of how it would work in practice. The particular
benefits for such enterprises would stem from the simplicity of retaining a single tax
system, while the risks to Member State revenues could be acceptable. Indeed if Home
State Taxation applied initially only to small and medium-sized enterprises it might be
possible to consider its introduction without an immediate allocation formula given the
small proportion of corporate tax revenues that these enterprises represent. Enterprises
incorporated under the European Company Statute would form another logical grouping
for any trial.
It is more difficult to form conclusions on approaches based on a single or common
harmonised base since they have not been developed in such detail. However, given that
all Member States are committed to exploiting the opportunities of the Internal Market
to the maximum, there is certainly a case for continuing and extending the research into
these possibilities.
The search for a simpler mechanism for the allocation of profits and losses is a logical
response, given business and market developments, and there are examples of different
approaches being used by tax administrations. However, the two examples mentioned,
USA and Canada, have one fundamental distinctive feature in comparison to a possible420
EU system. In each case they have both a national (federal) tax and a local tax or taxes
(USA-State and Canada-Province)
The implications of this are important because in the EU context the allocation is
assumed to be for the purposes of a single tax within each Member State. The current
tax rates in the EU which would be applicable to the allocated tax bases range from 10%
to over 40%. The comparable state rates for the USA are 0% to 12%, which because
they are deductible for federal tax purposes (which is charged at the rate of 34%) are
effectively reduced to between 0% to 8%. A maximum of 19% of an enterprise’s overall
tax charge (made up of federal at 34% plus state tax charge at 8%) is therefore based on
allocated profits. For Canada the provincial tax rates are between 14% and 17%, and
these are additional to the federal tax (charged at 29%). A maximum of 37% of an
enterprise’s overall tax charge (federal 29% plus provincial tax charge at 17%) is
therefore based on allocated profits.
Comparing the USA and Canada could suggest that the more standardised the formulae,
the higher the proportion of tax it is reasonable to levy on profits allocated by formula as
opposed to the arms length principle. The USA is relatively non standardised – and only
up to 19% of the tax is based on ‘formula’ profits. Canada is reasonably standardised –
and up to 37% of the tax is based on ‘formula’ profits. One could conclude therefore
that in the hypothetical EU example - 100% of the corporate tax collected based on
‘formula’ profits, a very high level of standardisation in the formulae applied would be
required – perhaps a single set of formulae applicable across the EU.
Comparisons and an evaluation of the appropriateness of particular formulae have to
take this into account. Whereas ‘imperfections’ or uncertainties may be acceptable when
the rate of tax to be levied on the allocated base is relatively low in proportion to the
total tax, when it is the whole of the tax, which at current rates in the EU can be up to
40% of profits, the allocation system would have to be very robust. It would have to be
based on common definitions, with the accent on simplicity, and ease of availability
from existing records.
The fact that in the USA and Canada only a proportion of an enterprise’s tax is
determined by a formal apportionment of the tax base highlights another relevant issue.
Whether a minimum rate of tax would be required to avoid a ‘race to the bottom’ is an
open issue but in any consideration of the USA and Canada one should take into
account that the federal tax in both countries effectively functions as a minimum tax.
Part I outlined the general economic principles upon which any ‘ideal’ company tax
system has to based under the headings of i) equity, ii) efficiency, iii) simplicity,
certainty and transparency, and iv) effectiveness. It also considered the economic
welfare aspects of company taxation systems on the basis that, broadly speaking, if a tax
system satisfies some or all these principles then it should contribute to more EU
welfare. The resolution of each of the obstacles identified in Part IV of this study is
founded upon the assumption that this is in line with the principles and therefore also a
step towards improving EU welfare. However, it is useful to conclude a review of the
comprehensive approaches by revisiting these, sometimes contradictory, basic principles
to consider to what extent they are satisfied.421
 (TXLW\
The vertical equity dimension, described as the capacity to operate a distribution of the
tax burden among taxpayers according to their ability to contribute, is satisfied by the
comprehensive approaches to the extent that the determination of the tax base is
considered to be equitable. The method of apportionment therefore has to be accepted as
at least as ‘fair’ as the current separate accounting method. Although some supporters of
Home State Taxation have expressed a preference for an allocation based on ‘value
added’, the different possibilities have not been examined in sufficient depth in this
report to reach any firm conclusion on the most appropriate formula. To this extent there
is little to distinguish the different comprehensive approaches. The weaknesses of
separate accounting have been described in some depth but at this stage it is not possible
to measure the benefits of a switch to a formula approach. Accordingly no firm
conclusions can be reached regarding this aspect of equity.
The treatment of the three principles of inter-country equity: source country entitlement,
non discrimination and reciprocity is also to a certain extent determined by the use of an
allocation system rather than separate accounting. The comprehensive approaches
effectively re-interpret the source country entitlement by redefining the source. An
allocation formula for example, with the emphasis on labour costs, favours as the source
country the one with the highest labour costs. It is easier to demonstrate that the
comprehensive approaches satisfy the principles of non discrimination and reciprocity as
they are based on these two principles. However, whereas Home State Taxation is more
explicitly ‘reciprocal’ in that the whole concept is based on mutual recognition, it is not
so clear whether it satisfies the non-discrimination principle, as competing enterprises
could be subject to different rules for establishing their tax base. To a certain extent this
potential problem is present under any comprehensive approach where some enterprises
are within the system, and some outside, although where this is the result of choice it is
perhaps of less importance.
 (IILFLHQF\
One of the main objectives of the comprehensive approaches is to render tax as a factor
in the investment decision as neutral as possible. By providing enterprises with a single
method of calculating their tax, this could in theory be achieved. However, when the
rate is set by the individual Member States, as would be the case in all the
comprehensive approaches mentioned, with the possible exception of one variant of the
European Union Company Income Tax, then inefficiencies in this context between
Member States could remain. The fact that most of the harmonised approaches involve
the operation in parallel of the existing domestic systems and the new harmonised
system also needs to be taken into account. The possibility of a Member State
addressing a specific perceived failure in the market, which can at present be achieved
via a tax incentive applied as an adjustment to the tax base, would disappear. The only
mechanism for such corrective adjustments would be via the rate, which would be more
transparent, and therefore perhaps reduce the risk of unfair or unwarranted incentives
being introduced.
The exception to the above is Home State Taxation, which because it potentially
involves competing enterprises being taxed according to different bases maintains the
possibility of differentials. However, it should be emphasised that mutual recognition
requires a relatively high level of similarity between different participating Member422
State tax codes, in which case the differences should be minimised in comparison to the
situation today. However, the comments concerning corrective action to address failures
in the market remain valid, as any changes in the base, to the extent that other
participating members permitted them, would apply across the Home State group.
By definition the concept of Capital Import Neutrality is harder to satisfy under Home
State Taxation than under comprehensive approaches based on the harmonisation
principle. Investors in a particular Member State would not necessarily face the same
after tax rate of return on similar investments, because their tax base would be
determined on the basis of their ‘Home’ State rules. Conversely Capital Export
Neutrality, via a Home State enterprise, at least as far as the tax base is concerned,
should be satisfied, as investment into another Home State would be on the same terms
as domestic investment.
 (IIHFWLYHQHVV
The effectiveness of a given tax system depends on its ability to achieve its objectives,
to generate the necessary revenues and set the desired incentives. These are in part
linked to its interactions with other tax systems. Although under Home State Taxation
there remain a number of different bases, since these are linked in such a way that they
cannot be altered without agreement amongst the members of the group, they would
operate in a similar way to a single system. The ‘other’ tax systems under
comprehensive approaches would therefore, under Home State Taxation, be those of
non-participants in the EU and non EU countries. Under a harmonised approach, they
would be the remaining national systems to the extent that they remain and those of non
EU countries.
The objectives of a comprehensive approach are similar to those of the existing systems,
with the added aim of removing the obstacles as identified. However the introduction of
a new approach, principally the allocation method, could change the distribution of
income between participating EU states and impact on interactions with other tax
systems. However, these could be considered to be implementation issues rather than
ongoing ones. As regards the raising of revenues by individual Member States there
would still remain the possibility to influence this by way of the rate.
 6LPSOLFLW\FHUWDLQW\DQGWUDQVSDUHQF\
Any new approach to taxation obviously involves complexity and hence costs in its
implementation. Once established, the comprehensive approaches should achieve a
greater degree of simplicity although within the EU as a whole the addition of a tax
system, rather than the withdrawal of an old system and its replacement with a new one,
will tend to add complexity. Hence one can quite easily compare Home State Taxation
(15), Common (Consolidated) Base (15+1), and a compulsory harmonised base (1).
Home State Taxation appears simpler to operate than the other approaches because it
relies on existing tax codes, and therefore it should also achieve a higher degree of
certainty. The benefits of being able to retain each Member State’s existing tax
legislation and judicial precedents for interpretation should not be underestimated;
although participating Member States would be required in effect to extend their mutual
recognition to aspects of legal practice in addition to the underlying tax codes. In
contrast a new tax system, a new tax base potentially creates a high degree of423
uncertainty as to how it will operate in practice and how the courts will interpret its
application.
Whether the comprehensive approaches would contribute to transparency is difficult to
judge since it depends to a certain extent on the simplicity and certainty issues. At one
extreme a compulsory harmonised base, once established, should be the simplest, the
most certain and also the most transparent. However, the more pragmatic Home State
Taxation could be considered to start off as more transparent to the extent that it builds
on the existing systems, rather than a new untried, untested system. This transparency
could also be considered to be simply short-term predictability, whereas, for example, a
new common base, after an initial learning period, could in fact provide greater genuine
transparency.
The question of simplicity, certainty and transparency as applied to the allocation
process depends on the final format of any agreed process. When designing the process
one would aim at all three objectives, but potentially one could end up with an
extremely complex, uncertain, opaque system. However, potentially it could be an
improvement of the existing method of allocation, namely separate accounting.
 (FRQRPLF:HOIDUH
To varying degrees the comprehensive approaches meet some or all of the above criteria
and therefore should contribute to increased EU welfare. To the extent that the obstacles
are resolved, this is self-evident but, as outlined above, the introduction of any of the
comprehensive approaches assumes that certain obstacles are specifically addressed in
either the agreement to establish Home State Taxation or the design of any new
common or harmonised base. Potentially the welfare costs of inefficient resource
allocation due to varying effective tax rates across the EU would remain, to the extent
that differences in rates remained sufficiently large to influence investment location.
However, since the effective rates would be more transparent, particularly in the case of
a harmonised approach, such influences should be less than today and would be harder
to maintain in a competitive environment. The benefits in terms of reduced compliance
costs should over time be significant, provided that the costs of the allocation process
are reasonable.
From a pure efficiency point of view, a uniform EU-wide system would be better than
improvements to the current systems. Accordingly, a harmonised ‘comprehensive’
approach would be better for economic welfare but taxation ultimately involves a
political choice. The current fifteen separate tax systems were conceived when there
were fifteen separate national markets but as the Internal Market develops the concept of
a common ‘comprehensive’ approach to taxation demands examination. This section of
Part IV does not seek to promote any particular approach, but rather to contribute to the
debate and to identify areas for further review and analysis to enable the political choice
to be made. There are potentially very significant benefits to be derived from a
comprehensive solution and much could be gained from extending the debate to a wider
range of interested parties./,672)$11(;(6
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